Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Several individuals filed a putative class action against two related corporate defendants, alleging that the defendants’ website terms and conditions violated a California statute known as section 1670.8, or the “Yelp Law.” The plaintiffs argued that certain provisions in the website’s terms—specifically, language related to trademark use and website access—prohibited or penalized negative statements about the defendants, their employees, or their goods and services. The plaintiffs claimed these provisions constituted unlawful non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and sustained the defendants’ demurrer to the consolidated class action complaint, first with leave to amend and then, after an amended complaint was filed, without leave to amend. The court found that the challenged terms were limited to intellectual property protections and did not restrict consumer speech. It also determined that the statute did not create a private right of action for merely including a violative provision unless there was a threat to enforce that provision or penalize speech. The court concluded that neither the trademark nor the termination provisions in the defendants’ terms constituted actionable violations of section 1670.8 and entered judgment dismissing the case.Upon appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the website’s trademark language did not waive consumers’ rights to make critical statements about the defendants, and the website access termination clause was not a restriction on consumer speech. The court concluded that plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action under section 1670.8 and confirmed that the inclusion of these provisions, without a threat or attempt to enforce against protected speech, does not violate the statute. View "Scott v. Ulta Beauty, Inc." on Justia Law

A debt buyer initiated a lawsuit against a consumer to collect an alleged unpaid debt, attaching to its complaint a borrower agreement that did not clearly identify the consumer or the specific debt. The complaint described the agreement as evidence of the debt, but did not include more specific documentation such as a signed loan agreement or transaction history. The consumer responded by filing a cross-complaint, alleging that the debt buyer violated requirements under California’s Fair Debt Buying Practices Act by failing to have proper documentation before attempting collection and by not attaching required documents to the complaint. After the cross-complaint was filed, the debt buyer amended its complaint to include additional documents, such as the executed loan agreement and transaction history.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County granted summary judgment in favor of the debt buyer on the cross-complaint, finding that the debt buyer had satisfied the requirement to have access to documentation evidencing the consumer’s agreement to the debt, that there was no violation of the attachment requirement, that any failure to attach additional documentation was a bona fide error, and that the consumer lacked standing.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the access requirement, agreeing that the debt buyer had access to sufficient documents before filing the original complaint. However, it reversed the trial court’s adjudication on the attachment requirement, finding that the document attached to the original complaint did not evidence the consumer’s agreement to the debt as required by law. The appellate court also held that filing an amended complaint with the proper documents did not cure the original violation, that there were triable issues of fact regarding the bona fide error defense, and that the consumer had statutory standing to bring the claims. The court reversed summary judgment in favor of the debt buyer, except as to the access requirement. View "Velocity Investments, LLC v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

A plaintiff leased a new vehicle from a dealership and soon experienced significant problems, including charging failures, starting difficulties, and an event involving fire risk. Despite attempts at repair by the dealership and authorized facilities, the vehicle remained inoperable. The plaintiff’s lease included an arbitration provision broadly defining disputes to include claims concerning the vehicle’s condition and warranties. The plaintiff sued the vehicle manufacturer under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act for a range of statutory violations related to the vehicle’s defects and warranty service.The Santa Clara County Superior Court denied the manufacturer’s motion to compel arbitration. The trial court reasoned that the manufacturer could not enforce the arbitration agreement as a third party beneficiary under the rationale of Ford Motor Warranty Cases, because the plaintiff’s statutory claims arose from the manufacturer’s obligations under the Song-Beverly Act, not from the lease itself. The court also rejected the manufacturer’s equitable estoppel argument, and, finding no enforceable arbitration agreement between the parties, declined to address issues of unconscionability or delegation.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the matter. It held that the manufacturer was in fact a third party beneficiary of the arbitration provision, as the lease explicitly defined the manufacturer as a party entitled to enforce arbitration and covered disputes involving the vehicle’s condition and warranties. The court distinguished the California Supreme Court’s decision in Ford Motor Warranty Cases, finding it inapplicable where the manufacturer is named in the lease. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for the trial court to decide whether the arbitration provision’s delegation clause is unconscionable. The appellate court expressed no opinion on unconscionability, leaving that issue for the trial court. View "Srivastava v. BMW of North America" on Justia Law

