Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

A collection company, acting on behalf of a hospital, sued John Brown. The lawsuit stemmed from Brown’s nonpayment for medical services. Though Brown initially answered, claiming entitlement to a set-off, he later tried to amend his answer to add a recoupment defense aimed at whittling down his amount owed. The county court judge denied the amendment, but certified the judgment as final and appealable under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). But instead of seeking the intended review by the Mississippi Supreme Court, Brown chose to file his appeal with the circuit court, which affirmed the county court judgment and also entered a Rule 54(b) certification. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found several "jurisdictional snags" with Brown’s case: (1) the county court’s judgment did not decide a “claim” between two parties, thereby making its Rule 54(b) certification invalid; (2) recoupment was a defense under Mississippi law inappropriate for final-judgment entries under Rule 54(b); and (3) appeals from interlocutory judgments of a county court must be filed with the Supreme Court, not the circuit court. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court lacked a final, appealable judgment and an improper interlocutory appeal, the Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Brown v. Collections, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Northland, alleging that it violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., by sending him and other class members a debt collection letter that gave a call‐back number but did not specify the name of the person at that number. The district court denied class certification, and then dismissed the complaint for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff’s allegations concerning the failure to include the name of a person to call back do not state a claim under the FDCPA. However, the court disagreed with the district court that the claim is so insubstantial that it does not even support federal‐question jurisdiction.  The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gallego v. Northland Group Inc." on Justia Law

On September 15, 2011, Elder Living ordered a background screening report on Rocheleau from First Advantage's predecessor, in conjunction with Rocheleau’s application for employment. The search disclosed criminal convictions matched to Rocheleau’s name and birth date. On September 16, First notified Rocheleau that it was reporting information derived from his public record and to direct any questions to its disclosure center. Days later, it sent another notice, advising that information from Rocheleau's report “may adversely affect [his] employment status” and that he was entitled to dispute it. The notice included a summary of rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681. On September 26, First notified Rocheleau that he had not been hired again advising Rocheleau of dispute procedures. Rocheleau contends that Elder shared the report with his then-employer, which terminated his employment. Rocheleau contacted First and complained that he had not authorized the report's release; he did not dispute its accuracy. On November 25, 2013, Rocheleau filed suit under FCRA, claiming that Elder obtained the report without his permission or notifying him that adverse action could result; that neither First nor Elder issued certifications mandated by statute; and that First failed to adhere to required “strict procedures” in releasing his information. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of the claims as time-barred under the two-year limitations period. View "Rocheleau v. Elder Living Constr., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs received medical care from Mount Carmel Hospital in Columbus, Ohio. Consultant Anesthesiologists provided anesthesiology services to each at Mount Carmel Hospital. After plaintiffs did not pay their bills, Consultant Anesthesiologists transferred the delinquent accounts to Credit Adjustments, which called plaintiffs’ cell phone numbers, despite never having received their contact information directly from them. Credit Adjustments received the numbers from Consultant Anesthesiologists, which received them from Mount Carmel Hospital. As part of their admission for services to Mount Carmel Hospital, Baisden and Sissoko signed Patient Consent and Authorization forms covering “all medical and surgical care,” and stating “I understand Mount Carmel may use my health information for … billing and payment … I authorize Mt. Carmel to receive or release my health information, [to] agents or third parties as are necessary for these purposes and to companies who provide billing services.” Plaintiffs contend Credit Adjustments violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), when it placed debt collection calls to their cell phone numbers using an “automatic telephone dialing system” and an “artificial or prerecorded voice.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs gave their “prior express consent” to receive such calls. View "Baisden v. Credit Adjustments, Inc." on Justia Law

The Orcillas are Filipino and English is their second language. Virgilio is unable to work due to a medical condition. In 2006, in response to marketing materials, Teodora contacted Quick Loan and applied to refinance their San Jose home for $525,000. At the Quick Loan agent’s recommendation, Teodora did not include Virgilio on the loan application. Teodora told the agent she could not afford the loan modification because the monthly payments would be more than her monthly income, but eventually accepted the agent’s false representation that she could afford the loan modification. After two notices of default (allegedly “robo-signed”) and attempts to obtain loan modification, they lost the property through a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in 2010. The Orcillas and their three minor grandchildren were forced to vacate. The California Department of Corporations revoked Quick Loan’s lending license. The Orcillas allege Quick Loan never assigned the Note or its interest in the Deed of Trust and filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure and various statutory violations. The court of appeal reversed, in part, the dismissal of their complaint. The Orcillas alleged an actionable unlawful or unfair business practice by the defendants as well as standing to assert an unfair competition claim. View "Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc." on Justia Law

