Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

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In 2018, Steven Laurent Montgomery Jr. was sentenced to 18 years in prison, including two one-year enhancements for prior prison sentences, after pleading no contest to several violent felonies. Later, under Senate Bill No. 483, which invalidated most prison priors imposed before January 1, 2020, Montgomery became eligible for resentencing. Although the court struck the prison priors, it did not hold a resentencing hearing.This matter before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three was to correct this oversight. The court agreed with the Attorney General's concession of error, reversed the trial court's order striking the prison priors, and remanded the case for a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75.The court also addressed a disagreement between the parties about the power of the prosecutor to withdraw from the plea bargain if the resentencing resulted in further sentence reductions. The court sided with Montgomery, concluding that the legislature intended to limit the prosecutor's ability to withdraw from the plea bargain due to sentence reductions at the resentencing hearing. The court's interpretation was based on the text and legislative history of Senate Bill No. 483, which indicated an intent to reduce or preserve sentences while limiting the prosecutor's ability to rescind plea agreements. View "People v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

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The case centers around Laurie Smith, a former sheriff of Santa Clara County, who was investigated for bribery and other crimes related to the processing of concealed firearms licenses. Although she was not criminally charged, a civil grand jury presented an accusation charging her with misconduct in office. A month-long trial ensued, following which Smith retired and moved to dismiss the removal proceedings on the grounds of mootness. However, the trial court denied her motion, and Smith was found guilty on six counts, leading to a judgment of removal.Smith appealed, arguing that the removal proceedings were moot as she had already retired. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, disagreed. Despite her retirement, the judgment of removal had consequential implications: it barred Smith from jury service under section 203, subdivision (a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which excludes individuals convicted of malfeasance in office. In her removal trial, the jury found Smith guilty of perjury, a form of malfeasance in office.Smith contended that the literal language of these statutes should be disregarded because removal proceedings are not criminal cases. However, the court concluded that Smith's retirement did not render the removal proceedings moot because her conviction in those proceedings barred her from serving on a jury. The judgment of removal was thus affirmed. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, the Board of Education of the County of Cabell challenged two state laws that required the Board to include funding for the Cabell County Public Library and the Greater Huntington Park and Recreation District in its excess levy proposals. The Board argued that these laws violated the equal protection guarantees of the West Virginia Constitution because they imposed funding requirements on the Board that were not required of other county boards of education.The court agreed with the Board, finding that the laws did indeed create a discriminatory classification. The court noted that 53 other county boards were free to seek voter approval of excess levy funding without such restrictions. The court could not find a compelling state interest to justify this unequal classification.The court also addressed a second issue related to equalization payments for fiscal years 2024 and 2025. The court concluded that although the Board was required to make annual payments to the Library and the Park District, it was not required to make equalization payments for these fiscal years.The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the respondents’ Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus. View "Board of Education v. Cabell County Public Library" on Justia Law

