Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Solomon v. Flipps Media, Inc.
The plaintiff, Detrina Solomon, a subscriber to a digital video streaming service operated by Flipps Media, Inc. (doing business as FITE), alleged that her rights under the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) were violated when FITE disclosed her streaming history to Facebook (now Meta Platforms, Inc.). The disclosed information included the titles and URLs of the videos she watched and her Facebook ID (FID), which is linked to her Facebook profile.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Solomon's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, concluding that she failed to plausibly allege that FITE disclosed her personally identifiable information as defined by the VPPA. The district court also denied her leave to amend the complaint, noting that she had multiple opportunities to propose amendments but did not do so.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court adopted the "ordinary person" standard, which holds that personally identifiable information under the VPPA includes information that would allow an ordinary person to identify a consumer's video-watching habits. The court concluded that the information disclosed by FITE, consisting of video titles and FIDs, did not meet this standard because an ordinary person would not be able to use this information to identify Solomon's video-watching habits without additional effort or technological expertise.The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of leave to amend, as Solomon's request was made only in a footnote and lacked any proposed amendments to address the deficiencies in her complaint. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Solomon v. Flipps Media, Inc." on Justia Law
Beck v. Manhattan College
In spring 2020, Czigany Beck, a full-time student at Manhattan College, paid tuition and a comprehensive fee for the semester. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the college transitioned to remote learning in March 2020, and Beck received only 46% of her education in person. Beck filed a class action lawsuit against Manhattan College, claiming breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment for not refunding a portion of her tuition and fees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Beck's claims. The court found that the college's statements were not specific enough to constitute a promise for in-person classes or access to on-campus facilities. The court also ruled that the comprehensive fee was nonrefundable based on the college's terms, and thus Beck's unjust enrichment claim for fees was barred. The court granted summary judgment to Manhattan College on Beck's remaining unjust enrichment claim for tuition, concluding that the college's switch to online instruction was reasonable given the pandemic.Beck appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the district court's judgment should be reversed based on the decision in Rynasko v. New York University. Manhattan College countered with decisions from the New York Supreme Court's Appellate Division, which supported affirming the district court's judgment. The Second Circuit identified a split between federal and state courts on New York contract-law principles and certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals: whether New York law requires a specific promise to provide exclusively in-person learning to form an implied contract between a university and its students regarding tuition payments. The Second Circuit reserved decision on Beck's appeal pending the New York Court of Appeals' response. View "Beck v. Manhattan College" on Justia Law
Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., Inc.
Eight Black homeowners in New York City sued a lending institution and affiliated entities, alleging that the lender violated federal, state, and city antidiscrimination laws. They claimed the lender made mortgage refinancing loans with high default interest rates to Black and Latino individuals in poor neighborhoods who had no income, no assets, and low credit scores but high equity in their homes, and then foreclosed on the loans when the individuals defaulted. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York entered a final judgment awarding four homeowners $722,044 in compensatory damages and four others nominal damages.The lender appealed, arguing that the district court erred in three ways: by finding the homeowners' claims timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling and the discovery rule of accrual, in its instructions to the jury on disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of discrimination, and in holding that a release-of-claims provision in a loan modification agreement signed by two homeowners was unenforceable as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the homeowners' claims were timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling. The court also found no error in the district court's instructions to the jury on disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of discrimination. Finally, the court agreed that the release-of-claims provision in the loan modification agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., Inc." on Justia Law
Pyskaty v. Wide World of Cars, LLC
The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's lemon law suit based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed suit under the Magnuson‐Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Act (MMWA), 15 U.S.C. 2301 et seq., and New York State law, contending that the "certified pre-owned" BMW she purchased from defendant was incurably defective. The Second Circuit held that the value of plaintiff's MMWA claims, as pled, exceeded the $50,000 minimum amount in controversy requirement. In this case, although plaintiff could neither add punitive damages under the MMWA nor rely on the value of her state law claims to meet the jurisdictional threshold, plaintiff's rescission claim supplied a sufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction. View "Pyskaty v. Wide World of Cars, LLC" on Justia Law
Carlin v. Davidson Fink LLP
Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed suit against defendant, alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to provide the "amount of the debt" within five days after an initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of a debt, as required by section 1692g. The court declined to hold that a mortgage foreclosure complaint was an initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection debt. In this case, the court concluded that neither the Foreclosure Complaint nor the July Letter were initial communications giving rise to the requirements of section 1692g(a). The court held, however, that the August Letter was an initial communication in connection with the collection of a debt, and that the Payoff Statement attached to the August Letter did not adequately state the amount of the debt. The Payoff Statement included a "Total Amount Due," but that amount may have included unspecified "fees, costs, additional payments, and/or escrow disbursements" that were not yet due at the time the statement was issued. The court explained that a statement was incomplete where, as here, it omits information allowing the least sophisticated consumer to determine the minimum amount she owes at the time of the notice, what she will need to pay to resolve the debt at any given moment in the future, and an explanation of any fees and interest that will cause the balance to increase. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carlin v. Davidson Fink LLP" on Justia Law
Radha Geismann, M.D., P.C. v. ZocDoc
Plaintiff filed suit against ZocDoc, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. Plaintiff's suit stemmed from two unsolicited telecopies (faxes), it allegedly received from ZocDoc. ZocDoc made a settlement offer to plaintiff as to its individual claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, but plaintiff rejected the offer. The district court subsequently granted ZocDoc's motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the ground that its offer afforded plaintiff complete relief, thus mooting the action. The court concluded, however, that the action was not and is not moot. The court held that an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment was, regardless of its terms, a legal nullity. In this case, the district court entered a judgment that should not have been entered in the first place, and ZocDoc then more than one year later deposited an amount in satisfaction of that errant judgment in an account payable to plaintiff. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded. View "Radha Geismann, M.D., P.C. v. ZocDoc" on Justia Law
Physicians Healthsource v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals
Physicians filed suit against Boehringer, a pharmaceutical company, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Protection Act of 2005 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. Specifically, Physicians alleged that Boehringer sent an unsolicited advertisement in violation of the TCPA - a fax invitation for a free dinner meeting to discuss ailments relating to Physicians' business. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, holding that no facts were pled that plausibly showed that the fax had a commercial purpose. The court held that, while a fax must have a commercial purpose to be an "unsolicited advertisement," the district court improperly dismissed Physicians' complaint where Physicians' allegation is sufficient to state a claim. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Physicians Healthsource v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law
Strubel v. Comenity Bank
Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Comenity to recover statutory damages for violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. The district court concluded that plaintiff failed, as a matter of law, to demonstrate that four billing-rights disclosures made to her by Comenity in connection with plaintiff's opening of a credit card account violated the TILA. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate the concrete injury required for standing to pursue two of her disclosure challenges and thus dismissed those two claims for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that, although plaintiff established standing to pursue the two remaining claims, those challenges fail as a matter of law. In this case, Comenity’s notice that certain TILA protections applied only to unsatisfactory credit card purchases that were not paid in full is substantially similar to Model Form G–3(A) and, therefore, cannot as a matter of law demonstrate a violation of 15 U.S.C. 1637(a)(7). Furthermore, because neither the TILA nor its implementing regulations require unsatisfactory purchases to be reported in writing, Comenity’s alleged failure to disclose such a requirement cannot support a section 1637(a)(7) claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Comenity on those TILA claims. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of her cross-motion for class certification as moot. View "Strubel v. Comenity Bank" on Justia Law
Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc.
After plaintiff purchased a "1 Day Diet" weight loss product containing sibutramine, a controlled substance that had been removed from the market in October 2010, on Amazon.com, he filed suit alleging claims under the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. 2051 et seq., and state law. The district court dismissed the complaint based on the ground that the parties are bound by the mandatory arbitration provision in Amazon's Conditions of Use. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that plaintiff failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and held that Amazon failed to show that plaintiff was on notice and agreed to mandatory arbitration as a matter of law. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff did not establish a likelihood of future or continuing harm where, even assuming his past purchase of the product resulted in injury and that he may continue to suffer consequences as a result, he failed to show that he is likely subjected to further sales by Amazon of products containing sibutramine. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff's remaining arguments are meritless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district courtʹs denial of plaintiffʹs motion for a preliminary injunction, but vacated the dismissal for failure to state a claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law
Avila v. Riexinger & Assoc., LLC
Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e, alleging that they received collection notices that were misleading because they stated the “current balance,” but did not disclose that the balance might increase due to interest and fees. The court held that Section 1692e requires debt collectors, when they notify consumers of their account balance, to disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of this claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' other claims in a summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion. View "Avila v. Riexinger & Assoc., LLC" on Justia Law