Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Barton, Weiss, and CACi, raising claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692d-f, alleging misrepresentations along with certain claims for interest and costs. The court concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply in this case where plaintiff seeks relief from neither a Missouri judgment nor an Illinois garnishment order. Rather, plaintiff alleges statutory violations seeking statutory penalties based on Barton’s actions in the process of obtaining the judgment and order. The court further concluded that, because equitable tolling does not apply, all of plaintiff’s FDCPA claims directed towards conduct that preceded the Illinois proceedings are time barred. Because Barton's use of the Illinois courts did not amount to an action "against the consumer," those actions were not subject to the FDCPA's venue restriction. The court affirmed as to these claims. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of claims that allege independent FDCPA violations in the Illinois proceedings related to the identity of Barton’s client and the amounts of interests and costs asserted; the court declined at the pleading stage of this case to apply state-law preclusion principles to these remaining claims due to the absence of briefing and the parties’ failure to clearly identify the state law applied by the Illinois court; and because federal claims remain, the court reversed the discretionary dismissal of the state law claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hageman v. Barton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Collectors, alleging that the debt collection letter they sent her violated section 1692(g) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692(g), by failing to notify her of the "in writing" requirement. Plaintiff also alleged that omitting the “in writing” requirement violated section 1692e, which prohibits using “false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court joined the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in holding that a debt collection notice sent to a consumer’s attorney is an “indirect” communication with the consumer; the court rejected the notion that section 1692g gives debt collectors discretion to omit the “in writing” requirement or cure improper notice by claiming waiver; the FDCPA already specifies a remedy for violations of section 1692g and the court will not judicially fashion a waiver remedy for violations of section 1692g when the FDCPA identifies civil liability as the remedy for noncompliance; and the communication alleged in this case states a claim for “false, deceptive, or misleading” behavior under section 1692e where neither the “competent lawyer” nor the “least sophisticated consumer” could be said to have notice of the “in writing” requirement after receiving a letter like the one alleged. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Bishop v. Ross Earle & Bonan, P.A." on Justia Law

Sgouros purchased a “credit score” package from TransUnion. Armed with the number TransUnion gave him, he went to a car dealership and tried to use it to negotiate a favorable loan. The score he had bought, however, was useless: it was 100 points higher than the score pulled by the dealership. Sgouros filed suit, asserting that TransUnion violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681g(f)(7)(A); the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1; and the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.010, by misleading consumers by failing to inform them that the formula used to calculate their purchased credit scores was materially different from the formula used by lenders. TransUnion moved to compel arbitration, asserting that the website through which Sgouros purchased his product included an agreement to arbitrate. The district court concluded that no such contract had been formed and denied TransUnion’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed after evaluating the website and concluding that TransUnion had not put consumers on notice of the terms of agreement, as required by Illinois law, but actually distracted them from noticing those terms. View "Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four Maryland consumers, filed suit against Santander and its agents, alleging that defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.1692-1692p, by engaging in prohibited collection practices when collecting on plaintiffs’ automobile loans. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Santander's motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not allege facts showing that Santander qualified as a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA. The court concluded that the FDCPA generally does not regulate creditors when they collect debt on their own account and that, on the facts alleged by plaintiffs, Santander became a creditor when it purchased the loans before engaging in the challenged practices. View "Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e, alleging that they received collection notices that were misleading because they stated the “current balance,” but did not disclose that the balance might increase due to interest and fees. The court held that Section 1692e requires debt collectors, when they notify consumers of their account balance, to disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of this claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' other claims in a summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion. View "Avila v. Riexinger & Assoc., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, consumers from California and Texas, filed class actions against Electrolux, the manufacturer of front-loading washing machines, alleging warranty and consumer claims. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the rubber seal on the front door of the machines retains water, allowing mildew to grow, causing stains on clothing, and creating a foul odor. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in assessing predominance and therefore vacated the class certification. On remand, the district court should revisit Electrolux's argument that the consumer claims do not satisfy predominance because plaintiffs cannot prove causation on a classwide basis, and the district court abused its discretion by certifying the warranty claims without first resolving preliminary questions of state law that bear on predominance. The court further concluded that plaintiffs' damages do not necessarily defeat predominance, and Electrolux's defense of misuse does not necessarily defeat predominance. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Brown v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that the fees Defendant charged for providing copies of their medical records and billing statements were excessive in violation of Iowa Code 622.10(6). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, alleging that section 622.10(6) did not apply to it because it was not a provider under the statute. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an entity that acts as a provider’s agent in fulfilling records requests covered by section 622.10(6) cannot charge more for producing the requested records than the provider itself could legally charge; and (2) the well-pleaded facts in the petition indicated that Defendant acted as an agent of the providers by fulfilling the records requests on their behalf, and therefore, the district court was correct in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ petition. View "Young v. Healthport Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative consumer class action against Fresh, alleging that Fresh’s label, tube design, and packaging are deceptive and misleading. Plaintiff alleged that the tube design for Fresh's Sugar Lip Treatment product line uses a screw mechanism that allows only 75% of the product to advance up the tube. Each Sugar tube contains a weighted metallic bottom and is wrapped in oversized packaging. The district court granted Fresh's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Although the court concluded that neither the safe harbor doctrine nor the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq., preemption bars plaintiff’s supplemental statement claim, this label claim ultimately fails on the merits because plaintiff cannot plausibly allege that the omission of supplemental disclosures about product weight rendered Sugar’s label “false or misleading” to the reasonable consumer. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's package-based claims under various California consumer laws because plaintiff cannot plausibly allege that Sugar’s design and packaging is deceptive. When viewed in the proper context of the high-end cosmetics market, Sugar’s elaborate packaging and the weighty feel of the tube is commonplace and even expected by a significant portion of Fresh’s “targeted consumers.” Finally, the district court correctly concluded that the First Amended Complaint fails to allege a violation of California Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 12606(b). Any further amendment to the complaint would be futile. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Ebner v. Frech, Inc." on Justia Law

Class representatives filed suit alleging that RHI committed numerous violations of Civil Code section 1747.08, also known as the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act. The trial court found RHI was liable for as many as 1,213,745 violations of that statute and set a penalty recovery in the amount of $30 per violation, subject to RHI's right to dispute any specific claim. Francesca Muller, a class member and the person prosecuting the appeal, requested the court order notice of the attorney fee motion be sent to all class members. The trial court denied the request, granted the attorney fee motion, and entered judgment in the action. Muller appealed. Michael Hernandez, class representative, contests each of Muller's claims of error. The court concluded that, under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, the court must adhere to Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co. and dismiss the appeal. Even if the court were free to disregard Eggert, adhering to Eggert's approach would not leave nonparty class members without protection or appellate recourse. Under California law, where class members are given the option of opting out, they are not bound by the judgment in the class action but instead may pursue their own action. Intervention would have the effect of giving Muller a clear avenue from which to challenge the attorney fee award. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc." on Justia Law

National Financial, LLC, a consumer finance company, loaned $200 to Gloria James. In substance, the loan was a one-year, non-amortizing, unsecured cash advance. The total repayments added up to $1,820, totaling a cost of credit of $1,620. The annual percentage rate (APR) of for the loan was 838.45 percent. After James defaulted, she filed this lawsuit. The Court of Chancery held that the loan was invalid and (1) rescinded the loan on the grounds that it was unconscionable, and (2) awarded statutory damages and attorneys fees and costs on the basis that National violated the Truth in Lending Act. View "James v. National Financial, LLC" on Justia Law