Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Midland Funding LLC filed suit against Mark Walton alleging that he had entered into a credit card agreement with Barclays Bank Delaware, used the card to obtain extensions of credit, and failed to make payments on the account. Midland purchases debt from Barclays. Midland sought to collect an outstanding balance of $5,684.72. After a trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Midland in the amount of $5,684.72, plus costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) jurisdiction over this matter was properly established in the district court; and (2) the district court did not err in admitting documentation of the assignment of Walton’s debt from Barclays to Midland pursuant to the business record exception to the hearsay rule. View "Midland Funding LLC v. Walton" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals stem from a class action suit against Target after the retailer announced a security breach by third-party intruders that compromised the payment card data and personal information of millions of customers. Class member Leif Olson challenges the class certification for lack of adequate representation due to an alleged intraclass conflict; class member Jim Sciaroni challenges the district court’s approval of the settlement agreement; and both challenge the district court’s order requiring them to post a bond of $49,156 to cover the costs of this appeal. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to rigorously analyze the propriety of certification, especially once new arguments challenging the adequacy of representation were raised after preliminary certification. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to conduct and articulate a rigorous analysis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)'s certification prerequisites as applied to this case. The court also concluded that costs associated with delays in administering a class action settlement for the length of a class member’s appeal may not be included in an appeal bond under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 7. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to reduce the Rule 7 bond to reflect only those costs that Appellees will recover should they succeed in any issues remaining on appeal following the district court’s reconsideration of class certification. View "Sciaroni v. Target Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that defendants sent unauthorized text messages in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227; California Business and Professions Code 17538.41; and California Business and Professions Code 17200. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that plaintiff has Article III standing under Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins because plaintiff established a concrete injury-in-fact. On the merits, the court concluded that the FCC has established no rule that a consumer who gives a phone number to a company has consented to be contacted for any reason. Instead, FCC orders and rulings show that the transactional context matters in determining the scope of a consumer’s consent to contact. In this case, the court held that as a matter of law plaintiff gave prior express consent to receive defendants’ text messages where he gave his cell phone number for the purpose of a gym membership contract. Revocation of consent must be clearly made and express a desire not to be called or texted. The court joined its sister circuits and agreed that the TCPA permits consumers to revoke their prior express consent to be contacted by telephone autodialing systems. Here, the court held that, although consumers may revoke their prior express consent, plaintiff's gym cancellation was not effective in doing so here. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff lacked standing to bring his claim under the California Business and Professions Code. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group" on Justia Law

University Toyota and University Chevrolet Buick GMC (collectively referred to as "the University dealerships") appealed a circuit court order allowing Beverly Hardeman and Vivian Roberts to pursue their claims against the University dealerships in arbitration proceedings. conducted by the American Arbitration Association ("the AAA") instead of the Better Business Bureau of North Alabama ("the BBB"), the entity identified in the controlling arbitration agreements. In conjunction with their purchases of new vehicles from the University dealerships’ predecessor, Jim Bishop, Hardeman and Roberts purchased service contracts entitling them to no-cost oil changes for as long as they owned their respective vehicles. When the Jim Bishop dealerships were sold and rebranded as the University dealerships, initially the University dealerships honored the no-cost oil-change service contracts sold by the Jim Bishop dealerships. However, they eventually stopped providing no-cost oil changes to customers who held those contracts. On October 29, 2015, Hardeman and Roberts filed a demand for arbitration with the BBB, the dispute-resolution entity identified in arbitration agreements they had executed when they purchased their vehicles, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals, based on the University dealerships' refusal to honor the service contracts. Because a trial court can compel arbitration only in a manner consistent with the terms of the applicable arbitration agreement, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order compelling arbitration and remanded the case for the entry of a new order compelling Hardeman and Roberts to arbitrate their claims against the University dealerships before the BBB if they chose to pursue those claims. View "University Toyota v. Hardeman" on Justia Law

