The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the bank in an action alleging violation of the Homeowners Protection Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the bank failed to make certain required disclosures in connection with their residential mortgage loans. The court held that the statute was clear that these mortgage insurance disclosures were mandated only if lender-paid mortgage insurance was a condition of obtaining a loan. In this case, because no such conditions applied to plaintiffs' loans, nondisclosure was not a violation of the Act. View "Dwoskin v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit certified two questions of New Jersey law to the New Jersey Supreme Court arising from two putative class actions brought under the New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA). Plaintiffs David and Katina Spade claimed that on or about April 25, 2013, they purchased furniture from a retail store owned and operated by defendant Select Comfort Corporation. They alleged that Select Comfort’s sales contract included the language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c). The Spades also alleged the sales contract that Select Comfort provided to them did not include language mandated by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2(a) and N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(a). The Third Circuit asked: (1) whether a violation of the Furniture Delivery Regulations alone constituted a violation of a clearly established right or responsibility of the seller under the TCCWNA and thus provided a basis for relief under the TCCWNA; and (2) whether a consumer who receives a contract that does not comply with the Furniture Delivery Regulations, but has not suffered any adverse consequences from the noncompliance, an “aggrieved consumer” under the TCCWNA? The New Jersey Supreme Court answered the first certified question in the affirmative and the second certified question in the negative. View "Spade v. Select Comfort Corp." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Accounts Receivable in an action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. The court held that the district court did not err by applying the materiality standard to the relevant provisions of the Act; Accounts Receivable's inadequate documentation of the assignment did not constitute a materially false representation, and the other alleged inaccuracies in the exhibits were not material; and Accounts Receivable did not commit unfair practices and violate the Act by trying to collect interest under Minnesota Statutes 549.09. View "Hill v. Accounts Receivable Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner’s petition alleging that the debt collection actions of the owners and operators of LifeSmile Dental Care (collectively, LifeSmile) and attorney Dennis Barton (collectively, Respondents) violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and that Barton violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA). The circuit court concluded (1) Petitioner’s FDCPA claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and (2) Petitioner's MMPA claim failed to state a claim because Barton’s collection activities were not “in connection with” the sale of LifeSmile’s dental services to Petitioner, and no lender-borrower relationship existed between Barton and Petitioner. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an FDCPA violation is not time-barred simply because it restates or relates back to assertions made in a debt collection action that is beyond the one-year statute of limitations, and Petitioner identified three actions he alleged amounted an FDCPA violation occurring within a year of his filing of the action; and (2) Barton’s efforts to collect payment were an attempt to complete the transaction of the sale of dental services to Petitioner and were therefore “in connection with” the sale. View "Jackson v. Barton" on Justia Law

