Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
HECKMAN V. LIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., and Ticketmaster LLC, alleging anticompetitive practices in violation of the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs had purchased tickets through Ticketmaster’s website, which required them to agree to Ticketmaster’s Terms of Use. These terms included an arbitration agreement mandating that disputes be resolved by an arbitrator from New Era ADR, using expedited/mass arbitration procedures.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the clause delegating the authority to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement to the arbitrator was unconscionable under California law, both procedurally and substantively. The court also held that the entire arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The defendants appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the delegation clause and the arbitration agreement as a whole were unconscionable under California law. The court found that the delegation clause was part of a contract of adhesion and that the terms on Ticketmaster’s website exhibited extreme procedural unconscionability. Additionally, the court identified several features of New Era’s arbitration rules that contributed to substantive unconscionability, including the mass arbitration protocol, lack of discovery, limited right of appeal, and arbitrator selection provisions.The Ninth Circuit also held that the application of California’s unconscionability law to the arbitration agreement was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). As an alternate and independent ground, the court held that the FAA does not preempt California’s prohibition of class action waivers in contracts of adhesion in large-scale small-stakes consumer cases, as established in Discover Bank v. Superior Court. The court concluded that Ticketmaster’s Terms and New Era’s Rules were independently unconscionable under Discover Bank. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "HECKMAN V. LIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT, INC." on Justia Law
BOWEN V. ENERGIZER HOLDINGS, INC.
A Californian plaintiff purchased several bottles of Banana Boat sunscreen between 2017 and 2020, including Ultra Sport SPF 100, SPF 50, and SPF 30. She later discovered that the SPF 50 bottle contained 0.29 parts per million (ppm) of benzene, a known carcinogen. She alleged that the products were falsely advertised as safe and that the presence of benzene was not disclosed on the labels. The plaintiff claimed she would not have purchased the products, or would have paid less for them, had she known about the benzene contamination.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for lack of Article III standing, concluding that she did not demonstrate a non-speculative increased health risk or actual economic harm. The court relied on FDA guidelines permitting up to 2 ppm of benzene in sunscreen, determining that the plaintiff’s allegations did not establish that 0.29 ppm of benzene posed a credible risk of harm or economic injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the district court erred by resolving disputed facts in favor of the defendants and prematurely addressing merits issues intertwined with the jurisdictional question of standing. The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff adequately established an injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing, as she alleged economic harm from purchasing a product she would not have bought, or would have paid less for, absent the defendants’ misrepresentations. The court also determined that the plaintiff met the causation and redressability elements of standing, as her injury was likely caused by the defendants' alleged misrepresentations and could be redressed by judicial relief. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "BOWEN V. ENERGIZER HOLDINGS, INC." on Justia Law
TERPIN V. AT&T MOBILITY LLC
Michael Terpin, a cryptocurrency investor, sued AT&T Mobility, LLC after hackers gained control over his phone number through a fraudulent "SIM swap," received password reset messages for his online accounts, and stole $24,000,000 of his cryptocurrency. Terpin alleged that AT&T failed to adequately secure his account, leading to the theft.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed some of Terpin's claims for failure to state a claim and later granted summary judgment against him on his remaining claims. The court dismissed Terpin's fraud claims and punitive damages claim, holding that he failed to allege that AT&T had a duty to disclose or made a promise with no intent to perform. The court also held that Terpin failed to allege facts sufficient to support punitive damages. On summary judgment, the court ruled that Terpin's negligence claims were barred by the economic loss rule, his breach of contract claim was barred by the limitation of liability clause in the parties' agreement, and his claim under Section 222 of the Federal Communications Act (FCA) failed because the SIM swap did not disclose any information protected under the Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Terpin's fraud claims and punitive damages claim, agreeing that Terpin failed to allege a duty to disclose or an intent not to perform. The court also affirmed the summary judgment on Terpin's breach of contract claim, holding that consequential damages were barred by the limitation of liability clause. The court affirmed the summary judgment on Terpin's negligence claims, finding them foreclosed by the economic loss rule. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment on Terpin's claim under Section 222 of the FCA, holding that Terpin created a triable issue over whether the fraudulent SIM swap gave hackers access to information protected under the Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this claim. View "TERPIN V. AT&T MOBILITY LLC" on Justia Law
LYTLE V. NUTRAMAX LABORATORIES, INC.
