Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

After owning a car that she purchased from Century West for eleven months, plaintiff filed suit against Century West and BMW Financial Services, which financed the vehicle, seeking to unwind the contract. The trial court found in favor of defendants. On appeal, plaintiff argued that because Century West entered her three-check down payment on the line of the sales contract describing it as a down payment, rather than on the line describing it as a “deferred” down payment, she has the right to rescind the contract under the Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales and Finance Act, Civil Code, 2981, et seq. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Act authorizes her to rescind the contract. In this case, neither the language of the Act nor the cases plaintiff cites compel a finding that a car dealer’s informal agreement to wait to deposit a check tendered the day of the purchase - as opposed to scheduling a payment to be made at a later date - constitutes a “deferred” down payment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Nichols v. Century West" on Justia Law

California’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 (OPPA), under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et. seq.), addresses the obligations of an operator of a commercial Web site or online service regarding the posting of a privacy policy on the Internet. The state sought damages and injunctive relief under OPPA, alleging that Delta’s Fly Delta mobile application violated the privacy policy requirements. The trial court dismissed, finding the suit expressly preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (49 U.S.C. 41713 (b)(1)). The court of appeal affirmed. To compel Delta to comply with the OPPA would effectively interfere with the airline’s “selection and design” of its mobile application, a marketing mechanism “appropriate to the furnishing of air transportation service,” for which state enforcement has been held to be expressly preempted. View "Harris v. Delta Air Lines" on Justia Law

Defendant CarMax Auto Superstores California LLC (CarMax) advertised and sold cars as "certified" used vehicles. It sold a 2008 used Jeep Wrangler to plaintiff Jessica Brooks. CarMax had promoted the Jeep as a certified used vehicle, inspected the Jeep, made some repairs, and ultimately placed a signed "Certified Quality Inspection" document (the CQI Certificate) for the Jeep in the Jeep's glove box. The CQI Certificate remained in the glove box at all relevant times. Several months after Brooks purchased the Jeep, she drove it through a deep puddle and the engine was so severely damaged that it had to be replaced. She thereafter demanded (among other things) that CarMax rescind the purchase agreement and buy the Jeep back. When CarMax rejected her demands, she filed this action alleging it violated Vehicle Code section 11713.18, because neither the content of the CQI Certificate nor its method of delivery to her complied with CarMax's duties under section 11713.18. Brooks pleaded claims against CarMax under California's Consumer's Legal Remedies Act and Unfair Competition Law. The trial court ruled Brooks had suffered no damage from CarMax's alleged violations of section 11713.18, and therefore concluded she did not have standing to pursue claims under the CLRA or the UCL. Brooks argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that reversal was warranted because she adequately demonstrated the type of damage necessary to prosecute a claim under the CLRA or the UCL or, alternatively, she was entitled to prosecute her claims under the CLRA or the UCL without showing any injury. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Brooks v. CarMax Auto Superstores" on Justia Law

This case arose under California's Unclaimed Property Law (UPL). Plaintiff Vanacore and Associates, Inc., dba Vanacore International (Vanacore) was a private investigation firm that specialized in the recovery of unclaimed property. Vanacore entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with defendant Kenneth Rosenfeld. The MOU contemplated that Vanacore would locate and recover shares of stock belonging to Rosenfeld in exchange for a fee. After signing the agreement, Rosenfeld found and recovered the shares himself and refused to pay Vanacore's fee. Vanacore sued for breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment. Rosenfeld demurred on the ground that the MOU violated the Unclaimed Property Law, which precluded certain asset recovery agreements. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding the MOU illegal and unenforceable. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Vanacore and Associates, Inc. v. Rosenfeld" on Justia Law

Class representatives filed suit alleging that RHI committed numerous violations of Civil Code section 1747.08, also known as the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act. The trial court found RHI was liable for as many as 1,213,745 violations of that statute and set a penalty recovery in the amount of $30 per violation, subject to RHI's right to dispute any specific claim. Francesca Muller, a class member and the person prosecuting the appeal, requested the court order notice of the attorney fee motion be sent to all class members. The trial court denied the request, granted the attorney fee motion, and entered judgment in the action. Muller appealed. Michael Hernandez, class representative, contests each of Muller's claims of error. The court concluded that, under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, the court must adhere to Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co. and dismiss the appeal. Even if the court were free to disregard Eggert, adhering to Eggert's approach would not leave nonparty class members without protection or appellate recourse. Under California law, where class members are given the option of opting out, they are not bound by the judgment in the class action but instead may pursue their own action. Intervention would have the effect of giving Muller a clear avenue from which to challenge the attorney fee award. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc." on Justia Law

