Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Carol Harrell entered into a credit card agreement with Citibank but later defaulted on her promise to repay the debt. The right to collect Harrell’s outstanding debt was later assigned to Unifund CCR Partners. Unifund filed a collection action against Harrell seeking, in addition to the outstanding balance of Harrell’s account, statutory pre-judgment interest pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 360.010(1). Harrell filed a counterclaim alleging that Unifund’s request for statutory prejudgment interest was in violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The circuit court dismissed Harrell’s counterclaim for failure to state a claim. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court erred in concluding that Unifund’s claim for statutory interest did not violate the FDCPA and in granting Unifund’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Harrell plausibly alleged that Unifund violated the FDCPA. Remanded. View "Unifund CCR Partners v. Harrell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff had an Oregon auto insurance policy issued by defendant. In 2008, plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident. Among other expenses, plaintiff incurred $430.67 in transportation costs to attend medical appointments and to obtain medication. She then applied for PIP medical benefits under her insurance policy. Defendant paid for plaintiff’s medical care, but it declined to pay for her transportation expenses to obtain her medical care. Plaintiff then filed a complaint for breach of contract, both for herself and on behalf of others similarly situated. She alleged that her claim for medical expenses under ORS 742.524(1)(a) included her transportation costs. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing ORS 742.524(1)(a) did not require it to pay for transportation costs. After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s motion and entered a judgment in defendant’s favor. The question on review was whether the PIP medical benefit in ORS 742.524(1)(a) included the insured plaintiff’s transportation costs to receive medical care. The Supreme Court held that PIP benefits for the “expenses of medical * * * services” do not include an insured’s transportation costs for traveling to receive medical care. Therefore, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant. View "Dowell v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2004, respondents Robert Ingersoll and Curt Freed began a committed, romantic relationship. In 2012, the Washington legislature passed Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 6239, which recognized equal civil marriage rights for same-sex couples. Respondents intended to marry in September 2013. By the time he and Freed became engaged, Ingersoll had been a customer at Arlene's Flowers for at least nine years, purchasing numerous floral arrangements from Stutzman and spending an estimated several thousand dollars at her shop. Baroronelle Stutzman owned and was the president of Arlene's Flowers. Stutzman knew that Ingersoll is gay and that he had been in a relationship with Freed for several years. The two men considered Arlene's Flowers to be "[their] florist." Stutzman’s sincerely held religious beliefs included a belief that marriage can exist only between one man and one woman. Ingersoll approached Arlene's Flowers about purchasing flowers for his upcoming wedding. Stutzman told Ingersoll that she would be unable to do the flowers for his wedding because of her religious beliefs. Ingersoll did not have a chance to specify what kind of flowers or floral arrangements he was seeking before Stutzman told him that she would not serve him. They also did not discuss whether Stutzman would be asked to bring the arrangements to the wedding location or whether the flowers would be picked up from her shop. Stutzman asserts that she gave Ingersoll the name of other florists who might be willing to serve him, and that the two hugged before Ingersoll left her store. Ingersoll maintains that he walked away from that conversation "feeling very hurt and upset emotionally." The State and the couple sued, each alleging violations of the Washington Law Against Discrimination and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Stutzman defended on the grounds that the WLAD and CPA did not apply to her conduct and that, if they did, those statutes violated her state and federal constitutional rights to free speech, free exercise, and free association. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the State and the couple, rejecting all of Stutzman's claims. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Holloway Automotive Group (Holloway) appealed a circuit court order ruling that the liquidated damages clause contained in the parties’ contract was unenforceable. Holloway was an authorized franchisee of Mercedes-Benz North America. Defendant Steven Giacalone purchased a new vehicle from Holloway. At the time of the purchase, the defendant signed an “AGREEMENT NOT TO EXPORT:” “MBUSA prohibits its authorized dealers from exporting new Mercedes-Benz vehicles outside of the exclusive sales territory of North America and will assess charges against [Holloway] for each new Mercedes-Benz vehicle it sells . . . which is exported from North America within one (1) year.” By signing the agreement, defendant promised “not [to] export the Vehicle outside North America . . . for a period of one (1) year” from the date of the Agreement and, if he did so, to pay Holloway $15,000 as liquidated damages. The vehicle was subsequently exported within the one-year period. Holloway sued claiming breach of contract and misrepresentation and seeking liquidated damages in the amount of $15,000, plus interest, costs, and attorney’s fees. The trial court found that the Agreement was entered into “between the parties to protect [Holloway] from a claim by [MBUSA],” but that MBUSA did not, in fact, charge Holloway any fees despite the vehicle having been exported. The trial court declined to enforce the liquidated damages clause in the agreement. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the $15,000 liquidated damages provision was enforceable because Holloway’s damages resulting from the breach were not “easily ascertainable.” Accordingly, the Court held the trial court’s determination that the liquidated damages provision in the parties’ Agreement was unenforceable was not supported by the record and was erroneous as a matter of law. View "Holloway Automotive Group v. Giacalone" on Justia Law

