Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

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Gerald Silver filed a putative class action against the City of Albuquerque, alleging that the City violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by making pre-recorded phone calls to invite residents to virtual town hall meetings during the COVID-19 pandemic. Silver claimed he received at least seven such calls on his cell phone. The City argued that it was not subject to the TCPA as it was not a "person" under the statute and that the calls fell under the TCPA’s emergency purposes exception.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted the City’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the calls fell within the emergency purposes exception of the TCPA. The court did not address whether the City was a "person" under the TCPA. Silver appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that even assuming the TCPA applies to local governments, Silver’s complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court found that the calls were made by a local government official, were informational, and were made necessary by the COVID-19 pandemic to inform residents about virtual town hall meetings, which were a mitigation measure in response to the pandemic. Therefore, the calls fell within the TCPA’s emergency purposes exception. The court did not need to determine whether local governments qualify as persons under the TCPA. View "Silver v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

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Rory M. Isaac and Kimberly J. Isaac, buyers in a residential real estate transaction, sued the sellers' real estate agent, Laura Kopchynski, for failing to disclose high moisture levels in the crawl space and mischaracterizing a wood infestation report as "good." The Isaacs claimed fraud, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and violation of the South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Kopchynski on all claims. The Isaacs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment on the negligent misrepresentation and Disclosure Act claims, while affirming the summary judgment on the fraud and civil conspiracy claims. Kopchynski then petitioned for certiorari.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the Isaacs' agent did not rely on Kopchynski's statement about the June CL-100 report being "good" and that the Isaacs had a duty to inspect the property themselves. Therefore, the Isaacs could not establish justifiable reliance, a necessary element for negligent misrepresentation. The Court also held that the South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act does not create a private cause of action against real estate licensees, only against property owners.The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Kopchynski on both the negligent misrepresentation and Disclosure Act claims. View "Isaac v. Kopchynski" on Justia Law

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Tina McPherson purchased a car from Suburban Ann Arbor, a Michigan car dealership, in July 2020. She was misled into believing she had been approved for financing, paid a $2,000 down payment, and drove the car home. Later, she was informed that the financing had fallen through and was given the option to sign a new contract with worse terms or return the car. McPherson refused the new terms, and Suburban repossessed the car and kept her down payment and fees. McPherson sued Suburban, alleging violations of state and federal consumer protection laws.A federal jury found Suburban liable for statutory conversion under Michigan law and violations of the Michigan Regulation of Collection Practices Act, among other claims. The jury awarded McPherson $15,000 in actual damages, $23,000 for the value of the converted property, and $350,000 in punitive damages. The district court denied McPherson's request for treble damages but awarded her $418,995 in attorney’s fees, $11,212.61 in costs, and $6,433.65 in prejudgment interest, totaling $824,641.26. McPherson appealed the denial of treble damages and the amount of attorney’s fees awarded, while Suburban cross-appealed the fee award as excessive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying treble damages, as the $350,000 punitive damages already served to punish and deter Suburban's conduct. The court also found that the district court properly calculated the attorney’s fees, considering the market rates and the skill of McPherson’s attorneys. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "McPherson v. Suburban Ann Arbor, LLC" on Justia Law

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John and Deena Dostart were awarded $182,408.30 in compensatory damages and $17,591.70 in exemplary damages by a jury for consumer fraud claims against their general contractor, Tyler Custom Homes, Ltd., and its owner, James Harmeyer. Columbia Insurance Group, which provided a commercial-general-liability (CGL) insurance policy to Tyler Custom Homes, declined to indemnify the judgment, arguing that consumer fraud is excluded from coverage under the CGL policy. Unable to collect directly from Tyler Custom Homes or Harmeyer, the Dostarts filed a suit seeking payment of the unsatisfied judgment from Columbia.The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted Columbia's motion for summary judgment regarding the exemplary damages but found that fact questions existed as to whether the consumer fraud was an "occurrence" under the CGL policy, whether the jury's award was for "property damage," and whether the intentional acts exclusion applied. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, noting the lack of evidence about the underlying dispute beyond the verdict form and jury instructions.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the consumer fraud involved in the underlying action is not a covered "occurrence" under the CGL policy and that the alleged harm does not include covered "property damage" as defined in the policy. The court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversed the district court's ruling, and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Columbia. The court emphasized that defective workmanship or failure to complete construction does not constitute an "occurrence" under a CGL policy and that the damages sought were not for "property damage" as contemplated by the policy. View "Dostart v. Columbia Insurance Group" on Justia Law