The Arbitration Certification Program (ACP) certifies the qualified dispute resolution process identified in the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civil Code 1790, the “lemon law.” Not all automobile manufacturers must have an ACP certified program. Those manufacturers who choose to operate a certified arbitration process have limited lemon law liability. Plaintiffs bought new cars that were under the original manufacturers’ warranties when they sought declaratory relief claiming that public statements in ACP publications were illegal underground regulations not adopted in conformity with California’s Administrative Procedures Act, because the ACP states that car manufacturers may adjust the price of a defective vehicle to be repurchased from its owner as a lemon for excessive wear and tear and that it is not within an arbitrator’s purview to make such an adjustment. The court concluded plaintiffs were interested persons under Government Code 11350 and denied a motion to dismiss. The court of appeal vacated. Plaintiffs may not invoke the doctrine of public interest standing, and their individual interests in the controversy are too conjectural to confer standing to bring an action for declaratory relief. View "CA Dep't. Consumer Affairs v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Orcillas are Filipino and English is their second language. Virgilio is unable to work due to a medical condition. In 2006, in response to marketing materials, Teodora contacted Quick Loan and applied to refinance their San Jose home for $525,000. At the Quick Loan agent’s recommendation, Teodora did not include Virgilio on the loan application. Teodora told the agent she could not afford the loan modification because the monthly payments would be more than her monthly income, but eventually accepted the agent’s false representation that she could afford the loan modification. After two notices of default (allegedly “robo-signed”) and attempts to obtain loan modification, they lost the property through a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in 2010. The Orcillas and their three minor grandchildren were forced to vacate. The California Department of Corporations revoked Quick Loan’s lending license. The Orcillas allege Quick Loan never assigned the Note or its interest in the Deed of Trust and filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure and various statutory violations. The court of appeal reversed, in part, the dismissal of their complaint. The Orcillas alleged an actionable unlawful or unfair business practice by the defendants as well as standing to assert an unfair competition claim. View "Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc." on Justia Law

Samuel Heckart brought this action against A-1 Self Storage, Inc., Caster Properties, Inc., Caster Family Enterprises, Inc., Caster Group LP, and Deans & Homer (together, Defendants) for violations of the Unfair Competition Law, violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, negligent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy. Heckart alleged A-1's sale of a Customer Goods Protection Plan (the Protection Plan) in connection with its rental of storage space constituted unlicensed sale of insurance. The form Protection Plan required the tenant to either initial to accept or decline participation in the plan. Heckart declined participation by initialing that option, which provided: "No, I decline participation in the . . . Protection Plan. I am currently covered by an insurance plan that covers my belongings in the storage facility. I understand that I need to provide the policy information in writing to the facility Owner within 30 days or I will automatically be enrolled in the . . . Protection Plan until I do provide such information to the Owner." Heckart "inadvertently" purchased the Protection Plan and was enrolled in it, presumably because he failed to provide proof of insurance within 30 days. In April 2013, Heckart, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated California residents, sued A-1 and Caster Group. The trial court sustained Defendants' demurrer to Heckart's first amended complaint without leave to amend, concluding the Protection Plan was not insurance. Heckart appealed, contending his allegations were sufficient to state the asserted causes of action because the Protection Plan was insurance that must comply with the Insurance Code. The Court of Appeal found his arguments unavailing and affirmed. View "Heckart v. A-1 Self Storage" on Justia Law

Defendant Westlake Services LLC appealed a trial court order denying its motion to compel arbitration. Alfredo Ramos, and coplaintiffs (who are not parties to this appeal) sued Defendant Westlake Services LLC for causes of actions arising out of their purchase of used automobiles. Ramos alleged that negotiations for his purchase of a car were conducted primarily in Spanish. Defendant charged Ramos money for a “guaranteed auto protection” (GAP) contract to cover the vehicle he purchased. A copy of the GAP contract was not provided to him in Spanish. In exchange for the payment of a premium by the consumer and/or purchaser of the automobile, the ‘GAP’ insurance policy contract, which identifies the respective rights and liabilities of the parties to the contract, is purportedly intended to pay the difference between the actual cash value of the financed automobile and the then-current outstanding balance on the loan for the automobile should the financed automobile be destroyed or ‘totaled’ in an accident. Ramos asserted three causes of action based on Westlake’s failure to provide a translation of the GAP contract: (1) violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA); (2) violation of section 1632; and (3) violation of the unfair competition law (UCL). Westlake moved to compel arbitration of Ramos’s and his coplaintiffs’ claims, relying on the arbitration provisions contained in the underlying sales contracts they each had signed. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that Ramos reasonably relied on a Spanish translation of the English contract that Pena Motors (as Westlake’s agent) provided him that did not include the arbitration. The Court concluded that mutual assent to the arbitration agreement was lacking, void and that the trial court correctly denied Westlake’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Ramos v. Westlake Services" on Justia Law