Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries
Andrade v. Western Riverside Council of Governments
The plaintiff, SanJuana Andrade, filed a lawsuit against the Western Riverside Council of Governments (Council) on the basis that she had been fraudulently enrolled in a Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) program. She claimed that her signature was forged on the PACE loan agreements, resulting in a lien on her home and increased property tax assessments that she had not agreed to. Following an investigation by the state Department of Financial Protection and Innovation, which confirmed the contractors’ fraud, the Council released its assessment and the lien on Andrade’s home. In January 2022, Andrade filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs under Civil Code section 1717, which provides for attorney’s fees in any action on a contract where the contract specifically provides for such fees. The trial court denied Andrade’s motion, concluding that the contractual fee provisions were limited in scope and did not entitle Andrade to attorney’s fees because they concerned fees for “a judicial foreclosure action.”On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court's decision. It held that under section 1717, a fee provision must be construed as applying to the entire contract unless each party was represented by counsel in the negotiation and execution of the contract, and the fact of that representation is specified in the contract. The Court found that limiting the fee provisions to foreclosure proceedings would be the precise kind of lopsided arrangement that section 1717 prohibits. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether Andrade is “the party prevailing on the contract” and therefore entitled to attorney's fees. View "Andrade v. Western Riverside Council of Governments" on Justia Law
Barclift v. Keystone Credit Services LLC
In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the appellant, Paulette Barclift, sued Keystone Credit Services, LLC ("Keystone") for allegedly violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). Barclift claimed that Keystone unlawfully communicated her personal information to a third-party mailing vendor, RevSpring, without her consent. She sought to represent a class of similarly situated plaintiffs. The District Court dismissed her suit on the grounds that she did not allege an injury sufficient to establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution.Upon appeal, the Third Circuit agreed with the lower court that Barclift lacked standing, but modified the District Court's order so that the dismissal would be without prejudice. The court found that Barclift's alleged harm—embarrassment and distress caused by the disclosure of her personal information to a single intermediary (RevSpring)—did not bear a close relationship to a harm traditionally recognized by American courts, such as the public disclosure of private facts. Therefore, the court concluded that Barclift did not suffer a concrete injury and could not establish Article III standing. The court further held that the possibility of future harm was too speculative to establish a concrete injury. The case was dismissed without prejudice, allowing Barclift the opportunity to amend her complaint if she can allege a concrete injury. View "Barclift v. Keystone Credit Services LLC" on Justia Law
Baker v. Duffus
In this case, Lee Baker and Kenneth Duffus were partners in a real estate development company, Harvest Properties, LLC. Baker was accused of defrauding the company, leading to a lawsuit from the company's members for defaulting on a loan. Duffus cross-claimed against Baker, alleging Baker had violated the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). Baker argued that the UTPA did not apply since his conduct was part of a real estate transaction and was within the company's internal operations. The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska rejected Baker's arguments and affirmed the superior court's ruling. The court held that Baker's fraudulent actions were not part of a real estate transaction because they did not involve the actual transfer of an interest in real property. Instead, they interfered with the company's ability to realize larger, future real estate transactions. The court also held that the UTPA applies even when a party has a fiduciary relationship with a business entity if the parties also engage in arms-length commercial transactions. Baker's provision of services through his separate corporation was considered such an arms-length transaction. View "Baker v. Duffus" on Justia Law
Schiff v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.
The case involves a dispute between Dr. Stan Schiff and Liberty Mutual Insurance Companies. Dr. Schiff, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated providers, claimed that Liberty Mutual's practice of reducing provider bills to an 80th percentile cap based on a computer-generated calculation violated Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Liberty Mutual argued that the statutory requirement to conduct a reasonable investigation into medical expenses is satisfied by determining the 80th percentile of charges for a treatment in the geographic area, and this practice is not an unfair practice under the CPA.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington ruled that Liberty Mutual's practice of using the FAIR Health database to determine the 80th percentile of charges for a treatment in the geographic area is not unfair or unreasonable and does not violate the CPA or the personal injury protection (PIP) requirements to establish standards under which reasonable charges for medical procedures are determined. The court reasoned that comparing charges for the same treatment in the same geographic area is relevant to the determination of reasonableness. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court to enter a summary judgment order in favor of Liberty Mutual. View "Schiff v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law
McCants v. CD & PB Enterprises, LLC
In Virginia, Bryant McCants arranged for his 1970 Ford Mustang Mach 1 to be repaired at a shop operated by CD & PB Enterprises, LLC, doing business as Maaco Collision Repair & Auto Painting. The repair shop was managed by Hanson Butler, a part owner and employee of CD & PB Maaco. After the work was completed, McCants inspected the vehicle and was unsatisfied with the work, prompting Butler to agree to repaint it. However, due to various personal circumstances, McCants was unable to pick up the vehicle for several months. In the meantime, Butler initiated the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles' abandoned-vehicle process, which resulted in him acquiring title to the vehicle, which he later sold.McCants sued Butler for conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act. The jury found in favor of McCants on the conversion claim only and awarded him $78,500. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding that Butler had properly followed the abandoned-vehicle process and had obtained legal title to the vehicle.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that a rational jury could have found that Butler wrongfully used the DMV's abandoned-vehicle process as a pretext for severing McCants's ownership rights in the vehicle and thereafter claiming it for himself. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstated the jury’s verdict, and affirmed the trial court’s confirmation order. View "McCants v. CD & PB Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law