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Roxann Brown and Michelle Smith filed a lawsuit against Old Navy, alleging that the retailer sent them e-mails with subject lines containing false or misleading information about the duration of promotions, in violation of the "Commercial Electronic Mail Act" (CEMA). The plaintiffs claimed that Old Navy's e-mails falsely suggested that promotions were ending or were limited-time offers, which were extended beyond the specified time limits.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reviewed the case and certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of RCW 19.190.020(1)(b). The federal court sought clarification on whether the statute prohibits any false or misleading information in the subject lines of commercial e-mails or only false or misleading information about the commercial nature of the message.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the certified question de novo and concluded that RCW 19.190.020(1)(b) prohibits the use of any false or misleading information in the subject line of a commercial e-mail, not just information about the commercial nature of the message. The court emphasized that the statute's plain language is clear and unambiguous, and it does not require judicial construction. The court also noted that the statute's focus on subject lines is appropriate and does not lead to absurd results. The court held that mere puffery, which includes subjective statements, opinions, and hyperbole, is not prohibited by the statute. The court's decision clarifies that commercial e-mails sent to Washington residents must have truthful and non-misleading subject lines. View "Brown v. Old Navy, LLC" on Justia Law

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Jina Garcia received treatment from St. Anthony North Hospital, operated by Centura Health Corporation, following a motor vehicle accident. Garcia informed the hospital that she had Medicare and Medicaid coverage and that her automobile insurance carrier was Progressive Insurance. Centura asserted a hospital lien against Garcia for $2,170.35 without billing Medicare first. Garcia filed a class action lawsuit against Centura, alleging violations of the hospital lien statute by filing liens before billing Medicare, seeking damages of twice the amount of the asserted liens.The District Court of the City and County of Denver certified a class and ordered Garcia to respond to substantial discovery requests from Centura. Garcia objected, arguing the requests were irrelevant, overbroad, and violated her privacy. The district court required Garcia to provide much of the requested discovery. Garcia sought relief from the Colorado Supreme Court, which issued an order to show cause and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to determine the relevance and proportionality of the discovery requests.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case again and concluded that the district court abused its discretion in ordering Garcia to respond to the discovery requests. The court found that the discovery sought by Centura was not relevant to the claims or defenses in the case and was not proportional to the needs of the case. The court emphasized that the principal factual issues were whether Centura asserted liens without billing Medicare and the amount of those liens. The court made its order to show cause absolute and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Garcia v. Centura Health Corp." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs created accounts on justanswer.com and paid to ask questions. According to JustAnswer's Terms of Service, paying for answers automatically enrolled plaintiffs in a recurring monthly subscription. Plaintiffs alleged that JustAnswer violated the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and various state consumer protection laws by enrolling them in the subscription service without their consent and making cancellation difficult. JustAnswer sought to compel arbitration based on a provision in its Terms of Service, asserting that plaintiffs were put on inquiry notice of those terms and agreed to arbitrate any claims arising from their use of the site.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied JustAnswer's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that plaintiffs did not receive sufficient notice of JustAnswer's Terms of Service containing the arbitration clause, and thus no contract was formed. The court found that the payment pages and other advisals presented to plaintiffs were not sufficiently conspicuous to put them on inquiry notice of the terms, and the advisals did not explicitly inform users that clicking a button would constitute assent to the terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The Ninth Circuit concluded that no contracts were formed between plaintiffs and JustAnswer under an inquiry theory of notice. The court held that the website did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms, and the advisals did not unambiguously manifest the plaintiffs' assent to those terms. Therefore, plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration provision in JustAnswer's Terms of Service, and the motion to compel arbitration was denied. View "GODUN V. JUSTANSWER LLC" on Justia Law

