Midland sent six letters to the Schultzes, attempting to collect separate outstanding debts that had been outsourced to Midland for collection after default. None of the debts exceeded $600. Each letter offered to settle for less than the full amount owing and each stated: We will report forgiveness of debt as required by IRS regulations. Reporting is not required every time a debt is canceled or settled, and might not be required in your case.” Since the Treasury only requires an entity to report a discharge of indebtedness of $600 or more to the IRS, the Schultzes claimed that the statement was “false, deceptive and misleading” in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692. Their putative class action complaint was dismissed. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the statement may violate the FDCPA. A dunning letter is false and misleading if it implies that certain outcomes might befall a delinquent debtor, when legally, those outcomes cannot occur. Even if the least sophisticated debtor can distinguish between “may” and “must,” the language at issue references an event that would never occur. It is reasonable to assume that a debtor would be influenced by potential IRS reporting and that, if that reporting cannot occur, it could signal a potential FDCPA violation regardless of the conditional language. View "Schultz v. Midland Credit Management, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to Crunch Fitness on plaintiff's claim that three text messages he received from Crunch violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The panel held, in light of the DC Circuit's recent opinion in ACA International v. Federal Communications Commission, 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 2018), and based on the panel's own review of the TCPA, that the statutory definition of automatic text messaging system includes a device that stores telephone numbers (ATDS) to be called, whether or not those numbers have been generated by a random or sequential number generator. Because the district court did not have the benefit of ACA International or the panel's construction of the definition of ATDS, the panel vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, convicted of drug offenses between 1997 and 2007, applied to Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) for jobs that involved operating vehicles. Each filled out a form disclosing his criminal history and authorizing SEPTA to obtain a background check. SEPTA denied them employment. SEPTA did not send Plaintiffs copies of their background checks before it decided not to hire them, nor did it send them notices of their rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which required SEPTA to send both before it denied them employment, 15 U.S.C. 1681b(b)(3). Plaintiffs filed a putative class action, which the district court dismissed for lack of standing, reasoning there was only a “bare procedural violation,” not a concrete injury in fact because Plaintiffs alleged that SEPTA denied them jobs based on their criminal history, which Plaintiffs disclosed before the background checks. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claim based on failure to provide notice of FCRA rights. Plaintiffs became aware of their FCRA rights and were able to file this lawsuit within the prescribed limitations period, so they were not injured. The court reversed the dismissal of the claim based on failure to provide copies of the consumer reports. That right exists whether the report is accurate or not; FCRA clearly expresses Congress’s “intent to make [the] injury redressable.” View "Long v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

Villanueva and the class (Plaintiffs) alleged that Fidelity, an underwritten title company that handled Plaintiffs’ escrow accounts, engaged in unlawful conduct under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200) in charging overnight mail delivery fees, courier fees, and document preparation or “draw deed” fees that were not listed in its schedule of rates filed with the Department of Insurance in violation of Insurance Code 12401–12410.10, 12414.27. Fidelity argued that the lawsuit was barred by the statutory immunity in section 12414.26 for matters related to rate-making. The trial court rejected Fidelity’s immunity claim and granted Plaintiffs injunctive relief under the UCL, but denied their restitution claims. The court of appeal reversed. Fidelity’s immunity defense is not subject to the forfeiture doctrine because it implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction; this claim is subject to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner because it challenges Fidelity’s activity related to rate-making. The court directed the trial court to enter a new order awarding costs to Fidelity. View "Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co." on Justia Law

Bayer AG, maker and marketer of One A Day brand vitamins, was sued in California Superior Court for alleged violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Unfair Competition Law and express warranty law. Plaintiff William Brady’s theory was that Bayer’s packaging of its “Vitacraves Adult Multivitamin” line of gummies was misleading. Brady argued that despite the One A Day brand name, these particular vitamins require a daily dosage of two gummies to get the recommended daily values. Thus buyers end up receiving only half the daily vitamin coverage they think they are getting. The initial complaint was filed as a class action in March 2016, followed by an amended complaint in April, followed by a demurrer in May. The trial court, relying on the unpublished Howard v. Bayer Corp., E. D. Ark. July 22, 2011 (2011 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 161583) involving the supposedly misleading packaging of Bayer’s One A Day gummies, sustained Bayer’s demurrer without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal concluded Bayer failed to appreciate the degree to which their trade name One a Day has inspired reliance in consumers, and held an action alleging they violated California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Unfair Competition Law and express warranty law should have survived demurrer. View "Brady v. Bayer Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the guardianship of a ten-year-old child, Jane Doe II (“Jane”), whose parents passed away in 2017. A family friend petitioned for guardianship; Jane's aunt (twin sister of her mother) also petitioned for guardianship. A guardian ad litem recommended the friend be awarded temporary guardianship for Jane to finish the school year, then the aunt be permanent guardian. The friend appealed. The final decree appointing Aunt as Jane’s permanent guardian was vacated by the Idaho Supreme Court, which remanded the case for the magistrate court to conduct a hearing to determine whether Jane possessed sufficient maturity to direct her own attorney prior to a new trial. View "Western Community Ins v. Burks Tractor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer (the City), a law firm, and CBC, alleging that defendants violated their obligations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), in handling a consumer report that she agreed to provide as part of her application for employment with the City. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the City and law firm for failure to state a claim and granted judgment on the pleadings for CBC. The Eighth Circuit held that plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring her claims in federal court. In this case, plaintiff failed to plead an intangible injury to her privacy that was sufficient to confer Article III standing and there was no well-pleaded allegation that the City acted beyond her consent. Furthermore, plaintiff's claims of reputational harm, compromised security and lost time did not establish Article III standing. Likewise, plaintiff lacked standing to pursue her claim that the City's law firm and CBC violated her rights under the Act. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's orders and remanded with instructions that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Auer v. CBCInnovis, Inc." on Justia Law

