Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Several individuals who purchased and used Samsung smartphones and tablets alleged that the preinstalled Samsung Gallery app created and stored face templates by scanning photographs for facial geometry, thereby capturing biometric data. They claimed that Samsung’s proprietary algorithm measured unique facial features, and the resulting face templates were stored locally on their devices. Plaintiffs argued that Samsung controlled the biometric data, since users had no way to disable the facial recognition features, and Samsung’s privacy policy indicated it “may collect” such information. They further contended that Samsung lacked a written policy for retention and destruction of biometric data and failed to provide required disclosures or obtain releases, in violation of the Illinois Biometric Privacy Information Act (“BIPA”).The plaintiffs initially filed their suit in Illinois state court, seeking class certification for all Illinois residents whose biometric data was collected or stored by Samsung. Samsung removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the Class Action Fairness Act. After several amended complaints and motions to dismiss, the district court ultimately granted Samsung’s third motion to dismiss with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Samsung possessed or exerted control over the biometric data stored on users’ devices.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that under both Illinois law and BIPA, “possession,” “collection,” and “capture” require a degree of control by the company over the biometric data. Because the plaintiffs’ allegations did not plausibly show that Samsung itself controlled the facial geometry data generated by the app, the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. View "G.T. v Samsung Electronics America, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff leased a new vehicle from the defendant, but soon experienced persistent defects that could not be repaired despite multiple attempts. After the defendant failed to promptly replace the vehicle or provide restitution under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the plaintiff filed suit for breach of warranty, seeking damages and attorney fees. During litigation, the defendant made a statutory settlement offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998, presenting two alternative sets of terms: a lump-sum payment or a reimbursement option requiring proof of damages, both accompanied by provisions for attorney fees and costs.In the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the jury awarded the plaintiff damages totaling $76,155.27, less than the lump-sum alternative in the defendant’s 998 offer. The trial court found the offer valid, imposed section 998’s cost-shifting penalty, limited plaintiff’s postoffer costs and attorney fees, and awarded defendant its postoffer costs. The plaintiff appealed, contesting the validity of the alternative-choice offer. The California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s awards, finding the lump-sum alternative sufficiently certain but deemed alternative-choice offers categorically invalid for cost-shifting purposes.The Supreme Court of California reviewed whether an offer under section 998 that presents two independent, alternative sets of terms for acceptance is categorically invalid due to uncertainty. The Court held that such an alternative-choice offer can be valid if it clearly presents the alternatives and at least one alternative is sufficiently certain to permit accurate valuation at the time the offer is made. If the judgment or award does not exceed the highest valued, valid alternative, cost-shifting under section 998 is permitted. The Court affirmed the trial court’s award, but rejected the Court of Appeal’s categorical prohibition of alternative-choice offers under section 998. View "Gorobets v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC" on Justia Law

Three individuals, all cast members of a reality television show, became embroiled in a public scandal when one, Rachel Leviss, had a secret sexual affair with another cast member, Tom Sandoval, who was in a relationship with fellow cast member Ariana Madix. The affair came to light when Sandoval’s phone fell into Madix’s possession during a public event. Upon accessing his phone—using a passcode known to her from their longstanding relationship—Madix discovered and recorded sexually explicit videos of Leviss that Sandoval had secretly made. Madix then sent these videos to Leviss and informed the show’s production team, after which the affair became widely publicized.Leviss filed a civil suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against Sandoval and Madix, asserting causes of action for violation of privacy and “revenge porn,” among others. She alleged that Madix had obtained and disseminated the explicit videos without consent, causing Leviss emotional and reputational harm. Madix responded with a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16), arguing that her conduct was protected as activity in connection with a public issue involving public figures. The Superior Court denied Madix’s motion, finding that the conduct did not constitute protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, and that the gravamen of Leviss’s claims was private conduct, not public commentary.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling, holding that Madix failed to meet her burden to show that Leviss’s claims arose from constitutionally protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court determined that the unauthorized acquisition and dissemination of private sexual videos did not qualify as conduct in connection with a public issue or a matter of public interest as required by the statute. View "Leviss v. Madix" on Justia Law

