Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC failed to meet its evidentiary burden to show the existence of an arbitration agreement in this case surrounding a dispute over the unpaid balance on an automobile loan, holding that the circuit court erred.Ford Credit sued Ronald Miller for the alleged balance due on a loan. Miller asserted a class action counterclaim for unlawful debt collection practices, in response to which Ford Credit filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Ford Credit failed to provide evidence that an arbitration agreement existed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties had been established. View "Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Exile Brewing Company's attempt to intervene in the underlying probate matter and striking Exile's motion to vacate, dismiss, and close two estates seeking to pursue certain claims, holding that the probate court did not err in denying the request to intervene and close the estates.During the 1950s and '60s, Ruth Bisignano owned and operated a popular bar in Des Moines. In 2012, Exile named one of its craft beers "Ruthie" and used Ruth's image. Ruthie died in 1993, and her estate was closed that year. Her husband Frank Bisignano died three years later, and his estate was closed in 1999. In 2020, Plaintiff successfully filed petitions to reopen both estates. Subsequently, as administrator of Frank's estate, Plaintiff sued Exile alleging common law appropriation and other claims. Exile filed a motion to vacate, dismiss, and close both estates, arguing that the probate court lacked statutory jurisdiction to reopen the estates. The probate court denied the motion, concluding that Exile had no right to intervene in the probate proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probate court correctly determined that Exile was an interloper with no ability to challenge the estates' reopening. View "In re Estate of Bisignano" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court on interlocutory appeal denying Defendants' remand for a jury in this argument over the requirement that civil enforcement actions brought by the attorney general "shall be by equitable proceedings," holding that the requirement was enforceable and did not violate the jury right preserved by Iowa Const. art. I, 9.The attorney general commenced this action alleging that Defendants had violated the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), Iowa Code 714.16, and the Older Iowans Act (OIA), Iowa Code 714.16A, by engaging in false and deceptive conduct and unfair practices in the "sale and advertisement of stem cell and exosome therapy in Iowa." Defendants answered and demanded a jury, but the attorney general moved to strike the jury demand because subsection 714.16(7) requires that civil actions "shall be by equitable proceedings." The district court granted the motion to strike, and Defendants applied for interlocutory review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in striking Defendants' jury demand. View "State ex rel., Attorney General" on Justia Law

Ring manufactures and sells home security and smart home devices including video doorbells, security cameras, and alarms. The plaintiffs purchased video doorbell and security camera products from Ring and subsequently filed a class action complaint against Ring asserting claims under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, false advertising law, and Unfair Competition Law. They sought injunctive relief requiring Ring to prominently disclose to consumers certain information about its products and services.Ring moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision in its terms of service. The plaintiffs did not dispute that they agreed to Ring’s terms of service but argued the arbitration provision violates the California Supreme Court’s 2017 “McGill” holding that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is invalid and unenforceable under state law insofar as it purports to waive a party’s statutory right to seek public injunctive relief.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Ring's motion to compel arbitration. The parties did not “clearly and unmistakably" delegate to the arbitrator exclusive authority to decide whether the arbitration provision is valid under McGill. The contract language at issue is commonly understood to preclude public injunctive relief in arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, does not preempt McGill’s holding. The contract’s severability clause means the plaintiffs’ claims cannot be arbitrated and may be brought in court. View "Jack v. Ring LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kamiya Perry appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. (Kia) after a jury found in favor of Kia in her automobile defect trial. On appeal, she argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury that Kia had concealed evidence (certain engineering documents) during discovery; (2) the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of Kia’s paralegal who verified discovery requests relevant to the engineering documents; and (3) she was not given a fair trial because the jurors were required to deliberate in a small room, which, in the midst of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, incentivized the jury to complete their deliberations quickly. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Perry v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law

After the bankruptcy court allowed Chapter 12 debtors – several years in a row – to modify their confirmed plan over the objection of their primary secured creditor, that creditor appealed. The issues are whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by confirming the debtors’ fourth modified plan under 11 U.S.C. Section 1229 without requiring the debtors to show an “unanticipated and substantial change in circumstances” and whether, under whatever standard applicable to plan modifications, the court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, at a minimum, a substantial change in circumstances is required to justify modification of a plan under Section 1229. The bankruptcy court’s alternate ruling that the debtors met their burden of showing an unanticipated, substantial change in circumstances is not clearly erroneous, nor is the bankruptcy court’s finding that the fourth modified plan was feasible and confirmable. View "Farm Credit Services v. Steven L. Swackhammer" on Justia Law

