Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a law firm and debt collection agency, alleging claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692(e)(11). Plaintiff alleged that defendant was attempting to collect a debt on behalf of American Express and that by leaving the September 25th voicemail message, defendant violated the FDCPA by failing to disclose in subsequent communications that the communication was from a debt collector in violation of section 1692e(11). The court held that if a subsequent communication is sufficient to disclose to the least sophisticated debtor that the communication was from a debt collector, there is no violation of section 1692e(11) even if the debt collector did not expressly state, “this communication is from a debt collector.” Accordingly, defendant did not violate the FDCPA and the court reversed the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff. View "Davis v. Hollins Law" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lamar Williams worked and owned a car in Alaska. In February 2010, he arranged through his employer to have the car shipped to New Jersey by defendant American Auto Logistics. After the car arrived, Williams visited the American Auto Logistics facility in New Jersey to pick it up. Williams inspected the car, found no apparent damage, and drove away. On leaving the facility, however, he heard swishing noises in the back of the car. He found water in the trunk and returned to the facility, where defendant's employees removed the accumulated water and offered a small amount of money for water damage. Williams rejected the offer. Williams sought out a mechanic who estimated the repairs would cost more than $10,000. He called American Auto Logistics and offered to settle for less than that amount, but the company rejected the offer and refused to pay anything for the damage. American Auto Logistics followed up by sending Williams a letter that disclaimed any responsibility and claimed the car was not damaged during shipping. Williams was twice denied his right to a jury trial by a trial court in the Special Civil Part. On both occasions, the trial court relied on Rule 4:25-7, prescribing certain pre-trial procedures, and sanctioned Williams for failure to comply by denying his right to a jury. In this appeal, the issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether a litigant could lose his constitutionally protected right to a jury trial as a sanction for failure to comply with procedural rules. The case also presented a question about the court rules applicable to the Superior Court's Law Division, Special Civil Part. The Court held trial courts could not deprive civil litigants of their constitutionally protected right to a jury trial as a sanction for failure to comply with a procedural rule. The Court further instructed that Rule 4:25-7 did not apply to proceedings in the Special Civil Part. View "Williams v. American Auto Logistics" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq.; the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. CODE 28-3901 et seq.; and the District of Columbia Debt Collection Law, D.C.CODE 28-3814 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that the debt collection letter sent to her from defendant violated these statutes because the letter falsely implies both that defendant is meaningfully involved with the case as an attorney and that the creditor is threatening to bring a lawsuit to collect the debt. The court concluded, however, that the letter does not threaten any legal action, and the prominent disclaimer made clear that defendant was acting only in his capacity as a debt collector. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on the pleadings. View "Jones v. Dufek" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that Urban Outfitters’ and Anthropologie’s zip code requests at the cashier stand violated two District of Columbia consumer protection laws. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case because neither plaintiff has alleged a concrete Article III injury tied to disclosure of her zip code that could support standing. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for dismissal of the case. View "Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action, alleging that WZP violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692(g)(a), by sending a debt collection letter that lacked the disclosures required by section 1692(g)(a) of the FDCPA. Applying well-established tools of statutory interpretation and construing the language in section 1692g(a) in light of the context and purpose of the FDCPA, the court held that the phrase “the initial communication” refers to the first communication sent by any debt collector, including collectors that contact the debtor after another collector already did. The court held that the FDCPA unambiguously requires any debt collector - first or subsequent - to send a section 1692g(a) validation notice within five days of its first communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt. In this case, the district court erred in concluding that, because WZP was not the first debt collector to communicate with plaintiff about her debt, it had no obligation to comply with the statutory validation notice requirement. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Hernandez v. Williams, Zinman & Parham PC" on Justia Law

Historically, sovereigns were not subject to statutes of limitations without their explicit consent. Washington State consented to some statutes of limitations but not to others. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review in this case was whether Washington consented to a statute of limitations that would bar this antitrust suit filed by the Washington State attorney general on behalf of the State against more than 20 foreign electronics manufacturing companies. The State alleged that between at least March 1, 1995, through at least November 25, 2007, the defendants violated RCW 19.86.030, which prohibited any "contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce," by agreeing to raise prices and agreeing on production levels in the market for CRTs (cathode ray tubes) used in televisions and computer monitors before the advent of LCD (liquid crystal display) panels and plasma display technologies. Due to this unlawful conspiracy, the State alleges, Washington consumers and the State of Washington itself paid supracompetitive prices for CRT products. Ten of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the claims were time barred because Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA) must be brought within four years. The State responded that RCW 19.86.120's statute of limitations did not apply to its claims under RCW 19.86.080. