Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sued U.S. Bank after the Bank enforced its rights under a revolving credit agreement on which plaintiffs failed to make timely payment. The district court granted summary judgment for the Bank, ruling that plaintiffs, by signing forbearance agreements, released all claims against the Bank, and rejected the contention that these agreements were void because of duress caused by an alleged forgery. The alleged forgery was immaterial to the claims because plaintiffs failed to pay the loan by the maturity date, and the Bank was entitled to enforce its rights under the revolving credit agreement. The court agreed with the district court that the alleged forgery was immaterial and affirmed the judgment. View "Meyer, et al v. U.S. Bank National Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant in this case arising under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394. Plaintiff's claims were based upon the receipt of one fax advertisement from defendant, which plaintiff's agent undisputedly consented to receive. The one fax plaintiff received did not contain opt-out language that he argued was mandated by federal regulation. According to the FCC, the contested opt-out language was required, even on faxes sent after obtaining a potential recipient's consent. The court reversed because the Administrative Orders Review Act (Hobbs Act), 28 U.S.C. 2342 et seq., precluded the court from entertaining challenges to the regulation other than on appeals arising from agency proceedings. Without addressing such challenges, the court could not reject the FCC's plain-language interpretation of its own unambiguous regulation. View "Nack v. Walburg" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs' house was sold at a non-judicial foreclosure sale, they sued the lender, the holder of the Deed of Trust at the time of the sale, and the successor trustee. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Fannie Mae designation; the foreclosure sale's procedures complied with Missouri law; the district court properly ruled that plaintiffs' challenged to activities after the foreclosure sale lacked standing; the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim; and the district court did not err in deciding that plaintiffs had failed to plead facts that proved a duty to investigate the transaction on the part of the fiduciary trustee. View "Hallquist, et al v. United Home Loan, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Tenant Tracker alleging that it failed to adopt reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy of its credit reporting, in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. Plaintiff claimed that Tenant Tracker violated the FCRA by including entries in her credit report that did not accurately reflect her own background. The court held that plaintiff did not present competent evidence that she suffered actual damages under the FCRA where the only alleged harm she suffered was emotional injury. The corroboration of a brief episode of frustration and unhappiness did not constitute a genuine injury and actual damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of her suit. View "Taylor v. Tenant Tracker, Inc." on Justia Law

Universal successfully defended a lawsuit brought by a group of cotton farmers in Arkansas state court for damages arising from off-target aerial application of the herbicide known as 2,4-D Amine. Universal then sued several aerial herbicide applicators (collectively, Crop Dusters) who were not parties to the cotton farmers' litigation, seeking to recover its attorney's fees incurred during the cotton farmers' litigation. Because the Crop Dusters owed no duty to Universal, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Universal's negligence claim. The court affirmed the dismissal of Universal's Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ark. Code Ann. 4-88-107(a), claim where the alleged conduct failed to fit within the scope of the unconscionable trade practices prohibited by the ADTPA. Because the Arkansas Supreme Court most recently has rejected any cause of action against a third party for attorney's fees incurred in earlier litigation against another party, and in this case there was no duty running from the third party to the plaintiff that would support such a cause of action in any event, the court affirmed the dismissal of Universal's claims based on the third-party-litigation exception to the American Rule and Restatement (Second) of Torts section 914(2). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Universal's complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Universal Cooperatives, Inc., et al v. AAC Flying Service, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Mortgagors appealed from the district court's dismissal of their claims against the FHLMC and other financial institutions, a law firm, and others. Mortgagors asserted twenty-one claims under Minnesota law related to defendants' rights to the mortgages on the mortgagors' homes. The court rejected the mortgagors' argument that the district court improperly dismissed their claims against the law firm and their contention that their complaint made out a Minnesota slander-of-title action. The court also concluded that the mortgagors did not make out a quiet title claim and the district court properly dismissed their claims against the financial institutions. View "Peterson, et al v. CitiMortgage, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Mortgagors filed suit in Minnesota state court against defendants, alleging numerous deficiencies in the assignment of their mortgages and in their foreclosures. In this appeal, plaintiffs asserted that the district court erred in denying their motion to remand when it concluded that they failed to make out claims for slander of title, declaratory judgment, and quiet title, and in mistakenly relying on Jackson v. Mortgage Registration Sys. Because the court recently concluded that nearly identical claims against a resident law firm had no reasonable basis in law and fact under Minnesota law and constituted fraudulent joinder, the court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the district court erred by dismissing the claims against the law firm and denying remand; the court disposed of the slander-of-title claim because the court recently upheld the dismissal of a virtually identical claim in Butler v. Bank of America; the court denied plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment to determine whether defendants had "any true interest in or right to foreclose on their properties" and whether the notes were properly accelerated by the correct party; and the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the quiet title action. View "Karnatcheva, et al v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Wells Fargo for fraudulent misrepresentation and promissory estoppel after Wells Fargo initiated foreclosure when plaintiffs stopped paying on their mortgage loan. The court held that plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the modification of their home loan and therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' claims under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b). The court also held that plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim for promissory estoppel and the district court did not err in dismissing their claim. View "Freitas, et al v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of an asserted class, brought this action in state court against MFA, Casey's General Stores, and Quicktrip Corporation (the operators) under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.020, alleging that defendants misrepresented the grade of gas pumped at their stations. Casey's General Stores removed the case to the federal district court asserting that plaintiff's claim was completely preempted by the Petroleum Practices Act (PMPA), 15 U.S.C. 2801 et seq., or alternatively, that there was diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1711 et seq. The court concluded that the absence of a federal cause of action in Subchapter II meant that plaintiff's claim was not completely preempted and that there was no federal jurisdiction over that claim. Since the question of whether there was jurisdiction under CAFA would benefit from full development and adversarial briefing, the court remanded those issues in order for the district court to consider whether there was federal jurisdiction over this case under CAFA. Accordingly, the court reversed the ruling that plaintiff's state claim was completely preempted and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. MFA Petroleum Co., et al" on Justia Law

B&B, a supplier of self-sealing fasteners, sued Fastenal for breach of an exclusive supply agreement, tortious interference with business expectancy, and violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA) based on Fastenal's purchases of self-sealing fasteners from competing suppliers. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the draft complaint that accompanied B&B's demand letter for the purpose of establishing when the statute of limitations began to run; the four-year statute of limitations applied to B&B's breach of contract claim; the statute-of-limitations barred the breach-of-contract claim; because no reasonable jury could find that B&B was ignorant of the facts surrounding Fastenal's breaching conduct, B&B could not benefit from an equitable exception to the statute of limitations; B&B had no cognizable tortious interference or ADTPA claims; and the attorney's fee award must be affirmed. View "B & B Hardware v. Fastenal Co." on Justia Law