A dispute arose from a vehicle lease agreement, leading Ari Law P.C. to file a Second Amended Complaint in May 2024 against BMW Financial Services NA, LLC and other defendants. Ari Law alleged breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, unfair business practices, fraud, and violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The San Mateo County Superior Court sustained BMW FS’s demurrer as to counts 2, 3, and 6 (warranty claims and Rosenthal Act claim) without leave to amend. Despite this, Ari Law included these dismissed counts in a Third Amended Complaint filed in September 2024. BMW FS repeatedly requested Ari Law to withdraw the improper claims, but Ari Law refused. BMW FS then served Ari Law with a motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.5 and 128.7, initially noticing a hearing for January 17, 2025, and later re-serving and filing the motion with a hearing date of March 18, 2025.The trial court sustained BMW FS’s demurrer to the same counts without leave to amend, and after considering the sanctions motion, imposed monetary sanctions of $29,055 against Ari Law and its counsel. Ari Law challenged the sanctions order, arguing that the notice of motion did not comply with statutory requirements due to differing hearing dates and insufficient time for the safe harbor period. The trial court rejected these procedural objections, finding that Ari Law had adequate notice and opportunity to address the motion, and denied Ari Law’s motion for reconsideration.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that the discrepancy in hearing dates between the served and filed notices did not invalidate the sanctions order, so long as the substance of the motion remained the same and the safe harbor provisions were strictly satisfied. The court affirmed the sanctions order, denied BMW FS’s request for sanctions on appeal, and awarded BMW FS costs. View "Ari Law v. Autonation.com" on Justia Law

Four individuals who were or are patients of a health care system brought a proposed class action against the system, alleging violations of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA) and the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA). They claimed the health care provider installed web tracking technologies, specifically Meta Pixel and Google Analytics, on its various websites, including a public health risk assessment (HRA) site and a password-protected patient portal. According to the plaintiffs, these tools tracked users’ activities, collected their data—including personally identifiable information, health-related communications, and protected health information—and transmitted it to Meta and Google, who then used the data for advertising purposes.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in its entirety. The court found that the proposed subclasses—patients who logged into the patient portal and those who submitted HRA forms—were not ascertainable, that individual issues predominated over common ones, and that a class action was not the superior or manageable method. It reasoned that determining whether the tracking technologies’ transmissions constituted “contents” under CIPA or “medical information” under CMIA would require individualized inquiries into each user’s data. The court also concluded plaintiffs had abandoned their CIPA claim under section 632.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appellate court held that the HRA form subclass and the CIPA claim for the patient portal subclass met the requirements for class certification, as key liability questions could be resolved with common proof. However, it affirmed the denial of class certification for the CMIA claim for the patient portal subclass and agreed that plaintiffs forfeited their CIPA section 632 claim. The court found class action treatment was superior and manageable for the certified subclasses. View "Doe v. Adventist Health System/West" on Justia Law

This case involves three individuals who were cast members on a reality television show. The plaintiff was engaged in a secret sexual affair with another cast member, who was the longtime boyfriend of the defendant. The defendant discovered the affair after finding sexually explicit videos of the plaintiff on her boyfriend’s cell phone, which had been recorded without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent. The defendant then made recordings of these videos and sent them to the plaintiff, along with a confrontational text message. The situation became widely publicized, leading to significant media attention and public scrutiny of the plaintiff.The plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against both the boyfriend and the defendant, alleging claims for “revenge porn” under Civil Code section 1708.85, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The complaint alleged that the defendant accessed the boyfriend’s phone without authorization, made copies of the explicit videos, and disseminated them to others, resulting in harm to the plaintiff. The defendant responded by filing a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that her actions were protected as speech on a matter of public interest. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the claims arose from private conduct, not protected activity.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the order denying the special motion to strike de novo. The court held that the defendant failed to meet her burden of showing that the plaintiff’s claims arose from constitutionally protected activity under section 425.16. Specifically, the court concluded that the alleged acquisition and dissemination of the private videos did not constitute conduct in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. The order denying the special motion to strike was affirmed. View "Leviss v. Madix" on Justia Law

