Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Nevada
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. District Court
The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief in this challenge to a district court order reinstating a claim against a cigarette manufacturer under the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA), holding that mandamus relief was not warranted.Plaintiffs brought filed suit against Petitioner, a cigarette manufacturer, alleging civil conspiracy and a violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA). The district court granted Petitioner's motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiffs were not consumer fraud victims under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.600(1) because they never used Petitioner's products. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiffs were not consumer fraud victims under the statute. The district court then granted reconsideration, concluding that the earlier dismissal order was erroneous. Petitioner then brought this petition, arguing that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the deceptive trade practices claim against Petitioner because they never used Petitioner's products. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. View "R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. District Court" on Justia Law
Leigh-Pink v. Rio Properties, LLC
The Supreme Court answered a certified question of law by holding that a plaintiff is not damaged for purposes of a common-law fraudulent concealment claim or a Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.600 consumer fraud claim when the plaintiff receives the true value of the good or service purchased.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit asked the Supreme Court to determine whether a plaintiff has suffered damages for purposes of common-law fraudulent concealment and statutory consumer fraud claims if the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff to purchase a service or product the Plaintiff would not otherwise have purchased even if the value of that service or product was at least equal to what the plaintiff paid. The Supreme Court concluded that a plaintiff who receives the true value of the services or goods purchased has not suffered damages under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.600 or under theories of common-law fraudulent concealment. View "Leigh-Pink v. Rio Properties, LLC" on Justia Law
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Consumer Law, Supreme Court of Nevada
State, Department of Business & Industry v. TitleMax of Nevada, Inc.
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of TitleMax of Nevada, Inc. and declaring that TitleMax's practice of "refinancing" did not violate either Nev. Rev. Stat. 604A.5074 or Nev. Rev. Stat. 604A.065, holding that the court erred in part.In 2018, the Nevada Department of Business and Industry, Financial Institutions Division (FID) issued several Records of Examination stating that TitleMax's "refinances" were actually "extensions" that violated the extension provision in section 604A.5074(3)(c) and that TitleMax had underwritten loans that exceeded the fair market value of the securing vehicle. TitleMax sued, asking the district court to declare that refinancing a title loan does not amount to a prohibited extension. The district court granted summary judgment for TitleMax. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the extension prohibition on 210-day title loans includes refinances as a species of extension based on the plain language of section 604A.065; and (2) section 604A.5076(1) refers only to the principal amount of the loan. View "State, Department of Business & Industry v. TitleMax of Nevada, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Consumer Law, Supreme Court of Nevada
State, Department of Business & Industry, Financial Institutions Division v. TitleMax of Nevada, Inc.
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part an order of the district court granting a petition for judicial review of a decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) and vacated the ALJ's order finding that the Grace Period Payment Deferment Agreement (GPPDA) marketed by TitleMax of Nevada, Inc. violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 604A.445 and Nev. Rev. Stat. 604A.210, holding that the GPPDA impermissibly extended the duration of the loan.In 2014, TitleMax began offering the GPPDA, marketed as an amendment and modification to its 210-day loan and under which TitleMax collected seven months of interest-only payments calculated based on a static principal balance and then collected seven months of payments amortizing principal. The Nevada Department of Business and Industry, Financial Institutions Division brought the underlying administrative disciplinary action alleging that TitleMax violated sections 604A.445(3) and 604A.210. The ALJ ordered TitleMax to cease and desist offering the GPPDA and sanctioned TitleMax for willfully violating the statutes. The district court vacated the ALJ's order. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) because the GPPDA required borrowers to make unamortized payments and consequently charged "additional interest" it violated the pertinent statutes; and (2) TitleMax's statutory violation was not "willful" and thus did not warrant statutory sanctions. View "State, Department of Business & Industry, Financial Institutions Division v. TitleMax of Nevada, Inc." on Justia Law
State of Nevada Department of Business and Industry, Financial Institutions Division v. Dollar Loan Center., LLC
Enacted in 2005, in response to the "debt treadmill," NRS Chapter 604A regulates the payday loan industry, including deferred deposit loans and loans with an annual interest rate greater than 40 percent. If a borrower cannot repay such a loan within 35 days, NRS 604A.480 subsection 1 allows for an extension but a licensee cannot extend the period beyond 60 days and cannot "add any unpaid interest or other charges accrued ... to the principal amount of the new deferred deposit loan or high-interest loan." However, under subsection 2, certain new deferred deposit or high-interest loans are exempt from those restrictions: A licensee may offer a new loan to satisfy an outstanding loan for a period of not less than 150 days and at an interest rate of less than 200 percent. The licensee must follow all of subsection 2's requirements for the new loan to be exempted. Subsection (2)(f) permits a loan under subsection 2 if the licensee does “not commence any civil action or process of alternative dispute resolution on a defaulted loan or any extension or repayment plan thereof." Reversing the district court, the Nevada Supreme Court held that NRS 604A.480(2)(f) bars a licensee from bringing any type of enforcement action on a refinancing loan made under NRS 604A.480(2) and is not merely a condition precedent to making a refinancing loan under the subsection. View "State of Nevada Department of Business and Industry, Financial Institutions Division v. Dollar Loan Center., LLC" on Justia Law
Nevada Department of Business & Industry v. Dollar Loan Center, LLC
NRS 604A.480(2)(f) bars a licensee from bringing any type of enforcement action on a refinancing loan made under NRS 604A.480(2). In this case, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court erred in concluding that NRS 604A.480 does not prohibit certain payday loan licensees from filing suit against borrowers who default on the loans. The state supreme court noted that the bar against future civil action on loans made under subsection 2(f) puts an end to the debt treadmill. Accordingly, the state supreme court reversed the judgment. View "Nevada Department of Business & Industry v. Dollar Loan Center, LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Consumer Law, Supreme Court of Nevada
Principal Investments v. Harrison
Appellant, a payday loan company, provided loans to the named plaintiffs. The named plaintiffs and other borrowers did not repay their loans, prompting Appellant to file several thousand individual collection actions. Appellant secured thousands of default judgments against the named plaintiffs. It was later discovered that the process server hired by Appellant falsified affidavits of service. The named plaintiffs sued Appellant, alleging that Appellant improperly obtained its default judgments against them and other similarly situated borrowers without their knowledge. Appellant moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provisions in its loan agreements. The district court denied Appellant’s motions, holding that Appellant waived its right to arbitrate by bringing collection actions in justice court and obtaining default judgments based on falsified affidavits of service. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Appellant waived its right to an arbitral forum where the named plaintiffs’ claims all concerned the validity of the default judgments Appellant obtained against them in justice court. View "Principal Investments v. Harrison" on Justia Law