Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Purchasers sued the manufacturer, claiming that their motorhome had numerous defects and that defendant misrepresented the size of its engine. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. There was evidence that the purchasers gave defendant an opportunity to cure, as required for Indiana law claims for breach of implied and express warranties and federal claims under the Magnuson-Moss Act, 18 U.S.C. 2310(e). Evidence also supported a claim that defendant committed an "uncured" deceptive act under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act in representing the engine size. Federal regulations prohibited defendant's designation of the vehicle, which was completed during the 2008 production cycle and had the characteristics of a 2008 model year, as a "2009," but there are disputed questions of fact surrounding information defendant disclosed to the purchasers. The district court properly entered summary judgment on claims for fraud and for commission of an "incurable" deceptive act under Indiana law because the evidence does not support that defendant acted with intent to deceive.

Plaintiff claims that fiber identified on the nutrition label (required by 21 U.S.C. 343(q)(1))of "chewy bars" made and sold by defendants is inferior to unprocessed fiber and can be harmful. The district judge held that the suit was precluded by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 343-1(a)(5), which forbids states to impose "any requirement respecting any claim of the type . . . made in the label or labeling of food that is not identical to the requirement of section 343(r)." The Act does not create a private right of action; suit was filed under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505, and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS 510. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The labeling of the challenged products is compliant with the statute and FDA regulations. The disclaimers that the plaintiff wants added are not identical to the labeling requirements imposed by federal law, and so they are barred. The court further noted that plaintiff failed to state claim under Illinois law.

Plaintiff complained that defendant told credit agencies that she was behind in payments on a loan in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681s–2(a). The district court dismissed the federal claim on the ground that the statute does not create a private cause of action and held that state common law claims are not preempted. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the state claims should have been dismissed with prejudice. Allowing state common law claims would defeat the purpose of the statute.

Plaintiffs, citizens of Illinois, brought a class action on behalf of licensed drivers in several states against West Publishing, asserting claims under the Driver’' Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2722. They contend that West acquires personal information contained in motor vehicle records of millions of drivers, directly or indirectly, from state DMVs for resale in violation of the Act. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.While the Act does create a federal private right of action for people who claim that their personal information has been disclosed in violation of the Act, it does not prohibit West Publishing from reselling the plaintiffs' personal information to those with uses permitted by the Act.

The company made and sold a toy that, when swallowed, made children seriously ill. The product was recalled and removed from store shelves. Plaintiffs, purchasers whose children were not harmed and who did not ask for a refund, challenged the adequacy of the recall and alleged violations of the Consumer Products Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 2051–89, express and implied warranties, and state consumer-protection statutes. The district court denied class certification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that plaintiffs' had standing, based on financial harm. There would be serious problems of class action management, apart from differences in state law. Individual notice would be impossible, making it hard for class members to opt out. No one knows who bought the kits or who used them without problems. It would be difficult to determine who would be entitled to a remedy. The per-buyer costs of identifying class members and giving notice would exceed the price of the toys. The principal effect of class certification would be to induce defendants to pay class lawyers enough to make them go away; effectual relief for consumers is unlikely.

Plaintiff claims that defendants are billing aggregators engaged in "cramming" by placing unauthorized charges on telephone bills, arranged unauthorized charges on plaintiff's telephone bill, and were responsible for unauthorized charges on the telephone bills of more than one million Indiana telephone numbers. Defendants produced evidence that plaintiff actually ordered the services in question. Plaintiff argued that the service was not legally authorized if defendants did not possess all customer authorization documentation required by the Indiana anti-cramming regulation, 170 IAC 7-1.1-19(p). That law does not provide a private right of action, but plaintiff argued that defendants' failure to comply proved unjust enrichment and provided a basis for suit under Indiana's Deceptive Commercial Solicitation Act, Ind. Code 24-5-19-9. The district court denied class certification and granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The anti-cramming regulation does not apply to these defendants, which are not telephone companies and did not act in this case as billing agents for telephone companies. There was no unjust enrichment and the DCSA does not apply; plaintiff ordered and received services. Common issues do not predominate over individual issues, as required for a class under FRCP 23(b)(3).

Plaintiffs want to represent a class of more than 100 people with stakes of more than $5 million and invoked federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2), the Class Action Fairness Act. They claim that the company violates the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act prohibition on pyramid schemes, 815 ILCS 505/2A(2). The company's customers sell each other the right to act as travel agencies, as well as selling travel services to the public. The district court did not decide whether the operation is a pyramid scheme, but ruled that transactions with residents of states other than Illinois are outside the Act, dismissed the non-Illinois plaintiffs, and decided that the suit is an intra-state controversy that belongs in state court. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Section 1332(d)(4) requires the court to decline jurisdiction when at least two-thirds of the members of the proposed class reside in the same state as the principal defendant. The class that plaintiffs propose is nationwide. Subject-matter jurisdiction depends on the state of things when suit is filed; what happens later does not detract from jurisdiction already established. While the pleadings do not establish that Illinois law does apply, they do not defeat the application of that law.

The tenant appealed an eviction order. The appeals court reversed, finding that the management company had not given notice required by state law. One member of the state appellate panel opined that the company violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The tenant sought damages in federal court. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the management company is not a debt collector under the Act. The company is an agent of the building owner and "obtained" an interest a debt when it was given the right to collect the tenant's rent, before she fell behind on payments.