Allied offered Robertson a job, but ran a background check before she reported to work. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) 15 U.S.C. 1681a(d)(1), Robertson claims that Allied violated a requirement to notify her “clear[ly] and conspicuous[ly],” in writing, unadorned by additional information, of its intent to obtain the report and to secure her consent (notice claim). Non‐conviction information appeared in Robertson’s background check. Allied revoked its offer. An employer that relies on a background check for an adverse employment decision must provide the applicant with a copy of the report and a written description of her rights under FCRA before acting. Allied provided neither (adverse action claim). After mediation, the parties reached a tentative settlement. Months later, the Supreme Court held that federal jurisdiction exists only if the plaintiff has alleged an injury that is concrete and particular. Months later, Robertson moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) for preliminary approval of the settlement and for certification of two settlement classes. The court rejected, as “simply wrong,” Robertson’s assertion that it could approve the settlement without jurisdiction over the underlying case and dismissed the case for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to the adverse action claim. Allied’s alleged violations of the Act caused Robertson concrete injury. Dismissal of the notice claim was proper because authority to adjudicate must exist before a court can resolve the case, even if that resolution is only a Rule 23(e) fairness hearing, followed by approval of a settlement. View "Robertson v. Allied Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant in an action alleging that the law firm violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Plaintiff alleged that his rights were violated under the FDCPA where, after he received his cease letter, the firm sent him a garnishment summons cover letter and tried to collect the underlying debt during a September phone call. The court held that the district court did not fail to apply the unsophisticated consumer standard where plaintiff's experience in debt collection and FDCPA litigation belies his grievance; the law firm did not violate plaintiff's rights by briefly discussing a possible resolution of the debt during the phone call, because plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly waived his cease letter for purposes of allowing the debt collector to answer his question after plaintiff called to ask a question about the underlying debt; the court agreed with the district court's assessment that plaintiff's call was an unsubtle and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to provoke the debt collector into committing an FDCPA violation; and the letter accompanying the garnishment summons was accurate. View "Scheffler v. Gurstel Chargo, P.A." on Justia Law

In 2014, Michael Messier and Kay Bushman were involved in an auto accident. Both were the drivers of their respective vehicles and were then-alleged to be Vermont residents. In 2017, shortly before the statute of limitations was to expire, Messier filed suit against Bushman and her auto insurer, Travelers, for damages he claimed to have sustained in the accident. The claim against Bushman sounded in negligence, the claim against Travelers asserted breach of the Vermont Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Bushman and a motion to dismiss filed by Travelers. Messier appeals both decisions. The Vermont Supreme Court determined the motion filed by Bushman was one that challenged the sufficiency of service of process: the trial court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, found that Messier did not send a copy of the return of service on the Commissioner to Bushman as required by 12 V.S.A. 892(a). The Supreme Court reversed as to Bushman's motion because the issues concerning what was included in the mailing and whether the affidavit contained sufficient specificity to comply with section 892(a) were contested and needed to be resolved through factual determination by the trial court. Regarding Messier's claim against Travelers, the Supreme Court found his claim was brought under the CPA, but references unfair claims settlement practices which were part of Vermont Insurance Trade Practices Acts (ITPA). The Court found Messier did not purchase anything from Travelers- his only connection was that Bushman was insured by Travelers. Thus, Messier was not a consumer with respect to Bushman's Travelers insurance policy, and therefore had to CPA claim against them. The case was remanded for further proceedings with respect to the claim against Bushman; dismissal of the claim against Travelers was affirmed. View "Messier v. Bushman" on Justia Law