Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

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In 2007, the State of Mississippi, through the Attorney General’s office, filed suit against Louisville Tire Center, Inc. d/b/a Fair Oil Company (Fair Oil) for violating Mississippi’s price-gouging statute. Fair Oil filed a successful motion for summary judgment on the basis that the price-gouging statute was unconstitutional as written; however, on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for the Chancery Court to examine Fair Oil’s conduct in light of the statute’s language. After remand, several years passed without activity in the case, and in July 2015, the Chancery Court granted Fair Oil’s motion to dismiss for want of prosecution pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The State appealed that decision. Finding no error in the dismissal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mississippi, Ex Rel. Hood, Attorney General v. Louisville Tire Center, Inc." on Justia Law

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CACH, LLC filed a complaint against William Echols alleging that Echols breached his contract with a bank when he defaulted on his obligation to pay for charges incurred on a credit card and that, as current owner of the account, CACH was entitled to payment of the balance due on the credit card. Echols filed a class action counterclaim alleging that CACH violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the common law when it demanded payment from and filed suit against Echols and other Arkansas residents. The circuit court entered an order granting class certification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting class certification. View "CACH, LLC v. Echols" on Justia Law

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Real parties in interest, Kevin Hicks et al., filed an action against petitioner Elliott Homes, Inc. (Elliott), the builder of their homes, seeking damages for construction defects. Elliott moved to stay the litigation until real parties in interest complied with the prelitigation procedure set forth in “SB 800” or “Right to Repair Act” (Act), Civil Code sections 895 through 945.5. Real parties in interest opposed the motion, arguing that the prelitigation procedure did not apply because they had not alleged a statutory violation of the Act. The trial court denied Elliott’s motion for a stay, and Elliott petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to vacate its order, and enter a new order granting the motion for a stay. The Court issued an alternative writ of mandate and stayed the proceedings in the trial court. Elliott contended the trial court erred in concluding that real parties in interest did not need to comply with the prelitigation procedure set forth in the Act prior to filing the underlying action and in denying the motion to stay. The Court of Appeal granted the petition. View "Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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Condon purchased a car. Believing the dealership knowingly failed to disclose prior damage, Condon sued. The contract required arbitration of disputes. An arbitration award would be final, unless “the arbitrator’s award for a party is $0 or against a party is in excess of $100,000, or includes an award of injunctive relief.” In such case, “that party may request a new arbitration under the rules of the arbitration organization by a three-arbitrator panel. Condon maintained the provision was unconscionable because of the possibility of a second arbitration, which he claimed favored the dealer. The trial court ordered arbitration. The arbitrator, ADR, found for Condon, ordered him reimbursed, and excused Condon from making further payments. The defendants did not oppose Condon’s motion for costs and fees. ADR awarded $180,175.34. Defendants requested ADR to proceed to new arbitration. ADR concluded it lacked authority to resolve the parties’ disagreement over whether new arbitration was proper. Condon returned to court, which confirmed the award and denied defendants’ request for a second arbitration, reasoning that the forum lacked separate “appellate” rules and could not conduct a second arbitration. The court of appeal reversed. ADR did not refuse to conduct a second arbitration because of the lack of appellate rules, but solely because Condon objected. View "Condon v. Daland Nissan, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Comenity to recover statutory damages for violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. The district court concluded that plaintiff failed, as a matter of law, to demonstrate that four billing-rights disclosures made to her by Comenity in connection with plaintiff's opening of a credit card account violated the TILA. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate the concrete injury required for standing to pursue two of her disclosure challenges and thus dismissed those two claims for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that, although plaintiff established standing to pursue the two remaining claims, those challenges fail as a matter of law. In this case, Comenity’s notice that certain TILA protections applied only to unsatisfactory credit card purchases that were not paid in full is substantially similar to Model Form G–3(A) and, therefore, cannot as a matter of law demonstrate a violation of 15 U.S.C. 1637(a)(7). Furthermore, because neither the TILA nor its implementing regulations require unsatisfactory purchases to be reported in writing, Comenity’s alleged failure to disclose such a requirement cannot support a section 1637(a)(7) claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Comenity on those TILA claims. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of her cross-motion for class certification as moot. View "Strubel v. Comenity Bank" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Zen Magnets, LLC (“Zen”) challenged a regulation promulgated by Respondent Consumer Product Safety Commission (“the Commission”) restricting the size and strength of the rare earth magnets that Zen sold. The sets consisted of small, high-powered magnets that users could arrange and rearrange in various geometric designs. The component magnets are unusually small (their diameters are approximately five millimeters) and unusually powerful. Magnets of this type have been marketed and sold to consumers (by Zen and other distributors) as desktop trinkets, stress-relief puzzles, and toys, and apparently also for educational and scientific purposes. Although the strength of these magnets was part of their appeal, it could also pose a grave danger when the magnets are misused, particularly if two or more magnets were ingested. During 2011, in response to reports of injured children, Commission staff began evaluating whether the magnet sets currently on the market complied with ASTM F963 (“the toy standard”). In May 2012, the Commission required the thirteen leading magnet set distributors to report any information of which they were aware reasonably supporting the conclusion that their magnets did not comply with an applicable safety standard, contained a defect, or created an unreasonable risk of serious injury. Four months after eliminating ten of the leading magnet set distributors, the Commission proposed a new safety standard aimed at regulating the size and strength of all magnet sets. Unlike the toy standard, the final rule was not limited to magnets designed or marketed as toys for children under fourteen years of age, but rather applied to all magnet sets. Zen was the only remaining importer and distributor of the magnet sets targeted by the final rule. Over the years, Zen made efforts to comply with the toy standard by implementing age restrictions and placing warnings on its website and packaging, as well as by imposing sales restrictions on its retail distributors. Its magnet sets, however, did not comply with the strength and size restrictions of the final rule. Zen sought judicial review of that safety standard. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Commission’s prerequisite factual findings, which were compulsory under the Consumer Product Safety Act, were incomplete and inadequately explained. Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded this case back to the Commission for further proceedings. View "Zen Magnets v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n" on Justia Law