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the State's action for injunctive relief and restitution was exempt from the statute of limitations in RCW 19.86.120 and from the general statutes of limitations in chapter 4.16 RCW. View "Washington v. LG Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Midland, alleging claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. Plaintiff claims that Midland erroneously attributed debts to her, reported the debts to Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion credit reporting agencies (the CRAs), and failed to properly verify the debts when plaintiff disputed their validity. The district court held that no reasonable jury could find that Midland violated the FCRA or the FDCPA with respect to plaintiff. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Midland willfully violated section 1681s-2(b) when it reported the GE/Meijer and T-Mobile accounts as “verified” without obtaining sufficient documentation that the debts in fact belonged to plaintiff. The court reversed as to this claim and affirmed as to all other claims. View "Hinkle v. Midland Credit Mgmt." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Midland under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e, alleging that Midland violated the FDCPA by filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court declined to extend the FDCPA to time-barred proofs of claim, concluding that an accurate and complete proof of claim on a time-barred debt is not false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable under the FDCPA. The court explained that the bankruptcy code provides for a claims resolution process and these protections against harassment and deception satisfy the relevant concerns of the FDCPA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt." on Justia Law

A mandatory arbitration clause is contained in each deposit agreement for customers of appellee SunTrust Bank. The clause permits an individual depositor to reject the agreement’s mandatory arbitration clause by giving written notice by a certain deadline. SunTrust claimed it drafted the arbitration clause in such a way that only an individual depositor may exercise this right to reject arbitration on his or her own behalf, thereby permitting that individual to file only an individual lawsuit against the bank. But SunTrust asserted that even if, as it has been determined here, the filing of a lawsuit prior to the expiration of the rejection of arbitration deadline operated to give notice of the individual plaintiff’s rejection of arbitration, the complaint could not be brought as a class action because the filing of a class action could not serve to reject the arbitration clause on behalf of class members who have not individually given notice. Jeff Bickerstaff, Jr., who was a SunTrust Bank depositor, filed a complaint against SunTrust on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated alleging the bank’s overdraft fee constitutes the charging of usurious interest. At the time Bickerstaff opened his account (thereby agreeing to the terms of SunTrust’s deposit agreement), that agreement included a mandatory arbitration provision. In response to the ruling of a federal court in an unrelated action finding the arbitration clause in SunTrust’s deposit agreement was unconscionable at Georgia law, and after Bickerstaff’s complaint had been filed, SunTrust amended the arbitration clause to permit a window of time in which a depositor could reject arbitration by sending SunTrust written notification that complied with certain requirements. SunTrust had not notified Bickerstaff or its other customers of this change in the arbitration clause of the deposit agreement at the time Bickerstaff filed his complaint, but the complaint, as well as the first amendment to the complaint, was filed prior to the amendment’s deadline for giving SunTrust written notice of an election to reject arbitration. It was only after Bickerstaff’s complaint was filed that SunTrust notified Bickerstaff and its other existing depositors, by language printed in monthly account statements distributed on August 24, 2010, that an updated version of the deposit agreement had been adopted, that a copy of the new agreement could be obtained at any branch office or on-line, and that all future transactions would be governed by the updated agreement. SunTrust appealed the order denying its motion to compel Bickerstaff to arbitrate his claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, finding that the information contained in the complaint filed by Bickerstaff’s attorney substantially satisfied the notice required to reject arbitration. Bickerstaff appealed the order denying his motion for class certification, and in the same opinion the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision, holding in essence, that the contractual language in this case requiring individual notification of the decision to reject arbitration did not permit Bickerstaff to reject the deposit agreement’s arbitration clause on behalf of other putative class members by virtue of the filing of his class action complaint. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the terms of the arbitration rejection provision of SunTrust’s deposit agreement did not prevent Bickerstaff’s class action complaint from tolling the contractual limitation for rejecting that provision on behalf of all putative class members until such time as the class may be certified and each member makes the election to opt out or remain in the class. Accordingly, the numerosity requirement of OCGA 9-11-23 (a) (1) for pursuing a class complaint was not defeated on this ground. View "Bickerstaff v. SunTrust Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Lendmark under Maryland’s Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq., challenging the manner in which Lendmark charged and applied late fees towards her personal loan of roughly $2,600. The district court entered judgment for Lendmark. The court concluded that Lendmark was not entitled to charge a late fee in December 2010 or February 2011, or in any month in which plaintiff paid an installment timely and in full. Because the court held that the complaint alleging these facts states a plausible claim for relief, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of this claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed as to the remainder of plaintiff's claims. View "Williams v. Lendmark Fin. Serv." on Justia Law