Simm, a debt collection agency, sent plaintiffs collection letters, stating: CLIENT: PAYPAL CREDIT ORIGINAL CREDITOR: Comenity Capital Bank; giving the balance and origination date; and stating that, upon the debtor’s request, Simm will provide “the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.” Plaintiffs filed purported class actions (consolidated on appeal) under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging Simm violated 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(2) by failing to disclose the current creditor or owner of the debt and that the letter was false, deceptive, or misleading. The court granted Simm summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The letter identifies a single “creditor,” as well as the commercial name to which the debtors had been exposed, allowing the debtors to easily recognize the nature of the debt. It is true the letter identifies Comenity as the “original” instead of “current” creditor but the FDCPA does not require the use of any specific terminology to identify the creditor. The letter does not identify any creditor other than Comenity, which might have led to consumer confusion. By informing debtors they could request the name of the original creditor if different from the current creditor, the letter alerts debtors the original and current creditor may be the same. View "Nieto v. Simm Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue were claims of fraudulent sales practices by two car dealerships that allegedly induced consumers to enter into agreements for the purchase of cars. The question presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s review was whether plaintiffs could avoid being compelled to arbitrate those claims. Plaintiffs challenged the formation and validity of their sales agreements on the bases that the dealerships’ fraudulent practices and misrepresentations induced them to sign the transactional documents and that the agreements were invalid due to violations of statutory consumer fraud requirements. As part of the overall set of documents, plaintiffs signed arbitration agreements. Those agreements contained straightforward and conspicuous language that broadly delegated arbitrability issues. Each trial court determined the arbitration agreements to be enforceable and entered orders compelling plaintiffs to litigate their various claims challenging the overall validity of the sales contracts in the arbitral forum. The Appellate Division reversed those orders. The Supreme Court reversed: “the trial courts’ resolution of these matters was correct and consistent with clear rulings from the United States Supreme Court that bind state and federal courts on how challenges such as plaintiffs’ should proceed. Those rulings do not permit threshold issues about overall contract validity to be resolved by the courts when the arbitration agreement itself is not specifically challenged. Here, plaintiffs attack the sales contracts in their entirety, not the language or clarity of the agreements to arbitrate or the broad delegation clauses contained in those signed arbitration agreements.” View "Goffe v. Foulke Management Corp." on Justia Law

Casillas allegedly owed a debt to Harvester. Madison sent Casillas a letter demanding payment. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act requires a debt collector to give consumers written notice, 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a), including a description of two mechanisms that the debtor can use to verify her debt. A consumer can notify the debt collector “in writing” that she disputes all or part of the debt, which obligates the debt collector to obtain verification and mail a copy to the debtor or a consumer can make a “written request” that the debt collector provide her with the name and address of the original creditor. Madison’s notice neglected to specify that Casillas’s notification or request under those provisions must be in writing. Casillas filed a class action. She did not allege that she planned to dispute the debt or verify that Harvester was actually her creditor. The Act renders a debt collector liable for “fail[ing] to comply with any provision.” She sought to recover a $1000 statutory penalty for herself and a $5000 statutory penalty for unnamed class members, plus attorneys’ fees and costs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. A plaintiff cannot satisfy the injury‐in‐fact element of Article III standing simply by alleging that the defendant violated a disclosure provision of a consumer‐protection statute. Absent an allegation that Madison’s violation had caused harm or put Casillas at an appreciable risk of harm, Casillas lacked standing to sue. View "Casillas v. Madison Avenue Associates, Inc" on Justia Law

In this appeal concerned two City of Cranston ordinances that promulgated a ten-year suspension of the cost-of-living adjustment benefit for retirees of the Cranston Police Department and Cranston Fire Department who were enrolled in the City's pension plan the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court finding in favor of Defendants, holding that the superior court did not err in its judgment. The Cranston Police Retirees Action Committee (Plaintiff) brought this action against the City, Mayor Allan Fung, and members of the Cranston City Council (collectively, Defendants) alleging claims ranging from constitutional violations to statutory infringements. A superior court justice found in favor of Defendants on all counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court justice did not err by (1) finding that the ordinances did not violate the Contract Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions; (2) applying the burden of proof in the Contract Clause analysis; (3) applying expert testimony; (4) granting summary judgment for the City as to Takings Clause, res judicata, and Rhode Island Open Meetings Act claims; and (5) ruling on an assortment of motions and in her findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Cranston Police Retirees Action Committee v. City of Cranston" on Justia Law