Lorene Lowe had two credit cards issued by Citibank, N.A. Citibank sold both credit card accounts to Pilot Receivables Management, LLC, and in late 2012, it assigned the accounts for collection to Unifund CCR, LLC. On December 2, 2013, Unifund filed this action to collect on Account No. 2085, and on May 23, 2014, it filed an amended complaint to add a claim to collect on Account No. 0415. Lowe filed an answer asserting the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations and four counterclaims. Both parties moved for summary judgment, with the primary issue being the applicable statute of limitations. Unifund contended that the applicable statute of limitations was a five-year statute applicable to an action on a written contract, and Lowe contended that the applicable statute of limitations was a four-year statute applicable to an action on an oral contract. Both parties agreed that the statute of limitations began to run on each account on the date of the last payment. The district court ruled that the five-year statute of limitations applied. Lowe then agreed to withdraw her counterclaims in exchange for an offset of $500 against the amount of any judgment obtained by Unifund. The district court entered a judgment against her in the sum of $35,259.87, which included the principal, prejudgment interest, court costs and attorney fees. Lowe then timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Unifund CCR, LLC v. Lowe" on Justia Law

Bravo sued Midland for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692. Midland agreed to forgive two of Bravo’s debts (GE/Lowe’s and Citibank/Sears) as part of a settlement agreement. Philipps, an attorney who specializes in consumer litigation, represented Bravo. After the settlement, Midland sent two letters addressed to Bravo at Philipps' office. The letters were received at Philipps’ business office and were basically identical. One requested the payment of the GE/Lowe’s account and the other requested the payment of the Citibank/Sears account. Philipps did not forward the correspondence to his client, but opened and reviewed the content of the letters. Bravo filed another claim, asserting that the letters violated sections 1692c,e of the FDCPA which prohibit contact with a consumer regarding debts once the consumer notifies the debt collector that she is represented by counsel, prohibit a debt collector from continuing to communicate a demand for payment to a consumer once the consumer has refused to pay, and prohibit false and misleading statements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The letters were not continued communication to a consumer and would not have deceived a competent attorney who was aware that the debts had been resolved. View "Bravo v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Delbert alleging that Delbert violated debt collection practices. The district court granted Delbert's motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 4. The court concluded, however, that the arbitration agreement in this case is unenforceable where it purportedly fashions a system of alternative dispute resolution while simultaneously rendering that system all but impotent through a categorical rejection of the requirements of state and federal law. The court went on to conclude that the FAA does not protect the sort of arbitration agreement that unambiguously forbids an arbitrator from even applying the applicable law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hayes v. Delbert Services Corp." on Justia Law

In 2011, Henderson Square Condominium Association sued, alleging: breach of the implied warranty of habitability, fraud, negligence, breach of the Chicago Municipal Code’s prohibition against misrepresenting material facts in marketing and selling real estate, and breach of a fiduciary duty. The defendants were developers that entered into a contract with the city for a mixed use project, the Lincoln-Belmont-Ashland Redevelopment Project. Sales in the project had begun in 1996. The trial court dismissed, finding that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the Chicago Municipal Code violation and breach of fiduciary duty and that counts were time-barred under the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-214). The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. A condominium association generally has standing to pursue claims that affect the unit owners or the common elements. A question of fact remains as to whether defendants’ failure to speak about construction deficiencies or to adequately fund reserves, coupled with earlier alleged misrepresentations, amounted to fraudulent concealment for purposes of exceptions to the limitation and repose periods. It is possible that minor repairs, along with the limited nature of water infiltration, reasonably delayed plaintiffs’ hiring of professional contractors to open the wall and discover latent defects. The date when plaintiffs reasonably should have known that an injury occurred and that it was wrongfully caused was a question of fact. View "Henderson Square Condo. Ass'n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeffrey Smith appealed a circuit court granting judgment to defendant Milko Pesa d/b/a Auto Milko, on plaintiff’s small claim action seeking damages and other relief on the grounds that he validly revoked acceptance of the used motor vehicle the defendant sold him and that, by selling him the vehicle, the defendant violated RSA chapter 358-F. In February 2014, plaintiff purchased a 2004 Subaru from defendant “as is as seen.” Before purchasing it, he signed and/or initialed four documents, namely a receipt from defendant’s car dealership stating that plaintiff purchased the motor vehicle “as is as seen,” and containing statements in which defendant, as the seller of the motor vehicle, disclaimed “ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.” After purchasing the motor vehicle, the plaintiff had it inspected by a Subaru dealership, and the vehicle failed inspection. Thereafter, the parties agreed that the vehicle would be inspected by an independent mechanic. According to plaintiff, the independent mechanic corroborated the opinion of the Subaru dealership that the vehicle was beyond repair. According to defendant, the independent mechanic opined that the vehicle required only the replacement of a missing part. Plaintiff subsequently brought a small claim action against the defendant, seeking damages and rescission of the sale. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Smith v. Pesa" on Justia Law