Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Lea and Samantha Johnson obtained a mortgage loan serviced by Freedom Mortgage Corporation and made regular payments. After filing for bankruptcy in March 2020, they reaffirmed the loan, but were required to pay by mail and instructed to include their loan number with each payment. In April 2020, Lea mailed a cashier’s check for their monthly payment, but did not put the loan number on the check itself. Freedom Mortgage received the check but could not identify the correct account to credit, as the check did not match the payment amount and only listed Samantha’s name, a common name among its customers. As a result, the payment was not credited and the Johnsons’ account was marked past due, which was subsequently reported to credit agencies. After realizing the issue, the Johnsons sent a new check with the loan number and the payment was credited, but their credit reports reflected a late payment.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota found there was no material dispute about the accuracy of Freedom Mortgage’s reporting and granted summary judgment to the defendant. The court determined that the payment was in fact late because the first check did not comply with the required instructions, and therefore the information reported to the credit agencies was accurate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. The court held that Freedom Mortgage’s investigation into the Johnsons’ credit dispute was reasonable given the conclusory nature of the dispute letters. The court also found that the reported late payment was accurate under both the standard and heightened accuracy tests, and declined to adopt a heightened standard of accuracy. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Freedom Mortgage. View "Johnson v. Freedom Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

The State of Ohio brought a lawsuit in state court against several pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and related entities, alleging they conspired to artificially inflate prescription drug prices in violation of Ohio law. Ohio claimed that the PBMs, acting as intermediaries between drug manufacturers and health plans, negotiated rebates and fees in a manner that increased drug list prices and extracted payments from pharmacies, harming consumers and violating state antitrust and consumer protection statutes. The PBMs provided services to both private clients and federal health plans, including those for federal employees and military personnel.The defendants, Express Scripts and Prime Therapeutics, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under the federal officer removal statute, arguing that their negotiations on drug prices were conducted on behalf of both federal and non-federal clients in a unified process subject to federal oversight. Ohio moved to remand the case to state court, asserting that its claims did not target conduct directed by federal officers and disclaimed any challenge to the administration of federal health programs like FEHBA or TRICARE. The district court accepted Ohio’s disclaimer and determined that the complaint did not impose liability for acts under federal direction, granting Ohio’s motion to remand.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the matter de novo. The court held that the PBMs were “persons acting under” federal officers because their negotiations were performed under detailed federal supervision and regulation for federal health plans. The court further found that the complaint related to acts under color of federal office, as the alleged wrongful conduct was inseparable from federally directed negotiations. The court also determined that the PBMs raised colorable federal defenses based on federal preemption. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings in federal court. View "Ohio ex rel. Yost v. Ascent Health Services, LLC" on Justia Law

An individual seeking to refinance his mortgage visited a website that offers mortgage information and referrals to affiliated lenders. During three separate visits, he entered personal information and clicked buttons labeled “Calculate” or “Calculate your FREE results.” Immediately below these buttons, the website displayed language in small font stating that clicking would constitute consent to the site’s Terms of Use, which included a mandatory arbitration provision and permission to be contacted by the site or affiliates. The Terms of Use were accessible via a hyperlinked phrase. After using the site, the individual was matched with a particular lender but did not pursue refinancing. Later, he received multiple unwanted calls from the lender and filed a class-action lawsuit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, alleging violations such as calling numbers on the Do Not Call registry.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan initially dismissed the complaint on the merits and denied the lender’s motion to compel arbitration as moot. Upon realizing the arbitration issue should have been decided first, the court reopened the case but found no enforceable agreement to arbitrate existed, denying the motion to compel arbitration. The court also denied reconsideration and allowed the plaintiff to amend his complaint. The lender appealed the denial of arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the denial de novo. It held that, under California law, the website provided reasonably conspicuous notice that clicking the buttons would signify assent to the Terms of Use, including arbitration. The court found that the plaintiff’s conduct objectively manifested acceptance of the offer, forming a binding arbitration agreement. The court also concluded that the agreement was not invalid due to unspecified procedural details and that questions of arbitrability were delegated to the arbitrator. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Dahdah v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

