Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that grocery stores in New York operated by Whole Foods systematically overstated the weights of pre‐packaged food products and overcharged customers as a result.  The district court dismissed the complaint based on plaintiff's lack of Article III standing. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the district court did not draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. In this case, plaintiff plausibly alleged a nontrivial economic injury sufficient to support standing. According to the DCA's investigation, Whole Foods packages of cheese and cupcakes were systematically and routinely mislabeled and overpriced, and plaintiff regularly purchased Whole Foods packages of cheese and cupcakes throughout the relevant period. Therefore, the complaint satisfied the low threshold required to plead injury in fact. View "John v. Whole Foods Market Group" on Justia Law

After review of the documents and affidavits proffered in support of Plaintiff Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC’s (“PRA”) position, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded they did not contain adequate foundation and were not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. PRA sued Defendant Lloyd MacDonald for an amount owed on a Citibank credit card account. MacDonald filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that PRA did not have standing to bring this action because it could not prove that the debt had been assigned by Citibank to PRA. MacDonald objected to the evidence PRA submitted to support its position, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay and lacked adequate foundation. The magistrate court overruled MacDonald’s objections and granted summary judgment in favor of PRA. MacDonald appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. The Supreme Court found that even the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule could not be used to admit some of the documents. The decision to grant summary judgment in favor of PRA was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Portfolio Recovery Assoc v. MacDonald" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant after it attempted to collect debt from plaintiff, alleging that the company violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the District of Columbia Consumer Protections Procedures Act (CPPA), and the District of Columbia Debt Collection Law (DCDCL). Plaintiff eventually accepted defendant's offer of judgment regarding the FDCPA claim and the district court determined the attorney's fees to which she was entitled for this success. The DC Circuit held that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(D) and 72(b)(3) foreclose the district court from using a "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard when evaluating a magistrate judge's proposed disposition of an attorney's fee request. The correct standard of review is de novo. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to allow the trial judge to reconsider this matter in the first instance applying de novo review. The court affirmed as to the remaining orders challenged on appeal. View "Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Attorney alleging that Attorney failed properly to advertise and conduct non-judicial foreclosure sales of their properties in violation of duties under Plaintiffs’ mortgages, statutory law, common law, and the consumer protection statute. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that dismissal was appropriate where (1) the statutory requirements of former Haw. Rev. Stat. 667-5 and 776-7 do not give rise to a private right of action against a foreclosing mortgagee’s attorney; and (2) an unfair or deceptive acts or practices acts or practices claim against Attorney as the foreclosing mortgagee’s attorney was not recognized. View "Sigwart v. Office of David B. Rosen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Fairview, alleging that the company made unauthorized telemarketing calls in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Fairview's motion to dismiss, holding that whether consent is an affirmative defense is irrelevant to the Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry; the exhibits at issue were documents embraced by the pleadings that may be considered by the court; the district court did not commit plain error in concluding that the documents were properly authenticated documents reflecting an aspect of the parties' contractual relationship; given the contractual relationship alleged in the complaint, the district court did not err in considering the documents as reflecting plaintiff's pre-purchase consent; and Fairview's telemarketing calls were within the scope of the consent established. View "Zean v. Fairview Health Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Fat Bullies Farm, LLC (Fat Bullies), and the counterclaim defendants, Donald Gould and Peter Simmons, appealed certain superior court findings and rulings made during the course of litigation with defendants Alan and Donna Perkins and Lori and Bret Devenport, involving the sale of a 3.1 acre horse farm in North Hampton known as Runnymede Farm. When the Devenports purchased the property in 1998, they promised to operate it as a horse farm in perpetuity, and to allow the former owner to maintain an office on site. Simmons told the Devenports that he was interested in purchasing the property. The Devenports told Simmons they would only sell if the buyer agreed to the horse farm and on site office conditions. Simmons spoke with Gould about purchasing the property jointly with the intent to develop and/or resell it. The two created Fat Bullies “for the purpose of acquiring real estate for development or resale.” After amendments to the purchase contract, the Devenports reiterated that they would sell the property only if Fat Bullies committed to operating it as a horse farm. Despite their intentions to develop the property, Simmons and Gould agreed. The parties executed a sales agreement. No payment had been made on the property; word got back to Lori Devenport that Simmons had talked to others in North Hampton about purchasing the farm. The Devenports rescinded the agreement, believing Simmons lied to them about promising to operate Runnymede as a horse farm. Fat Bullies invoked an option, but the Devenports refused to sell. In 2011, the Devenports sold Runnymede to the Perkinses. After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Devenports on Fat Bullies’ breach of contract claim, finding that Fat Bullies failed to prove the existence of a contract by a preponderance of the evidence, and a verdict in favor of Fat Bullies, Simmons, and Gould on the Devenports’ fraudulent inducement claim. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the trial court with respect to a Consumer Protection Act violation decision; the Court reversed with respect to attorney fees related to that Act decision. The Court affirmed in all other respects, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fat Bullies Farm, LLC v. Devenport" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion affirming in part and vacating in part the dismissal of plaintiff's action for failure to state a claim, holding that the trustee of a California deed of trust is a "debt collector" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).Actions taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default and notice of sale, are not attempts to collect "debt" as that term is defined by the FDCPA; enforcement of a security interest will often involve communications between the forecloser and the consumer; and when these communications are limited to the foreclosure process, they do not transform foreclosure into debt collection. The panel explained that, because the money collected from a trustee's sale is not money owed by a consumer, it is not "debt" as defined by the FDCPA. In this case, the notices at issue did not request payment from plaintiff, but merely informed her that the foreclosure had begun, explained the timeline, and apprised her of her rights. Therefore, the panel held that ReconTrust's activities fell into the category of enforcement of a security interest, rather than general debt collection. View "Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust" on Justia Law

