Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Austin Stuart Fraase applied for a full-time maintenance technician position with Fargo Parks District. During the hiring process, Fargo Parks ordered a background check from Advantage Credit Bureau, which incorrectly reported that Austin had a speeding conviction. In reality, the ticket belonged to his twin brother, Aaron Stuart Fraase. The criminal search section of the report listed the conviction, though the motor vehicle section showed a clean record. Fargo Parks’ human resources staff discussed the report with Austin and his supervisor, ultimately concluding that the ticket likely belonged to his brother. Austin was reassured that it would not affect his interview or hiring, and he accepted and began the job as scheduled. Advantage sent Austin notices of his right to dispute the report, but he chose instead to file suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota granted summary judgment to Advantage. The court concluded that Advantage had used reasonable procedures by searching the official North Dakota Courts website with Austin’s identifying information and reporting the results, and that Austin suffered no damages as he was hired without delay or loss.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Eighth Circuit held that Advantage’s reliance on the official court website as a reputable source was reasonable under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The court found no evidence of systemic problems with the website or that Advantage failed to follow its own procedures. Thus, Advantage was not liable for the inaccurate report. The court did not address whether Austin suffered actual damages, as it found no violation of the statute. The district court's grant of summary judgment was affirmed. View "Fraase v. Advantage Credit Bureau" on Justia Law

Robert Hossfeld received twelve telemarketing calls advertising Allstate Insurance products, despite having previously requested that Allstate not contact him. The calls were made by Atlantic Telemarketing Center, which had been subcontracted by Transfer Kings, a company retained by Allstate’s insurance agents, Fleming and Gilmond. Allstate’s internal do-not-call list included Hossfeld’s number months before the calls occurred. Neither Allstate nor its agents were aware that Atlantic was involved in marketing Allstate insurance until after Hossfeld initiated his lawsuit.Hossfeld sued Allstate in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) because Allstate failed to maintain an adequate do-not-call policy and permitted calls to be made to him after his request. He also sought class certification for other similarly affected individuals. The district court denied class certification, finding Hossfeld had not demonstrated that the proposed class was sufficiently numerous. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in Hossfeld’s favor, holding Allstate vicariously liable for Atlantic’s calls under agency law and awarding treble damages for willful violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the denial of class certification, agreeing that Hossfeld failed to prove numerosity and impracticability of joinder. However, it reversed the district court’s summary judgment on liability, concluding that Hossfeld failed to show Allstate was liable for Atlantic’s calls under any theory of agency law, including subagency, apparent authority, or ratification. The Seventh Circuit clarified that the willfulness standard under the TCPA requires reckless or knowing conduct, not merely volitional acts. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, directing judgment for Allstate. View "Hossfeld v Allstate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a Black family residing in Nebraska, visited the Kiewit Luminarium, an institution operated by Omaha Discovery Trust. They paid the full admission price for entry in February 2024. The Luminarium had a policy granting free admission to registered members of federally recognized Native American tribes and their household members. After learning of this policy, the plaintiffs sought a refund for their tickets, which was denied. They then filed suit, alleging that the policy constituted unlawful racial discrimination in violation of federal civil rights statutes and the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska reviewed the complaint after the defendant moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion to dismiss on all claims. It reasoned that the Luminarium’s policy distinguished based on tribal membership, which is a political classification rather than a racial one. As a result, the court concluded the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for race discrimination under the relevant federal statutes and that their Nebraska Consumer Protection Act claim failed for the same reason.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that membership in a federally recognized tribe is a political classification, not a racial one, relying on Supreme Court and circuit precedent. The court determined the plaintiffs did not plead facts showing they were discriminated against because of their race. Because their claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000a-2, 1981, and 1982, as well as under the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act, all depended on a showing of racial discrimination, the Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal of all claims. View "Nare v. Omaha Discovery Trust" on Justia Law

