Husband and wife paid $83,475 for a new Volvo T8, plus $2,700 for a charging station. Volvo’s advertisements claimed that the T8’s battery range was 25 miles. In practice their T8 averaged a eight-10 miles of battery‐only driving. Husband filed suit, asserting a class of others similarly situated under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), and received a letter from Volvo that offered “a full refund upon return of the vehicle if you are not satisfied with it for any reason” and to “arrange to pick up your vehicle.” The next day Volvo moved to dismiss husband’s suit on the theory that he lacked standing because only his wife was on the car’s title. Before the court ruled on the motion, his wife was added to the complaint. Volvo moved to dismiss, contending that she lacked standing because its letter had offered complete relief before she filed suit. The district judge agreed and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, seeing “no reason why the timing of the offer has such a powerful effect. Offers do not bind recipients until they are accepted. An unaccepted pre‐litigation offer does not deprive a plaintiff of her day in court. View "Laurens v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC" on Justia Law

Anaya Law Group, a debt collector, filed suit in state court to collect an unpaid credit card debt, but the complaint overstated both debtor's principal due and the applicable interest rate. Debtor then filed suit against Anaya in federal court for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and of California's Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Anaya. The Ninth Circuit held, however, that the false statements made by Anaya were material because they could have disadvantaged a hypothetical debtor in deciding how to respond to the complaint. Accordingly, the panel vacated summary judgment as to the FDCPA claim and remanded. In regard to the Rosenthal Act claim, the panel affirmed summary judgment on an alternative ground. The panel held that Anaya corrected the misstatements within fifteen days of discovering the violation and thus satisfied the requirements necessary to avail itself of a defense under the Rosenthal Act. View "Afewerki v. Anaya Law Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against SPS for damages under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to SPS, holding that SPS successfully invoked section 3500.21(e)(1) by directing borrowers to mail qualified written requests (QWRs) to a particular office, even though it used that office for other purposes as well. Because plaintiff failed to address his QWR to SPS's designated address for QWR receipt, SPS had no duty to respond to it. View "Bivens v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against SPS for damages under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to SPS, holding that SPS successfully invoked section 3500.21(e)(1) by directing borrowers to mail qualified written requests (QWRs) to a particular office, even though it used that office for other purposes as well. Because plaintiff failed to address his QWR to SPS's designated address for QWR receipt, SPS had no duty to respond to it. View "Bivens v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

Gerboc used the Wish Marketplace website to buy portable speakers for $27. Sellers on Wish can include a Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price, which appears (crossed-out) on a product’s “detail page.” Gerboc saw “$300” next to the speakers’ purchase price. Gerboc believed the crossed-out price was a promise of a 90% markdown but the speakers allegedly never sold for $300. Gerboc decided that he never received the promised discount and filed suit on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated buyers. Arguing that Wish’s price visuals are deceptive, he alleged breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, and violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (OCSPA). ContextLogic removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). Gerboc abandoned his contract claim; the court dismissed his unjust enrichment, fraud, and class OCSPA claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Gerboc did not establish unjust enrichment; he got what he paid for. Nor did he establish the notice element of an OCSPA claim: The consumer must show either that the Ohio Attorney General had already “declared [the seller’s practice] to be deceptive or unconscionable” or that an Ohio court had already “determined [the practice] . . . violate[s] [the OCSPA]” before the seller engaged in it. View "Gerboc v. ContextLogic, Inc." on Justia Law

To establish a concrete injury for purposes of Article III standing, the plaintiff must allege a statutory violation that caused him to suffer some harm that actually exists in the world. There must be an injury that is "real" and not "abstract" or merely "procedural." On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an action alleging willful violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. In this case, plaintiff alleged that Spokeo failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information in his consumer report. The panel was satisfied that plaintiff had alleged injuries that were sufficiently concrete for the purposes of Article III; the alleged injuries were also sufficiently particularized to plaintiff and they were caused by Spokeo's alleged FCRA violations and were redressable in court; and therefore plaintiff had adequately alleged the elements necessary for standing. Accordingly, the court remanded. View "Robins v. Spokeo, Inc." on Justia Law

