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A debt collector engages in unfair or unconscionable litigation conduct in violation of section 1692f when, as alleged here, it in bad faith unduly prolongs legal proceedings or requires a consumer to appear at an unnecessary hearing. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of an action alleging that GMBS violated sections 1692e and 1692f of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e and 1692f, when it garnished plaintiff's bank account and then tried to block him from showing that all of the funds in his account were exempt from garnishment. In this case, GMBS was alleged to have violated each section based on different conduct: section 1692e based on the false statements made in GMBS's affirmation, and section 1692f based on GMBS's objection to plaintiff's exemption claim when it allegedly knew there was no legally sufficient basis to do so. The court held that the complaint stated a claim under sections 1692e and 1692f. View "Arias v. Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt LLP" on Justia Law

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In 2012, Respondent Allister Boustred, a Colorado resident, purchased a replacement main rotor holder for his radio-controlled helicopter from a retailer in Fort Collins, Colorado. The main rotor holder was allegedly manufactured by Petitioner Align Corporation Limited (“Align”), a Taiwanese corporation, and distributed by Respondent Horizon Hobby, Inc. (“Horizon”), a Delaware-based corporation. Align had no physical presence in the United States, but it contracted with U.S.-based distributors to sell its products to retailers who, in turn, sell them to consumers. Boustred installed the main rotor holder to his helicopter and was injured in Colorado when the blades held by the main rotor holder released and struck him in the eye. He filed claims of strict liability and negligence against both Align and Horizon in Colorado. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the stream of commerce doctrine and the prerequisites for a state to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), set out the controlling stream of commerce doctrine, which established that a forum state could assert jurisdiction where a plaintiff showed a defendant placed goods into the stream of commerce with the expectation that the goods will be purchased in the forum state. Applying this doctrine, the Court concluded Boustred made a sufficient showing to withstand a motion to dismiss. View "Align Corporation, Ltd. v. Boustred" on Justia Law

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California consumers who can seek in California state court an order requiring the manufacturer of an allegedly falsely advertised product to cease the false advertising may also seek such an order in federal court. A consumer's inability to rely in the future upon a representation made on a package, even if the consumer knew or continued to believe the same representation was false in the past, is an ongoing injury that may justify an order barring the false advertising.The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of an action alleging that Kimberly-Clark falsely advertised that four cleansing wipes they manufactured and sold were flushable. The action was filed in state court and then removed to federal court. The panel held that plaintiff plausibly alleged that Kimberly-Clark engaged in false advertising and that she will suffer further harm in the absence of an injunction. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp." on Justia Law

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Defendants manufacture and distribute FDA-approved prescription eye drop medications for treating conditions such as glaucoma. Bottles are pre-packaged with a fixed volume of medication; labeling does not indicate how many doses or days of treatment a patient can extract from the bottle. The dimensions of the bottle’s dropper tip dictate the size of the drop dispensed. Scientific research indicates that a normal adult’s inferior fornix – the area between the eye and the lower eyelid – has a capacity of approximately 7-10 microliters (µLs) of fluid. If a drop exceeding that capacity is placed into an eye, excess medication is expelled, providing no pharmaceutical benefit to the patient. Expelled medication also may flow into a patient’s tear ducts and move into his bloodstream, increasing the risk of certain harmful side effects. These studies conclude that eye drops should be 5-15 µLs. Defendants’ products emit drops that are considerably larger so that at least half of every drop goes to waste. The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of a putative class action (Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332) under state consumer protection statutes. The consumers’ allegations of injury were sufficient to confer standing. Plaintiffs claim economic interests in the money they spent on medication that was impossible for them to use; their concrete and particularized injury claims fit comfortably in categories of “legally protected interests” readily recognized by federal courts. View "Cottrell v. Alcon Laboratories" on Justia Law

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West Virginia’s consumer credit protection statute does not regulate the residential rental fees a landlord may charge a tenant pursuant to a lease for residential real property. The Attorney General filed a civil action against Defendant Landlord, one of the largest residential lessors in the state, alleging that Landlord’s residential leases included fees and charges that violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (CCPA), W.Va. Code 46A-1-101 et seq. Landlord filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the CCPA does not apply to residential leases. The circuit court denied the motion. Thereafter, the circuit court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the CCPA applies to the relationship between a landlord and tenant under a residential lease. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative. View "State ex rel. Morrisey v. Copper Beech Townhome Communities Twenty-Six, LLC" on Justia Law