Plaintiffs, dog owners, alleged that Nutramax Laboratories falsely marketed their product, Cosequin, as promoting healthy joints in dogs, despite evidence suggesting it provided no such benefits. They claimed this violated the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). The district court certified a class of California purchasers who were exposed to the allegedly misleading statements on Cosequin’s packaging.The United States District Court for the Central District of California certified the class, relying on the proposed damages model of Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Jean-Pierre Dubé, who had not yet executed his model. Nutramax challenged this, arguing that the model needed to be applied to the class to demonstrate that damages were susceptible to common proof. The district court found Dr. Dubé’s model sufficiently reliable for class certification purposes and concluded that common questions predominated regarding injury. Nutramax also contended that the element of reliance was not susceptible to common proof, but the district court found that classwide reliance could be established through proof of material misrepresentation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that there is no general requirement for an expert to apply a reliable damages model to the proposed class to demonstrate that damages are susceptible to common proof at the class certification stage. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Dr. Dubé’s proposed model sufficiently sound. Additionally, the court rejected Nutramax’s argument regarding reliance, affirming that classwide reliance could be established under the CLRA through proof of material misrepresentation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of class certification. View "LYTLE V. NUTRAMAX LABORATORIES, INC." on Justia Law
Estate of Bride v. Yolo Technologies, Inc.
The case involves the plaintiffs, including the estate of Carson Bride and three minors, who suffered severe harassment and bullying through the YOLO app, leading to emotional distress and, in Carson Bride's case, suicide. YOLO Technologies developed an anonymous messaging app that promised to unmask and ban users who engaged in bullying or harassment but allegedly failed to do so. The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against YOLO, claiming violations of state tort and product liability laws.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, holding that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) immunized YOLO from liability. The court found that the claims sought to hold YOLO responsible for third-party content posted on its app, which is protected under the CDA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' misrepresentation claims, holding that these claims were based on YOLO's promise to unmask and ban abusive users, not on a failure to moderate content. The court found that the misrepresentation claims were analogous to a breach of promise, which is not protected by Section 230. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' product liability claims, holding that Section 230 precludes liability because these claims attempted to hold YOLO responsible as a publisher of third-party content. The court concluded that the product liability claims were essentially about the failure to moderate content, which is protected under the CDA. View "Estate of Bride v. Yolo Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law
CALHOUN V. GOOGLE LLC
A group of Google Chrome users who chose not to sync their browsers with their Google accounts alleged that Google collected their personal data without consent. They believed that, based on Google's Chrome Privacy Notice, their data would not be collected if they did not enable sync. The users filed a class action lawsuit against Google, claiming violations of various state and federal laws.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Google. The court found that the data collection was "browser-agnostic," meaning it occurred regardless of the browser used. It concluded that Google's general privacy policies, which the users had consented to, governed the data collection. The court held that a reasonable person would understand from these policies that Google collected data when users interacted with Google services or third-party sites using Google services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court should have determined whether a reasonable user would understand Google's various privacy disclosures as consenting to the data collection. The court found that the district court erred by focusing on the technical distinction of "browser agnosticism" rather than the reasonable person standard. The appellate court noted that Google's Chrome Privacy Notice could lead a reasonable user to believe that their data would not be collected without enabling sync. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings to determine whether the users consented to Google's data collection practices. View "CALHOUN V. GOOGLE LLC" on Justia Law
MONTERA V. PREMIER NUTRITION CORPORATION
The case involves a consumer class action against Premier Nutrition Corporation, which marketed Joint Juice, a dietary supplement drink, as effective for relieving joint pain. Mary Beth Montera, representing a class of New York consumers, alleged that Premier's advertising was deceptive and violated New York General Business Law (GBL) §§ 349 and 350. These laws require proof that the defendant engaged in consumer-oriented conduct that was materially misleading and caused injury to the plaintiff.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California certified the class and the case proceeded to trial. Montera presented evidence, including studies showing that Joint Juice's key ingredients, glucosamine and chondroitin, were ineffective for joint health. Premier countered with industry-funded studies supporting the product's efficacy. The jury found Premier's statements deceptive and awarded statutory damages based on the number of units sold in New York during the class period. Premier's post-trial motions to decertify the class and for judgment as a matter of law were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's rulings on class certification, liability under GBL §§ 349 and 350, and the initial calculation of statutory damages. The court rejected Premier's arguments that its statements were not materially misleading and that Montera's injury was not cognizable under New York law. The court also upheld the jury's finding that the class members' injuries were caused by Premier's misrepresentations.However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's award of prejudgment interest, ruling that statutory damages under GBL §§ 349 and 350 are not compensatory and thus do not warrant prejudgment interest. The court also remanded the case for the district court to reconsider the statutory damages award in light of the factors identified in Wakefield v. ViSalus, Inc., which addresses the substantive due process limits on aggregate statutory damages. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated and remanded in part. View "MONTERA V. PREMIER NUTRITION CORPORATION" on Justia Law
WHITESIDE V. KIMBERLY CLARK CORP.
