Plaintiff was diagnosed with drug-induced lupus, allegedly a side effect from using Solodyn, a treatment for acne. Plaintiff sued Medicis Pharmaceutical Corporation, which manufactures and distributes Solodyn, alleging that Medicis knowingly represented and omitted material facts in connection with the sale or advertisement of Solodyn in violation of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Plaintiff also alleged that Medicis failed to adequately warn her of the consequences of the long-term use of Solodyn. The superior court granted Medicis’s motion to dismiss. At issue on appeal was the learned intermediary doctrine (LID), under which a manufacturer satisfies its duty to warn end users by giving appropriate warnings to the class of persons who may prescribe or administer the product. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, holding (1) the LID does not prevent Plaintiff from suing Medicis; (2) Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to survive Medicis’s motion to dismiss with regard to her products liability claim; and (3) the CFA applies to prescription pharmaceuticals, and therefore, Plaintiff alleged an actionable claim under the CFA. View "Watts v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp." on Justia Law
Autozone was fined for violating the Pricing Act. The State subsequently sued AutoZone under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), alleging that by violating the Pricing Act, AutoZone had also violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. 44-1522(A) (Statute), which prohibits deceptive practices in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise. The superior court entered summary judgment for AutoZone. The court of appeals vacated the superior court and remanded. Among other things at issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Statute's Act Clause, which prohibits deceptive acts or practices in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise, or the Omission Clause, which prohibits omission of material facts with intent that others rely on such omissions, governed the State's non-pricing claims. The Court vacated the court of appeals, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly held that neither side was entitled to summary judgment, as the question of whether AutoZone had the intent required by the CFA was an issue of fact, regardless of whether the Act or the Omission Clause applied to the non-pricing allegations; (2) the CFA did not authorize disgorgement to the State; and (3) the court of appeals erred by awarding the State interlocutory attorney's fees. View "State ex rel. Horne v. Autozone, Inc." on Justia Law
The Arizona Department of Weights and Measures fined AutoZone, Inc. for violating the Pricing Act, which prohibits mispricing and requires a seller to display prices on merchandise or at the point of display. The State later sued AutoZone alleging that, by violating the Pricing Act, AutoZone had also violated the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of AutoZone. The court of appeals vacated the superior court and remanded, holding that because the Pricing Act imposes a statutory duty to price items, any failure to do was not an omission but an "act," and was thus governed by the CFA's Act Clause, which imposes strict liability for not pricing goods as required by the Pricing Act. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly held that neither side was entitled to summary judgment; (2) the CFA does not authorize disgorgement to the State; and (3) the court of appeals erred in awarding the State interlocutory attorney's fees. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Horne v. Autozone, Inc." on Justia Law
Plaintiff refinanced her home by executing a promissory note in favor of Saxon Mortgage and a deed of trust (DOT) naming Saxon as beneficiary and a title company as trustee. Saxon assigned the note to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as trustee for Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2005-3 by endorsing the note in blank. The assignment was not recorded. Plaintiff defaulted under the note. Deutsche Bank then executed a substitution of trustee, removing the title company as trustee and appointing Tiffany and Bosco as the substituting trustee. Tiffany and Bosco recorded a notice of trustee's sale, naming "Deutsche Bank/2005-3" as the current beneficiary in care of Saxon Mortgage Services. An agent of Saxon then executed an assignment of the DOT, assigning all its beneficial interest to Deutsche Bank. The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of questions certified by the United State Bankruptcy Court, answering that the recording of an assignment of deed of trust is not required prior to the filing of a notice of trustee's sale under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-808 when the assignee holds a promissory note payable to bearer.
Posted in: Arizona Supreme Court, Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, Consumer Law, Real Estate & Property Law