Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

John Doe filed a putative class action against SSM Health Care Corporation in Missouri state court, alleging that SSM shared private health information with third-party marketing services without authorization, violating Missouri law. Doe claimed that SSM's MyChart patient portal transmitted personal health data to third-party websites like Facebook. The lawsuit included nine state law claims, such as violations of the Missouri Wiretap Statute and the Computer Tampering Act.SSM removed the case to federal court, citing the federal officer removal statute and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Doe moved to remand the case to state court. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri rejected SSM's arguments, ruling that SSM was not "acting under" a federal officer and that Doe's proposed class was limited to Missouri citizens, thus lacking the minimal diversity required under CAFA. The district court remanded the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that SSM did not meet the criteria for federal officer removal because it was not acting under the direction of a federal officer. The court also held that the proposed class was limited to Missouri citizens, which destroyed the minimal diversity necessary for CAFA jurisdiction. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's remand order. View "Doe v. SSM Health Care Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves the Cigar Association of America and other plaintiffs challenging a regulation by the FDA that applied to premium cigars. The FDA had issued a rule under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, which brought all tobacco products, including premium cigars, under its regulatory authority. The plaintiffs argued that the regulation was arbitrary and capricious as applied to premium cigars, citing studies that suggested premium cigars posed fewer health risks due to less frequent use.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, presided over by Judge Mehta, found in favor of the plaintiffs. The court determined that the FDA had failed to consider relevant evidence, specifically the Corey study and Monograph No. 9, which indicated that premium cigars were used less frequently and posed fewer health risks. The district court vacated the FDA's rule as it applied to premium cigars, finding the agency's action arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court's finding that the FDA's rule was arbitrary and capricious because the agency ignored relevant data and falsely claimed that no such evidence existed. The appellate court upheld the vacatur of the rule as applied to premium cigars but remanded the case to the district court to invite further briefing on the appropriate definition of "premium cigars." The court emphasized that the vacatur should not allow for revisiting past user fee payments. The decision affirmed the district court's ruling in full, except for the need to refine the definition of premium cigars. View "Cigar Association of America v. FDA" on Justia Law

Rebecca Petta filed a class-action complaint in the circuit court of Champaign County against Christie Business Holdings Company, P.C., doing business as Christie Clinic. Petta alleged that Christie negligently failed to prevent unauthorized access to its business email account, which potentially exposed patients' private personal data, including Social Security numbers and health insurance information. Christie moved to dismiss the complaint, and the trial court granted the motion.The trial court found that Petta had standing due to an inference of injury from unauthorized use of her phone number and city in a loan application. However, the court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a valid claim under existing law and due to the economic loss doctrine. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal but on the grounds that Petta lacked standing, as the alleged increased risk of identity theft was too speculative and the unauthorized loan application did not involve her private personal data.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and agreed with the appellate court. The court held that Petta's allegations of increased risk of harm were insufficient to confer standing in a complaint seeking monetary damages. The court also found that the unauthorized loan application, which used only Petta's publicly available phone number and city, was not fairly traceable to Christie's alleged misconduct. Consequently, the court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, concluding that Petta lacked standing to bring her claims. View "Petta v. Christie Business Holding Co., P.C." on Justia Law

Lance and Tracy Degeneffe entered into a roofing contract with Home Pride Contractors, Inc. to repair their roof, gutters, and siding after wind and hail damage. Home Pride completed the repairs and billed the Degeneffes, who refused to pay, leading Home Pride to hire an attorney to collect the debt. The Degeneffes sued Home Pride, alleging that its prior counsel engaged in harassing and abusive collection efforts in violation of the Iowa Consumer Credit Code (ICCC).The Iowa District Court for Boone County reviewed cross motions for summary judgment. Home Pride argued it was not subject to the ICCC as it did not extend credit or lend money to its customers. The Degeneffes argued that the roofing contract was a consumer credit sale subject to the ICCC and that Home Pride’s conduct was harassing and abusive under the ICCC. The district court denied Home Pride’s motion and granted the Degeneffes’ motion in part, establishing that the roofing contract constituted a consumer credit sale subject to the ICCC, but left the question of whether Home Pride’s conduct was harassing and abusive for trial.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the roofing contract was a consumer credit sale subject to the ICCC. The court concluded that Home Pride did not grant credit to the Degeneffes, as the contract required full payment upon completion of the work, and the 1.5% monthly interest charge for late payment did not constitute an extension of credit. The court reversed the district court’s entry of partial summary judgment in favor of the Degeneffes and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Home Pride. View "Degeneffe, v. Home Pride Contractors, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Carmen Mercado and Jorge Lopez, filed a class action complaint against their former employer, S&C Electric Company, in the circuit court of Cook County. They alleged that S&C underpaid their overtime wages by excluding certain performance bonuses from the "regular rate" of pay used to calculate overtime. S&C argued that the bonuses were statutorily excluded from the regular rate of pay and that they had made adjusted payments to cover any alleged unpaid wages.The circuit court granted S&C's motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, finding that the adjusted payments satisfied the alleged underpayment. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, agreeing that the bonuses were properly excluded from the regular rate of pay and that the adjusted payments fully compensated the plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' judgments. The court held that the performance bonuses should have been included in the regular rate of pay for calculating overtime wages. The court found that the bonuses were not gifts but compensation for services performed, and thus did not fall under the exclusion in section 210.410(a) of the regulations. Additionally, the court held that the adjusted payments did not fully compensate the plaintiffs for their statutory damages, including treble damages, monthly interest, and attorney fees, as required by section 12(a) of the Minimum Wage Law.The Supreme Court of Illinois remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Mercado v. S&C Electric Co." on Justia Law

