Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

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In 2018, Marriott announced a data breach affecting the guest reservation database of Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, which Marriott had acquired in 2016. The breach exposed personal information of approximately 133.7 million guests, including some payment card information. Plaintiffs filed class action lawsuits against Marriott and Accenture, a third-party IT service provider for Starwood and Marriott during the breach. The cases were consolidated for pretrial proceedings in the District of Maryland.The district court initially certified multiple state-specific damages classes against Marriott and issue classes against both Marriott and Accenture. However, the court did not address the effect of a class-action waiver in the Starwood Preferred Guest Program (SPG) contract, which Marriott argued precluded class certification. The Fourth Circuit vacated the class certification, instructing the district court to consider the class-action waiver's impact.On remand, the district court again certified the classes, holding that Marriott had waived its right to enforce the class-action waiver by participating in multidistrict litigation (MDL) and by agreeing to pretrial proceedings in Maryland, contrary to the SPG contract's venue and choice-of-law provisions. The court also suggested that the class-action waiver might be unenforceable under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Marriott did not waive its right to enforce the class-action waiver and that the waiver was valid and enforceable. The court found that the waiver applied to the plaintiffs' claims, including consumer protection and negligence claims, as they were related to the SPG Program. Consequently, the court reversed the certification of all classes against Marriott and the issue classes against Accenture, as the latter were justified only in combination with the Marriott damages classes. View "Maldini v. Marriott International, Incorporated" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Khalilah Suluki alleged that her mother, Khadijah Suluki, committed identity theft by opening several credit card accounts in her name without permission, including an account with Credit One Bank, N.A. Upon discovering the alleged fraud, Suluki disputed the account with Credit One and the three major national credit reporting agencies (CRAs). Credit One investigated the dispute multiple times and concluded that the account was legitimate and belonged to Suluki. Suluki filed suit, claiming that Credit One violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to conduct a reasonable investigation into her dispute.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Credit One. The court concluded that, regardless of the reasonableness of Credit One's investigation, no reasonable investigation required by the statute would have yielded a different result. The court also found that Suluki did not present any triable issues of fact regarding whether Credit One willfully or negligently violated the FCRA to be liable for damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the accuracy of the information reported and the reasonableness of Credit One's investigations. However, it concluded that no reasonable investigation would have led Credit One to determine that the account was fraudulent or that the information was unverifiable. The court also determined that Suluki could not recover damages because she did not present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Credit One willfully or negligently violated the FCRA. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Suluki v. Credit One Bank, NA" on Justia Law

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M.G. received health care coverage through Medi-Cal and was treated by Dameron Hospital Association (Dameron) after an automobile accident. Dameron required M.G. or her representative to sign a conditions of admissions (COA) form, which included an assignment of benefits (AOB) clause. This clause assigned to Dameron the right to direct payment of uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM) benefits from M.G.'s automobile insurance policy with Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (Progressive). Dameron sought payment from Progressive for M.G.'s treatment at rates higher than Medi-Cal would pay. Progressive settled a UM claim with M.G. but did not pay Dameron, leading Dameron to sue Progressive for damages, an injunction, and declaratory relief.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County sustained a demurrer to Dameron's complaint without leave to amend, citing collateral estoppel based on a prior decision in Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (Dameron v. AAA). The court found the COA forms to be contracts of adhesion and the AOBs unenforceable, as it was not within the reasonable expectations of patients that a hospital would collect payments for emergency care directly from their UM benefits.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the COAs were contracts of adhesion and that it was not within the reasonable expectations of Medi-Cal patients that their UM benefits would be assigned to the hospital for payment of medical bills at rates higher than Medi-Cal would pay. The court concluded that the AOBs were unenforceable and did not need to address arguments regarding collateral estoppel or the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act. The court also denied Progressive's motion to strike exhibits from Dameron's reply brief. View "Dameron Hospital Assn. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Joshua Naranjo, filed a class action lawsuit against Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc., alleging violations of the unfair competition law (UCL) and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) due to the hospital's practice of charging an undisclosed "Evaluation and Management Services Fee" (EMS Fee) to emergency room patients. Naranjo claimed that the fee was charged without prior notification or agreement, making it an unfair, deceptive, and unlawful practice.The Superior Court of Stanislaus County sustained the hospital's demurrer to each cause of action in Naranjo's first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. Naranjo appealed, and the Court of Appeal initially reversed the judgment, finding that Naranjo had stated valid causes of action under the UCL and CLRA and for declaratory relief. The court also directed the trial court to consider any future motion by Naranjo to amend his FAC to state a breach of contract cause of action.The California Supreme Court granted review and subsequently transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal, directing it to reconsider the matter in light of its ruling in Capito v. San Jose Healthcare System, LP. In Capito, the Supreme Court held that hospitals do not have a duty under the UCL or CLRA to disclose EMS fees to emergency room patients prior to treatment beyond what is required by the statutory and regulatory scheme.Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeal concluded that Naranjo's claims are barred to the extent they are based on an alleged duty to disclose EMS fees prior to treatment. However, the court found that Naranjo had stated a valid contract-based cause of action for declaratory relief and should be allowed to amend his FAC to state causes of action for breach of contract and violations of the UCL and CLRA, subject to specific parameters. The judgment of dismissal was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Naranjo v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc." on Justia Law

