Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on whether a defamatory statement made in an online business review was entitled to First Amendment protection. Plaintiff Carol Neumann owned plaintiff Dancing Deer Mountain, LLC, a business that arranged and performed wedding events at a property owned by Neumann. Defendant Christopher Liles was a wedding guest who attended a wedding and reception held on Neumann’s property in June 2010. Two days after those events, Liles posted a negative review about Neumann and her business on Google Reviews, a publicly accessible website where individuals may post comments about services or products they have received. In response to Neumann and Dancing Deer Mountain's defamation claim, Liles filed a special motion to strike under Oregon’s Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (Anti-SLAPP) statute. After a hearing, the trial court allowed Liles’s motion to strike and entered a judgment of dismissal of Neumann’s defamation claim without prejudice. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, reasoning that “the evidence submitted by plaintiffs, if credited, would permit a reasonable factfinder to rule in Neumann’s favor on the defamation claim, and the evidence submitted by [Liles] does not defeat Neumann’s claim as a matter of law.” After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the online review at issue in this case was entitled to First Amendment protection. The Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals to the contrary and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to resolve a disputed attorney fee issue. View "Neumann v. Liles" on Justia Law

Facing more than $40,000 in unsecured debt that she owed to Discover Bank and other banks, Susan Ossello enrolled in a debt reduction program and signed a contract with Global Client Solutions. Ossello subsequently stopped making payments on her credit card debt, and Discover Bank brought a collection action against her. Ossello filed a third-party complaint against Global, alleging that Global used deceptive and fraudulent representations to solicit her participation in an illegal debt settlement plan. Global filed a motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss the third-party complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The district court concluded that the arbitration clause in Global’s contract was unconscionable and not unenforceable and therefore denied Global’s motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) reserving to itself the determination of arbitrability, and (2) declaring that the arbitration provision was unconscionable and therefore not enforceable against Ossello. View "Discover Bank v. Ossello" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the assignee of his mortgage after his servicer failed to provide a payoff balance. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1641(e)(1)(A), creates a cause of action against an assignee for a violation that is “apparent on the face of the disclosure statement provided in connection with [a mortgage] transaction pursuant to this subchapter.” The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's amended complaint because the failure to provide a payoff balance is not a violation apparent on the face of the disclosure statement. View "Evanto v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract, negligence, wrongful foreclosure, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 17.50(a)(1)). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of her claims, as well as her motion to join a non-diverse defendant. The court concluded that the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim was proper because she failed to allege any facts showing her own performance and did not refute the facts in documents referred to in her complaint, central to her claims, and attached to the motion to dismiss; the dismissal of the negligence claim was proper where any damages stemming from an alleged violation of those solely contractual duties are not redressable in tort; the wrongful-foreclosure claim was properly dismissed where plaintiff never alleged that Wells Fargo disposed of the house at a “grossly inadequate selling price,” nor does she allege that Wells Fargo fraudulently chilled the bidding at the foreclosure sale; and, where plaintiff bases her DTPA claims on Wells Fargo’s failure to make automatic withdrawals to pay the loan, such services cannot form the basis of a DTPA claim because they are incidental to the loan and would serve no purpose apart from facilitating the mortgage loan. Finally, in regard to the motion to join a non-diverse defendant, the district court applied the correct legal standard and its finding of fact were not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Villarreal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Arbitration Certification Program (ACP) certifies the qualified dispute resolution process identified in the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civil Code 1790, the “lemon law.” Not all automobile manufacturers must have an ACP certified program. Those manufacturers who choose to operate a certified arbitration process have limited lemon law liability. Plaintiffs bought new cars that were under the original manufacturers’ warranties when they sought declaratory relief claiming that public statements in ACP publications were illegal underground regulations not adopted in conformity with California’s Administrative Procedures Act, because the ACP states that car manufacturers may adjust the price of a defective vehicle to be repurchased from its owner as a lemon for excessive wear and tear and that it is not within an arbitrator’s purview to make such an adjustment. The court concluded plaintiffs were interested persons under Government Code 11350 and denied a motion to dismiss. The court of appeal vacated. Plaintiffs may not invoke the doctrine of public interest standing, and their individual interests in the controversy are too conjectural to confer standing to bring an action for declaratory relief. View "CA Dep't. Consumer Affairs v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A collection company, acting on behalf of a hospital, sued John Brown. The lawsuit stemmed from Brown’s nonpayment for medical services. Though Brown initially answered, claiming entitlement to a set-off, he later tried to amend his answer to add a recoupment defense aimed at whittling down his amount owed. The county court judge denied the amendment, but certified the judgment as final and appealable under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). But instead of seeking the intended review by the Mississippi Supreme Court, Brown chose to file his appeal with the circuit court, which affirmed the county court judgment and also entered a Rule 54(b) certification. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found several "jurisdictional snags" with Brown’s case: (1) the county court’s judgment did not decide a “claim” between two parties, thereby making its Rule 54(b) certification invalid; (2) recoupment was a defense under Mississippi law inappropriate for final-judgment entries under Rule 54(b); and (3) appeals from interlocutory judgments of a county court must be filed with the Supreme Court, not the circuit court. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court lacked a final, appealable judgment and an improper interlocutory appeal, the Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Brown v. Collections, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Northland, alleging that it violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., by sending him and other class members a debt collection letter that gave a call‐back number but did not specify the name of the person at that number. The district court denied class certification, and then dismissed the complaint for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff’s allegations concerning the failure to include the name of a person to call back do not state a claim under the FDCPA. However, the court disagreed with the district court that the claim is so insubstantial that it does not even support federal‐question jurisdiction.  The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gallego v. Northland Group Inc." on Justia Law