Colorado’s Attorney General and the Administrator of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code (“UCCC”) (collectively, “the State”) sought to enjoin the respondent corporate entities and individuals that made up the career school known as CollegeAmerica (collectively, “CollegeAmerica”) from engaging in conduct that the State believed to be in violation of Colorado law. Specifically, the State contended that several aspects of CollegeAmerica’s marketing and admissions operations constituted deceptive trade practices under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”) and that CollegeAmerica’s institutional loan program, “EduPlan,” was unconscionable under the UCCC. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded, as did the division below, that the State’s CCPA civil penalty claims were equitable in nature and thus CollegeAmerica was not entitled to a jury trial on those claims. The Court further concluded the division erred in remanding this case for a new trial without first assessing whether CollegeAmerica had, in fact, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of significant public impact and, if so, whether the evidence sufficiently established such an impact. Finally, the Court concluded the division correctly determined that CollegeAmerica’s EduPlan loans as a whole were not unconscionable, although the Supreme Court disagreed with the division’s conclusion that individualized evidence regarding the probability of repayment was necessary to establish unconscionability. View "Colorado v. Center for Excellence in Higher Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the permanent injunction against Defendants for cybersquatting, holding that Charter West Bank failed to produce evidence showing it was entitled to protection under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).Charter West brought this lawsuit against pursuant to the ACPA in state district court seeking an injunction enjoining Defendants from using the domain name "www.charterwestbank.com" and using the website to post information that would reflect negatively on Charter West. The district court concluded that Defendants violated the ACPA by threatening to use the website to disseminate adverse information unless the bank purchased it for $1 million. The district court granted Charter West's request for a permanent injunction and enjoined Defendants from using any domain name containing the words "charter west." The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the injunction, holding that Charter West failed to prove it owned a mark that was "distinctive" or "famous" and therefore did not meet the requirements of the ACPA. View "Charter West Bank v. Riddle" on Justia Law

Defendant spearheaded a get-rich-quick scam—which promised to make consumers rich but ultimately defrauded them of hundreds of millions of dollars. In response, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) brought suit against Defendant and other scam participants under Sections 13(b) and 19 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”) and under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, alleging that the scam violated Section 5 of the FTCA and the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule. In 2012, the district court granted summary judgment to the FTC, holding that Defendant’s scam indeed violated Section 5 of the FTCA and the Telemarketing Sales Rule. To remedy the established violations, the district court granted both injunctive and monetary relief. Defendant never challenged the statutory validity of the equitable monetary relief, nor appealed from the 2012 judgment—which has remained on the books all this time.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from an equitable money judgment. The panel held that Defendant failed to establish a certain type of jurisdictional error. Defendant failed to show that the equitable monetary judgment here—which was consistent with then-prevailing precedent—rested on a total want of jurisdiction or lacked even a colorable basis. Second, Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the equitable monetary portion of the judgment lacked prospective application under Rule 60(b)(5). The panel held that the first relevant set of considerations—the nature and relationship of the intervening change in the law—did not establish that the district court abused its discretion in denying relief. View "FTC V. GARY HEWITT, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) prohibits the misbranding of any food. A food is deemed to be misbranded if it meets any of the definitions in 21 U.S.C. Section 343. To implement this subsection, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) promulgated regulations governing the nutrition labeling of dietary supplements. Plaintiff alleged that she and other consumers were damaged because “they paid for a product that they would not have purchased had it truthfully disclosed that it did not contain Glucosamine Sulfate.” The second amended complaint claimed violations of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, the California Unfair Competition Law, the California False Advertising Law, unjust enrichment, restitution, and breach of warranty. The district court concluded that Walmart had carried its burden of showing Plaintiff’s state-law claims were preempted by federal law.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment for Walmart Inc. The panel held that Defendant’s proposed rule to the contrary was preempted. The holding in Durnford v. MusclePharm Corp., 907 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2018), did not provide otherwise. Nothing in Durnford suggested its analysis applied only to the nutrition panel. The panel concluded that Defendant’s claims were preempted, and Walmart was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "DARLENE HOLLINS, ET AL V. WALMART INC., ET AL" on Justia Law