Two individuals filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and a proposed class, alleging that a life insurance company’s “Trendsetter LB” term life insurance policy misrepresented its premium structure. The plaintiffs argued that policy language stating the annual premium was “excluding riders” and that additional accelerated death benefit riders were included at “no charge” was misleading. They claimed consumers were led to believe these extra benefits were free, when in fact the premium included undisclosed charges for these riders. The plaintiffs did not allege they were denied any promised benefits, but contended the policy failed to break down the cost of its bundled components, allegedly causing consumers to misunderstand their options and overpay compared to a more basic policy.The case began in Alameda County Superior Court. Plaintiffs sought class certification for claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), focusing only on alleged misrepresentations in the policy’s standardized language. The trial court initially found ascertainability and numerosity met, but denied class certification for most claims, ruling that determining liability would require individualized inquiries into what information each customer received from agents or marketing materials. The court certified only a narrow claim regarding compliance with a statutory notice requirement, but later, at plaintiffs’ request, denied certification entirely when they clarified they did not intend to pursue that claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s denial of class certification. The court held that the policy language was, at best, ambiguous and that resolving liability would depend not just on the form policy language but also on individualized evidence about communications with each purchaser. The court determined that common issues did not predominate and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification. The judgment was affirmed. View "Guthrie v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Several Michigan residents purchased expensive solar-panel systems from a company that promised substantial reductions in their electricity bills. The company’s advertising, prepared in part by entities connected to Trivest Partners, promoted significant savings and government payments, but the plaintiffs experienced little to no reduction in their bills and, in some cases, saw increases. The company, which operated in both Michigan and Florida, later went bankrupt. Alleging fraud and racketeering violations, the plaintiffs brought a civil RICO action and a Michigan Consumer Protection Act claim against Trivest Partners, its affiliates (all Florida entities), and the company founder.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the two Florida-based Trivest defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the civil RICO statute did not allow them to be sued in Michigan, as a court in Florida could exercise jurisdiction over all defendants. The district court denied the motion, holding that several practical factors—including the pending status of the case in Michigan, local counsel, and comparative convenience—favored retaining jurisdiction. The plaintiffs later added additional Trivest-related defendants, also Florida citizens, with the court again finding personal jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) de novo. The appellate court held that the district court’s reasons, grounded in convenience and practical considerations, were insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the “ends of justice require” standard under § 1965(b). The Sixth Circuit concluded that interests of convenience alone cannot justify asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants with no minimum contacts to the forum. The court reversed the district court’s order denying dismissal and vacated the order denying the Trivest defendants’ motions to compel arbitration. View "Hall v. Trivest Partners L.P." on Justia Law

A former patient of a hospital in Bayamón, Puerto Rico, alleged that her personally identifiable and health information was compromised in a ransomware attack that affected over half a million patients. She received a notice letter from the hospital confirming the breach but stating that, although files were accessed and encrypted, there was no indication that patient information had been used by unauthorized persons. Subsequently, she filed a putative class action in federal court, claiming that the breach resulted from the hospital’s failure to properly safeguard patient data. She asserted that this failure exposed her and others to risks such as identity theft, required them to spend time and incur expenses mitigating potential harm, and diminished the value of their information.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, after several rounds of amended complaints and motions, dismissed the claims for lack of Article III standing. The district court found that the plaintiff’s complaint did not plausibly allege that her alleged injury—such as the discovery of a fraudulent cellphone account opened in her name—was traceable to the hospital’s data breach. Attempts to add further allegations or conduct jurisdictional discovery were denied as futile.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether the plaintiff had adequately pleaded both an injury in fact and traceability for standing. The court held that, while the complaint sufficiently alleged an injury in fact by describing actual misuse of her information, it failed to plausibly connect that harm to the hospital’s data breach. The court found no specific facts to support a temporal or factual link between the breach and the fraudulent activity. As a result, the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims for lack of standing. View "Santos-Pagan v. Bayamon Medical Center" on Justia Law

Deque Systems Inc., a company specializing in web accessibility software, developed and registered multiple versions of its DevTools and Rules Help Pages products. To access these, users agreed not to copy, reverse-engineer, or otherwise misuse the software or its documentation. In 2021, BrowserStack, a competing firm, sought to develop its own accessibility testing tools. More than 100 BrowserStack employees created accounts with Deque—agreeing to Deque’s terms—and later, BrowserStack released an Accessibility Toolkit, which Deque alleged was developed by unlawfully copying and reverse-engineering DevTools and the Rules Help Pages.Deque filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming copyright infringement, false advertising, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, and sought injunctive relief, damages, and other remedies. During discovery, Deque repeatedly failed to properly disclose its damages calculations and supporting evidence by the deadlines set in the court’s scheduling order. Despite several opportunities to supplement its disclosures and a late attempt to introduce expert testimony, Deque did not timely provide the required information. BrowserStack moved to exclude Deque’s damages evidence and for summary judgment. The district court granted these motions, finding that Deque’s noncompliance with disclosure rules was neither substantially justified nor harmless, and that Deque presented no evidence supporting injunctive or other relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding all evidence of Deque’s damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) due to repeated and unjustified failures to comply with disclosure requirements. The court also held that summary judgment for BrowserStack was warranted because Deque could not establish entitlement to injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief. View "Deque Systems Inc. v. Browserstack, Inc." on Justia Law

