Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

After Kimberly Adkins and Chaille Dubois filed separate Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions in the Bankruptcy Court, Atlas filed proofs of claim in their bankruptcy cases based on debts that were barred by Maryland’s statute of limitations. At issue is whether Atlas violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., by filing proofs of claim based on time-barred debts. The court held that Atlas’s conduct does not violate the FDCPA because filing a proof of claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy based on a debt that is time-barred does not violate the FDCPA when the statute of limitations does not extinguish the debt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dubois v. Atlas Acquisitions LLC" on Justia Law

Respondents filed a class-action complaint alleging, among other claims, that MoneyMutual, LLC, which operates a website allowing individuals to apply for short-term loans known as payday loans, matched Respondents with payday lenders that were unlicensed in Minnesota and that the terms of the payday loans were illegal. MoneyMutual moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that it could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over MoneyMutual based on MoneyMutual’s email correspondence with residents and advertising in Minnesota. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that sufficient minimum contacts existed for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over MoneyMutual and that exercising personal jurisdiction over MoneyMutual comported with notions of fair play and substantial justice. View "Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that 21 Budget rental car businesses willfully violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g)(1), by issuing receipts that contained more than five digits of customers’ credit card numbers. The parties subsequently mediated and agreed on a proposed settlement. The settlement provided that each class member would receive a certificate worth $10 off any car rental or $30 off a rental over $150, with no holiday blackout days. Applying the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1712(a)-(c), the district court awarded $23,137.46 in attorneys’ fees and costs, and a $1,000 class representative incentive fee. Plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that the district court erred by following the In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig. mandatory approach in applying section 1712(a)-(c) without explicitly stating that the award was based on an exercise of the district court’s discretion to determine a reasonable attorney’s fee. But plaintiffs do not argue the award was a breach of the district court’s discretion, and if the court remanded, it would be for an explicit exercise of that discretion, applying the principles of section 1712(a)-(c). The court determined that any award greater than $17,438.45 would be unreasonable in light of class counsel’s limited success in obtaining value for the class. Accordingly, the court concluded that any error was harmless and affirmed the judgment. View "Galloway v. The Kansas City Landsmen, LLC" on Justia Law

Brown, Brown & Brown, P.C. (BB&B), a Virginia law firm, entered into more than fifty agreements over a nine-month period with Maryland homeowners facing foreclosure. Under the agreements, in return for an advance payment of money, BB&B promised to attempt to renegotiate the mortgage loan so that the homeowner could avoid foreclosure. Ultimately, BB&B did not obtain loan modifications for any of the homeowners. The Commissioner of Financial Regulation (Commissioner) concluded that BB&B had violated the Maryland Credit Services Businesses Act (MCSBA) and directed BB&B to pay treble damages to the Maryland homeowners with whom they had agreements. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the MCSBA did not apply to BB&B because the agreements at issue were for legal services rather than credit services. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) BB&B’s activities fell within the definition of “credit services business” under the MCSBA; and (2) BB&B did not qualify for the attorney exemption in the MCSBA. View "Comm'r of Fin. Regulation v. Brown, Brown & Brown, P.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs each purportedly owed a debt; each creditor filed suit in Cook County seeking to collect on that debt. After each plaintiff failed to appear, a Cook County Circuit Court entered a default judgment. B&G, a debt collector, filed an affidavit for a wage deduction in the First Municipal District in downtown Chicago and obtained a summons against Plaintiffs’ respective employers. Plaintiffs allege it was this final act that violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) venue provision, 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(2), because B&G should have filed the affidavits in the Sixth Municipal District in Markham, Illinois (the municipal district closest to Plaintiffs) and not in the First Municipal District. The Cook County Circuit Court’s Municipal Department has been sub‐divided into six smaller units called municipal districts. B&G moved to dismiss on the basis that B&G’s filing of an affidavit for a wage deduction did not constitute a “legal action” against a “consumer” within the meaning of the FDCPA. The district courts agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that such actions are not against the consumer. View "Etro v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C." on Justia Law