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In West Virginia, a woman sued the City of Logan after she tripped over a loop of cable wire on a sidewalk, which she alleged the city negligently maintained. The cable wire and post were owned by the First Baptist Church of Logan, West Virginia, and the wire had been around the pole for at least ten years. The woman had walked the same route on her lunch break daily for over a year prior to the accident. She testified that she had never noticed the wire before the day of her injury.The city, in its defense, pointed out that it did not own the wire, had never received any reports about the wire causing a hazard, and did not have any notice or knowledge that the wire was on the sidewalk before the woman's fall. Street Commissioner for the City of Logan, Kevin Marcum, testified that under city ordinances, property owners are in charge of sidewalks.Following discovery, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, finding that the woman failed to support a negligence claim under West Virginia law. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed this decision, agreeing that the woman failed to establish that the city knew or should have known that the wire was on the sidewalk causing a potential hazard. The court held that foreseeability or reasonable anticipation of the consequences of an act is determinative of a defendant’s negligence. Because there was no evidence demonstrating that the city knew or should have known that the wire was on the sidewalk causing a potential hazard, the court concluded that the city was entitled to summary judgment. View "Orso v. The City of Logan" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia recently ruled on a case involving the nonprofit organization Tax Analysts and Matthew Irby, the West Virginia State Tax Commissioner. Tax Analysts requested copies of field audit and audit training manuals from the West Virginia State Tax Department under the West Virginia Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Department denied the request, citing a statutory exemption protecting certain tax-related documents. Tax Analysts then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to prevent the Department from withholding the requested documents.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County ruled in favor of the Department and dismissed the case, accepting the Department's argument that the documents were statutorily protected by the asserted FOIA disclosure exemption. However, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed this decision, concluding that the circuit court erred by not requiring the Department to present detailed justifications, known as a Vaughn index and an affidavit, as to why each document or part of it was exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.The court remanded the case with instructions for the circuit court to require the Department to file a Vaughn index and an affidavit explaining why disclosure of the documents would be harmful and why they should be exempt. The court concluded that the Department had not met its burden of showing the express applicability of the claimed exemption to the material requested. View "Tax Analysts v. Irby" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of the United States decided in the case of Mark Pulsifer, who was convicted for distributing methamphetamine and sought to minimize his sentence using the "safety valve" provision of federal sentencing law. This provision allows a sentencing court to disregard the statutory minimum if a defendant meets five criteria, one of which is related to the defendant's criminal history. The government argued that Pulsifer did not meet this requirement due to his previous three-point offenses, disqualifying him under the safety valve provision. Pulsifer, however, contended that he should be considered eligible as he did not have a two-point violent offense, arguing that only the combination of all three elements of the provision could prevent him from receiving safety-valve relief.The court held that a defendant is eligible for safety-valve relief only if he or she satisfies each of the provision’s three conditions. More specifically, a defendant is eligible only if they do not have more than four criminal-history points, do not have a prior three-point offense, and do not have a prior two-point violent offense. This interpretation aligns with the text and context of the law and the Sentencing Guidelines. The court rejected Pulsifer’s attempts to invoke the rule of lenity, as the court found no ambiguity in the statute and, therefore, no room for lenity to play a role. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. View "Pulsifer v. United States" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over the legality of an agreement between River 1, LLC, an American company, and Viking USA LLC, a subsidiary of a Swiss company, under federal maritime law. The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) had confirmed the legality of the agreement as a "time charter" under 46 U.S.C. § 56101(a)(i). However, American Cruise Lines argued that the agreement should be construed as a "bareboat" charter which is not covered under the standing blanket approval of MARAD, and thus, grants a foreign company impermissible control of an American vessel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed MARAD's decision. It found that the agreement didn't grant Viking exclusive possession and control of the cruise ship in a way that blackletter maritime law recognizes as sufficient to create a bareboat charter. It noted that the ship's crew was provided by River 1, the vessel master was overseen by River 1, and River 1 bore primary responsibility for the ship’s day-to-day maintenance and care. Viking's ability to set the itinerary was consistent with the maritime law definition of a time charter.The court also rejected American Cruise Lines' allegations that MARAD failed to follow the notice and comment provisions applicable to this case. It concluded that MARAD fully complied with the new procedural requirements imposed by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2021. View "American Cruise Lines v. United States of America" on Justia Law

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The case before the Supreme Court of Texas concerned the City of Dallas and the Employees’ Retirement Fund of the City of Dallas. The issue at hand was whether a city ordinance could confer a third party the perpetual right to veto categories of future lawmaking. The Court of Appeals held that the City of Dallas could not amend Chapter 40A of its code of ordinances unless the board of trustees of the Employees’ Retirement Fund agreed to the amendment. However, the Supreme Court of Texas found that such delegation of lawmaking authority was not permissible.The Supreme Court of Texas based its ruling on the principle that a legislative body cannot bind its successors, and on the constitutional principle forbidding the city council from giving away its authority to legislate. The court determined that the board’s veto in § 40A-35(a) was unenforceable and cannot prevent an otherwise valid ordinance from taking effect.However, the court did not resolve whether the City must hold an election that submits § 8-1.5(a-1) to the voters before it can enforce that provision. The court declined to address this question and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further consideration. View "THE CITY OF DALLAS v. THE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT FUND OF THE CITY OF DALLAS" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between developers of rent-restricted housing projects and the Lancaster County Board of Equalization. The Board sought permission from the Tax Equalization and Review Commission to use a different methodology than the statutorily provided income approach for assessing the value of the housing projects. The Board argued that the income approach did not result in actual value and sought to use a different, professionally accepted mass appraisal method. The developers appealed the Commission's decision to grant the Board's request.The Nebraska Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the Commission's decision was a "final decision" subject to appeal. The court concluded that the Commission's decision was not final because it did not approve a specific alternate methodology and did not determine the valuation of the properties. The court further reasoned that the decision could be rendered moot by future developments in the litigation, such as the Board's refusal to approve the County Assessor's proposed valuations. The court held that, because the developers' rights had not been substantially affected by the Commission's decision, it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. View "A & P II, LLC v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Nebraska recently ruled on a dispute between the Nebraska Journalism Trust (NJT) and the Nebraska Department of Environment and Energy (NDEE) over the cost of providing public records. NJT had requested email records from NDEE relating to certain environmental topics, and was given an estimated cost of $44,103.11, mainly for the time spent by non-attorney staff to review the requested records. NJT filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the cost estimate included charges unauthorized by Nebraska law.The court ruled that a requester of public records who is provided with a fee estimate that contains unauthorized charges may indeed file for a writ of mandamus. The court also clarified that the party seeking a writ of mandamus has the burden of proving that the fee estimate includes unauthorized charges, after which the public body must show that the fees charged are authorized by law.However, the court found that the plain language of Nebraska law permits a public body to charge a fee for time spent by non-attorney employees, in excess of four cumulative hours, reviewing requested public records. The court thus concluded that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the law, vacated its writ of mandamus and its order awarding attorney fees and costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nebraska Journalism Trust v. Dept. of Envt. & Energy" on Justia Law