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Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, a debt purchaser, filed suits against three consumers, Jeannie Duvall, Allease Riddle, and Lorrena Terry, to collect past-due credit card debts. The consumers counterclaimed, alleging that Portfolio's debt-collection practices violated Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). The superior courts ruled in favor of the consumers on Portfolio's debt-collection claims, finding insufficient admissible evidence to prove Portfolio's ownership of the debts or the amounts owed. The courts also ruled in favor of the consumers on some of their UTPA counterclaims, awarding statutory damages and attorney's fees.In Duvall's case, the superior court granted summary judgment on her UTPA counterclaim that Portfolio sought unauthorized fees and charges, finding Portfolio failed to produce the original credit card agreement. The court excluded a late-disclosed witness and certain documents as inadmissible hearsay. Portfolio's contract claim failed due to lack of evidence. The court awarded Duvall partial attorney's fees under the UTPA and Rule 82.In Riddle's case, the superior court granted summary judgment on her UTPA counterclaim, finding Portfolio lacked standing to sue without proving ownership of the debt. The court awarded Riddle statutory damages and partial attorney's fees, reducing the award due to excessive litigation by both parties.In Terry's case, the superior court ruled in her favor on Portfolio's contract claim and her UTPA counterclaims after a bench trial. The court found Portfolio's conduct unfair and deceptive, awarding Terry statutory damages and full attorney's fees.The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior courts' rulings on the merits and statutory damages. It found no abuse of discretion in the evidentiary rulings or the exclusion of the late-disclosed witness. The court affirmed the attorney's fees award in Duvall, remanded the fees award in Riddle for reconsideration, and remanded the fees award in Terry for a minor correction. View "Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Duvall" on Justia Law

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In 2007, Osman Yunus Guracar took out a private student loan from Bank of America but stopped making payments in 2009. In 2017, Student Loan Solutions, LLC (SLS) purchased the loan and sued Guracar for non-payment in 2022. Guracar filed cross-claims against SLS and others, alleging violations of state and federal debt collection statutes. The cross-defendants moved to strike the cross-claims under California's anti-SLAPP statute, which the trial court granted.The Santa Clara County Superior Court ruled that Guracar's cross-claims arose from protected conduct and triggered the anti-SLAPP statute. The court also found that Guracar failed to show a probability of prevailing on his claims, holding that the loan was an installment debt and that SLS had timely accelerated the loan in June 2022. The court did not address Guracar's argument that the loan had been accelerated in February 2010.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Guracar had standing to assert his claims under the Debt Buyers Act, the PSLCRA, the Rosenthal Act, and the FDCPA without showing concrete harm. On the merits, the court found that Guracar established a probability of prevailing on his cross-claims for suing to collect a time-barred debt, making false and misleading representations, and failing to comply with certain PSLCRA requirements. The court reversed the trial court's judgment, reinstating these cross-claims but affirmed the striking of Guracar’s other cross-claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Guracar v. Student Loan Solutions" on Justia Law

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Yelp, a company that publishes consumer reviews, introduced a notification on its business pages for crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs) in 2022, stating that these centers typically offer limited medical services. After objections from several state Attorneys General, including Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, Yelp replaced the notice with one stating that CPCs do not offer abortions or abortion referrals. Despite this change, Paxton initiated an investigation and sent Yelp a notice of intent to file suit, alleging that the original notice violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices – Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). Yelp then filed a lawsuit in federal court, claiming First Amendment retaliation, and sought to enjoin Paxton from further action. The next day, Paxton filed a state court action against Yelp.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Yelp’s federal case based on the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with ongoing state judicial proceedings. The district court found that the requirements for Younger abstention were met and that the bad faith exception did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Younger’s bad faith exception did not apply because Yelp had not sufficiently established that the Texas civil enforcement action was brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid judgment or was facially meritless. The court also found that Yelp failed to show that Paxton’s enforcement action was motivated by a desire to harass or retaliate against Yelp for its support of abortion rights. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Yelp’s request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. View "YELP INC. V. PAXTON" on Justia Law

