Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Christie's under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., and common law fraud claims under New York law. The claims related to alleged fraud in inflating the value of bottles of wine by falsely attributing them to Thomas Jefferson's wine collection. Because the court found no error in the district court's conclusion that plaintiff's claims were time-barred, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Koch v. Christie's International PLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants on behalf of themselves and similarly situated plaintiffs, alleging, inter alia, that defendants engaged in unlawful, unfair, and deceptive practices through unauthorized enrollment practices known as "post transaction marketing" and "data pass." At issue was whether plaintiffs were bound to arbitrate their dispute with defendants as a consequence of an arbitration provision that defendants asserted was part of a contract between the parties. The court concluded that despite some limited availability of the arbitration provision to plaintiffs, they were not bound to arbitrate this dispute. In regards to the email at issue, under the contract law of Connecticut or California - either of which could apply to this dispute - the email did not provide sufficient notice to plaintiffs of the arbitration provision, and plaintiffs therefore could not have assented to it solely as a result of their failure to cancel their enrollment in defendants' service. In regards to the hyperlink at issue, the court concluded that defendants forfeited the argument that plaintiffs were on notice of the arbitration provision through the hyperlink by failing to raise it in the district court. View "Schnabel et al. v. Trilegiant Corp. et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced this action, on behalf of herself and the 181 other individuals in New York State who had received student loan collection letters from defendant. At issue was whether a debt collector's inaccurate representation to a debtor that her student loans were "ineligible" for bankruptcy discharge was a "false, misleading, or deceptive" debt collection practice, in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. The court held that it was because the least sophisticated consumer would interpret defendant's letter as representing, incorrectly, that bankruptcy discharge of her loans was wholly unavailable to her. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Easterling v. Collecto, Inc." on Justia Law

Hecht sued UCB, a debt collector alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by placing telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity, 15 U.S.C. 1692d(6), and by failing to disclose in its initial communication that the debt collector was attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained would be used for that purpose. The district court dismissed, finding that the suit was precluded under the doctrine of res judicata because Hecht alleged facts and violations already litigated, settled, and disposed of by a final judgment. The Second Circuit reversed. The prior judgment does not bar Hecht’s claims because she had a due process right to notice of that suit and the manner of providing notice, publication of the notice in a single issue of USA Today, was inadequate.View "Hecht v. United Collection Bureau, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased furniture from the Fortunoff store and purchased a furniture protection plan. Defendant sold the plans to Fortunoff, which in turn sold them to plaintiffs. After the Fortunoff store closed and the company went into bankruptcy, defendant rejected plaintiffs’ claims under the plan. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging breach of contract, that the store closing termination clause in the plan violated New York General Business Law 395-a, and deceptive business practices in violation of General Business Law 36 349. The district court dismissed, holding that there was no implied cause of action under 395-a. The Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals: May parties seek to have contractual provisions that run contrary to General Business Law 395-a declared void as against public policy? May plaintiffs bring suit pursuant to 349 on the theory that defendants deceived them by including a contractual provision that violates 395-a and later enforcing this agreement? View "Schlessinger v. Valspar Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that Chase willfully and maliciously provided false information about his finances to Equifax, a consumer credit reporting agency. Chase removed the suit to federal court and moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(F). Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his state common law tort claims. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the FCRA preempted plaintiff's state law claims against Chase. View "Macpherson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and from the district court's order denying its motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff asserted, inter alia, claims against defendants under the First and Fourth Amendments and under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. 3401-3422, as well as under state constitutions and various anti-wiretapping, consumer protection, and deceptive trade practices laws. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred by holding that it lacked standing, by denying jurisdictional discovery, and by denying it leave to amend its complaint. The court held that the district court correctly determined that plaintiff did not have Article III standing to assert its claims. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery and for leave to amend its complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and order of the district court. View "Amidax Trading Group v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants brought various claims before Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitrators against Ameriprise, a financial-services company, for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation related to the decline in value of various financial assets owned by appellants and managed by Ameriprise. Ameriprise answered appellants' FINRA complaint by asserting, principally, that appellants released their claims by operation of a settlement agreement in a class-action agreement suit that had proceeded between 2004 and 2007 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. After FINRA arbitrators denied Ameriprise's motion to stay appellants' arbitration, Ameriprise moved in the district court, in which the class action had been litigated and settled, for an order to enforce the settlement agreement that would enjoin appellants from pressing any of their claims before FINRA arbitrators. The district court concluded that the class settlement barred all of appellants' arbitration claims and therefore granted Ameriprise's motion and ordered appellants to dismiss their FINRA complaint with prejudice. The court held that the district court had the power to enter such an order and that several of appellants' arbitration claims were barred by the 2007 class-action settlement. Therefore, the court affirmed in part. But because the court concluded that appellants' arbitration complaint plead claims that were not, and could not have been, released by the class settlement, the court vacated in part the district court's judgment, and remanded the case for the entry of an order permitting the non-Released claims to proceed in FINRA arbitration. The court dismissed as moot appellants' appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for reconsideration.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment dismissing as time-barred a putative class action alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, arising from the transmission of an unsolicited advertisement to plaintiff by means of a telephone facsimile machine. At issue was whether a state statute of limitations was among the "laws" referenced in the TCPA's "otherwise permitted" provision, or whether the statute of limitations for TCPA actions was the federal catch-all four-year limitations period provided in 28 U.S.C. 1658(a). The court held that, in the circumstances of this case, where the relevant state law, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-570c, specifically recognized a cause of action for statutory damages for the transmission of unsolicited commercial facsimile communications, but permitted such an action to be filed only within two years of the complained-of transmission, a TCPA action could be maintained only as permitted by that state statute of limitations. Accordingly, in this instance, plaintiff's complaint was untimely even if tolling were to be calculated.

Appellants appealed the dismissal of their class action complaint against Nextel, the law firm of Leeds, Morelli & Brown, P.C. (LMB), and seven of LMB's lawyers (also LMB). Appellants were former clients of LMB who retained the firm to bring discrimination claims against Nextel. The complaint asserted that, inter alia, LMB breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty to appellants and the class by entering into an agreement with Nextel in which Nextel agreed to pay: (i) $2 million to LMB to persuade en masse its approximately 587 clients to, inter alia, abandon ongoing legal and administrative proceedings against Nextel, waive their rights to a jury trial and punitive damages, and accept an expedited mediation/arbitration procedure; (ii) another $3.5 million to LMB on a sliding scale as the clients' claims were resolved through that procedure; and (iii) another $2 million to LMB to work directly for Nextel as a consultant for two years beginning when the clients' claims had been resolved. The court held that appellants have alleged facts sufficient to state a claim against LMB for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty and against Nextel for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.