Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, Northstar Wireless, LLC (“Northstar”), and SNR Wireless LicenseCo, LLC (“SNR”) placed more than $13 billion in winning bids at a Federal Communications Commission  (“Commission”) auction to license wireless spectrum. The Commission determined that neither company was eligible for the very-small-business discount because both were de facto controlled by their biggest investor, the large telecommunications company DISH Network Corporation (“DISH”). Northstar and SNR (collectively, “Companies”) petitioned for a review of that decision.   Northstar and SNR have again sought our review, contending that the Commission flouted this court’s orders in SNR Wireless by not working closely enough with them to reduce DISH’s control, wrongfully found them to be controlled by DISH, and penalized them without fair notice.   The DC Circuit rejected the Companies’ challenges to the Commission’s orders. The court held that the Commission complied with the court’s previous decision by affording the Companies an opportunity to cure. The Commission also reasonably applied its precedent to the Companies and gave them fair notice of the legal standards that it would apply in analyzing their claims to be very small companies. View "Northstar Wireless, LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the Inter-American Development Bank (the “IDB” or the “Bank”), alleging that the IDB violated its internal investigatory procedures when investigating allegations that the Plaintiffs had engaged in “Prohibited Practices”—e.g., corruption, fraud, coercion, collusion, obstruction and misappropriation—in the performance of IDB-financed contracts, an investigation that ultimately led to the imposition of severe sanctions against the Plaintiffs. The IDB moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting immunity under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA), 22 U.S.C. Sections 288–288l. Plaintiffs countered that their case fell within two exceptions to IOIA immunity: the commercial activity exception and the waiver exception. Rejecting the Plaintiffs’ arguments, the district court granted the IDB’s motion to dismiss.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that Plaintiffs’ cases did not fall within the IOIA immunity exceptions. The court reasoned that in the context of a multilateral bank like the IDB, the Court has generally looked to whether waiver of immunity serves to “enhance the marketability” of an international organization’s financial products “and the credibility of its activities in the lending markets. Weighing the costs and benefits here, the court saw no reason to find a waiver of immunity. It is true that the IDB is obligated to, among other things, “promote the investment of public and private capital for development purposes” and “encourage private investment,” IDB Charter art. I, Section 2(a), meaning that the Plaintiffs’ argument that judicial review would assuage commercial partners’ “fears that [the Sanctions Procedures] will be applied in bad faith,” and thereby promote investment, is, at the very least, colorable. View "Noah Rosenkrantz v. Inter-American Development Bank" on Justia Law

Appellant used an email application on his laptop to send Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") records requests to fourteen components of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Not having received any response, he filed a complaint in district court almost seven months later seeking an order to require the DOD to conduct a search for and promptly produce the requested records. Appellant attached copies of the emails to the complaint. The DOD responded by moving for summary judgment, relying on a DOD official’s declaration that all fourteen components had searched for but had not received any request from Appellant. The district court granted the DOD’s motion, concluding that Appellant had not created a genuine dispute as to the DOD’s “receipt” of the requests under 5 U.S.C. Section 552(a)(6)(A)(i).   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to the DOD. First, Appellant argued that it “goes well beyond any agency deference and borders on vacuous” to allow the government to prevail based solely on a declaration that it could not find a request. But, the court reasoned, Appellant’s framing—that any declaration denying receipt after a search would warrant granting summary judgment to the government—is flawed. The court affords a presumption of good faith only if we conclude that an agency’s declaration is “relatively detailed and non-conclusory, and . . . submitted in good faith.”  The court explained that Appellant, who filed suit over six months after saving the requests on his computer, has presented insufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute regarding the DOD’s “receipt” of his FOIA requests View "Patrick Eddington v. DOD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are commercial truck drivers who received citations for violating state vehicle safety laws. State officials reported these citations to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration for inclusion in the Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS), 49 U.S.C. 31106(a)(3)(B). After state courts dismissed misdemeanor charges arising from the citations, the drivers asked the Administration to remove them from the MCMIS. The Administration forwarded the requests to the relevant state agencies, which declined to remove the citations. The drivers later authorized the release of their PreEmployment Screening Program (PSP) reports to prospective employers.The drivers allege harm from the inclusion of their citations in the PSP reports and sought damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681e. The drivers alleged that the Administration violated FCRA by not following reasonable procedures to ensure that their PSP reports were as accurate as possible, by failing to investigate the accuracy of their PSP reports upon request, and by refusing to add a statement of dispute to their PSP reports. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Administration, in releasing MCMIS records as required by the SAFE Transportation Act, is not a “consumer reporting agency” under FCRA. View "Mowrer v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Consumer Product Safety Commission revised its safety standard for infant bath seats, stating: “Each infant bath seat shall comply with all applicable provisions of ASTM F1967–19, Standard Consumer Safety Specification for Infant Bath Seats.” When Milice, a then-expectant mother, contacted Commission staff about inspecting the ASTM standard, they were told they would have to purchase the standard from its developer. Milice challenged the 2019 Rule on the grounds that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the First and Fifth Amendments because its content is not freely available to the public. The D.C. Circuit declined to address Milice’s arguments, finding her petition for review was untimely, having been filed more than 60 days after the 2019 Rule was published in the Federal Register, 15 U.S.C. 2060(g)(2). A revised voluntary safety standard issued by an outside organization that serves as the basis of a Commission standard “shall be considered to be a consumer product safety standard issued by the Commission” effective 180 days after the Commission is notified, “unless . . . the Commission notifies the organization that it has determined that the proposed revision does not improve the safety of the consumer product covered by the standard,” 15 U.S.C. 2056a(b)(4)(B). View "Milice v. Consumer Product Safety Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Autovest and its debt-collection agency under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging claims related to a prior collection action.The DC Circuit vacated the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants, holding that plaintiff lacked Article III standing because she did not suffer a concrete injury-in-fact traceable to the alleged false representations or alleged statements for requested contingency fees. Rather, plaintiff testified unequivocally that she neither took nor failed to take any action because of these statements. Nor did plaintiff testify that she was otherwise confused, misled, or harmed in any relevant way during the collection action by the contested affidavits. In this case, although plaintiff stated that Autovest's collection action caused her stress and inconvenience, she never connected those general harms to the affidavits. Therefore, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. View "Frank v. Autovest, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003's truncation requirement imposes on the merchant the duty not to print "more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date." The duty applies at the "point of the sale or transaction" and a violation occurs regardless whether a plaintiff ever becomes the victim of any crime. The interest protected by FACTA—avoiding an increased risk of identity theft—is concrete.The DC Circuit reversed the district court's grant of Centerplate's motion to dismiss plaintiff's action alleging that Centerplate violated FACTA. In this case, plaintiff made a credit card purchase at a Centerplate location and received a receipt that displayed her sixteen-digit credit card number and credit card expiration date. Although not every FACTA violation creates a concrete injury in fact, the court concluded that the alleged violation of plaintiff's right does so. The court held that plaintiff has pleaded enough facts to establish standing, because she was not able to use her credit card without incurring an increased risk of identity theft and, as a result, suffered a concrete injury in fact. View "Jeffries v. Volume Services America, Inc." on Justia Law