Family Security Credit Union ("FSCU") appealed the trial court's denial of its motions to compel arbitration in eight separate but closely related cases. Action Auto Sales ("Action Auto") was a car-financing group that financed the vehicle inventory of Pine City Auto ("Pine City"), a used-car dealership. Action Auto held titles to the vehicles in inventory, and released a title only when a vehicle was sold, and Pine City paid off a proportional amount of the inventory financing. Pine City eventually went out of business without paying off the inventory financing on some of the vehicles it had sold. Action Auto sued Pine City and the purchasers of eight vehicles who had purchased vehicles from Pine City and financed those purchases through FSCU. Action Auto sought possession of the vehicles and money damages. The purchasers each filed counterclaims and cross-claims against Action Auto and Pine City and third-party claims against FSCU, alleging negligence, wantonness, and conspiracy. The purchasers' third-party claims against FSCU were based on FSCU's alleged failure to perfect its security interest in the vehicles before financing the purchasers of the vehicles. FSCU moved for each of those third-party claims to be submitted to arbitration. The purchasers opposed the motions to compel arbitration, but they did not submit any evidence. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying FSCU's motions to compel arbitration in each of the eight cases, and remanded all for further proceedings. View "Family Security Credit Union v. Etheredge" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling that Petitioner was not a “consumer” within the applicable definitions of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondent, a debt collector, concluding that Petitioner lacked standing to seek relief under the Act because Petitioner did not have any specific debt in connection with the calls that Respondent made to her land line phone. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner clearly did not come within the definition of “consumer” set forth in the Act, and (2) therefore, the circuit court correctly ruled that Petitioner lacked standing to pursue a claim under the Act. View "Young v. EOSCCA" on Justia Law

In 2014, plaintiff filed suit against NCO for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) because NCO attempted to collect medical debts from her (Vanover I). Plaintiff then filed suit against NCO in Florida state court alleging violations of the TCPA, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FCPA), and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA) (Vanover II). The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the permissive joinder of additional parties because plaintiff's failure to timely amend her complaint in Vanover I to include these parties did not justify subjecting NCO to duplicative litigation. Furthermore, NCO had no obligation to seek consolidation of Vanover I and Vanover II. Therefore, the district court properly acted within its discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion to permissively join additional parties. The Eleventh Circuit, as a matter of first impression, agreed with the test announced by the Tenth Circuit that claim-spitting is not whether there is finality of judgment, but whether the first suit, assuming it were final, would preclude the second suit. Consequently, the district court did not err by dismissing Vanover II for improper claim-splitting. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Vanover v. NCO Financial Services" on Justia Law