Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Janice Hollabaugh authorized her attorney to request her medical records from a health care provider for a personal injury claim. The provider contracted with MRO Corporation to fulfill the request. MRO sent a "Cancellation Invoice" to Hollabaugh’s attorney, stating that the request was canceled and charged a $22.88 fee for searching for the records, even though no records were produced. Hollabaugh reimbursed her attorney for the fee and subsequently filed a class action lawsuit against MRO, alleging that the fee violated the Confidentiality of Medical Records Act.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County determined that Hollabaugh had standing but concluded that the Act authorized MRO’s fee, leading to the dismissal of the case. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the standing decision but also upheld the fee's authorization under the Act. Hollabaugh then petitioned the Supreme Court of Maryland, which granted certiorari to review the case.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that Hollabaugh had standing to sue because she reimbursed her attorney for the fee, creating a reasonable inference of injury. The Court further held that the Confidentiality of Medical Records Act does not permit a health care provider to charge a preparation fee for a search that does not result in the production of any medical records. The Court reasoned that the statutory language and context imply that fees are only authorized for the retrieval and preparation of existing records. Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision on standing but reversed the decision regarding the fee's authorization, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Hollabaugh v. MRO Corporation" on Justia Law

Melissa Wanna discovered her profile on MyLife, an information broker, which contained a poor reputation score and references to court records. MyLife offered to provide details or remove the profile for a fee. Believing she lost employment opportunities due to this profile, Wanna filed a class action lawsuit against several Lexis entities, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), and the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), along with several Minnesota state law claims.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Wanna’s claims, concluding that MyLife was not Lexis’s agent. The court found that the data-licensing agreement between Lexis and MyLife explicitly stated that their relationship was that of independent contractors, not principal and agent. As a result, Wanna’s federal claims, which depended on an agency relationship, failed. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Wanna’s state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed the dismissal. The appellate court agreed that Wanna’s federal claims required an agency relationship between Lexis and MyLife, which was not established. The court found that MyLife did not have actual or apparent authority to act on Lexis’s behalf, nor did Lexis ratify MyLife’s actions. Additionally, the appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "Wanna v. RELX Group, PLC" on Justia Law

Vivos Therapeutics, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Ortho-Tain, Inc. in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The lawsuit stemmed from communications made by Ortho-Tain’s CEO and attorney to Benco Dental Supply, alleging that Vivos misrepresented Ortho-Tain’s products as its own. Vivos’s amended complaint included claims for false advertising under the Lanham Act, violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, libel per se, slander per se, intentional interference with contractual relations, and a declaratory judgment that Vivos did not violate the Lanham Act.The District Court for the District of Colorado denied Ortho-Tain’s motion to dismiss, which argued that certain claims should be dismissed based on the Colorado litigation privilege. Ortho-Tain appealed the denial, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit previously held that it lacked jurisdiction over the denial of immunity for Neff’s communications due to disputed factual issues. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider whether the communications were made in good faith contemplation of litigation.On remand, the district court again denied Ortho-Tain’s motion to dismiss, stating that it would not make a factual determination on whether the communications were made in good faith at the pleading stage. Ortho-Tain appealed this decision, arguing that the district court failed to properly analyze the good faith of the communications.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that it could not review the district court’s denial of immunity because it involved disputed factual issues. Without jurisdiction over the denial of immunity, the Tenth Circuit also declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the remaining interlocutory rulings. View "Vivos Therapeutics. v. Ortho-Tain" on Justia Law

