Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

James Cherry appealed the grant of summary judgment entered against him and in favor of Pinson Termite and Pest Control, LLC, and Jerry Pinson. In 2011, Cherry purchased a home. The sales contract required the seller to provide a "Wood Infestation Inspection Report (WIIR)." A termite-services contract with Pinson Termite ("termite bond") was transferrable from the seller to Cherry, but it was disputed whether the bond actually transferred to Cherry. In late 2011, Cherry began remodeling him home when he discovered extensive termite damage. A State inspector confirmed the damage and sent Pinson a letter that it had "observed findings of subterranean termite damage" that were not mentioned on the WIIR and that, although the WIIR "indicates the structure was treated by your company, ... we did not observe all mechanics of subterranean control work." The State inspector monitored Pinson's re-treatment of the house. At about the same time, Cherry and Pinson signed a contract for an extension of the termite bond. Shortly thereafter, cherry hired an attorney, who sent Pinson a letter offering to settle his claim for the re-treatment of his home. The State inspector sent Cherry a letter advising that it had supervised Pinson's re-treatment of the house and that if Cherry had any question he should contact the State within 10 days of receiving the letter. If he did not contact, the letter stated the State would "assume that the matter has been resolved." There was no record of any further contact between Cherry and State inspector. Approximately one year after the State letter, Cherry sued Pinson Pest, and Pinson alleging fraud; negligence; negligent hiring, training, and supervision; and breach of contract and seeking "equitable relief pursuant to the 'made whole' doctrine." When summary judgment was granted in favor of Pinson, Cherry appealed arguing that the trial court erred. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Pinson, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cherry v. Pinson Termite & Pest Control, LLC" on Justia Law

The Consumer Protection Division of Maryland’s Office of the Attorney General (CPD) concluded that Petitioner and his companies engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The CPD issued sanctions, imposed civil penalties, and assessed costs. Thereafter, the Maryland State Board of Plumbing (the Board) opened a complaint against Petitioner alleging that Petitioner had violated the Maryland Plumbing act (MPA). The Board’s case largely consisted of the CPD’s findings and conclusions. The Board, by application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, adopted the findings of fact made by the CPD and concluded that Petitioner violated the MPA. The Board revoked Petitioner’s master plumber license and imposed a civil penalty. The circuit court ruled that the Board properly invoked collateral estoppel in adopting the CPD’s findings of fact. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel is permissible in this State and can be invoked to grant preclusive effect to an administrative order; and (2) Petitioner’s double jeopardy protections were not violated when the Board and the CPD both fined him for the same conduct. View "Garrity v. State Bd. of Plumbing" on Justia Law

Defendant CarMax Auto Superstores California LLC (CarMax) advertised and sold cars as "certified" used vehicles. It sold a 2008 used Jeep Wrangler to plaintiff Jessica Brooks. CarMax had promoted the Jeep as a certified used vehicle, inspected the Jeep, made some repairs, and ultimately placed a signed "Certified Quality Inspection" document (the CQI Certificate) for the Jeep in the Jeep's glove box. The CQI Certificate remained in the glove box at all relevant times. Several months after Brooks purchased the Jeep, she drove it through a deep puddle and the engine was so severely damaged that it had to be replaced. She thereafter demanded (among other things) that CarMax rescind the purchase agreement and buy the Jeep back. When CarMax rejected her demands, she filed this action alleging it violated Vehicle Code section 11713.18, because neither the content of the CQI Certificate nor its method of delivery to her complied with CarMax's duties under section 11713.18. Brooks pleaded claims against CarMax under California's Consumer's Legal Remedies Act and Unfair Competition Law. The trial court ruled Brooks had suffered no damage from CarMax's alleged violations of section 11713.18, and therefore concluded she did not have standing to pursue claims under the CLRA or the UCL. Brooks argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that reversal was warranted because she adequately demonstrated the type of damage necessary to prosecute a claim under the CLRA or the UCL or, alternatively, she was entitled to prosecute her claims under the CLRA or the UCL without showing any injury. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Brooks v. CarMax Auto Superstores" on Justia Law

Seeing an internet advertisement for a 1997 FLTHTC Harley‐Davidson motorcycle, Hahn visited City Limits dealership, test‐drove a 2004 motorcycle, took pictures, and made a downpayment. Days later, Hahn returned, paid the balance, and drove the 2004 motorcycle home. The bill of sale listed the VIN, year, and mileage for the 1997 motorcycle. The newer model had half that mileage. The next day, Hahn tried to purchase insurance and discovered the discrepancy. Hahn thought this was a scrivener’s error and called City Limits, which demanded more money and eventually called the police. After being contacted by an officer, Hahn took the motorcycle to the police station. Hahn claims that City Limits has not returned the $7,626.66. He filed suit, alleging that the police violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of property without due process and that the business violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. There is no allegation that the officer violated any state law by making telephone calls or by facilitating the return of the motorcycle; even with such an allegation, the federal constitution is not automatically violated every time the police fail to follow state or local rules. The court correctly declined jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "Zappa v. Smith" on Justia Law