After owning a car that she purchased from Century West for eleven months, plaintiff filed suit against Century West and BMW Financial Services, which financed the vehicle, seeking to unwind the contract. The trial court found in favor of defendants. On appeal, plaintiff argued that because Century West entered her three-check down payment on the line of the sales contract describing it as a down payment, rather than on the line describing it as a “deferred” down payment, she has the right to rescind the contract under the Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales and Finance Act, Civil Code, 2981, et seq. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Act authorizes her to rescind the contract. In this case, neither the language of the Act nor the cases plaintiff cites compel a finding that a car dealer’s informal agreement to wait to deposit a check tendered the day of the purchase - as opposed to scheduling a payment to be made at a later date - constitutes a “deferred” down payment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Nichols v. Century West" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and purportedly on behalf of others similarly situated, filed suit against GameStop for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, money had and received, and violation of Minnesota’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), Minn. Stat. 325F.68, et seq. Plaintiff alleged that GameStop's disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII) to a third party (Facebook) violated an express agreement not to do so. The district court granted GameStop's motion to dismiss based on plaintiff's lack of standing. The court concluded that plaintiff provided sufficient facts alleging that he is party to a binding contract with GameStop, and GameStop does not dispute this contractual relationship; GameStop has violated that policy; and plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of GameStop's breach. The court also concluded that plaintiff has standing to bring his breach-of-contract claim and to bring his other claims. The court concluded, however, that the privacy policy unambiguously does not include those pieces of information among the protected PII. Therefore, the protection plaintiff argues GameStop failed to provide was not among the protections for which he bargained by agreeing to the terms of service, and GameStop thus could not have breached its contract with plaintiff. Plaintiff's Minnesota CFA claims fail for similar reasons. Finally, plaintiff has not alleged a claim for unjust enrichment or the related claim of money had and received. View "Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc." on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs, 2008-2011 graduates of the Widener School of Law, claim that Widener violated the New Jersey and Delaware Consumer Fraud Acts by intentionally publishing misleading statistics, reporting that in 2005-2011, 90-97% of graduates were employed. In reality, only 50-70% of Widener graduates secured full-time legal positions. The school included non-legal and part-time positions without reporting the breakdown. In 2011, Widener improved its reporting, but allegedly continued to gather unreliable information by crediting secondhand accounts of employment and avoiding responses from unemployed graduates. The plaintiffs claim that publishing misleading statistics enabled Widener to inflate tuition. The plaintiffs moved to certify a class of “persons who enrolled in Widener University School of Law and were charged full or part-time tuition within the statutory period.” The district court denied class certification, finding that the plaintiffs could not meet FRCP 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common questions “predominate” over individual questions because they had not shown that they could prove damages by common evidence. The court noted differences in class members’ employment outcomes and that New Jersey has rejected a “fraud-on-the-market” theory outside the securities fraud context. Plaintiffs could not meet Rule 23(a)(3)’s requirement that the named plaintiffs’ claims be “typical” of the claims of the proposed class; students who enrolled in 2012 and later, after Widener improved its reporting, might prefer not to have Widener’s reputation tarnished by the lawsuit. The Third Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs’ theory was insufficiently supported by class-wide evidence. View "Harnish v. Widener Univ. Sch. of Law" on Justia Law

Franklin and Chism parked their cars in a Chicago-area lot owned by Metra, the public commuter railroad, and operated by CPS. The lot offers parking spaces to the public for $1.50 per day. CPS says the two failed to pay and sent them violation notices demanding payment of the $1.50 fee and a $45 nonpayment penalty. When they still did not pay, CPS referred the matter for collection to Parking Revenue, which sent them collection letters for the $46.50 . Franklin and Chism filed a class action against Parking Revenue alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court entered summary judgment for Parking Revenue, holding that the FDCPA does not apply because the unpaid parking obligations are not “debts” as that term is defined in section 1692a(5). The Seventh Circuit reversed. The obligations at issue are “debts” within the meaning of the FDCPA. That statutory term comprises obligations “arising out of” consumer “transactions.” Parking in a lot that is open to all customers subject to stated charges is a “transaction.” The obligation that arises from that transaction is a “debt,” and an attempt to collect it must comply with the FDCPA. View "Franklin v. Parking Revenue Recovery Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

In each of three cases, a debtor filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, represented by counsel. During the bankruptcy proceedings, a debt collector submitted a proof of claim for a “stale” debt, for which the statute of limitations had expired. As required by Bankruptcy Rule 3001, the proof of claim filed by the debt collector accurately noted the origin of the debt, the date of the last payment, and the date of the last transaction. Each debtor objected to the claim; each was disallowed and eventually discharged. Each debtor brought a separate suit against the debt collector, alleging that the act of filing a proof of claim on a time‐barred debt constituted a false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable means of collecting a debt in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the cases. The debt collectors’ conduct was not deceptive or misleading. The information contained in the proof of claim was not misleading, but set forth accurate and complete information about the status of the debts. View "Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC" on Justia Law