In March 2021, the district attorneys of Riverside, San Diego, Los Angeles, and Santa Clara counties filed a civil enforcement action against Credit One Bank, N.A. (Credit One) on behalf of the People of the State of California. The lawsuit alleged that Credit One engaged in debt collection practices that violated California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Unfair Competition Law. The People sought injunctive relief, civil penalties, restitution, and other equitable relief. Credit One responded with written discovery requests and later noticed the deposition of the People’s person most qualified (PMQ) to testify on 25 topics, including two document requests.The trial court denied the People’s motion to quash the deposition notice but instructed them to refile it as a motion for a protective order. The court granted the protective order in part, limiting the deposition topics and document requests but requiring the People to designate a PMQ. The People challenged this order, arguing that they should not be subject to deposition under the Code of Civil Procedure and that the deposition would be tantamount to deposing opposing counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the People, represented by government agencies, are subject to deposition under section 2025.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the court agreed that deposing the People in this context is effectively deposing opposing counsel. Therefore, the court applied the standard from Carehouse Convalescent Hospital v. Superior Court, requiring Credit One to demonstrate “extremely” good cause for the deposition. The trial court had not applied this standard, so the appellate court granted the petition and ordered the trial court to reconsider the People’s motion for a protective order using the correct standard. View "People v. Superior Ct. (Credit One Bank)" on Justia Law

Carmen Lamonaco sued Experian Information Solutions, Inc., alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act after a fraudulent auto loan appeared on her credit report. She claimed Experian failed to implement reasonable procedures to ensure credit report accuracy and did not conduct a proper reinvestigation. Experian moved to compel arbitration based on a clickwrap agreement that included an arbitration clause and a delegation clause. The District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the motion, concluding that Experian did not prove the existence of an agreement and had waived arbitration by engaging in litigation.The District Court found that Experian's declaration, which was based on internal records and described the enrollment process, lacked probative value because it did not attach the internal records or provide sufficient detail. The court also held that Experian waived its right to arbitration by participating in litigation activities such as answering the complaint, participating in a case management conference, and serving Rule 26 disclosures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that Experian provided competent and unrebutted evidence that Lamonaco agreed to the Terms of Use, which included the arbitration clause. The court also determined that the delegation clause in the agreement assigned the question of waiver to the arbitrator, not the court. Therefore, the District Court lacked the authority to decide the waiver issue. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case with instructions to grant Experian's motion to compel arbitration. View "Lamonaco v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Two brothers, Roland and Robert, ran an automotive business together under Guieb Inc. Their relationship deteriorated when Robert made decisions that Roland disagreed with, including using their company for his own benefit and allegedly stealing the trade name and most profitable shop for his personal companies. Roland sued Robert, alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices, unfair methods of competition, and deceptive trade practices under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 480-2 and 481A-3. He also sought punitive damages for fraud, misrepresentation, nondisclosure, and breach of fiduciary duty.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted Robert’s motion for partial summary judgment (MPSJ) and dismissed Roland’s claims under count 12, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The court also granted Robert’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on punitive damages, preventing the jury from considering them. Additionally, the court ruled that brotherhood did not establish a fiduciary duty, granting Robert’s MPSJ on that issue as well.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed the circuit court on three issues. It held that Roland’s unfair and deceptive trade practices claim should have gone to the jury, as there was evidence that Robert represented Guieb Inc. and Guieb Group as the same entity. The ICA also held that the jury should have considered punitive damages, given the evidence of Robert’s actions that could justify such damages. Lastly, the ICA found that brotherhood created a kinship fiduciary duty, which should have been considered by the jury.The Supreme Court of Hawaii agreed with the ICA that the jury should have considered Roland’s claims under count 12 and punitive damages. However, it disagreed that kinship created a fiduciary duty, affirming the circuit court’s MPSJ on that issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Guieb v. Guieb" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Kimberly-Clark Corporation, alleging that the company falsely advertised its bathroom wipes as flushable, leading consumers to pay a premium and causing plumbing damage. The parties reached a settlement where Kimberly-Clark agreed to pay up to $20 million in compensation to the class and up to $4 million in attorney’s fees. However, class members claimed less than $1 million. The district court approved the settlement under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York approved the settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and adequate. Objector Theodore H. Frank appealed, arguing that the settlement disproportionately benefited class counsel, who received most of the monetary recovery. Frank contended that the district court failed to properly assess the allocation of recovery between the class and class counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Frank that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in its Rule 23(e) analysis. The appellate court clarified that Rule 23(e) requires courts to compare the proportion of total recovery allocated to the class with the proportion allocated to class counsel. The court vacated the district court’s order and judgment approving the settlement and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The appellate court did not reach a conclusion on whether the settlement was fair but emphasized the need for a proper proportionality analysis. View "Kurtz v. Kimberly-Clark Corp." on Justia Law