Benjamin Hoskins and his wife, Leanne Rodgers, participated in a telemarketing operation that defrauded consumers of more than $130 million by selling worthless “business coaching” services. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) obtained a judgment against Hoskins for over $130 million and against Rodgers for approximately $1.5 million, reflecting the proceeds they received from the scam. Hoskins and Rodgers took steps to hinder collection by transferring assets through trusts and shell entities, including a residence in Las Vegas held via a trust in which they were both trustees and beneficiaries.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada initially blocked the FTC’s attempts to enforce the judgment, concluding that Nevada’s six-year statute of limitations for enforcement of judgments barred the FTC’s action against Rodgers. The court also quashed a writ of execution the FTC obtained under the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act (FDCPA), reasoning that Nevada law required a separate action to prove the trust holding the property was Rodgers’s alter ego before the property could be levied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed both of the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that the FDCPA preempts inconsistent state statutes of limitations and has no time limit for collecting debts owed to the federal government by writ of execution. The court also determined that the judgment against Rodgers, which is payable to the FTC, qualifies as a “debt” under the FDCPA, regardless of whether the proceeds are ultimately distributed to victims. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held that the FTC was not required to file a separate alter ego action under state law to levy property held in trust; under the FDCPA, the FTC may levy any property in which the judgment debtors have a substantial nonexempt interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS" on Justia Law

The plaintiff purchased a portable speaker from a Wisconsin-based retailer, believing she was receiving a $30 discount off a regular price of $129.99. However, she later discovered that the retailer almost always sold the speaker at the “sale” price of $99.99 and rarely at the higher “regular” price. She claimed she would not have bought the speaker if she had known this, and brought suit on behalf of a proposed nationwide class, alleging the retailer had violated Wisconsin’s Unfair Trade Practices Act by using misleading price comparison advertising. The suit was filed in federal court, invoking the Class Action Fairness Act as the basis for subject matter jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff had not adequately alleged pecuniary loss under Wisconsin law. The court reasoned that, for damages under Wisconsin’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, the plaintiff must plead that the product was defective or worth less than the price paid, or otherwise did not receive the benefit of the bargain. Because the plaintiff did not make such allegations, the court concluded it was legally impossible for her to meet the required amount-in-controversy for class action jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It found Wisconsin law unclear on whether a consumer who was misled by false price comparison advertising, but received a product worth the purchase price, suffers a pecuniary loss. Noting a split in authority and uncertainty in Wisconsin precedent, the appellate court certified this question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court and stayed further proceedings pending an answer. View "Cortez Gomez v Kohl's Corporation" on Justia Law

The Michigan Attorney General initiated an investigation into Eli Lilly and Company's insulin pricing practices, alleging potential violations of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). Specifically, the Attorney General asserted there was probable cause to believe Eli Lilly's pricing strategies for insulin, including disparities between branded and generic products and differences between U.S. and international prices, constituted violations of specific MCPA provisions. The Attorney General sought authorization from the Ingham Circuit Court to issue investigative subpoenas and also filed a complaint for declaratory relief, asking the court to rule that the investigation and any future enforcement action were not barred by a statutory exemption for conduct "specifically authorized" by law.The Ingham Circuit Court found probable cause for the investigation and authorized subpoenas. However, Eli Lilly argued that, based on prior Michigan Supreme Court decisions—Smith v Globe Life Ins Co and Liss v Lewiston-Richards, Inc.—the MCPA exemption for regulated conduct applied, as the sale of pharmaceuticals is regulated by law. The parties agreed to pause the subpoenas pending resolution of the declaratory relief action. The circuit court granted summary disposition for Eli Lilly, concluding the exemption applied, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.On review, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled its previous broad interpretation of the MCPA exemption in Smith and Liss, holding instead that courts must consider whether the specific transaction or conduct at issue, rather than the general activity, is "specifically authorized" by law. The Court found that Smith and Liss had improperly expanded the exemption, undermining the MCPA's purpose. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, vacated the circuit court's order, and remanded for further proceedings to determine if Eli Lilly's specific conduct was exempt under the new, narrower standard. View "Attorney General v. Eli Lilly And Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a private organization, brought suit under California’s Proposition 65 against several companies, alleging they failed to warn consumers about exposure to a chemical, DINP, in certain clutch and wallet products. Prior to this lawsuit, another private enforcer had brought a similar Proposition 65 action involving the same or similar products and chemical exposure, which resulted in a consent judgment requiring reformulation or labeling of the products and payment of civil penalties. The plaintiff in the current case argued that the earlier action did not specifically include the wallet and clutch products in its notice, and therefore the consent judgment should not bar its claims.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, dismissing the case. The court found the action was barred by res judicata, relying on the consent judgment from the prior Proposition 65 action, and also concluded there were defects in the plaintiff’s presuit notice. The court reasoned that both private enforcers, in bringing Proposition 65 claims, represented the public interest, creating privity between them. It also noted that even if the earlier notice had defects, the proper time to challenge that was before the consent judgment became final.