Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Honda appealed the district court's decision to certify a nationwide class of all consumers who purchased or leased Acura RLs equipped with a Collision Mitigation Braking System (CMBS) during a 3 year period under Rule 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs alleged that certain advertisements misrepresented the characteristics of the CMBS and omitted material information on its limitations. The court held that the district court erred because it erroneously concluded that California law could be applied to the entire nationwide class, and because it erroneously concluded that all consumers who purchased or leased the Acura RL could be presumed to have relied on defendant's advertisements, which allegedly were misleading and omitted material information. Accordingly, the court vacated the class certification order. View "Mazza, et al. v. American Honda Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced this action against Burger King, raising claims under Oregon law for product liability, negligence, and vicarious liability after plaintiff discovered that a Burger King employee had spit into his Whopper. Plaintiff subsequently appealed from a final judgment on the pleadings dismissing his diversity action against defendants. This order certified to the Supreme Court of Washington the dispositive and unsettled question of Washington state law at issue in this appeal, namely, whether the Washington Products Liability Act (WPLA), Wash. Rev. Code 7.72.010, permitted relief for emotional distress damages, in the absence of physical injury to the plaintiff purchaser, caused by being served and touching, but not consuming a contaminated food product. View "Bylsma v. Burger King Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging, among other things, a violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. The district court subsequently granted defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion and plaintiffs timely appealed. The court held that plaintiffs clearly alleged in their complaint that they were never given a Notice of Right to Cancel that complied with TILA. Consequently, the complaint was not subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Balderas, et al. v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., et al." on Justia Law

The Attorneys General of Washington and California filed parens patriae actions in their states' courts alleging that defendants engaged in a conspiracy to fix the prices of thin-film transistor liquid crystal display (TFT-LCD) panels, and that state agencies and consumers were injured by paying inflated prices for products containing TFT-LCD panels. At issue was whether parens patriae actions filed by state Attorneys General constituted class actions within the meaning of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The court held that under the plain text of section 1332(d), the parens patriae suits were not class actions within the meaning of CAFA. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the actions and properly remanded them to state court. Given this conclusion, the court need not, reach any other issue raised by the party.

Plaintiffs, representing a putative class of purchasers of contact lens solutions, appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that defendant violated California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq., and False Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500 et seq., by marketing Complete MoisturePlus as a product that cleaned and disinfected lenses. The district court ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing. Defendant argued that the ruling was not in error and that even if it was, the suit was properly dismissed because the class' claims were preempted by 21 U.S.C. 360k(a) of the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976 (MDA), 21 U.S.C. 360(c) et seq. The court held that the district court was incorrect to conclude that this class of plaintiffs lacked standing where they had demonstrated economic harm, but the court held that it could affirm the district court's summary judgment on any ground supported by the record. Therefore, the court held that the record demonstrated that the class' claims were preempted, so the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.

Appellant appealed the district court's decision, on summary judgment, that letters sent by appellant to nearly 40,000 California residents constituted "false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s]... in connection with the collection of any debt" in violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e. Appellant also appealed the jury's award of statutory damages under both the FDCPA and California's Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act), California Civil Code 1788, et seq. The court held that the letters, which misleadingly implied that appellant had the ability to report obsolete debts to credit bureaus, and impliedly threatened to make such reports, violated section 1692e(5) and e(10) of the FDCPA. The court recognized that the FDCPA did not pre-empt consistent state action, including cumulative recovery of statutory damages under state law. The court also held that the Rosenthal Act's remedies were cumulative, and available even when the FDCPA afforded relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court.

Plaintiffs, individual homeowners, sued defendants, some of the nation's largest housing developers, seeking damages, attorneys fees and costs, and the option to rescind their home purchases due to defendants' fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of California law. At issue was whether plaintiffs, who purchased homes in new developments, had standing to sue defendants for injuries allegedly caused by defendants' practice of marketing neighboring homes to individuals who presented a high risk of foreclosure and abandonment of their homes, financing those high-risk buyers, concealing that information, and misrepresenting the character of the neighborhoods. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' overpayment and rescission claims for lack of Article III standing. The court also held that plaintiffs' decreased economic value and desirability were cognizable injuries. While the court agreed with the district court that, on the current record, plaintiffs have not established a sufficient causal connection between any decreased value and desirability and defendants' actions, plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their complaint and attach expert testimony on causation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff brought suit against the Dealership and Porsche when the pre-owned car that she purchased from the Dealership developed serious mechanical problems during the warranty period and the Dealership refused to honor her warranty claims. Plaintiff alleged breach of implied and express warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), 15 U.S.C. 2301 et seq., and breach of contract and unconscionability under California law. The district court granted the Dealership's petition to compel arbitration pursuant to the mandatory arbitration provision in the sales contract that plaintiff signed when she bought the car and stayed the action against Porsche. Plaintiff's principal argument on appeal was that the MMWA barred the provision mandating pre-dispute binding arbitration of her warranty claims against the Dealership. Although the text of the MMWA did not specifically address the validity of pre-dispute mandatory binding arbitration, Congress expressly delegated rulemaking authority under the statue to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC construed the MMWA as barring pre-dispute mandatory binding arbitration provisions covering written warranty agreements and issued a rule prohibiting judicial enforcement of such provisions with respect to consumer claims brought under the MMWA. Because it was required to defer to the reasonable construction of a statute by the agency that Congress had authorized to interpret it, the court held that the MMWA precluded enforcement of pre-dispute agreements such as Porsche's that required mandatory binding arbitration of consumer warranty claims. The court declined to address plaintiff's remaining claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff brought suit against Toyota when the new car that she leased developed mechanical problems during the warranty period and Toyota failed to repair them to her satisfaction. In addition to several California state law claims, she alleged breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), 15 U.S.C. 2301 et seq. The district court granted Toyota's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that plaintiff did not, before filing suit in civil court, pursue her claims through the California Dispute Settlement Program (CDSP) that Toyota maintained and specified in its warranty. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that her failure to initially resort to the CDSP provided Toyota an affirmative defense to her warranty claims under the MMWA, but did not defeat subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the prerequisite in section 2310(a) of the MMWA that a "consumer may not commence a civil action... unless he initially resorts to [an informal dispute settlement procedure]" was merely a codification of the MMWA's exhaustion requirement and did not operate as a jurisdictional bar. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded so that the district court could consider how to proceed with the instant action, including the failure-to-exhaust issues.

Plaintiff sued Holland American, alleging that the cruise line breached its duty to warn him of the dangers associated with swimming on the Pacific Ocean side of Lover's Beach on Mexico's Baja Peninsula. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Holland American, holding that the cruise line did not have a duty to warn plaintiff because the conditions of the ocean at Lover's Beach were open and obvious and because there was no evidence of particularly hazardous conditions or of prior accidents at that location. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking the sworn declarations of plaintiff's expert witnesses. The court also held that, because Holland American had neither actual nor constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the Pacific Ocean side of Lover's Beach, it had no duty to warn plaintiff about swimming there. Therefore, the court need not address whether the possible dangers of swimming at that location were open and obvious, or whether that question was an appropriate one for decision on summary judgment. Accordingly, the court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Holland American.