Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, municipal corporations operate the local “emergency communications” or “911” programs in their respective counties, alleged that the telephone company, to reduce costs, offer lower prices, and obtain more customers, engaged in a covert practice of omitting fees mandated by Tennessee’s Emergency Communications District Law (Code 7-86-101), and sought compensation under that statute. They also alleged that, while concealing this practice, the telephone company violated the Tennessee False Claims Act. The district court dismissed the first claim, finding that the statute contained no implied private right of action, and rejecting the second claim on summary judgment on the second claim, finding that the statements at issue were not knowingly false. In consolidated appeals, the Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs provided evidence of a “massive quantity of unexplained unbilled lines,” establishing a disputed question of material fact. The Law does not require the plaintiffs to prove that the defendant acted in some form of bad faith, given that the statute imposes liability for “deliberate ignorance” View "Knox County Emergency Communications District v. BellSouth Telecommunications LLC" on Justia Law

The State brought this civil action against Consumer Attorney Services, P.A., The McCann Law Group, LLP, and Brenda McCann (collectively, Defendants), alleging that Defendants’ conduct violated four Indiana consumer protection statutes: the Credit Services Organizations Act (CSOA), the Mortgage Rescue Protection Fraud Act (MRPFA), the Home Loan Practices Act (HLPA), and the Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (DCSA). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were statutorily exempted from liability. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither the CSOA, the MRPFA, the HLPA, nor the DCSA provides an exemption for law firms. View "Consumer Attorney Services, P.A. v. State" on Justia Law

ECM BioFilms manufactures an additive that it claims accelerates the rate at which plastic biodegrades. In 2013, the Federal Trade Commission filed an administrative complaint, claiming that several of ECM’s biodegradability claims were deceptive. The full Commission ultimately found that three of ECM’s claims were false and misleading under 15 U.S.C. 45. The Commission’s order prohibits ECM from representing that ECM plastic is biodegradable “unless such representation is true, not misleading, and, at the time it is made, respondent possesses and relies upon competent and reliable scientific evidence that substantiates the representation,” The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting claims that part of the Commission’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence and that the Commission violated ECM’s rights under the First Amendment, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the Due Process Clause. ECM had adequate notice and the order is not a prohibition on claims of biodegradability. View "ECM BioFilms, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, pro se, filed suit against Chase, alleging claims for, inter alia, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings, and a violation of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, as well as violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from damages allegedly suffered when she unsuccessfully attempted over a two-year period to modify the loan on her home. The district court granted summary judgment for Chase. The court concluded that the facts plainly demonstrated a viable UCL claim based on the ground that plaintiff was the victim of an unconscionable process. In this case, Chase knew that plaintiff was a 68 year old nurse in serious economic and personal distress, yet it strung her along for two years, kept moving the finish line, accepted her money, and then brushed her aside. During this process, plaintiff made numerous frustrating attempts in person and by other means to seek guidance from Chase, only to be turned away. The court also concluded that the district court erred in failing to acknowledge plaintiff's claim for breach of contract and remanded with instructions to permit plaintiff to amend if necessary and to proceed with her complaint. The court also remanded with instructions to permit plaintiff to amend her complaint to allege a right to rescind under Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. View "Oskoui v. J.P. Morgan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Bank, alleging violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., and California's unfair competition law (UCL), Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200 et seq., fraudulent omission/concealment, and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The trial court applied the doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) based on plaintiff's prior unsuccessful lawsuit against the Bank for breach of contract. The court concluded that the Bank's demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend where the TILA claim was not subject to claim preclusion or issue preclusion, but was time-barred; plaintiff adequately alleged injury in fact and had standing to pursue a UCL claim, but the UCL claim was time-barred; the fraudulent omission/concealment claim was likewise time-barred; plaintiff's request for injunctive relief necessarily failed as well; and the Bank's demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ivanoff v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against ZocDoc, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. Plaintiff's suit stemmed from two unsolicited telecopies (faxes), it allegedly received from ZocDoc. ZocDoc made a settlement offer to plaintiff as to its individual claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, but plaintiff rejected the offer. The district court subsequently granted ZocDoc's motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the ground that its offer afforded plaintiff complete relief, thus mooting the action. The court concluded, however, that the action was not and is not moot. The court held that an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment was, regardless of its terms, a legal nullity. In this case, the district court entered a judgment that should not have been entered in the first place, and ZocDoc then more than one year later deposited an amount in satisfaction of that errant judgment in an account payable to plaintiff. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded. View "Radha Geismann, M.D., P.C. v. ZocDoc" on Justia Law

