Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit for damages in connection with a $66,500 loan secured by a deed of trust on her house. Plaintiff alleged that, in the administration of and collection efforts on the loan, defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq.; the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The district court dismissed plaintiff's FDCPA and TILA claims and, following discovery, granted Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment on her RESPA claim. The court concluded that plaintiff adequately alleged that the White Firm and the Substitute Trustees were “debt collectors,” as that term is used in the FDCPA. Therefore, the court reversed the order of dismissal of her FDCPA claims against them and remanded for further proceedings, without suggesting whether or not those defendants violated the FDCPA. The court affirmed as to the TILA claims. View "McCray v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

A person who pays for a trip to the emergency room out-of-pocket can be charged significantly more for care than a person who has insurance. This case centered on whether a person could maintain an action challenging this variable pricing practice under the Unfair Competition Law, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act or and action for declaratory relief. The Court of Appeals concluded after review of this case that most of the claims asserted by plaintiff Gene Moran lacked merit. However, he sufficiently alleged facts supporting a conclusion that he had standing to claim the amount of the charges defendants' hospital bills self-pay patients was unconscionable. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of Moran's case, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Moran v. Prime Healthcare" on Justia Law

Evidence Code 1158 requires medical providers to produce records demanded by patients before litigation and authorizes the requesting attorney to employ a photocopier to obtain the records. Reasonable costs may be charged, subject to limits: $0.10 per page for reproducing regular-sized documents, $0.20 per page for producing documents from microfilm, and clerical costs not to exceed $16 per hour per person for locating and making records available. Plaintiff was admitted to Saint Francis for treatment of burn injuries. Operating under a contract with Saint Francis, HealthPort responded to plaintiff’s attorney’s request for medical records, sending an invoice, stating: “HealthPort has agreed to copy records for you, upon your hiring of HealthPort .... The rates that HealthPort is charging do not fall under [section] 1158.” HealthPort’s invoice included a $30 “basic fee,” a $15 “retrieval fee,” $25.25 for copying 101 pages at $0.25 per page, $10.30 for shipping, and $5.97 for sales tax, and stated “Payment implies that you agreed to employ HealthPort … and ... accepted the charge.” Plaintiff’s attorney paid HealthPort’s invoice, “under protest ∙ in violation of CA EVID CODE 1158.” In 2013, plaintiff filed suit, alleging violation of section 1158 and of the Unfair Competition Law and sought class certification. The court of appeal reversed denial of that motion. The common question is the application of section 1158 to HealthPort’s uniform practices in response to attorney requests for medical records. The fact that each class member ultimately may have to establish his request was submitted in contemplation of litigation does not overwhelm the common question. View "Nicodemus v. St. Francis" on Justia Law

TransUnion prepared a credit report which revealed, based on information obtained from Toyota, that Brill was in arrears on an extension of a vehicle lease. Brill claimed that his signature was forged by a former girlfriend. He demanded that TransUnion “conduct a reasonable reinvestigation” under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681i(a)(1)(A). At TransUnion's request, Toyota confirmed that the name on the extension was Brill; it did not try, and was not asked to try, to determine whether the signature was a forgery. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Brill’s suit against Transunion. TransUnion had no duty to verify the accuracy of Brill’s signature. Toyota was in a better position to determine the validity of its own lease. It would be unrealistic to expect Transunion to verify the signature by communication with the Toyota employees who handled the transaction. Forcing a credit reporting agency to hire a handwriting expert in every case of alleged forgery would impose an expense disproportionate to the likelihood of an accurate conclusion. The Act’s identity-theft provisions call for a report to the police before turning to the credit reporting agency. Brill apparently made no such report. The court noted that Brill sued Toyota; the parties settled, under terms that are confidential, so it is not clear whether Brill has cleared the cloud on his credit. View "Brill v. TransUnion LLC" on Justia Law

The firm filed suit against a consumer-debtor, Bryson Ray, in state court. After obtaining a judgment against Ray, the firm initiated a garnishment proceeding against Ray's bank to collect on the judgment. In response to the garnishment action, Ray filed suit alleging that the firm violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. i(a)(2), by bringing the garnishment action in a judicial district other than the one in which Ray resided or signed the underlying contract. The district court granted the firm's motion to dismiss. The court joined the First and Eighth Circuits and held that the FDCP's venue provision applies only to legal actions "against any consumer." In this case, the FDCPA’s venue provision does not apply to post-judgment garnishment proceedings under Georgia law where the process is fundamentally an action against the garnishee, not the consumer. The court rejected Ray's claims to the contrary and affirmed the judgment. View "Ray v. McCullough Payne & Haan, LLC" on Justia Law