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In these consolidated appeals, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to (1) dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under Massachusetts law for libel and intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, (2) bar portions of Plaintiffs’ Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A claim from going forward, and (3) award attorney’s fees and costs to Defendant. These consolidated appeals concerned a lawsuit that involved a number of claims arising under federal copyright law, state tort law, and chapter 93A. Defendant operated a website called RipoffReport.com. Plaintiffs were a Massachusetts attorney, a corporate entity that the attorney created, and Christian DuPont. Plaintiffs’ claims pertained to a dispute arising from two reports that DuPont authored and posted on the Ripoff Report and that were highly critical of the attorney. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s partial grant of Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant, and the district court’s fees award order for the reasons stated above. View "Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC" on Justia Law

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In this dispute concerning a liability insurance policy, the Supreme Court granted relief in prohibition to State Auto Property Insurance Companies, holding that State Auto was entitled to a dismissal of CMD Plus, Inc.’s third-party complaint as a matter of law. When Plaintiffs filed an action against CMD, a residential construction company, seeking recovery for damages to their house and property, CMD filed a third-party complaint against State Auto, its insurer, alleging that State Auto delayed investigating Plaintiffs’ claim, settling Plaintiffs’ lawsuit, and indemnifying CMD. In this petition for a writ of prohibition, State Auto challenged the circuit court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that relief in prohibition was warranted because the record showed that State Auto defended and indemnified CMD throughout the lawsuit as required by the commercial general liability policy, and the terms of the policy provided no coverage to CMD for damage to its own property. View "State ex rel. State Auto Property Insurance Cos. v. Honorable James C. Stucky" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in this class action finding that every class member suffered damage as a result of alleged misrepresentations on the part of Nissan North American, Inc. and entered judgment for Nissan pursuant to Mo. R. Civ. P. 84.14. Plaintiff, on behalf of a class of similarly situated plaintiffs, sued Nissan for violations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.010 to 407.130, based on alleged misrepresentations concerning the dashboards in certain Nissan Infinity FX vehicles. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment requiring Nissan to pay $2,000 in damages to each class member and $1.9 million in attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements at issue were not actionable “misrepresentations” under section 407.020.1. View "Hurst v. Nissan North America, Inc." on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the district judge’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s eight-count complaint. Plaintiff filed his complaint in state court against the servicers, holders, and assignees of his mortgage loan. Relevant to this appeal was count one, a claim predicated on the Massachusetts Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183C. The matter was removed to federal court, which dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The First Circuit held (1) Plaintiff’s chapter 183C was time-barred, and Plaintiff presented no reason to toll the applicable statute of limitations; and (2) the trial justice did not err in denying Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint because the amended complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Rife v. One West Bank, F.S.B." on Justia Law

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At issue in this appeal were denials of motions to compel arbitration filed by Locklear Chrysler Jeep Dodge, LLC ("Locklear CJD"), and Locklear Automotive Group, Inc. ("Locklear Group"), in actions filed by plaintiffs who alleged they were victims of identity theft resulting from personal information they had provided Locklear CJD in order to explore the possibility of financing the purchase of a vehicle from Locklear CJD. In case no. 1160435, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court order denying the motion to compel arbitration; in the other appeals, the Court reversed the trial court's orders and remanded for further proceedings. Plaintiffs in these cases purchased vehicles from Locklear CJD. All the plaintiffs signed an arbitration agreement as part of their vehicle purchases; the operative language of those arbitration agreements was the same. And all the plaintiffs alleged that they were the victims of identity theft that resulted from providing personal information to Locklear CJD when they filled out credit applications for the vehicle purchases. With respect to Case 1160435, the Supreme Court determined that on the face of the arbitration agreement, its terms did not apply to the interaction of the Lollars and the defendants that occurred in 2015. The Lollars purchased their vehicle in 2013; vehicle purchase to which the 2013 arbitration agreement referred and related was one transaction. The Lollars' 2015 visit to the dealership for the purpose of exploring whether to enter into an entirely different transaction with Locklear CJD (and their provision of financial information to Locklear CJD during that visit) was an unrelated matter to which the arbitration clause did not apply. View "Locklear Chrysler Jeep Dodge, LLC v. Hood" on Justia Law