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In 2013, the decedent filed a complaint alleging violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act and other causes of action against Respondent, Professional Bureau of Collections of Maryland, Inc. After the decedent died in 2014, Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the decedent’s claims under the Act did not survive his death pursuant to W. Va. Code 55-7-8a(a) because the claims were personal to the consumer who owed the debt and that the decedent’s estate did not have standing to bring a claim under the Act because an estate is not a natural person under the Act. Petitioner, the executrix of the estate of the decedent, moved to substitute the decedent’s estate as plaintiff. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent, concluding that the decedent’s estate lacked standing to maintain a private right of action as a “consumer” within the meaning of the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a claim brought under W. Va. Code 46A-2-127(c) of the Act is not sufficiently analogous to a claim for fraud so that the claim survives the death of the consumer pursuant to section 55-7-8a(a). View "Horton v. Professional Bureau of Collections of Maryland" on Justia Law

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This lawsuit involved a loan agreement between Lender and Borrowers. The agreement gave Lender an option to purchase the collateral for the loan - the famous ex-Presidential Yacht Sequoia. A valuation of the Sequoia for purposes of securing the loan was established via fraud on the part of Borrowers. The claims and counterclaims arising out of the loan agreement were eventually resolved by a settlement entered as a court order. The only issue remaining for the Court of Chancery was to oversee the computation of the amount due Borrowers from Lender should Lender elect to acquire the Sequoia. Lender agreed to a minimum option price of zero dollars. The Court of Chancery found the option price to be zero dollars. View "The Sequoia Presidential Yacht Group LLC v. FE Partners LLC" on Justia Law

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Robert Perry was issued a Citibank MasterCard account in 1998. The terms and conditions of the Citibank Card Agreement governing Perry’s account included an arbitration agreement. In 2010, Citibank filed a debt collection action against Perry seek to recover the balance owed on Perry’s account. In 2015, Perry filed an answer to Citibank’s complaint and a class counterclaim alleging that Citibank had violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. Thereafter, Citibank filed a motion asking the court to compel arbitration of the parties’ claims. The circuit court concluded that Citibank had implicitly waived its right to arbitration by filing suit in circuit court and waiting nearly five years before seeking to invoke its contractual right to arbitrate. Citibank appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Citibank did not waive its right to compel arbitration in this matter. Remanded. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Perry" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, alleging that the five letters sent to them between May 16 and December 13, 2013 violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and/or the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA), Fla. Stat. 559.55 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in concluding that the HOA fine at issue is not a debt for FCCPA purposes and granting summary judgment on that basis. The court did not decide whether under Florida law Marbella could be vicariously liable for the FCCPA violations of its agent because the district court failed to apply Florida law in the first instance. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Affinity, vacated the grant of summary judgment to Marbella, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Agrelo v. The Meloni Law Firm" on Justia Law