Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Shelby Roberts rented an apartment from Ansley at Roberts Lake Apartments. After a dispute over the lease termination, Ansley retained her $500 security deposit and sent her an invoice for $791.14 for additional damages. Roberts believed these charges were fabricated and refused to pay. Ansley referred the debt to Carter-Young, a collection agency, which reported the debt to credit reporting agencies. Roberts disputed the debt, but Carter-Young only confirmed the debt with Ansley without further investigation. Roberts sued Carter-Young for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina dismissed Roberts' claim, stating that her dispute involved legal, not factual, matters, and thus did not require Carter-Young to investigate under the FCRA. The court held that the FCRA did not mandate investigations into legal disputes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that to state a claim under the FCRA, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the information in their credit report is inaccurate or incomplete and that this inaccuracy is objectively and readily verifiable by the furnisher. The court found that both legal and factual disputes could form the basis of a claim if they meet this standard. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if Roberts' allegations met the new standard of being objectively and readily verifiable. View "Roberts v. Carter-Young, Inc." on Justia Law

Susan Carpenter, as trustee for the H. Joe King, Jr. Revocable Trust, sold two properties in North Carolina in April 2020. Both properties were part of homeowners’ associations managed by William Douglas Management, Inc. Carpenter paid fees for statements of unpaid assessments required for the sales, which she claimed were excessive under North Carolina law. She filed a class action lawsuit against William Douglas and NextLevel Association Solutions, Inc., alleging violations of state laws, including the prohibition of transfer fee covenants, the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the Debt Collection Act, along with claims of negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy.The case was initially filed in North Carolina state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The district court dismissed Carpenter’s complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that the fees charged were not transfer fees as defined by state law and that the companies were not deceptive or unfair in charging them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the fees charged for the statements of unpaid assessments did not qualify as transfer fees under North Carolina law. The court also found that the fees were not unfair or deceptive under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Consequently, Carpenter’s additional claims of unjust enrichment, violation of the Debt Collection Act, negligent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy were also dismissed, as they were contingent on the success of her primary claims. View "Carpenter v. William Douglas Management Inc" on Justia Law

Tiffany Johnson and Tracy Crider, Maryland residents, obtained credit card accounts from Continental Finance Company, LLC and Continental Purchasing, LLC. They filed separate class-action lawsuits in Maryland state court, alleging that Continental violated Maryland usury laws by charging excessive interest rates through a "rent-a-bank" scheme. They sought statutory damages and declaratory judgments to void their loans. Continental removed the cases to the District of Maryland and moved to compel arbitration based on a cardholder agreement containing an arbitration provision.The District of Maryland consolidated the cases and denied Continental's motions to compel arbitration. The court held that it was responsible for determining whether the arbitration agreement was illusory, not the arbitrator. It also found that the choice-of-law provisions in the agreements could not be applied before establishing the existence of a valid contract. Finally, the court concluded that the arbitration agreement was illusory under Maryland law due to a "change-in-terms" clause allowing Continental to unilaterally alter any term at its sole discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the court, not the arbitrator, should determine the contract's formation. It also concurred that the choice-of-law provisions could not be enforced before establishing a valid contract. Finally, the court held that the arbitration agreement was illusory under Maryland law because the change-in-terms clause allowed Continental to escape its contractual obligations, rendering the agreement non-binding. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Johnson v. Continental Finance Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, business entities owning recovery rights assigned by health insurers and other third-party Medicare payors, alleged that Defendants, including a drug manufacturer, a specialty pharmacy, and healthcare nonprofits, colluded to inflate the price and quantity of the drug Xenazine. This alleged scheme purportedly violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various state laws, causing the Assignors to reimburse inflated Xenazine prescriptions at supra-competitive prices.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the class-action complaint with prejudice, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that Defendants’ conduct proximately caused their injuries. The court emphasized that RICO’s proximate-causation requirement focuses on the directness of the harm, not its foreseeability. The court found the alleged causal chain too attenuated, involving numerous independent actors like physicians and pharmacists, and dismissed the state-law claims for similar reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the federal RICO claims, agreeing that Plaintiffs failed to establish proximate causation. The court noted that the alleged scheme had more direct victims, such as distributors and wholesalers, and that the volume of Xenazine prescriptions depended on the independent decisions of doctors. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the state-law consumer-protection and unjust-enrichment claims, finding them insufficiently pleaded.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs had standing to bring claims on behalf of unidentified assignors, remanding those claims for dismissal without prejudice. The court upheld the district court’s denial of post-judgment relief and leave to amend the complaint, concluding that further amendment would be futile. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Lundbeck LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Martinsville, Virginia, sued Express Scripts and OptumRx in state court, alleging public nuisance and harm related to the opioid epidemic. The defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, but the district court remanded it back to state court. In 2024, the defendants again removed the case to federal court under the federal-officer-removal statute. The district court granted Martinsville's motion to remand the case to state court.The defendants appealed the remand order before it was mailed to the state court and requested a stay of the remand order pending appeal, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski. The district court denied the stay, interpreting Coinbase narrowly to apply only to orders compelling arbitration. The defendants then sought a stay from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit granted the stay, holding that the district court was automatically stayed from mailing the remand order once the defendants filed their notice of appeal. The court applied the "Griggs principle," which divests the district court of control over aspects of the case involved in the appeal. The court found that the district court's interpretation of Coinbase was too narrow and that the automatic stay applied to the remand order. The court concluded that the district court lacked the authority to mail the remand order while the appeal was pending. View "City of Martinsville v. Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

