Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

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Bruce Jacobs, a Florida foreclosure attorney, filed a qui tam action against JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., alleging violations of the False Claims Act (FCA). Jacobs claimed that JP Morgan Chase forged mortgage loan promissory notes and submitted false reimbursement claims to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. He asserted that JP Morgan Chase used signature stamps of former Washington Mutual employees to endorse loans improperly, thereby defrauding the government by seeking reimbursement for loan servicing costs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Jacobs's initial complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to plead fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b). The court also noted that Jacobs needed to establish that he was an original source of the information under the FCA’s public disclosure bar. Jacobs amended his complaint, but the district court dismissed it again, this time with prejudice. The court found that Jacobs still failed to meet the Rule 9(b) requirements and that the FCA’s public disclosure bar applied because the allegations had already been disclosed in three online blog articles, and Jacobs was not an original source of the information.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that the blog articles, which were publicly available before Jacobs filed his lawsuit, qualified as "news media" under the FCA. The court found that the allegations in Jacobs's complaint were substantially the same as those disclosed in the blog articles. Additionally, Jacobs did not qualify as an original source because his information did not materially add to the publicly disclosed allegations. Therefore, the FCA’s public disclosure bar precluded Jacobs's lawsuit. View "Jacobs v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, dog owners, alleged that Nutramax Laboratories falsely marketed their product, Cosequin, as promoting healthy joints in dogs, despite evidence suggesting it provided no such benefits. They claimed this violated the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). The district court certified a class of California purchasers who were exposed to the allegedly misleading statements on Cosequin’s packaging.The United States District Court for the Central District of California certified the class, relying on the proposed damages model of Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Jean-Pierre Dubé, who had not yet executed his model. Nutramax challenged this, arguing that the model needed to be applied to the class to demonstrate that damages were susceptible to common proof. The district court found Dr. Dubé’s model sufficiently reliable for class certification purposes and concluded that common questions predominated regarding injury. Nutramax also contended that the element of reliance was not susceptible to common proof, but the district court found that classwide reliance could be established through proof of material misrepresentation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that there is no general requirement for an expert to apply a reliable damages model to the proposed class to demonstrate that damages are susceptible to common proof at the class certification stage. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Dr. Dubé’s proposed model sufficiently sound. Additionally, the court rejected Nutramax’s argument regarding reliance, affirming that classwide reliance could be established under the CLRA through proof of material misrepresentation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of class certification. View "LYTLE V. NUTRAMAX LABORATORIES, INC." on Justia Law

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Circle of Seven, LLC, left a Dodge Ram truck on a foreclosed property. The new property owner hired Bottoms Towing & Recovery to remove the truck. Bottoms Towing later sought to sell the truck to cover unpaid towing and storage fees. Circle of Seven contested the sale and the lien amount, arguing that the towing company had used the truck without authorization, which should reduce the lien.The Superior Court of Nash County held a hearing where Circle of Seven presented testimony from its managing member and an employee. The court found that Bottoms Towing had driven the truck and made unnecessary alterations, reducing the lien by $1,427.14 for maintenance and $62.50 for unauthorized use. Circle of Seven appealed, claiming the reduction was insufficient.The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, with a divided opinion. The majority found that the trial court's findings were supported by competent evidence. The dissent argued that Bottoms Towing unlawfully converted the truck for personal use and that the lien should be reduced based on the truck's loss in market value due to this conversion.The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case based on the dissent. The Court held that it could not address the dissent's theory because Circle of Seven had not raised the conversion argument or presented evidence on the truck's value in the lower courts. The Court emphasized that appellate courts should not address issues not raised by the parties. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Bottoms Towing & Recovery, LLC v. Circle of Seven, LLC" on Justia Law