Echlin received treatment at PeaceHealth but ignored multiple requests for payment. PeaceHealth referred her accounts to CCI, a purported collection agency. Under a 2004 agreement, for a fixed fee, CCI performed services related to debt-collection and PeaceHealth would suspend its in-house collection efforts. CCI independently screened each account for potential collection problems. Although PeaceHealth was generally aware of the standard format of CCI’s letters, CCI alone controlled their content without PeaceHealth’s approval. The letters were written on CCI letterhead, mailed from CCI’s in-house mailing center, and listed CCI’s contact information (PeaceHealth’s information was labeled “Creditor Detail”). The letters directed debtors to a CCI website. CCI handled correspondence from PeaceHealth debtors.CCI had no ability to process or negotiate payments but forwarded to PeaceHealth any payments it received. After two letters, accounts were returned to PeaceHealth. CCI did not participate in subsequent collection steps. Echlin filed a putative class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e, 1692j. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. CCI did not engage in “flat-rating,” in which a third party sends a delinquency letter to a debtor, portraying itself as a debt collector, when it actually has no real involvement in the debt collection effort. CCI meaningfully participated in PeaceHealth’s debt-collection efforts, screening the accounts, independently composing and mailing letters, responding to customer questions, and maintaining a website that allowed customers to access individualized information. View "Echlin v. PeaceHealth" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant, the owner of the website on which Plaintiff found a tropical villa that did not exist, holding that the district court correctly applied Massachusetts consumer protection law and that Plaintiff’s remaining contentions on appeal were unavailing. Plaintiff was scammed into parting with thousands of dollars to reserve a imaginary vacation rental property in Belize. At the time, Defendant maintained a guarantee that offered a $1000 refund to customers that fell victim to “Internet Fraud.” In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the guarantee caused him to lose $46,565 by misleading him into believing that Defendant made reasonable efforts to keep fraudulent listings off its site and that Defendant was liable for common law fraud and for engaging in unfair or deceptive trade practices under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 2(a). The district court decided against Plaintiff. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly found that the guarantee was not misleading or deceptive under Massachusetts law in the manner alleged by Plaintiff; and (2) nothing about the manner in which the district court proceeded in deciding the summary judgment motion caused Plaintiff any harm. View "Hiam v. Homeaway.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs visited different Massage Envy locations and had massages that lasted about 50 minutes. The company advertises, on its website, an “Introductory 1‐hour Massage Session*” at the price of $50. Clicking through two links leads to a disclaimer explaining that a “[s]ession includes massage or facial and time for consultation and dressing.” Their putative class action complaint alleged that the multiple asterisks confused the average consumer and that Massage Envy deceptively hid the disclosures where they were “nearly impossible” to find. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their claims under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act. Massage Envy’s representations regarding the one‐hour massage session were not the but‐for cause of any alleged injury as required by the Illinois law. There is no allegation that plaintiff’s belief about the length of the massage caused her to make the appointment; only the receipt of a gift card caused her to book a massage. With respect to Missouri law, the complaint failed to allege that a deceptive representation from Massage Envy caused plaintiff to suffer an ascertainable loss of money. View "Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC" on Justia Law

Linderman bought an Indianapolis house in 2004 and lived there with her ex-husband, their children, and her parents. In 2013, Linderman left and stopped paying the mortgage loan. The others left in 2014. The unoccupied structure was vandalized. U.S. Bank, which owns the note and mortgage, started foreclosure proceedings. The vandalism produced insurance money that was sent to the Bank. The city notified Linderman of code violations. Linderman hired a contractor. In 2015 the Bank disbursed $10,000 for repairs. The contractor abandoned the job. The house was vandalized twice more; a storm damaged the roof. Linderman has not hired a replacement contractor or asked the Bank for additional funds but inquired about the status of the loan and the insurance money. The Bank sent a response. Asserting that she had not received that response, Linderman sued under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2605(e)(1)(B). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of her claims. None of Linderman’s problems with her marriage and mental health can be traced to the Bank. Linderman does not explain how earlier access to the Bank’s record of the account could have helped her; some of her asserted injuries are outside the scope of the Act. The contract between Linderman and the Bank, not federal law, determines how insurance proceeds must be handled. Contract law also governs the arrangement between Linderman and the contractor. View "Floyd v. U.S. Bank National Association" on Justia Law

At issue was the definition of “debt collector” under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, 24, specifically its application to the statute’s licensing requirement. Plaintiffs individually filed suit against Defendant, alleging unlicensed debt collection, violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and unjust enrichment. A superior court judge consolidated the cases and certified them as a class action. The judge then concluded (1) Defendant violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, 24A because it operated as a debt collector without a license; and (2) Defendant met the exemption from liability in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 3 because the division of banks of the Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation had permitted Defendant to operate without a license. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that Defendant was not a debt collector under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, 24 because neither of the statute’s two separate definitions of “debt collector” applied to Defendant. View "Dorrian v. LVNV Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue was the definition of “debt collector” under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, 24, specifically its application to the statute’s licensing requirement. Plaintiffs individually filed suit against Defendant, alleging unlicensed debt collection, violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and unjust enrichment. A superior court judge consolidated the cases and certified them as a class action. The judge then concluded (1) Defendant violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, 24A because it operated as a debt collector without a license; and (2) Defendant met the exemption from liability in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 3 because the division of banks of the Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation had permitted Defendant to operate without a license. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that Defendant was not a debt collector under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, 24 because neither of the statute’s two separate definitions of “debt collector” applied to Defendant. View "Dorrian v. LVNV Funding, LLC" on Justia Law