On September 15, 2011, Elder Living ordered a background screening report on Rocheleau from First Advantage's predecessor, in conjunction with Rocheleau’s application for employment. The search disclosed criminal convictions matched to Rocheleau’s name and birth date. On September 16, First notified Rocheleau that it was reporting information derived from his public record and to direct any questions to its disclosure center. Days later, it sent another notice, advising that information from Rocheleau's report “may adversely affect [his] employment status” and that he was entitled to dispute it. The notice included a summary of rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681. On September 26, First notified Rocheleau that he had not been hired again advising Rocheleau of dispute procedures. Rocheleau contends that Elder shared the report with his then-employer, which terminated his employment. Rocheleau contacted First and complained that he had not authorized the report's release; he did not dispute its accuracy. On November 25, 2013, Rocheleau filed suit under FCRA, claiming that Elder obtained the report without his permission or notifying him that adverse action could result; that neither First nor Elder issued certifications mandated by statute; and that First failed to adhere to required “strict procedures” in releasing his information. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of the claims as time-barred under the two-year limitations period. View "Rocheleau v. Elder Living Constr., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs received medical care from Mount Carmel Hospital in Columbus, Ohio. Consultant Anesthesiologists provided anesthesiology services to each at Mount Carmel Hospital. After plaintiffs did not pay their bills, Consultant Anesthesiologists transferred the delinquent accounts to Credit Adjustments, which called plaintiffs’ cell phone numbers, despite never having received their contact information directly from them. Credit Adjustments received the numbers from Consultant Anesthesiologists, which received them from Mount Carmel Hospital. As part of their admission for services to Mount Carmel Hospital, Baisden and Sissoko signed Patient Consent and Authorization forms covering “all medical and surgical care,” and stating “I understand Mount Carmel may use my health information for … billing and payment … I authorize Mt. Carmel to receive or release my health information, [to] agents or third parties as are necessary for these purposes and to companies who provide billing services.” Plaintiffs contend Credit Adjustments violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), when it placed debt collection calls to their cell phone numbers using an “automatic telephone dialing system” and an “artificial or prerecorded voice.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs gave their “prior express consent” to receive such calls. View "Baisden v. Credit Adjustments, Inc." on Justia Law

The Orcillas are Filipino and English is their second language. Virgilio is unable to work due to a medical condition. In 2006, in response to marketing materials, Teodora contacted Quick Loan and applied to refinance their San Jose home for $525,000. At the Quick Loan agent’s recommendation, Teodora did not include Virgilio on the loan application. Teodora told the agent she could not afford the loan modification because the monthly payments would be more than her monthly income, but eventually accepted the agent’s false representation that she could afford the loan modification. After two notices of default (allegedly “robo-signed”) and attempts to obtain loan modification, they lost the property through a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in 2010. The Orcillas and their three minor grandchildren were forced to vacate. The California Department of Corporations revoked Quick Loan’s lending license. The Orcillas allege Quick Loan never assigned the Note or its interest in the Deed of Trust and filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure and various statutory violations. The court of appeal reversed, in part, the dismissal of their complaint. The Orcillas alleged an actionable unlawful or unfair business practice by the defendants as well as standing to assert an unfair competition claim. View "Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc." on Justia Law