Phillip and Sara Alig, along with Daniel and Roxanne Shea, filed a class action lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Inc. (now Rocket Mortgage, LLC) and Title Source, Inc. (now Amrock, Inc.). They alleged that during the refinancing of their home mortgage loans, they paid for appraisals that were not independent because the defendants had provided appraisers with the homeowners' estimates of their homes' value. They claimed this made the appraisals worthless and asserted statutory, breach of contract, and conspiracy claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia certified a class of West Virginia citizens who refinanced mortgage loans with Quicken and received appraisals that included an estimate of the property's value. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, awarding over $10.6 million in damages. The court found that the plaintiffs had established a conspiracy between the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the class certification and summary judgment on the statutory and conspiracy claims but vacated and remanded the breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which emphasized that every class member must have Article III standing to recover damages.On remand, the district court reinstated its original judgment, stating that TransUnion did not affect the class's standing. However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish that class members suffered concrete harm from the defendants' actions. The court reversed the district court's judgment certifying the class and awarding damages, affirming the judgment on the named plaintiffs' statutory and conspiracy claims, and vacating the judgment on the breach of contract claim, remanding it for further proceedings. View "Alig v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

A Braintree tobacco compliance officer observed an open container of Jazz brand "Black & Mild" cigars on display behind the cash register of a convenience store. The Board of Health of Braintree found that the store violated state and local tobacco laws by offering a flavored tobacco product for sale and imposed a $1,000 fine. The store argued that it did not intend to sell the product and that its point-of-sale system would have prevented the sale. The store also contended that the board acted outside its authority in imposing the fine and that the proceedings were procedurally defective.The Superior Court reviewed the case and upheld the board's decision, finding substantial evidence to support the board's conclusion that the store offered the cigars for sale. The court also determined that the board had the authority to impose the fine administratively and that no procedural irregularities fatally marred the board's actions. The store appealed the decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the store's placement and display of the cigars supported the board's finding that the product was being offered for sale. The court also concluded that the legislative and regulatory scheme governing the sale of tobacco products in Massachusetts permits local boards of health to enforce the regulations and impose mandatory penalties. The court found no procedural deficiencies that would invalidate the board's actions. View "Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Board of Health of Braintree" on Justia Law

Anastasia Wullschleger sued Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. in state court, alleging deceptive marketing practices. Her original complaint included both federal and state law claims. Royal Canin removed the case to federal court based on the federal claims, which allowed the federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. Wullschleger then amended her complaint to remove all federal claims and requested the case be remanded to state court.The District Court denied Wullschleger’s request to remand the case. However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the amended complaint, which no longer contained any federal claims, eliminated the basis for federal-question jurisdiction. Consequently, the federal court also lost its supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that when a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The case must then be remanded to state court. The Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s decision, emphasizing that the jurisdictional analysis must be based on the amended complaint, which in this case contained only state-law claims. View "Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Hobish Irrevocable Trust purchased a universal life insurance policy from AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company to insure Toby Hobish. The policy provided a $2 million death benefit and allowed flexible premium payments into a Policy Account, from which monthly cost of insurance (COI) charges were deducted. In 2015, AXA announced an increase in COI charges for certain policies, including the Trust's, leading to a significant rise in the monthly COI charge. The Trust surrendered the policy in 2016, receiving the remaining account balance minus a surrender fee.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court, alleging breach of contract and violation of General Business Law § 349. They claimed the COI rate increase was not equitable to all policyholders of a given class and that AXA had misled elderly consumers about the likelihood of such increases. The Supreme Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment on liability, finding the term "a given class" ambiguous and requiring further examination of extrinsic evidence. The court also dismissed several of plaintiffs' damages theories, including claims for the full value of the death benefit and restitutionary damages.The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's rulings, agreeing that the term "a given class" was ambiguous and that the extrinsic evidence did not resolve this ambiguity. The court also upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs' damages claims, including compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages, and limited punitive damages under General Business Law § 349 to three times the actual damages.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, agreeing that the term "a given class" was ambiguous and that the extrinsic evidence did not resolve this ambiguity. The court also upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs' damages claims and confirmed that punitive damages under General Business Law § 349 are limited to the statutory treble damages. View "Hobish v AXA Equit. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Robert Gallagher borrowed money from Santander Consumer USA to purchase a car. After making the final payment via electronic funds transfer, Santander, following its standard practice, waited 15 days before sending the car title. Missouri law requires lienholders to release their lien within five business days after receiving full payment, including electronic funds transfers, or pay liquidated damages. Gallagher filed a lawsuit in Missouri state court on behalf of a potential class of borrowers affected by Santander's 15-day policy.The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which granted summary judgment in favor of Santander. Gallagher appealed the decision, seeking to reverse the summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court focused on whether Gallagher had standing to bring the case in federal court, specifically whether he had suffered an injury-in-fact. The court determined that Gallagher had not identified a concrete harm resulting from the delay in receiving the car title. The court noted that a statutory violation alone is insufficient for standing; there must be a concrete harm related to the violation. Gallagher did not demonstrate any monetary harm, such as a failed sale or impaired credit rating, nor did he show any ongoing injury to his property rights.The Eighth Circuit concluded that Gallagher lacked standing because he did not suffer a concrete injury. As a result, the court vacated the district court's judgment and instructed the district court to remand the case to state court. View "Gallagher v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc." on Justia Law