The case involves a putative class action brought by the plaintiff against Kimberly Clark Corp., alleging that the labeling of the defendant's baby wipes was misleading under California's false advertising laws. The plaintiff claimed that the terms "plant-based wipes" and "natural care®" on the front label, along with nature-themed imagery, suggested that the wipes contained only natural ingredients without chemical modifications. However, the wipes contained synthetic ingredients.The United States District Court for the Central District of California separated the product labels into two categories: those with an asterisk and a qualifying statement ("Asterisked Products") and those without ("Unasterisked Products"). The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claims, concluding that both categories were not misleading as a matter of law. The court reasoned that the asterisk and qualifying statement on the Asterisked Products clarified that the wipes were not entirely plant-based, and the back label's disclaimer about synthetic ingredients dispelled any potential misrepresentation for both categories.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims regarding the Unasterisked Products, holding that the front label could plausibly mislead a reasonable consumer to believe the wipes contained only natural ingredients, precluding reliance on the back label at the pleadings stage. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims regarding the Asterisked Products, finding that the asterisk and qualifying statement, along with the back label, made it impossible for the plaintiff to prove that a reasonable consumer would be deceived. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the complaint failed to meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b). The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "WHITESIDE V. KIMBERLY CLARK CORP." on Justia Law
AMERICAN APPAREL & FOOTWEAR ASSOCIATION, INC. V. BADEN
The case involves trade associations representing manufacturers of children's products challenging Oregon's Toxic-Free Kids Act (TFKA) and its implementing regulations. The TFKA requires the Oregon Health Authority (OHA) to maintain a list of high priority chemicals of concern for children's health and imposes reporting and removal requirements for these chemicals. The trade associations argued that these state requirements are preempted by the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA) and the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA).The United States District Court for the District of Oregon partially dismissed the trade associations' claims and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The district court concluded that the federal Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) had not exercised independent judgment or expertise to trigger the express preemption provisions of the FHSA or CPSA for all 73 chemicals listed by the OHA. Therefore, the trade associations' facial challenges failed because they could not show that the Oregon statute and its regulations were invalid in all their applications.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the FHSA and CPSA did not expressly preempt the TFKA and its regulations because the CPSC had not promulgated regulations for all the chemicals at issue. The court also found that the CPSA did not impliedly preempt the TFKA through principles of conflict preemption. The court concluded that the state law did not interfere with the federal regulatory scheme and upheld the district court's judgment. The decision was affirmed. View "AMERICAN APPAREL & FOOTWEAR ASSOCIATION, INC. V. BADEN" on Justia Law
Davidson v. Sprout Foods, Inc.
The case involves Gillian and Samuel Davidson, who filed a class action lawsuit against Sprout Foods, Inc., alleging that the labels on Sprout's baby food pouches violated California's Sherman Law, which incorporates all federal food labeling standards. The Davidsons claimed that Sprout's labels, which stated the amount of nutrients the pouches contained, were misleading and harmful to consumers.The district court dismissed the Davidsons' claims. It ruled that the Sherman Law claim was preempted by federal law, which only allows the federal government to enforce food labeling standards. The court also dismissed the Davidsons' fraud-based claims, stating that they failed to specifically allege why Sprout's products were harmful.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that federal law did not preempt private enforcement of the Sherman Law's labeling requirements. The court reasoned that the federal food labeling statute permits states to enact labeling standards identical to the federal standards, which California has done through the Sherman Law. Therefore, the district court should not have dismissed the Sherman Law claims. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Davidsons' fraud-based claims, agreeing with the lower court that the Davidsons failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements for fraud. The court also reversed the dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim, which survived due to the reversal on the Sherman Law claim. View "Davidson v. Sprout Foods, Inc." on Justia Law