The State of Iowa brought suit against several related corporate entities associated with the TikTok social media platform, alleging violations of the Iowa Consumer Frauds Act. The State claimed that TikTok misrepresented the safety and age-appropriateness of its app by maintaining a “12+” rating on app stores despite the presence of mature and inappropriate content. The app was widely downloaded and used in Iowa, with hundreds of thousands of devices in the state activating it. TikTok entered into terms of service agreements with Iowa users, collected location data, and targeted Iowa-specific advertisements, thereby generating revenue from its Iowa user base.In the Iowa District Court for Polk County, the TikTok entities moved to dismiss the State’s petition on several grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, finding that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendants and that the State had properly pleaded a valid claim. The district court also denied the State’s request for a temporary injunction, concluding that irreparable harm had not been shown. The defendants sought interlocutory review solely on the issue of personal jurisdiction, which was granted.Upon review, the Iowa Supreme Court found that the TikTok entities had sufficient minimum contacts with Iowa, having purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business in the state by entering into ongoing contractual relationships, collecting data, and serving targeted advertisements. The court concluded that the State’s claims “arose out of or related to” these contacts, and that exercising jurisdiction did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "State of Iowa, Ex Rel. Attorney General Brenna Bird v. Tiktok, Inc." on Justia Law

Nicholas Giovannelli, a United States Army veteran, was photographed in Afghanistan in 2009. The image appeared on a Department of Defense website and was later downloaded and licensed by Stocktrek Images to Posterazzi, which produced posters featuring Giovannelli’s likeness. These posters were sold online through retailers including Walmart, Pixels, Amazon, and Posterazzi. Giovannelli only learned of the commercial use of his image in 2020, when a friend discovered the posters online. Experiencing renewed PTSD symptoms, Giovannelli sued the companies for violating the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, which prohibits using a person’s identity for commercial purposes without consent.The lawsuits were removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and severed due to misjoinder. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Giovannelli’s claims were barred by the Act’s one-year statute of limitations. Each district judge—Edmond E. Chang, LaShonda A. Hunt, and Jeffrey I. Cummings—granted summary judgment for the defendants, citing Blair v. Nevada Landing Partnership, where the Illinois Appellate Court held that the limitations period starts when the photo is first published, not when the plaintiff discovers the use.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied de novo review. The court held that, under Illinois law and Blair, the single-publication rule governs claims under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act—so the statute of limitations begins at first publication. The court found no basis for applying the discovery rule, and the exception for “hidden, inherently undiscoverable, or inherently unknowable” publications did not apply since the image was publicly accessible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district courts’ judgments, finding Giovannelli’s claims time-barred. View "Giovannelli v Stocktrek Images, Inc." on Justia Law

Taylor L. Wood, her husband, and her son received medical care from physicians employed by Intermountain Emergency Physicians, PLLC (IEP). The resulting medical debt was assigned to Medical Recovery Services, LLC (MRS) for collection. After Wood’s attorneys alleged violations of state law, the Woods and IEP entered into a settlement that discharged the debt and provided payment to the Woods. Nevertheless, MRS later sued Wood to collect the same debt. Wood responded by counterclaiming and bringing IEP into the case as a third-party defendant, relying on the settlement agreement. MRS dismissed its complaint upon learning of the prior settlement, and all claims were eventually dismissed by the court.After judgment was entered, both sides sought a determination of the prevailing party and an award of attorney fees. The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County, found that Wood was the prevailing party over MRS and ordered MRS to pay Wood’s costs and attorney fees, concluding that MRS’s complaint was frivolous due to lack of proper investigation and communication regarding the settlement. MRS and IEP filed a first motion for reconsideration of the fees order, which was denied. They then filed a second motion for reconsideration, also denied, and subsequently appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s order awarding costs and attorney fees to Wood because MRS and IEP’s notice of appeal from that order was untimely under Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a). The court did have jurisdiction to review the denial of the second motion for reconsideration, but because MRS and IEP failed to provide argument or authority on that issue, they waived it. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the second motion for reconsideration. View "Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Wood" on Justia Law