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In 1982, Lesley Phillips purchased an apartment in Cambridge, Massachusetts, assuming a preexisting mortgage. Phillips' spouse, Linda Pinti, was added to the deed in 2005. In 2008, Pinti and Phillips refinanced with a $160,000 promissory note and mortgage from Emigrant Mortgage Company (EMC). They defaulted on the note in 2009, and EMC initiated foreclosure proceedings. In 2012, EMC mistakenly issued a discharge of the mortgage, which Pinti recorded in 2015 after a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision voided the foreclosure sale.EMC filed a federal action in 2016 to strike the discharge, but the court dismissed it, ruling EMC was not the mortgagee. Emigrant Residential, LLC (Emigrant) then filed a new action in 2019. The district court granted summary judgment for Emigrant, striking the discharge and rejecting Pinti's counterclaims. Pinti appealed, contesting the district court's rulings on standing, the discharge, unclean hands, restoration to the status quo, and her Chapter 93A claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Emigrant had standing as the holder of the note, which was sufficient under Article III. The court found no genuine dispute that the discharge was a mistake, supported by EMC's policies and the fact that the note was never returned to Pinti. The court also ruled that Emigrant was entitled to equitable relief, rejecting Pinti's arguments of unclean hands and the inability to restore the status quo. Finally, the court upheld the dismissal of Pinti's Chapter 93A claim as time-barred. View "Emigrant Residential LLC v. Pinti" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff AirDoctor, LLC, sells air purifiers and replacement air filters, while Defendant Xiamen Qichuang Trade Co., Ltd., sells replacement air filters primarily through Amazon.com. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant falsely advertised its air filters as compatible with Plaintiff’s air purifiers and offering equivalent filtration, which diverted sales from Plaintiff and harmed its reputation. Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging violations of the Lanham Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, and California’s False Advertising Law, seeking various forms of relief, including actual damages to be determined at trial, attorney’s fees, and an injunction.The United States District Court for the Central District of California entered default judgment in favor of Plaintiff after Defendant failed to appear or respond. However, the district court denied Plaintiff’s request for actual damages, reasoning that awarding damages would exceed what was demanded in the pleadings under Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as the Complaint did not specify an amount of damages sought. The district court also denied attorney’s fees based on its local rules, which tied fees to the amount of damages awarded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Rule 54(c) does not prohibit awarding actual damages in a default judgment when the pleadings sought such damages in an amount to be determined at trial. The court referenced its decision in Henry v. Sneiders, which allowed for damages to be awarded even if the exact amount was not specified in the complaint. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of damages and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "AirDoctor, LLC v. Xiamen Qichuang Trade Co., Ltd" on Justia Law

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Barrie Myers was seriously injured in an automobile crash shortly after midnight on November 30, 2018. Nasar Khan, who had been drinking at Cadot Restaurant in Dallas, rear-ended Myers’s vehicle. Khan’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.139, well above the legal limit. The record, however, leaves many facts about the evening unclear, including how much alcohol Khan consumed and how long he was at the restaurant and Jones’s home before the crash.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Cadot Restaurant, concluding that Myers produced no evidence to establish that it was apparent to Cadot that Khan was obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented a clear danger when served. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed, holding that a fact issue existed based on Khan’s deposition concessions about his appearance and demeanor at Cadot.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with the trial court. The court held that the evidence presented by Myers required impermissible inferences upon inferences to establish how Khan may have appeared when served. The court emphasized that the Texas Dram Shop Act requires proof that it was apparent to the provider that the customer was obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented a clear danger. The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including Khan’s BAC and expert testimony, was insufficient to establish this fact. The court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Myers’s motion for continuance. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Cadot. View "Raoger Corp. v. Myers" on Justia Law