Daphne Automotive, LLC, and its employee, Robin Sanders appealed a circuit court order denying their motion to compel arbitration of the claims filed against them by Eastern Shore Neurology Clinic, Inc. ("Eastern Shore"), and Rassan Tarabein. Tarabein owned Eastern Shore and another company, Infotec, Inc. Tarabein hired his nephew, Mohamad Tarbin, as an employee of Infotec. As part of the nephew's compensation, Tarabein agreed to provide him with the use of a vehicle for as long as he was employed with Infotec. Accordingly, Tarabein purchased, through Eastern Shore, a vehicle from Daphne Automotive. Tarabein, the nephew, and the dealership agreed that the dealership would arrange for the vehicle to be titled in the nephew's name, but that Eastern Shore would be listed on the title as lienholder. In conjunction with the sale, the nephew signed the sales contract, which contained an arbitration clause. Tarabein executed only the documents to establish Eastern Shore as lienholder on the title for the vehicle. In January 2014, the Department of Revenue issued an original certificate of title for the vehicle that listed no lienholders to the nephew. A few months later, the nephew was terminated from his job with Infotec, and Tarabein attempted to take back the vehicle, but the nephew refused. According to Tarabein, the dealership never informed him that it had failed to list Eastern Shore as a lienholder on the application for the certificate of title. As a result, the nephew held title to the vehicle free and clear, and Eastern Shore held a reissued certificate of title for the same vehicle, listing it as lienholder. Eastern Short attempted to repossess the vehicle; the nephew avoided being arrested by producing the free-and-clear title to the vehicle. According to Tarabein, he became aware of the existence of the second certificate of title after the attempted arrest. Tarabein thereafter sued the dealership for a variety of claims; the dealer moved to compel arbitration. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the dealership failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of a contract calling for arbitration: the sales contract was limited in its scope with respect to disputes arising to parties to the contract and the agreements, here, between the nephew and the dealership. Accordingly, the Court found the trial court did not err in denying the dealership’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Daphne Automotive, LLC v. Eastern Shore Neurology Clinic, Inc." on Justia Law

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227 et seq., permits a consumer to partially revoke her consent to be called by means of an automatic telephone dialing system. The Eleventh Circuit thought it logical that a consumer's power under the TCPA to completely withdraw consent and thereby stop all future automated calls encompasses the power to partially withdraw consent and stop calls during certain times. In this case, the court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff partially revoked her consent to be called in "the morning" and "during the workday" on the October 13 phone call with a Comenity employee. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Schweitzer v. Comenity Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Royal under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, seeking to hold Royal vicariously liable for several telephone calls made by telemarketers employed by AAAP. The Ninth Circuit applied the ten non-exhaustive factors set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency 220(2) (1958), and found that AAAP's telemarketers were acting as independent contractors rather than as Royal's agents. Therefore, the court held that Royal was not vicariously liable for the telephone calls and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Royal. View "Jones v. Royal Administration Services" on Justia Law

Over about 18 months, Groshek submitted 562 job applications to employers. The job application, which the employers provided, included a disclosure and authorization form stating that a consumer report might be procured in making the employment decision; the form also contained other information, including a liability release. After Groshek submitted the application, with the signed disclosure and authorization, the employers obtained a consumer report on him from a third party. Groshek filed a class-action suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, which prohibits a prospective employer from procuring a consumer report for employment purposes unless a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the job applicant before the report is procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure. A consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes only if the applicant has authorized its procurement in writing. Groshek alleged that the violation of the "stand-alone document requirement" was willful and that, as a result, the employers failed to obtain a valid authorization before procuring a consumer report. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Groshek has not alleged facts demonstrating a real, concrete appreciable risk of harm and lacks Article III standing. View "Groshek v. Great Lakes Higher Education Corp." on Justia Law