More than one hundred individuals who became tenants at three apartment complexes in Los Angeles applied to rent from the property owners by filling out standard applications and paying $41.50 screening fees. The landlords used these fees to obtain credit and background reports. The plaintiffs alleged that the landlords violated California’s Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA) by failing to disclose the scope of the investigations, the identity of the reporting agencies, the right to inspect information, and by not providing copies of the consumer reports. Three plaintiffs also asserted a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) based on the same alleged violations.After consolidating the cases, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment for the defendants, reasoning that none of the plaintiffs had shown actual damages or concrete injury resulting from the alleged ICRAA violations, and thus lacked standing. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ UCL claims failed for similar reasons, as they did not lose money or property due to the alleged conduct.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, held that the plaintiffs have standing to pursue their ICRAA claims because the statute provides a $10,000 minimum recovery for violations without requiring proof of actual damages or concrete injury. The court found that the statutory remedy is punitive and serves to deter violations, granting standing based on the violation itself. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the UCL claims, concluding that plaintiffs did not suffer an “injury in fact” or lose money or property as required for UCL standing. The judgment was therefore reversed as to the ICRAA claims, affirmed as to the UCL claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Yeh v. Barrington Pacific" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff purchased a new Hyundai vehicle that experienced repeated mechanical issues, leading to seven repair attempts over 19 months. After the buyer or his wife requested Hyundai repurchase the vehicle, it was involved in a collision and declared a total loss. The wife’s insurer paid her for the vehicle’s loss. The plaintiffs—comprised of the buyer and his wife—then sued Hyundai under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, alleging breach of express warranty, among other claims. After some claims were dismissed, only the express warranty claim proceeded to trial.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County allowed the wife to join as a plaintiff, even after finding she was not the buyer, based on the belief that prior precedent allowed her to proceed. The jury returned a verdict for both plaintiffs, awarding damages and prejudgment interest, but the court reduced the damages by the amount of the insurance payment and adjusted the interest calculation. Both sides filed post-trial motions regarding prejudgment interest and costs, and both appealed aspects of the judgment and cost rulings.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that only a “buyer” as defined by the Act has standing to pursue claims under it; since the wife was not a buyer, she lacked standing and should not have been a party. The court also ruled that insurance payouts received after a vehicle is totaled cannot reduce the statutory restitution owed by the manufacturer under the Act. Additionally, the court found that prejudgment interest is available under Civil Code section 3288. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest and reconsideration of costs. View "Towns v. Hyundai Motor America" on Justia Law

Daevieon Towns purchased a new Hyundai Elantra in 2016, and over the next 19 months, the car required multiple repairs for alleged electrical and engine defects. In March 2018, either Towns or his wife, Lashona Johnson, requested that Hyundai buy back the defective vehicle. Before Hyundai acted, the car was involved in a collision, declared a total loss, and Johnson’s insurance paid her $14,710.91.Towns initially sued Hyundai Motor America in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. As trial approached, Towns amended his complaint to add Johnson as a plaintiff, arguing she was the primary driver and responsible for the vehicle. The trial court allowed the amendment, finding Johnson was not a buyer but permitted her to proceed based on its interpretation of Patel v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC. At trial, the jury found for Towns and Johnson, awarding damages and civil penalties. However, the court reduced the damages by the insurance payout and adjusted the prejudgment interest accordingly. Both parties challenged the judgment and costs in post-trial motions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that only a buyer has standing under the Act, so Johnson could not be a plaintiff. The court also held that third-party insurance payments do not reduce statutory damages under the Act, following the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC. Furthermore, prejudgment interest is available under Civil Code section 3288 because Hyundai’s statutory obligations do not arise from contract. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the trial court to enter a modified judgment and reconsider costs. View "Towns v. Hyundai Motor America" on Justia Law

The case involves an Arizona resident who received an unsolicited text message on his cell phone during the 2020 presidential election campaign. The message, sent by the Republican National Committee, included written text and an automatically downloaded video file featuring a still image of Ivanka Trump with a play button overlay. The plaintiff alleged the video contained an artificial or prerecorded voice and stated he never gave prior express consent to receive such messages. He claimed the message was part of a broader campaign targeting Arizona residents.In the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, the plaintiff filed a putative class action, alleging violations of two provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA): 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) and § 227(b)(1)(B), both prohibiting calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice without prior consent. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the statute did not apply because the recipient had to actively press play to hear the video’s audio, and, for the § 227(b)(1)(B) claim, because the message was exempted under FCC regulations for certain nonprofit organizations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the TCPA’s prohibitions apply only to the use of artificial or prerecorded voices in the manner in which a call is begun. Because the text message was made and initiated without the automatic playing of a prerecorded voice—the recipient had to affirmatively choose to play the video—the conduct did not violate the statutory provisions. The court concluded that sending a text message containing a video file that requires recipient interaction to play does not constitute “making” or “initiating” a call “using” a prerecorded voice under the TCPA. View "HOWARD V. REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE" on Justia Law