Chance Gordon, a licensed California attorney, appealed the district court's order of summary judgment for the CFPB on its enforcement action for violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. 5531, 5536, and Regulation O, 12 C.F.R. 1015.1-11. On January 4, 2012, President Obama, relying on his recess-appointment power, named Richard Cordray as the CFPB’s initial Director. President Obama renominated Cordray as Director on January 24, 2013. The parties agree that while Cordray’s initial January 2012 recess appointment was invalid, his July 2013 confirmation was valid. The court concluded that, while the failure to have a properly confirmed director may raise Article II Appointments Clause issues, it does not implicate the court's Article III jurisdiction to hear this case. That its director was improperly appointed does not alter the Executive Branch’s interest or power in having federal law enforced. The subsequent valid appointment, coupled with Cordray’s August 30, 2013 ratification, cures any initial Article II deficiencies. Because the CFPB had the authority to bring the action at the time Gordon was charged, Cordray’s August 2013 ratification, done after he was properly appointed as Director, resolves any Appointments Clause deficiencies. On the merits, the court concluded that CFPB is entitled to summary judgment on all counts because there is no dispute as to material fact regarding Gordon's liability. Because the district court conscientiously tailored the injunction at issue, it did not abuse its discretion in granting equitable judgment. However, because the district court may have impermissibly entered a monetary judgment against Gordon for a time period prior to the enactment or effective date of the relevant provisions of the CFPA and Regulation O, the court vacated and remanded for further consideration. View "Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Gordon" on Justia Law

P.F. Chang’s restaurant company announced that its computer system had been breached and some consumer credit- and debit–card data had been stolen. Kosner had dined at a P.F. Chang’s and paid with his debit card. Four fraudulent transactions were made with the card he had used; he cancelled it and purchased, for $106, a credit monitoring service to protect against identity theft, including against use of the card’s data to open new accounts in his name. Lewert used a debit card at the same restaurant (thought to be not among those breached) and had no fraudulent transactions, but claims that he spent time and effort monitoring his card statements and his credit report. Lewert and Kosner sought to represent a class of all similarly situated customers, under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). The district court dismissed for lack of standing, finding they had not suffered the requisite personal injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed. At least some of the injuries alleged qualify as immediate and concrete injuries sufficient to support Article III standing; all class members should be allowed to show that they spent time and resources tracking down possible fraud, changing automatic charges, and replacing cards as a prophylactic measure. View "Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc" on Justia Law

Florencio Pacleb filed a class action complaint against Allstate, alleging that he received unsolicited automated calls to his cell phone in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. Allstate deposited $20,000 in full settlement of Pacleb’s individual monetary claims in an escrow account “pending entry of a final District Court order or judgment directing the escrow agent to pay the tendered funds to Pacleb, requiring Allstate to stop sending non-emergency telephone calls and short message service messages to Pacleb in the future and dismissing this action as moot.” The court affirmed the district court's order denying Allstate’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that, even if the district court entered judgment affording Pacleb complete relief on his individual claims for damages and injunctive relief, mooting those claims, Pacleb would still be able to seek class certification under Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., which remains good law under Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co. The court also concluded that, even if Pitts were not binding, and Allstate could moot the entire action by mooting Pacleb’s individual claims for damages and injunctive relief, those individual claims are not now moot, and the court will not direct the district court to moot them by entering judgment on them before Pacleb has had a fair opportunity to move for class certification. View "Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case arose under California's Unclaimed Property Law (UPL). Plaintiff Vanacore and Associates, Inc., dba Vanacore International (Vanacore) was a private investigation firm that specialized in the recovery of unclaimed property. Vanacore entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with defendant Kenneth Rosenfeld. The MOU contemplated that Vanacore would locate and recover shares of stock belonging to Rosenfeld in exchange for a fee. After signing the agreement, Rosenfeld found and recovered the shares himself and refused to pay Vanacore's fee. Vanacore sued for breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment. Rosenfeld demurred on the ground that the MOU violated the Unclaimed Property Law, which precluded certain asset recovery agreements. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding the MOU illegal and unenforceable. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Vanacore and Associates, Inc. v. Rosenfeld" on Justia Law

Acceptance, a debt collector, purportedly acquired consumer debts purportedly owed by plaintiffs. The Fulton firm sent initial collection notices to the plaintiffs or their attorneys, identifying Acceptance as the “assignee” of the original creditors, but stating that the accounts had been “transferred” to Fulton. The letters did not explicitly identify Acceptance as the current creditor. Plaintiffs sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, which requires a debt collector to disclose to a consumer “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed,” either in its initial communication or in a written notice sent within the next five days. The court granted defendants summary judgment. The court found the letters ambiguous as to the identity of the current creditor, but held that plaintiffs needed to present extrinsic evidence of confusion, and that even with such evidence, the ambiguity would be immaterial to the Act’s objective of providing “information that helps consumers to choose intelligently.” The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court correctly found that the letters were unclear, but erred in finding that additional evidence of confusion was necessary to establish a violation. Section 1692g(a) requires debt collectors to disclose specific information. If a letter fails to disclose that information clearly, it violates the Act; there is no additional materiality requirement, express or implied. View "Janetos v. Fulton Friedman & Gullace, LLP" on Justia Law

Graiser, an Ohio citizen, saw a “Buy One, Get One Free” eyeglasses advertisement at the Beachwood, location of Visionworks, a Texas eye-care corporation operating in more than 30 states. According to Graiser, a Visionworks salesperson quoted Graiser “a price of $409.93 for eyeglasses, with a second eyeglasses ‘free.’” Alternatively, the salesperson told Graiser that he could purchase a single pair of eyeglasses for $245.95. Graiser filed a purported class action in state court, alleging violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. Visionworks removed the case under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), claiming that the amount in controversy recently surpassed CAFA’s jurisdictional threshold of $5,000,000. Graiser successfully moved to remand, arguing that removal was untimely under the 30-day period in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(3). The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that section 1446(b)’s 30-day window for removal under CAFA is triggered when the defendant receives a document from the plaintiff from which it can first be ascertained that the case is removable under CAFA. The presence of CAFA jurisdiction provides defendants with a new window for removability, even if the case was originally removable under a different theory of federal jurisdiction. View "Graiser v. Visionworks of America, Inc." on Justia Law