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Petitioners were defrauded by a now-defunct corporation that sold them long-term health care and estate planning services they never received. Unable to obtain compensation directly from the corporation, petitioners secured a federal bankruptcy court judgment against the corporation and applied for restitution from the Victims of Corporate Fraud Compensation Fund. The Secretary of State, who administers the Fund, denied their applications, leading petitioners to file a verified petition in the superior court for an order directing payment from the Fund. The superior court granted the petition, and the Secretary appealed.The superior court found that the bankruptcy court judgment was a qualifying judgment for compensation under the Fund. The court noted that the complaint contained allegations of fraud and requested a judgment finding the elements of fraud under California law were satisfied. The superior court also found that the administrative record contained ample evidence supporting the bankruptcy court’s default judgment against the corporation for fraud.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court’s final judgment, which expressly adjudged petitioners as victims of intentional misrepresentation, met the Fund’s requirement for a judgment based on fraud. The court affirmed the superior court’s judgment regarding petitioners' entitlement to payment from the Fund. However, it reversed and remanded the case for the superior court to specify the amount the Secretary shall pay each petitioner, as the original order did not account for the statutory limit of $50,000 per claimant and the need to consider spouses as a single claimant. View "Alves v. Weber" on Justia Law

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Bernadette O’Malley purchased a used 2007 Dodge Caliber from Valpo Motors, Inc. in late 2019. Valpo provided O’Malley with a Buyers Guide stating the car was sold “AS IS” and a Sales Agreement that disclaimed all warranties unless a written warranty or service contract was extended within 90 days. O’Malley also purchased a Service Contract, which was noted in the Buyers Guide. The car broke down a month later, and a repair shop deemed it not worth repairing due to extensive mechanical issues. O’Malley’s son-in-law, Glenn Thomas, took the car to the shop. After Valpo refused to arbitrate, O’Malley sued for breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA). O’Malley passed away during the proceedings, and Thomas continued the case as the personal representative of her estate.The Porter Superior Court granted summary judgment for Valpo Motors, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Buyers Guide’s disclaimer of all warranties controlled over any contrary provisions in the Sales Agreement. The appellate court rejected Thomas’s argument that the handwritten note on the Buyers Guide negated the warranty disclaimer. Judge Felix dissented, arguing that the Sales Agreement’s specific terms should trump the Buyers Guide’s general terms and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Valpo’s opportunity to cure the breach.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Valpo did not effectively disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability due to ambiguities in the Buyers Guide. The court found that fact issues remained regarding whether Valpo had a reasonable opportunity to cure the defects. The court vacated the summary judgment for Valpo, directed the trial court to enter partial summary judgment for Thomas on the warranty-disclaimer issue, and remanded for further proceedings to determine if Valpo had a reasonable opportunity to cure. If Thomas prevails, the trial court is to assess damages and reasonable attorney’s fees. View "Thomas v. Valpo Motors Inc." on Justia Law

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Sadok Ferchichi and Martina Coronado were involved in a motor vehicle collision with Crystal Krueger, who was driving a vehicle owned by Whataburger Restaurants LLC. Ferchichi sued Krueger and Whataburger for negligence. During mediation, Whataburger's counsel revealed the existence of a surveillance video of the plaintiffs, which they refused to share outside of mediation. Ferchichi filed a motion to compel the video and for sanctions. Whataburger responded with a motion to dismiss the sanctions request under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA).The trial court denied Whataburger's TCPA motion, but the Fourth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the motion for sanctions was a "legal action" under the TCPA and that Ferchichi failed to establish a prima facie case for the sanctions request. The court remanded the case to the trial court to award Whataburger its costs and attorney’s fees and to consider sanctions against Ferchichi.In a separate case, Haven at Thorpe Lane, a student-housing complex, was sued by students for fraud and deceptive trade practices. Haven filed a motion to compel discovery from two mothers of the plaintiffs, who had created a Facebook group criticizing Haven. The mothers filed a TCPA motion to dismiss Haven's motion to compel. The trial court denied the TCPA motion, but the Third Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the motion to compel was a "legal action" under the TCPA and that Haven failed to establish a prima facie case.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed both cases and held that motions to compel and for sanctions are not "legal actions" under the TCPA. Therefore, the TCPA does not apply. The court reversed the judgments of the courts of appeals and remanded both cases to the respective trial courts for further proceedings. View "HAVEN AT THORPE LANE, LLC v. PATE" on Justia Law