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Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve, LLC ("Radiance") appealed a judgment from the Henry Circuit Court in favor of Bondy's Ford, Inc. ("Bondy's"). Radiance had garnished the wages of David Sherrill, who worked for Bondy's. Bondy's stopped paying on the garnishment, claiming Sherrill had left its employment, but continued to pay for Sherrill's services through a company created by Sherrill's wife. Radiance argued that Bondy's should still comply with the garnishment by withdrawing funds owed for Sherrill's services.The Henry Circuit Court had initially entered a garnishment judgment in favor of SE Property Holdings, LLC, which was later substituted by Radiance. Bondy's reported Sherrill's employment termination in September 2019, two months after the required notice period. Radiance filed a motion for judgment against Bondy's, arguing that Sherrill continued to provide services to Bondy's through his wife's company, KDS Aero Services, LLC. Bondy's responded with a motion to dismiss, claiming Sherrill was an independent contractor. The trial court granted Bondy's motion to dismiss and denied Radiance's motion.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Bondy's payments to KDS Aero Services were actually owed to Sherrill. The lack of a contract or invoices between Bondy's and KDS Aero Services, coupled with inconsistencies in Sherrill's representations about his employment and residence, suggested potential fraud or misuse of corporate form to hide funds. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, emphasizing that neither party had met the burden for summary judgment. View "Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve, LLC v. Bondy's Ford, Inc." on Justia Law

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The case involves the plaintiffs, including the estate of Carson Bride and three minors, who suffered severe harassment and bullying through the YOLO app, leading to emotional distress and, in Carson Bride's case, suicide. YOLO Technologies developed an anonymous messaging app that promised to unmask and ban users who engaged in bullying or harassment but allegedly failed to do so. The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against YOLO, claiming violations of state tort and product liability laws.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, holding that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) immunized YOLO from liability. The court found that the claims sought to hold YOLO responsible for third-party content posted on its app, which is protected under the CDA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' misrepresentation claims, holding that these claims were based on YOLO's promise to unmask and ban abusive users, not on a failure to moderate content. The court found that the misrepresentation claims were analogous to a breach of promise, which is not protected by Section 230. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' product liability claims, holding that Section 230 precludes liability because these claims attempted to hold YOLO responsible as a publisher of third-party content. The court concluded that the product liability claims were essentially about the failure to moderate content, which is protected under the CDA. View "Estate of Bride v. Yolo Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

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A group of consumers who purchased or leased 2011-2016 GM Silverado or Sierra trucks with Duramax diesel engines sued General Motors LLC and Robert Bosch entities. They alleged that GM falsely advertised the trucks as having "clean diesel" technology with low emissions, while the vehicles actually emitted pollutants at levels much higher than advertised and above EPA standards. The plaintiffs claimed violations of state consumer protection laws, fraud, deceptive trade practices, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that the plaintiffs' state-law claims were preempted by the Clean Air Act (CAA) and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring RICO claims because they were indirect purchasers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs' state-law claims were not preempted by the CAA. The court distinguished this case from a previous decision, In re Ford Motor Co. F-150 and Ranger Truck Fuel Economy Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, noting that the plaintiffs' claims did not challenge EPA determinations but rather focused on GM's misleading advertisements to consumers. The court emphasized that the state-law claims were based on traditional state tort law and did not depend on proving fraud against the EPA.However, the court affirmed the district court's decision regarding the RICO claims. The court held that the plaintiffs, as indirect purchasers, lacked standing to bring RICO claims under the indirect-purchaser rule, which bars suits by consumers who are two or more steps removed from the violator in a distribution chain.In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the state-law claims, allowing those claims to proceed, but affirmed the summary judgment on the RICO claims, barring those claims. View "Fenner v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over the enforceability of a noncompetition provision in an operating agreement following the partial sale of a business interest. Robert and Stephen Samuelian co-founded Life Generations Healthcare, LLC, and later sold a portion of their interest in the company. The new operating agreement included a noncompetition clause that the Samuelians later challenged in arbitration. The arbitrator found the provision invalid per se under California Business and Professions Code section 16600, which generally voids contracts restraining lawful professions, trades, or businesses.The Superior Court of Orange County reviewed the arbitrator's decision de novo and confirmed the award, agreeing that the noncompetition provision was invalid per se. The court also found that the Samuelians did not owe fiduciary duties to the company as minority members in a manager-managed LLC. The company and individual defendants appealed, arguing that the arbitrator applied the wrong legal standard and that the reasonableness standard should apply instead.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the arbitrator had indeed applied the wrong standard. The court held that noncompetition agreements arising from the partial sale of a business interest should be evaluated under the reasonableness standard, not the per se standard. The court reasoned that partial sales differ significantly from the sale of an entire business interest, as the seller remains an owner and may still have some control over the company. Therefore, such noncompetition provisions must be scrutinized for their procompetitive benefits.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment confirming the arbitration award and directed the trial court to enter an order denying the Samuelians' petition to confirm the award and granting the company's motion to vacate the entire award, including the portion awarding attorney fees and costs. View "Samuelian v. Life Generations Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