A client personally financed the sale of his business corporation. His attorney drafted documents that secured the buyer’s debt with corporate stock and an interest in the buyer’s home. Over seven years later the government imposed tax liens on the corporation’s assets; according to the client, it was only then he learned for the first time that his attorney had not provided for a recorded security interest in the physical assets. The client sued the attorney for malpractice and violation of the Alaska Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). The superior court held that the statute of limitations barred the client’s claims and granted summary judgment to the attorney. But after review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that it was not until the tax liens were filed that the client suffered the actual damage necessary for his cause of action to be complete. Therefore, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Westbrook" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Rodenburg, a debt collection law firm, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692d-f. The court concluded that Rodenburg reasonably believed that plaintiff had not provided a complete response to his prior communication with defendant and thus section 1692(b)(3) permitted a call back. The court agreed with the district court that it was objectively reasonable for Rodenburg to believe that plaintiff, as the parent, had or could obtain location information about his daughter, Alexis, permitting a follow-up call to learn if he had acquired or was now willing to provide “correct or complete location information.” The court also agreed with the district court that there is no material factual dispute as to the section 1692d(5) claim because Rodenburg’s conduct did not rise to the level of harassment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kuntz v. Rodenburg LLP" on Justia Law

Eileen Dalton purchased two used cars under separate finance contracts which contained provisions that retained self-help remedies for both parties, and that allowed either party to compel arbitration of any claim or dispute arising out of the contracts that exceeded the jurisdiction of a small claims court (which in New Mexico was $10,000). One of the cars was repossessed without judicial action. Dalton sued, alleging fraud, violations of the New Mexico Uniform Commercial Code, unfair trade practices, conversion, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of warranty of title. Santander Consumer USA moved to compel arbitration based on the clause contained in the finance contracts. Dalton argued that the arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable on its face, and therefore unenforceable because the self-help and small claims carve-outs were unreasonably one-sided. After review of the provisions at issue here, the Supreme Court held that the arbitration provision in this case was not substantively unconscionable because: (1) lawful self-help remedies were extrajudicial remedies; and (2) the small claims carve-out was facially neutral because either party had to sue in small claims court if its claim was less than $10,000, or arbitrate if its claim exceeds $10,000, thereby neither grossly unfair nor unreasonably one-sided on its face. View "Dalton v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against PRA, a debt collector, and its attorneys, Gamache, under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. The district court granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The court concluded that nothing inherent in the process of charging off a debt precludes a claim for statutory interest, and Missouri’s prejudgment interest statute does not expressly preclude statutory prejudgment interest following a waiver of contractual interest. Therefore, defendants' demands for such interest were not actionable misrepresentations or unfair or unconscionable collection methods under sections 1692e or 1692f. Because the court held that the original creditors’ acts of charging off the debts did not effectuate waivers of statutory interest, the assignments of the debt to PRA did not “create” the entitlement to statutory prejudgment interest. The court concluded that the assignments merely transferred any entitlement to such interest that otherwise existed. The court further concluded that any demand requirement that exists as a precondition to the accrual of statutory prejudgment interest was satisfied by the original creditors’ demands upon plaintiff. The court held that there exists no de minimis exception to FDCPA liability based upon low dollar amounts; and debt collectors’ false representations about the availability of remedies or amounts owed under state law, like representations of fact, are to be viewed through the unsophisticated-consumer standard and may be actionable pursuant to the FDCPA. Applying these holdings to the present case, the court concluded that plaintiff has articulated viable section 1692e and 1692f(1) claims by alleging false statements and collection attempts regarding the availability of compound interest. Accordingly, the court reversed as to these claims, rejected plaintiff's remaining claims, and affirmed in all other respects. View "Haney v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc." on Justia Law

Hoffman, “a serial pro se class action litigant,” frequently sues under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, serving as both the sole class representative and sole class counsel. Hoffman has sued nearly 100 defendants in New Jersey state court in less than four years. Hoffman sued Nordic for its allegedly false and misleading advertisements for fish oil supplements. The suit was removed to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a claim. Hoffman filed a second suit, alleging the same facts and legal theories, but with a smaller class, to reduce the amount recoverable and defeat federal jurisdiction. Nordic again removed the suit. The district court declined to remand the case and dismissed, finding the action procedurally barred under New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine and, in the alternative, that Hoffman’s claims under the Consumer Fraud Act failed for substantially the same reasons they failed in the earlier suit. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court was permitted to “bypass” the jurisdictional inquiry in favor of a non-merits dismissal on claim preclusion grounds. View "Hoffman v. Nordic Naturals, Inc." on Justia Law