Until 1997, Illinois residents could only purchase power from a public utility, with rates regulated by the ICC. The Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law allows residents to buy electricity from their local public utility, another utility, or an Alternative Retail Electric Supplier (ARES). The ICC was not given rate-making authority over ARESs, but was given oversight responsibilities. The Law did not explicitly provide a mechanism for recovering damages from an ARES related to rates. Zahn purchased electricity from NAPG, after receiving an offer of a “New Customer Rate” of $.0499 per kilowatt hour in her first month, followed by a “market-based variable rate.” Zahn never received NAPG’s “New Customer Rate.” NAPG charged her $.0599 per kilowatt hour for the first two months, followed by a rate higher than Zahn’s local public utility charged. Zahn filed a class-action complaint, claiming violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or for failure to state a claim. After the Illinois Supreme Court answered a certified question, stating that the ICC does not have exclusive jurisdiction to hear Zahn’s claims, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court had jurisdiction and Zahn alleged facts that, if true, could constitute a breach of contract or a deceptive business practice. View "Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law

Physicians filed suit against Boehringer, a pharmaceutical company, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Protection Act of 2005 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. Specifically, Physicians alleged that Boehringer sent an unsolicited advertisement in violation of the TCPA - a fax invitation for a free dinner meeting to discuss ailments relating to Physicians' business. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, holding that no facts were pled that plausibly showed that the fax had a commercial purpose. The court held that, while a fax must have a commercial purpose to be an "unsolicited advertisement," the district court improperly dismissed Physicians' complaint where Physicians' allegation is sufficient to state a claim. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Physicians Healthsource v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law

In 2007, the legislature passed, and the voters ratified, the Insurance Fair Conduct Act (IFCA), RCW 48.30.015. IFCA gave insureds a new cause of action against insurers who unreasonably deny coverage or benefits. IFCA also directed courts to grant attorney fees and authorizes courts to award triple damages if the insurer either acts unreasonably or violates certain insurance regulations. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether IFCA also created a new and independent private cause of action for violation of these regulations in the absence of any unreasonable denial of coverage or benefits. The Court concluded it did not and affirmed. View "Perez-Crisantos v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Odin Anderson, his wife, and his daughter (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed personal injury action for injuries Odin suffered after being struck by a bus owned by Partners Healthcare Systems that was being driven by one of its employees. Plaintiffs then filed a separate action against Partner’s insurers and claims representatives. A jury awarded Odin $2,961,000 in damages in the personal injury action and awarded Odin’s wife and daughter $110,000 each. At a subsequent jury-waived trial, a judge found that the insurers and claims representatives violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D by their misconduct. The judge awarded Plaintiffs treble damages using as the “amount of the judgment” to be multiplied the combined amount of the underlying tort judgment and the accrued postjudgment interest on that judgment. The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that, in a case where the amount of actual damages to be multiplied due to a wilful or knowing violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A or Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D are based on the amount of an underlying judgment, that amount does not include postjudgment interest. View "Anderson v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh Pa." on Justia Law

Midland Funding LLC filed suit against Mark Walton alleging that he had entered into a credit card agreement with Barclays Bank Delaware, used the card to obtain extensions of credit, and failed to make payments on the account. Midland purchases debt from Barclays. Midland sought to collect an outstanding balance of $5,684.72. After a trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Midland in the amount of $5,684.72, plus costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) jurisdiction over this matter was properly established in the district court; and (2) the district court did not err in admitting documentation of the assignment of Walton’s debt from Barclays to Midland pursuant to the business record exception to the hearsay rule. View "Midland Funding LLC v. Walton" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals stem from a class action suit against Target after the retailer announced a security breach by third-party intruders that compromised the payment card data and personal information of millions of customers. Class member Leif Olson challenges the class certification for lack of adequate representation due to an alleged intraclass conflict; class member Jim Sciaroni challenges the district court’s approval of the settlement agreement; and both challenge the district court’s order requiring them to post a bond of $49,156 to cover the costs of this appeal. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to rigorously analyze the propriety of certification, especially once new arguments challenging the adequacy of representation were raised after preliminary certification. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to conduct and articulate a rigorous analysis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)'s certification prerequisites as applied to this case. The court also concluded that costs associated with delays in administering a class action settlement for the length of a class member’s appeal may not be included in an appeal bond under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 7. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to reduce the Rule 7 bond to reflect only those costs that Appellees will recover should they succeed in any issues remaining on appeal following the district court’s reconsideration of class certification. View "Sciaroni v. Target Corp." on Justia Law