A landlord served a residential tenant with an eviction notice for nonpayment of rent during a period when the governor had ordered a temporary ban on such notices due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The tenant responded by counterclaiming that the landlord violated the Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA), specifically Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(j), which bars attempts to collect a debt under an “agreement to defer payment” when the right to collect does not exist. The tenant also alleged the lease was void under Wis. Stat. § 704.44(10) and Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 134.08(10) because it permitted eviction for a crime committed in relation to the property but lacked the required notice of domestic abuse protections.The Marathon County Circuit Court dismissed the landlord’s eviction claim since the notice was issued during the moratorium. The court also held that the WCA did not apply to the lease and found the lease was not void under the cited statutes and regulations, concluding that the tenant was not entitled to damages or attorney fees. The tenant’s attorney was denied intervention for attorney fees but was later allowed to intervene to appeal that issue.The Court of Appeals reversed, holding for the first time that a residential lease with monthly rent payments is a “consumer transaction” and an “agreement to defer payment” under the WCA, and that serving the eviction notice violated the Act. The appellate court also found the lease void for omitting the required domestic abuse notice and allowed recovery of double damages and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the appellate court. It held that a typical residential lease with monthly rent payments is not an “agreement to defer payment” under Wis. Stat. § 427.104, so the WCA does not apply. Even if the lease were void, the tenant showed no pecuniary loss, precluding recovery of damages, costs, or attorney fees under Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) or § 425.308(1). View "Koble Investments v. Marquardt" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an Arizona resident, registered her personal cell phone on the national “do not call” registry in 2004. She alleged that a real estate company, Fast Easy Offer, LLC, and related entities, contacted her through at least six phone calls and two text messages in the fall of 2024. The messages asked if she had given up on selling her property. According to the plaintiff, Fast Easy Offer’s business model involves purchasing homes below market value and remarketing them, and if a home is not purchased, the lead is given to a real estate brokerage, Keller Williams Realty Phoenix, with revenues shared. The plaintiff claimed that the purpose of these communications was to solicit the purchase of real estate brokerage services.The plaintiff filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the communications did not qualify as “telephone solicitations” under the Act and that Keller Williams Realty, Inc. was not vicariously liable. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The court held that the calls and texts were not telephone solicitations because they did not expressly encourage the purchase of services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that under the TCPA’s definition, and consistent with Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 705 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2012), the plaintiff had adequately pleaded that the messages qualified as telephone solicitations. The court concluded that the purpose of initiation of the calls or messages is determinative, and the plaintiff’s allegations about defendants’ intent sufficed. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "COFFEY V. FAST EASY OFFER, LLC" on Justia Law

A trucking company conducted background checks on a job applicant, both before and during his employment, using disclosure and authorization forms. The applicant alleged these forms did not comply with the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and initiated a class action on behalf of similarly situated job seekers and employees. He asserted that the company obtained background checks without proper, legally compliant disclosures and authorizations, in violation of federal law.The San Mateo County Superior Court initially certified the class for claims under the FCRA. After the Fifth District Court of Appeal decided *Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc.*, which interpreted the FCRA as requiring plaintiffs to show concrete injury for standing in California courts, the defendant moved to decertify the class, arguing the applicant had not identified any actual harm. The Superior Court agreed, finding that the applicant’s confusion and lack of awareness about the background checks did not amount to concrete injury, and decertified the class.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that California courts are not bound by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which requires concrete injury in federal courts. The Court interpreted the FCRA’s language and legislative history to mean that statutory damages are available for willful violations, even absent proof of actual harm. It found that a statutory violation alone is sufficient to confer standing in California courts for FCRA claims, and that the applicant’s interest in his statutory rights was adequate. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court’s order decertifying the class, holding that proof of actual injury is not required to maintain a class action under the FCRA in California state court. View "Askins v. CRST Expedited, Inc." on Justia Law