A group of customers filed suit against SuperValu after hackers accessed customer financial information from hundreds of grocery stores operated by defendant. The Eighth Circuit previously affirmed the dismissal of all but one of the suit's named plaintiffs for lack of standing and, on remand, the district court dismissed the remaining plaintiff for failure to state a claim and denied plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend. The court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for leave to amend because plaintiffs' postjudgment motion was untimely. The court also held that the remaining plaintiff's allegations fell short of stating a claim for relief under Illinois law for negligence, consumer protection, implied, contract, and unjust enrichment. View "Alleruzzo v. SuperValu, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Dish Network, alleging that its sales representative, Satellite Systems Network (SSN), routinely violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by calling numbers on the national Do-Not-Call registry. After the district court certified the class, the case went to trial and Dish ultimately lost. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly applied the law and prudently exercised its discretion. The court rejected Dish's challenges to class certification and held that the class certified by the district court complied with Article III's requirements; the court rejected Dish's claims of error under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and held that the TCPA supported class-wide resolution of this class; and the court rejected Dish's challenges to the jury findings and held that there was ample evidence for the district court's rationales in the record produced at trial. View "Krakauer v. Dish Network" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants in a putative class action against American Honda Finance and other dealerships. Plaintiff alleged that defendants failed to provide add-ons that were promised in the Dealer Addendum when plaintiff bought his new Honda. The panel affirmed and held that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action at the time of removal because the Class Action Fairness Act's home state exception barred the exercise of jurisdiction. However, the panel held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction at the time it rendered a final decision on the merits, because plaintiff voluntarily amended his complaint to assert a federal Truth in Lending Act claim. On the merits, the panel held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the dealership defendants and American Honda Finance. In this case, plaintiff had not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was promised an add-on that he did not receive. The panel also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's request for more time for discovery. View "Singh v. American Honda Finance" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting judgment on the pleadings and dismissing Appellants' cause of action against the Kroger Company, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting judgment on the pleadings. In their complaint, Appellants alleged that Kroger had violated Ark. Code Ann. 4-75-501(a)(2) through its Kroger Plus Card policies and procedures. Thereafter, the General Assembly passed a bill that was signed into law (Act 850) that defined that parameters of section 4-75-501 in a way that was not previously set forth in the statute. Kroger moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the circuit court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Act 850 cannot be given retroactive application; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by applying the "functional availability" doctrine in dismissing the complaint; and (3) the absence of any factual allegation regarding the mens rea was fatal to this cause of action. View "Rhodes v. The Kroger Co." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Thomson Reuters' motion for summary judgment in an action alleging claims under the Federal Consumer Reporting Act (FCRA). Plaintiff filed suit after a background check performed using Thomson Reuters' subscription-based internet platform, "CLEAR," falsely reported that plaintiff had been previously convicted of theft. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that Thomson Reuters is not a "consumer reporting agency" and was therefore not subject to the FCRA. In this case, Thomson Reuters did not intend for its CLEAR platform to furnish "consumer reports." View "Kidd v. Thomson Reuters Corp." on Justia Law

Fifth Third Bank’s “Early Access” program is a short-term lending option for certain customers who hold eligible checking accounts. Fifth Third deposited Early Access loans straight into borrowers’ accounts, then paid itself back automatically, with a 10% “transaction fee,” after a direct deposit posted or 35 days elapsed, whichever came first. The contract governing the program disclosed the annual percentage rate (APR) as 120% in all cases. Plaintiffs obtained Early Access loans, which were paid back fewer than 30 days later. They contend that the 120% figure is false and misleading. Calculated using a more conventional method, in which the APR is tied to the length of the loan, plaintiffs assert that the APR was actually as high as 3650%. The district court rejected an Ohio law breach-of-contract claim, holding that the contract unambiguously disclosed the method for calculating APR despite admitting that the result “may be misleading.” The Sixth Circuit reversed. The contract was ambiguous because it provided different descriptions of “APR” that cannot be reconciled. The first was a definition, lifted verbatim from a federal regulation, that describes the APR as being “expressed as a yearly rate”; the second was the method used to calculate it, which is not based on any time period. The ambiguity raises a question of fact that should be resolved on remand. View "Laskaris v. Fifth Third Bank" on Justia Law