Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

The Michigan Attorney General initiated an investigation into Eli Lilly and Company's insulin pricing practices, alleging potential violations of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). Specifically, the Attorney General asserted there was probable cause to believe Eli Lilly's pricing strategies for insulin, including disparities between branded and generic products and differences between U.S. and international prices, constituted violations of specific MCPA provisions. The Attorney General sought authorization from the Ingham Circuit Court to issue investigative subpoenas and also filed a complaint for declaratory relief, asking the court to rule that the investigation and any future enforcement action were not barred by a statutory exemption for conduct "specifically authorized" by law.The Ingham Circuit Court found probable cause for the investigation and authorized subpoenas. However, Eli Lilly argued that, based on prior Michigan Supreme Court decisions—Smith v Globe Life Ins Co and Liss v Lewiston-Richards, Inc.—the MCPA exemption for regulated conduct applied, as the sale of pharmaceuticals is regulated by law. The parties agreed to pause the subpoenas pending resolution of the declaratory relief action. The circuit court granted summary disposition for Eli Lilly, concluding the exemption applied, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.On review, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled its previous broad interpretation of the MCPA exemption in Smith and Liss, holding instead that courts must consider whether the specific transaction or conduct at issue, rather than the general activity, is "specifically authorized" by law. The Court found that Smith and Liss had improperly expanded the exemption, undermining the MCPA's purpose. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, vacated the circuit court's order, and remanded for further proceedings to determine if Eli Lilly's specific conduct was exempt under the new, narrower standard. View "Attorney General v. Eli Lilly And Company" on Justia Law

Jacqueline Davis filed a lawsuit against BetMGM, LLC, in the Wayne Circuit Court, claiming fraud, conversion, and breach of contract after winning over $3 million on BetMGM's online gambling platform. BetMGM approved her withdrawal of $100,000 but later suspended her account, citing a game malfunction that erroneously credited her winnings. BetMGM refused to remit the remaining winnings, leading Davis to file a complaint with the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) and subsequently in court.The Wayne Circuit Court granted BetMGM's motion for summary disposition, ruling that the Lawful Internet Gaming Act (LIGA) preempted Davis's claims and that the MGCB had exclusive jurisdiction over online gambling disputes. The court relied on caselaw interpreting the Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act (MGCRA) and administrative rules under the LIGA, concluding that the LIGA precluded inconsistent common-law claims. Davis's motion for reconsideration was denied.The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision in a split decision. The majority agreed with the lower court's reasoning, while the dissent argued that the MGCB did not have the authority to resolve individual patron disputes and that Davis's claims were not inconsistent with the LIGA. The dissent also noted that the MGCB's role was limited to investigating violations of the LIGA and did not extend to adjudicating disputes between patrons and licensees.The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the LIGA did not abrogate common-law claims of fraud, conversion, and breach of contract. The court clarified that the correct principle to apply was abrogation, not preemption, and found no clear legislative intent to abrogate these common-law claims. The court also determined that Davis's claims were not inconsistent with the LIGA, as the MGCB did not have the authority to resolve such disputes. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Davis v. BetMGM, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2004, George and Thelma Nickola, were injured in a car accident. The driver of the other car was insured with a no-fault insurance policy provided the minimum liability coverage allowed by law: $20,000 per person, up to $40,000 per accident. The Nickolas’ (acting through their attorney) wrote to their insurer, defendant MIC General Insurance Company, explaining that the no-fault liability insurance policy was insufficient to cover the Nickolas' injuries. The letter also advised MIC that the Nickolas were claiming UIM benefits under their automobile policy. The Nickolas’ policy provided for UIM limits of $100,000 per person, up to $300,000 per accident, and they sought payment of UIM benefits in the amount of $160,000; $80,000 for each insured. An adjuster for defendant MIC denied the claim, asserting that the Nickolas could not establish a threshold injury for noneconomic tort recovery. The matter was ultimately ordered to arbitration, the outcome of which resulted in an award of $80,000 for George’s injuries and $33,000 for Thelma’s. The award specified that the amounts were “inclusive of interest, if any, as an element of damage from the date of injury to the date of suit, but not inclusive of other interest, fees or costs that may otherwise be allowable.” The trial court affirmed the arbitration awards but declined to award penalty interest under the UTPA, finding that penalty interest did not apply because the UIM claim was “reasonably in dispute” for purposes of MCL 500.2006(4). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the “reasonably in dispute” language applied to plaintiff’s UIM claim because a UIM claim “essentially” places the insured in the shoes of a third-party claimant. The Michigan Supreme Court held that an insured making a claim under his or her own insurance policy for UIM benefits cannot be considered a “third party tort claimant” under MCL 500.2006(4). The Court reversed the Court of Appeals denying plaintiff penalty interest under the UTPA, and remanded this case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Estate of Nickola v MIC General Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Marcy Hill, Patricia Hill, and Christopher Hill brought an action against Sears, Roebuck & Co., Sears Logistic Services, Inc., Merchant Delivery, Inc., Exel Direct, Inc., Mark Pritchard, Timothy Dameron, and others, seeking to recover damages for injuries and property damage incurred when Marcy Hill released natural gas through an uncapped gas line and plaintiffs’ home burned down following Patricia Hill’s attempt to light a candle. Defendants were prior owners of the home and the parties who sold, delivered, and installed an electric washer and dryer purchased by Marcy Hill in 2003. Hill’s mother had directed the installers to place the washer and dryer in the same location where the prior owners’ gas dryer had been situated. The prior owners had turned off the gas to the line supplying their dryer, but had not capped off the line when they moved, taking their dryer with them. In 2007, four years after the electric dryer’s installation, during which time it had functioned without incident, Hill inadvertently opened the valve on the gas line. Marcy and Patricia Hill smelled gas throughout the day but did not act on this information, despite both women’s knowledge that the smell of natural gas required safety precautions. Plaintiffs’ home exploded that night when Patricia Hill attempted to light the candle with a lighter. Plaintiffs asserted that the installers had negligently installed the dryer and failed to discover, properly inspect, cap, and warn plaintiffs about the uncapped gas line. The court denied the retailers’, delivery companies’, and installers’ motions for summary judgment. The installers, Mark Pritchard and Timothy Dameron, appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The retailers, delivery companies, and the installers filed separate applications for leave to appeal. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the delivery and installation of the washer and dryer did not create a new dangerous condition with respect to the uncapped gas line or make an existing dangerous condition more hazardous. The hazard associated with the uncapped gas line was present when the installers entered the premises and when they left; the danger posed by the uncapped gas line was the same before and after the installation. Any liability of the retailers or the delivery companies would have resulted from their agency relationship with the installers. The circuit court erred by denying the summary judgment motions. The case was reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting defendants summary judgment. View "Hill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co." on Justia Law