Three individuals, all cast members of a reality television show, became embroiled in a public scandal when one, Rachel Leviss, had a secret sexual affair with another cast member, Tom Sandoval, who was in a relationship with fellow cast member Ariana Madix. The affair came to light when Sandoval’s phone fell into Madix’s possession during a public event. Upon accessing his phone—using a passcode known to her from their longstanding relationship—Madix discovered and recorded sexually explicit videos of Leviss that Sandoval had secretly made. Madix then sent these videos to Leviss and informed the show’s production team, after which the affair became widely publicized.Leviss filed a civil suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against Sandoval and Madix, asserting causes of action for violation of privacy and “revenge porn,” among others. She alleged that Madix had obtained and disseminated the explicit videos without consent, causing Leviss emotional and reputational harm. Madix responded with a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16), arguing that her conduct was protected as activity in connection with a public issue involving public figures. The Superior Court denied Madix’s motion, finding that the conduct did not constitute protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, and that the gravamen of Leviss’s claims was private conduct, not public commentary.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling, holding that Madix failed to meet her burden to show that Leviss’s claims arose from constitutionally protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court determined that the unauthorized acquisition and dissemination of private sexual videos did not qualify as conduct in connection with a public issue or a matter of public interest as required by the statute. View "Leviss v. Madix" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a private organization, brought suit under California’s Proposition 65 against several companies, alleging they failed to warn consumers about exposure to a chemical, DINP, in certain clutch and wallet products. Prior to this lawsuit, another private enforcer had brought a similar Proposition 65 action involving the same or similar products and chemical exposure, which resulted in a consent judgment requiring reformulation or labeling of the products and payment of civil penalties. The plaintiff in the current case argued that the earlier action did not specifically include the wallet and clutch products in its notice, and therefore the consent judgment should not bar its claims.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, dismissing the case. The court found the action was barred by res judicata, relying on the consent judgment from the prior Proposition 65 action, and also concluded there were defects in the plaintiff’s presuit notice. The court reasoned that both private enforcers, in bringing Proposition 65 claims, represented the public interest, creating privity between them. It also noted that even if the earlier notice had defects, the proper time to challenge that was before the consent judgment became final.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiff was in privity with the prior enforcer because both acted in the public interest under Proposition 65, and that common-law res judicata principles apply to consent judgments in such cases. The court determined that any alleged defect in the earlier notice did not prevent the consent judgment from having claim-preclusive effect. The appellate court did not address the separate issue of defects in the plaintiff’s own presuit notice, as the res judicata ground was dispositive. View "Consumer Protection Group, LLC v. Signal Brands, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of consumers who purchased products from a coffee company’s website filed a class action lawsuit, claiming that the website’s terms and conditions improperly restricted their right to post negative reviews about the company or its products. The website included clauses stating that users could not submit content intended to cause commercial harm or use the company’s trademarks in a way that would disparage the brand. The plaintiffs did not allege that the company ever threatened to enforce these provisions against them or that they experienced any economic harm as a result.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the company responded with a demurrer, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim because merely including such provisions in the terms and conditions does not violate California Civil Code section 1670.8 unless there is an attempt to enforce or threaten enforcement of the provision. The court agreed, finding that section 1670.8 only permits a consumer to seek civil penalties when a business attempts to enforce or otherwise penalizes a consumer under such a clause, not merely for including the clause in a contract. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ related claim under the Unfair Competition Law, as no economic harm was alleged. The court denied leave to amend the Civil Code section 1670.8 claim and entered judgment in favor of the company.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the interpretation of section 1670.8. The appellate court held that while non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts are void and unenforceable, a business can only be held liable for civil penalties if it threatens to enforce or seeks to enforce such a provision or penalizes a consumer for protected speech. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Arterberry v. Peet's Coffee" on Justia Law

A private company operating an automated license plate recognition (ALPR) system collected and stored images of license plates and related data, including date, time, and location, from vehicles in public areas in California. The company maintained a written usage and privacy policy, posted on its website, which set out authorized uses of the ALPR information and procedures for access and security. A California resident whose license plate information was collected by this system filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that the company violated the ALPR statute by failing to meaningfully implement or publicly disclose a compliant usage and privacy policy, by failing to enact adequate security measures, and by improperly allowing customers to use the data for unauthorized purposes. The plaintiff claimed harm based on an asserted invasion of privacy due to the collection and storage of his information, but did not allege any unauthorized access, disclosure, or tangible injury.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment to the company, finding that the plaintiff lacked standing because he had not suffered actual harm as required by the ALPR statute. The court also denied another class member’s ex parte application to intervene as a substitute plaintiff, partly because the application was untimely and partly because he too failed to demonstrate actual harm resulting from a statutory violation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed both rulings. The appellate court held that standing to sue under the ALPR statute requires a showing of actual harm arising from a violation of the statute, not merely a statutory violation or a subjective sense of privacy invasion. The court concluded the plaintiff had not suffered actual harm, and therefore lacked standing. The appellate court also found no reversible error in the denial of the motion to intervene, as the movant failed to address all grounds for the trial court’s decision. View "Mata v. Digital Recognition Network, Inc." on Justia Law