Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against M&T Bank, alleging that it improperly charged its checking account customers overdraft fees. The district court denied M&T Bank's renewed motion to compel arbitration, finding that plaintiff's claims were not within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement. The court held that, under the delegation provision, the decision of whether plaintiff's claims were within the scope of the arbitration agreement was a decision for an arbitrator, and the district court erred in making the decision itself. Further, the court believed that it was prudent for the district court to reconsider its unconscionability determination in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, so the court did not reach whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Given v. M&T Bank Corp, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the district court's order denying their Rule 60(b) motion for the district court to reconsider its previous order remanding the case to state court. In support of their motion, appellants claimed that, in light of a recent opinion issued by this court clarifying the method for calculating the amount-in-controversy requirement for subject matter jurisdiction, the district court had jurisdiction over the case. The district court denied the motion to reconsider because the case had been remanded to state court and was no longer pending in federal court. The court agreed and affirmed the denial of appellants' Rule 60(b) motion.

Several purchasers of condominium units sued developer Harborage Cottages-Stuart, LLLP (Harborage), alleging that Harborage violated the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSFDA), 15 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., and several Florida statutes. Central to this appeal was whether Harborage violated section 1703(a)(1)(B) by failing to provide the purchasers with a property report prior to their signing the purchase agreements. The court held that Harborage failed to prove that it was entitled to an exemption from the ILFSDA and its admitted failure to provide the report violated the ILFSDA. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their claim under section 1703(a)(1)(B) and (C). The court also affirmed the district court's award of damages and attorney's fees under section 1709; affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Gentry-Hunt on the claim that Harborage violated Fla. Stat. 718.506 and vacated the judgment in favor of the Stones on the section 718.506 claim; and vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the claim that Harborage violated the anti-fraud provision of the ILSFDA and the claim asserted under Fla. Stat. 501.204(1).

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a nationwide consumer class action against Life of the South Insurance Company (Life of the South). At issue was whether Life of the South had a right to enforce against plaintiffs the arbitration clause in the loan agreement, between plaintiffs and the car dealership where they purchased their vehicle, where the loan agreement lead plaintiffs to enter into a separate credit life insurance contract with Life of the South. The court held that the loan agreement did not show, on its face or elsewhere, an intent to allow anyone other than plaintiffs, the car dealership, and Chase Manhattan, and the assignees of the dealership of Chase Manhattan, to compel arbitration of a dispute and Life of the South was none of those. The court also held that because the only claims plaintiffs asserted were based on the terms of their credit life insurance policy with Life of the South, which did not contain an arbitration clause, equitable estoppel did not allow Life of the South to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Life of the South's motion to compel arbitration.

Plaintiff was injured in a single-car accident when driving a vehicle manufactured by defendant and subsequently filed an action against defendant, alleging claims for failure to warn, strict liability, and negligence arising from the defective design of the car. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant with respect to all of plaintiff's claims. The district court held that plaintiff's failure to warn claim failed because it was undisputed that she had not read the warnings and therefore, the content of the warnings could not constitute a proximate cause of the accident. Consequently, the court held that plaintiff's failure to warn claim failed because plaintiff did not challenge that aspect of the district court's ruling and therefore, waived the issue. In light of plaintiff's commencement of the suit more than ten years from the date of the first sale of the vehicle, the court did not think that a reasonable trier of fact could find that defendant exhibited willful and wanton conduct when the vehicle in question performed safely according to reputable mainstream sources. Accordingly, the court held that there was no error in the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant on either the failure to warn claim or the negligent design claim.

Plaintiff's suit concerning purchase of an aircraft claimed specific performance; and, in the alternative, breach of contract; breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing; and breach of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), Fla. Stat. 501.2105. The district court rejected the claims; proceeded under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, as requested by plaintiff; ruled in favor of defendant, but refused to award attorney fees under FDUPTA. After concluding that FDUTPA and its fee award provision are applicable as substantive law of the forum state, the Eleventh Circuit certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court: Whether an offer of judgment may be viable when it purports to settle "all claims," even though it does not explicitly state whether the proposal includes attorneys' fees and whether fees are part of the legal claim; Whether the fee provision applies to a lawsuit seeking damages or, in the alternative, specific performance; Whether the fee-shifting provision applies to an action with the case's unique procedural history; and Whether the provision applies only to fees incurred during the seven months before the FDUTPA claim was defeated at summary judgment, or also to fees incurred during subsequent litigation.

Plaintiffs filed a purported class action as an adversary proceeding before the bankruptcy court alleging that their mortgage lender, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. ("Wells Fargo"), violated various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules by failing to disclose certain fees on the proof of claim it filed in plaintiffs' Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. At issue was whether the district court erred in affirming the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on plaintiffs' claims that Wells Fargo violated the automatic stay provisions in 11 U.S.C. 362; their claims that Wells Fargo violated 11 U.S.C 506(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 2016 by failing to disclose the fees; and their objection to the proof of claim. The court considered each of plaintiffs' automatic stay violations under section 362 and held that Wells Fargo was entitled to summary judgment on each claim. The court concluded that bankruptcy courts have not uniformly reached a conclusion supporting the proposition that pursuant to section 506(b), Rule 2016, or both of these provisions, a secured creditor must disclose and obtain court approval of post-petition legal expenses. Therefore, the court held that these provisions were not violated when a creditor merely recorded costs it had incurred in association with a mortgagee's bankruptcy for internal bookkeeping purposes and made no attempt to collect the fees or otherwise add them to the debtor's balance. Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs' disclosure claims relied on events that have occurred during the course of their Chapter 13 case, the district court did not err in affirming the bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment. The court further held that Wells Fargo's failure to include the proof of claim fees on the proof of claim did not provide a valid basis for an objection; and as to this amount, plaintiffs have identified no reason why such amount was unenforceable. Therefore, Wells Fargo was entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Plaintiff filed a class action suit against JP Morgan Chase Bank ("Chase") alleging violations of Fla. Stat. 655.85 and unjust enrichment where she was charged a fee to cash a check as a non-account holder at Chase. At issue was whether the district court properly granted Chase's motion to dismiss both plaintiff's claims as preempted by the National Bank Act ("NBA"), 12 U.S.C. 21 et seq. The court affirmed dismissal where Fla. Stat. 655.85 was preempted by the Office of Comptroller of the Currency's ("OCC") regulations promulgated pursuant to the NBA where Congress clearly intended that the OCC be empowered to regulate banking and banking-related services. The court also held that because plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim relied on identical facts as her claim under the state statute, it too was preempted.

Plaintiff sued defendants, General Mills, Inc. and wholly-owned subsidiary Yoplait, USA, Inc., for allegedly violating the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA") and for breach of an express warranty by making false and misleading claims about the digestive health benefits of YoPlus yogurt. At issue is whether the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and the FDUTPA by granting class certification and by defining the class as "all persons who purchased YoPlus in the State of Florida to obtain its claimed digestive health benefit" since such a definition requires individualized fact-finding. The court held that the class as certified is not consistent with the analysis of the law and therefore, the order certifying the class is vacated and remanded.