PATRICK V. RUNNING WAREHOUSE, LLC
California Privacy Protection Agency v. Superior Court
This case pertains to the enforcement of the California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 (the Act), a voter-enacted statute that expanded and amended the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. The California Privacy Protection Agency (the Agency) failed to adopt final regulations by the July 1, 2022 deadline set out in the Act. The California Chamber of Commerce sought a court order to delay enforcement of the Act until one year after the agency adopted all required regulations. The trial court granted the petition in part, ruling that the Agency could not enforce any regulation until one year after that regulation became final. The Agency appealed, arguing that the Act did not mandate a one-year delay between the approval of a final regulation and its enforcement. The appellate court agreed with the Agency, finding that the Act's language did not unambiguously require a one-year delay between approval and enforcement. The court ordered a new trial court order denying the Chamber's petition and allowing the trial court to consider any remaining issues regarding the prompt development of regulations. View "California Privacy Protection Agency v. Superior Court" on Justia Law
Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz
A consumer, Reginald Kirtz, secured a loan from the Rural Housing Service, part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Although Kirtz repaid his loan by mid-2018, the USDA continued to tell credit report company TransUnion that his account was past due, harming his credit score. The USDA failed to correct its records after being notified of the error, and Kirtz sued the agency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.The USDA argued that the case should be dismissed based on sovereign immunity, since the Supreme Court has held that the federal government is immune from suits for damages unless Congress waives that immunity. The agency claimed that the FCRA does not make the federal government amenable to suit for a violation. The district court agreed, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the FCRA authorizes suits for damages against any person who violates the Act, and “person” is defined to include any government agency.The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit, finding that sovereign immunity did not bar Kirtz’s claim. The Court held that the federal government is susceptible to suit when it provides false information to credit reporting agencies. It noted that dismissing a suit like Kirtz’s case would effectively negate a claim that Congress has clearly authorized. The Court’s ruling resolved a circuit split between the Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits, with which the Court agreed, and the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, with which it disagreed. View "Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz" on Justia Law
Babaletos v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.
The case involves an appeal from a wrongful death action brought by Joni Babaletos, the personal representative of her late husband Thomas Babaletos, against Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., Philip Morris USA Inc., and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Babaletos claimed that the cigarettes produced and sold by the defendants caused her husband's death. She brought claims for breach of warranty in design, negligence in design and marketing, fraud, civil conspiracy, and unfair and deceptive acts and practices in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 9. The jury found for the defendants on the four claims presented to them, and the trial judge subsequently found no liability with respect to the c. 93A claim.On appeal, Babaletos argued that the trial judge's imposition of time limits for the presentation of evidence forced her to omit essential evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that Babaletos failed to demonstrate either an abuse of discretion by the trial judge or how she was prejudiced by the imposition of time limits. The court noted that the trial judge had repeatedly offered to extend scheduled half days to full days should the need arise during trial, but Babaletos made no such requests as the trial progressed. As such, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court also provided guidance for trial judges who believe that setting time limits for the presentation of evidence would be prudent in a particular case. View "Babaletos v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc." on Justia Law
Hassett v. Secor’s Auto Center, Inc.
In this Connecticut case, the plaintiff, Erin C. Hassett, purchased a used motor vehicle from the defendant, Secor’s Auto Center, Inc., and experienced mechanical problems shortly after the purchase. The plaintiff claimed the defendant breached its warranty by refusing to make necessary repairs and, as a result, she revoked her acceptance of the vehicle. The plaintiff brought legal action against the defendant, alleging breach of warranty and revocation of acceptance under statute § 42a-2608. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, including on her revocation of acceptance claim, awarding her $11,000 in damages.The plaintiff then moved for additur, requesting a refund of the full purchase price of the vehicle in addition to the $11,000 award. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s decision. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, arguing that she was entitled to the $11,000 award plus a refund of the full purchase price because the jury found in her favor on her revocation of acceptance claim.The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for additur. The court found that the issue of revocation of acceptance damages had been submitted to the jury as a matter of disputed fact. The jury's award of $11,000 was determined to represent revocation of acceptance damages equivalent to its determination of "so much of the price as had been paid" in accordance with § 42a-2-711 (1). The plaintiff's argument that the court should have determined the proper measure of revocation of acceptance damages post-verdict was rejected. The court found that the plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the verdict did not constitute grounds to award her the full purchase price of the vehicle as a matter of law. View "Hassett v. Secor's Auto Center, Inc." on Justia Law