FIA Card Services, N.A. initiated this action against John Camire to recover damages arising out of a debt incurred using a Bank of America (Bank) credit card. Camire filed a counterclaim pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Upon the motion of FIA Card Services, the trial court dismissed Camire’s counterclaim, concluding that FIA Card Services was exempt from liability pursuant to the FDCPA. The Bank was later substituted as the plaintiff. After a trial, the court entered a judgment in favor of the Bank in the amount of $11,573 plus costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment in favor of the Bank but vacated the order dismissing Camire’s FDCPA counterclaim, holding (1) the trial court properly exercised its discretion in managing trial time, and no due process violation occurred; and (2) the trial court erred in concluding that FIA Card Services was exempt from the FDCPA as a matter of law. Remanded. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Camire" on Justia Law

The Tribal Lending Entities challenged the district court's decision compelling them to comply with the Bureau's civil investigative demands. The court rejected the Tribal Lending Entities' argument that because the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Title X, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat 1376, defines the term "State" as including Native American tribes, the Tribal Lending Entities, as arms of sovereign tribes, are not required to comply with the investigative demands. The court concluded that, in the Act, which is a generally applicable law, Congress did not expressly exclude tribes from the Bureau’s enforcement authority. The court explained that, although the Act defines “State” to include Native American tribes, with States occupying limited co-regulatory roles, this wording falls far short of demonstrating that the Bureau plainly lacks jurisdiction to issue the investigative demands challenged in this case, or that Congress intended to exclude Native American tribes from the Act’s enforcement provisions. Neither have the Tribes offered any legislative history compelling a contrary conclusion regarding congressional intent. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "CFPB v. Great Plains Lending, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against M-I, alleging violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681b(b)(2)(A). Addressing an issue of first impression, the court held that a prospective employer violates Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) when it procures a job applicant’s consumer report after including a liability waiver in the same document as the statutorily mandated disclosure. The court also held that, in light of the clear statutory language that the disclosure document must consist “solely” of the disclosure, a prospective employer’s violation of the FCRA is “willful” when the employer includes terms in addition to the disclosure, such as the liability waiver in this case, before procuring a consumer report or causing one to be procured. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Syed v. M-I, LLC" on Justia Law

Gubala subscribed to Time Warner’s cable services in 2004 and, as required, provided Time Warner with his date of birth, address, telephone numbers, social security number, and credit card information. In 2006, he cancelled his subscription. In 2014, upon inquiring, Gubala learned that all of his personal information remained in the company’s possession; none had been destroyed. Gubala filed a class-action suit for alleged violations of the Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. 551(e), which provides that a cable operator “shall destroy personally identifiable information if the information is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected and there are no pending requests or orders for access to such information [either by a cable subscriber, seeking access to his own information] … or pursuant to a court order.” The district judge dismissed the suit for lack of standing, stating that even if Gubala had standing, he failed to state a claim. He could not obtain an injunction, the only remedy he sought, because he had an adequate remedy at law (damages), but did not seek damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the lack of any concrete injury inflicted or likely to be inflicted on Gubala precluded the relief sought. View "Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc." on Justia Law

Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield provides health insurance products and services to approximately 3.7 million members. Two laptop computers, containing sensitive personal information about members, were stolen from Horizon. Four plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and other Horizon customers whose personal information was stored on those laptops, alleging willful and negligent violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681, and numerous violations of state law. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of Article III standing. According to the court, none of the plaintiffs had claimed a cognizable injury because, although their personal information had been stolen, none of them had adequately alleged that the information was actually used to their detriment. The Third Circuit vacated. In light of the congressional decision to create a remedy for the unauthorized transfer of personal information, a violation of FCRA gives rise to an injury sufficient for Article III standing purposes. Even without evidence that the plaintiffs’ information was in fact used improperly, the alleged disclosure of their personal information created a de facto injury. View "In re: Horizon Healthcare Inc. Data Breach Litigation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the law firm of Epsten Grinnell & Howell and attorney Debora M. Sumwalt (collectively, "Epsten") committed unlawful debt collection practices in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act), Cal. Civ. Code 1788 et seq., and the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, et seq. The district court dismissed the FDCPA claims and the state law claims. The court held, however, that plaintiff has alleged a plausible claim for relief because the collection letter contains language that overshadows and conflicts with her FDCPA debt validation rights when reviewed under the “least sophisticated debtor” standard; rejected Epsten's argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that in sending the collection letter, it merely sought to perfect a security interest and is therefore subject only to the limitations in section 1692f(6); and held that Epsten is subject to the full scope of the FDCPA. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell" on Justia Law