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Thomas Merck applied for an entry-level position at Walmart and was given a conditional job offer pending a background check. Merck failed to disclose an old misdemeanor conviction, which was discovered during the background check. Walmart, through a third-party vendor, provided Merck with an incomplete version of the report, which indicated he was "not competitive" for the job. Walmart then revoked the job offer. Merck claimed that Walmart violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by not providing him with the full consumer report before taking adverse action.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio initially denied Walmart's motion to dismiss, finding that Merck had standing based on a procedural violation of the Act. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which clarified the requirements for standing under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Walmart renewed its motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Merck had not demonstrated a concrete injury as required by TransUnion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Merck failed to show he suffered adverse effects from the denial of the full consumer report. Specifically, Merck did not provide evidence that he could have used the withheld information to his benefit, such as changing the outcome of his job application or affecting his subsequent job search. The court also rejected Merck's analogy to procedural due process claims and traditional common-law harms, finding that the statutory duty under the Fair Credit Reporting Act did not closely resemble these traditional harms. Therefore, Merck did not have constitutional standing to sue Walmart. View "Merck v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

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Jeremy Harris filed a lawsuit against City Cycle Sales, Inc. (CCS) in Kansas state court, alleging negligence and a violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA) due to CCS's failure to repair the Anti-Lock Brake System (ABS) on his motorcycle. Harris was seriously injured when the ABS malfunctioned. He abandoned the KCPA claim before the case went to the jury, which resulted in a final judgment against him on all claims. Harris appealed the adverse judgment on the negligence claim but did not challenge the KCPA claim. After the appellate court reversed the negligence judgment and remanded for a new trial, Harris and CCS stipulated to dismiss the case without prejudice. Harris then filed a new lawsuit in federal district court, again alleging negligence and KCPA violations, and won on both claims.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied CCS's motion to dismiss the KCPA claims, reasoning that the law-of-the-case doctrine and preclusion principles did not apply because there was no final judgment on the merits of the KCPA claims. The jury awarded Harris damages, finding CCS liable for both negligence and KCPA violations. CCS appealed, arguing that Harris was barred from raising the KCPA claim in federal court and that there was insufficient evidence to support the negligence claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment on the KCPA claim, holding that Harris was barred from raising the statutory claim in federal court due to his abandonment of the claim in the state trial and appellate courts. The court ruled that the federal district court was required to give full faith and credit to the Kansas proceedings, which had a preclusive effect on the KCPA claim. However, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment on the negligence claim, finding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that CCS's negligence caused Harris's injuries. View "Harris v. City Cycle Sales" on Justia Law

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A group of Google Chrome users who chose not to sync their browsers with their Google accounts alleged that Google collected their personal data without consent. They believed that, based on Google's Chrome Privacy Notice, their data would not be collected if they did not enable sync. The users filed a class action lawsuit against Google, claiming violations of various state and federal laws.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Google. The court found that the data collection was "browser-agnostic," meaning it occurred regardless of the browser used. It concluded that Google's general privacy policies, which the users had consented to, governed the data collection. The court held that a reasonable person would understand from these policies that Google collected data when users interacted with Google services or third-party sites using Google services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court should have determined whether a reasonable user would understand Google's various privacy disclosures as consenting to the data collection. The court found that the district court erred by focusing on the technical distinction of "browser agnosticism" rather than the reasonable person standard. The appellate court noted that Google's Chrome Privacy Notice could lead a reasonable user to believe that their data would not be collected without enabling sync. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings to determine whether the users consented to Google's data collection practices. View "CALHOUN V. GOOGLE LLC" on Justia Law