John Wertymer purchased two bottles of Walmart’s Great Value brand honey in June 2022, labeled “Raw Honey” and “Organic Raw Honey.” He claimed he paid a premium for these products due to their perceived nutritional and medicinal benefits. In April 2023, Wertymer sent the honey to a laboratory for testing, which allegedly showed that the honey was not raw. He then filed a diversity suit against Walmart, seeking to represent a nationwide class of purchasers, or alternatively, an Illinois class, alleging violations under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act and common law fraudulent misrepresentation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Wertymer’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief for lack of standing, which Wertymer did not appeal. The district court also dismissed the remainder of his claims, finding that the complaint failed to support any claims of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceptive practices.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court found that Wertymer’s complaint did not plausibly allege that Walmart committed a deceptive act. The court noted that Wertymer’s own allegations and sources indicated that elevated levels of 5-hydroxymethylfurfural (HMF) in honey could result from factors other than heating, such as storage conditions and geographic origin. The court also found that Wertymer’s claim regarding the presence of mannose in the “Organic Raw Honey” was speculative and unsupported by the sources cited in the complaint.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, concluding that Wertymer’s complaint was too speculative and failed to state a plausible claim for relief under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act or for common law fraudulent misrepresentation. View "Wertymer v Walmart Inc." on Justia Law

Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. (CAG) filed two lawsuits under Proposition 65 against Walmart Inc. and Wal-Mart.com USA, LLC (collectively, Walmart), alleging that Walmart failed to warn consumers about products containing chemicals known to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity. Michael Marcus, CAG’s Secretary and Chief Financial Officer, purchased the products online as a corporate agent for CAG. During the purchase process, Marcus agreed to Walmart’s Terms of Use, which included an arbitration clause.In the Alameda County Superior Court, Walmart filed petitions to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement Marcus accepted. The trial court denied Walmart’s petitions, concluding that Walmart failed to prove the existence of an agreement to arbitrate Proposition 65 claims, as the arbitration agreement only addressed the rights of the individual consumer and did not preclude an action brought by the state.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate a Proposition 65 claim against a seller of consumer products simply because an agent of the plaintiff previously agreed to arbitrate disputes with the seller when purchasing the products online. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s agent was not acting on behalf of the state, the real party in interest, when purchasing the products, and thus could not bind the state to arbitration. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court’s orders denying Walmart’s petitions to compel arbitration, as no agreement to arbitrate the Proposition 65 claims was formed. View "Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

23rd Psalm Trucking, L.L.C. entered into a four-year contract with the Madison Parish Police Jury on July 14, 2014, to collect and dispose of residential waste. The contract was extended for an additional three years, set to expire on July 14, 2021. However, due to fiscal concerns, the Police Jury rebid the contract in June 2020 and awarded it to another contractor, effective January 1, 2021. Psalm Trucking sued for breach of contract and unfair trade practices, claiming an estimated loss of $385,235.50.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Police Jury, finding the contract null and void under La. R.S. 39:1410.60 (A) because it was not approved by the State Bond Commission. The court also rejected Psalm Trucking’s detrimental reliance claim, noting the company did not seek legal advice before contracting. The Court of Appeal affirmed, agreeing that the Bond Commission’s approval was required for multi-year contracts without a non-appropriation clause.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that La. R.S. 33:4169.1 and La. R.S. 39:1410.60 must be read together, requiring Bond Commission approval for contracts that constitute debt. The court found the four-year contract constituted debt and was null and void without the Bond Commission’s approval. The court also agreed that Psalm Trucking failed to prove detrimental reliance against a governmental agency. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed. View "23rd Psalm Trucking, L.L.C. v. Madison Parish Police Jury" on Justia Law