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiff was in privity with the prior enforcer because both acted in the public interest under Proposition 65, and that common-law res judicata principles apply to consent judgments in such cases. The court determined that any alleged defect in the earlier notice did not prevent the consent judgment from having claim-preclusive effect. The appellate court did not address the separate issue of defects in the plaintiff’s own presuit notice, as the res judicata ground was dispositive. View "Consumer Protection Group, LLC v. Signal Brands, LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on allegations by a Minnesota-based health insurer that several related pharmaceutical companies carried out an unlawful scheme involving the distribution and sale of repackaged and adulterated oncology drugs. The scheme allegedly involved breaking sterile seals on medication vials, pooling overfill amounts—which were not intended for patient use—and creating pre-filled syringes that were then sold to healthcare providers. These syringes were ultimately administered to cancer patients, including many insured under programs operated by the plaintiff. The defendants did not themselves submit claims for reimbursement, but the plaintiff asserts it paid for treatments using these adulterated drugs, unaware of their compromised quality.Prior to this lawsuit, the scheme was the subject of other civil actions and federal investigations, including qui tam actions and a federal criminal prosecution. The defendants disclosed these investigations in annual reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the events received media attention beginning in 2012. In 2017, a related company pleaded guilty to federal charges, admitting to the repackaging scheme, and paid significant fines and settlements. The plaintiff filed suit in 2023, asserting claims for common-law fraud, unjust enrichment, and violations of several Minnesota consumer protection statutes. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed the complaint, finding the claims were barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations, and that the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently plead fraudulent concealment to toll the limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. It concluded that publicly available disclosures and the plaintiff’s own allegations established that the plaintiff should have discovered its causes of action no later than 2016. Because the plaintiff did not file suit until 2023, its claims were untimely. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that all claims were barred by the statute of limitations. View "United HealthCare Services, Inc. v. AmerisourceBergen Corporation" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff executed a deed in lieu of foreclosure on her home in 2016 after defaulting on her mortgage, and subsequently received a Chapter 13 bankruptcy discharge in 2018. When she reviewed her credit report in 2022, the report stated that she had both a bankruptcy discharge and an outstanding balance on her mortgage account, along with a balloon payment due in the future. She argued that this combination of information was inaccurate or misleading, given her bankruptcy discharge and the deed in lieu of foreclosure.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed her complaint. The district court determined that her claim depended on resolving legal questions—specifically, whether her mortgage was discharged in bankruptcy and the effect of the deed in lieu of foreclosure on her debt status. The court found that these were legal issues and that the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) does not require a consumer reporting agency to resolve such questions. Therefore, the court concluded that she failed to allege a factual inaccuracy that could support a claim under the FCRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that the FCRA does not obligate credit reporting agencies to make legal determinations regarding the discharge status or enforceability of debts. The court reasoned that the alleged inaccuracy was not objectively apparent from the records available to the credit reporting agency, and resolving it would require legal analysis beyond the agency’s competency. Therefore, the plaintiff’s claim could not proceed, and the district court's dismissal was affirmed. View "Sykes v Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Several vape industry businesses and a vape user challenged a North Carolina law that restricts the sale of vape products lacking approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). North Carolina’s statute, enacted in 2024, requires manufacturers to certify annually to the North Carolina Department of Revenue that their vape products either have FDA approval, were on the market by August 8, 2016 with a timely FDA application, or are exempt due to superficial changes. Products not listed in the resulting state directory cannot be sold in North Carolina, and violations can result in fines, product seizure, or lawsuits for deceptive trade practices.Before reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiffs sued North Carolina officials in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, arguing that the state law was preempted by federal law and violated the Equal Protection Clause. They sought a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the law, relying only on the preemption argument. The district court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had standing due to the threat of economic harm but were unlikely to succeed on the merits because the federal Tobacco Control Act did not preempt North Carolina’s regulation of vape product sales.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the commercial plaintiffs had standing due to the risk of substantial economic harm from enforcement of the law. On the merits, the court concluded that North Carolina’s law was not preempted by the relevant federal statutes. The state law was found to regulate sales, an area expressly preserved for state regulation by the federal Tobacco Control Act’s savings clause, and did not amount to impermissible enforcement of the FDA’s exclusive authority under federal law. The denial of a preliminary injunction was therefore affirmed. View "Vapor Technology Association v. Wooten" on Justia Law