Fried bought a home in 2007 for $553,330; an appraisal estimated the home’s value at $570,000. Fried borrowed $497,950 at a fixed interest rate. Because the loan-to-purchase-price ratio was more than 80%, Chase, the servicer for Fried’s mortgage required her to obtain private mortgage insurance. Fried had to pay monthly premiums for that insurance until the ratio reached 78%; projected to happen around March 2016. After the housing market crashed in 2008, Fried had trouble making mortgage payments. Chase modified Fried’s mortgage under the Home Affordable Mortgage Program, part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, by reducing the principal balance to $463,737. By reassessing the value of Fried’s home at the time of the modification, Chase extended Fried’s mortgage insurance premiums to 2026. The district court declined to dismiss Fried’s purported class action under the Homeowners Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. 4901. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the Act does not permit a servicer to rely on an updated property value, estimated by a broker, to recalculate the length of a homeowner’s mortgage insurance obligation following a modification; the Act requires that the ending of that obligation remain tied to the initial purchase price of the home. View "Fried v. JP Morgan Chase & Co" on Justia Law

The law firm’s contract with XO Communications provided that the contract would be automatically renewed “for a similar term and at the same rates.” A customer who did not want to renew was required to notify XO at least 30 days before the expiration date in the contract. The contract provided that if the customer terminated the contract after the deadline it would have to pay a termination fee. XO’s monthly invoices contain a prominent reminder of the automatic renewal. After its third renewal, the firm wanted out of the contract because it was moving to a location not serviced by XO. The firm, not wanting to pay the $9,000 termination fee, filed a purported class action, alleging that XO’s monthly reminders should have included the date of the automatic renewal, or that XO should have otherwise notified the plaintiff of the renewal date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that: "It’s not as if the plaintiff were some hapless consumer bamboozled by a huge company…. Had this substantial enterprise kept track of the date of its contract with XO (more precisely the date of its latest renewal of the contract), it would not have incurred the modest termination fee." View "Cafferty, Clobes, Meriwether & Sprengel, LLP v. XO Communications Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The district court certified eight classes, consisting of persons in Illinois and Missouri who take eye drops manufactured by six pharmaceutical companies for treatment of glaucoma. Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ eye drops are unnecessarily large and wasteful, in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/1, and the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.010, so that the price of the eye drops is excessive and that the large eye drops have a higher risk of side effects. There was no claim that members of the class have experienced side effects or have been harmed because they ran out of them early. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss. The court noted possible legitimate reasons for large drops, the absence of any misrepresentation or collusion, and that defendants’ large eye drops have been approved by the FDA for safety and efficacy. “You cannot sue a company and argue only ‘it could do better by us,’” nor can one bring a suit in federal court without pleading that one has been injured. The plaintiffs allege only “disappointment.” View "Eike v. Allergan, Inc." on Justia Law

Drummond Financial Services, LLC and TMX Finance Holdings, Inc. were competitors in the automobile title loan business. Both companies were based in Georgia, with TMX doing business as “TitleMax.” In 2014, Drummond and several of its affiliated companies filed a lawsuit against TitleMax and several of its affiliated companies, alleging that TitleMax was “engaged in a nationwide campaign to systematically and illegally steal [Drummond’s] customers.” Based on these allegations, Drummond asserted claims against TitleMax under the laws of Georgia and various other states for trespass, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with contracts, and unfair competition. Drummond filed a motion for a nationwide interlocutory injunction to prevent TitleMax from continuing to engage in practices that Drummond alleged were tortious and illegal. Following a hearing, the trial court granted a nationwide interlocutory injunction that prohibited TitleMax from “[e]ntering any of [Drummond’s] [s]tores or the parking lots [or certain portions of the parking lots] of [Drummond’s] [s]tores” to solicit Drummond customers or to record their license plate numbers or vehicle identification numbers (other than for purposes permitted by the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act). In addition, the injunction prohibited TitleMax from offering compensation to Drummond employees to refer Drummond customers to TitleMax. TitleMax appealed. Those aspects of the injunction appeared to the Georgia Supreme Court to have been based on the claims for trespass and misappropriation of trade secrets, but the laws of trespass and trade secrets (at least in Georgia) did not support the scope of the injunction. Accordingly, the Court vacated the injunction in those respects, and remanded for the trial court to reconsider the scope of its injunction. To the extent that the parties on remand might rely on law that varies significantly from state to state, the Court reminded them that activities in one state are not due to be enjoined simply because they might be unlawful if done in another state. View "TMX Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Drummond Financial Services, LLC" on Justia Law