Phillip and Sara Alig, along with Daniel and Roxanne Shea, filed a class action lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Inc. (now Rocket Mortgage, LLC) and Title Source, Inc. (now Amrock, Inc.). They alleged that during the refinancing of their home mortgage loans, they paid for appraisals that were not independent because the defendants had provided appraisers with the homeowners' estimates of their homes' value. They claimed this made the appraisals worthless and asserted statutory, breach of contract, and conspiracy claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia certified a class of West Virginia citizens who refinanced mortgage loans with Quicken and received appraisals that included an estimate of the property's value. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, awarding over $10.6 million in damages. The court found that the plaintiffs had established a conspiracy between the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the class certification and summary judgment on the statutory and conspiracy claims but vacated and remanded the breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which emphasized that every class member must have Article III standing to recover damages.On remand, the district court reinstated its original judgment, stating that TransUnion did not affect the class's standing. However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish that class members suffered concrete harm from the defendants' actions. The court reversed the district court's judgment certifying the class and awarding damages, affirming the judgment on the named plaintiffs' statutory and conspiracy claims, and vacating the judgment on the breach of contract claim, remanding it for further proceedings. View "Alig v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

Where an individual fails to allege a concrete injury stemming from allegedly incomplete or incorrect information listed on a credit report, he or she cannot satisfy the threshold requirements of constitutional standing. At issue in this case was whether the decision of Experian to list a defunct credit card company, rather than the name of its servicer, as a source of information on an individual's credit report -- without more -- created sufficient injury in fact under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681g(a)(2), for purposes of Article III standing. The Fourth Circuit found no concrete injury on behalf of plaintiff because he was not adversely affected by the alleged error on his credit report. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's denial of Experian's motion for summary judgment and remanded with instructions that the case be dismissed. View "Dreher v. Experian Information Solutions" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit for damages in connection with a $66,500 loan secured by a deed of trust on her house. Plaintiff alleged that, in the administration of and collection efforts on the loan, defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq.; the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The district court dismissed plaintiff's FDCPA and TILA claims and, following discovery, granted Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment on her RESPA claim. The court concluded that plaintiff adequately alleged that the White Firm and the Substitute Trustees were “debt collectors,” as that term is used in the FDCPA. Therefore, the court reversed the order of dismissal of her FDCPA claims against them and remanded for further proceedings, without suggesting whether or not those defendants violated the FDCPA. The court affirmed as to the TILA claims. View "McCray v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

After Kimberly Adkins and Chaille Dubois filed separate Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions in the Bankruptcy Court, Atlas filed proofs of claim in their bankruptcy cases based on debts that were barred by Maryland’s statute of limitations. At issue is whether Atlas violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., by filing proofs of claim based on time-barred debts. The court held that Atlas’s conduct does not violate the FDCPA because filing a proof of claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy based on a debt that is time-barred does not violate the FDCPA when the statute of limitations does not extinguish the debt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dubois v. Atlas Acquisitions LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Lendmark under Maryland’s Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq., challenging the manner in which Lendmark charged and applied late fees towards her personal loan of roughly $2,600. The district court entered judgment for Lendmark. The court concluded that Lendmark was not entitled to charge a late fee in December 2010 or February 2011, or in any month in which plaintiff paid an installment timely and in full. Because the court held that the complaint alleging these facts states a plausible claim for relief, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of this claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed as to the remainder of plaintiff's claims. View "Williams v. Lendmark Fin. Serv." on Justia Law