Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Henderson Square Condominium Association sued, alleging: breach of the implied warranty of habitability, fraud, negligence, breach of the Chicago Municipal Code’s prohibition against misrepresenting material facts in marketing and selling real estate, and breach of a fiduciary duty. The defendants were developers that entered into a contract with the city for a mixed use project, the Lincoln-Belmont-Ashland Redevelopment Project. Sales in the project had begun in 1996. The trial court dismissed, finding that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the Chicago Municipal Code violation and breach of fiduciary duty and that counts were time-barred under the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-214). The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. A condominium association generally has standing to pursue claims that affect the unit owners or the common elements. A question of fact remains as to whether defendants’ failure to speak about construction deficiencies or to adequately fund reserves, coupled with earlier alleged misrepresentations, amounted to fraudulent concealment for purposes of exceptions to the limitation and repose periods. It is possible that minor repairs, along with the limited nature of water infiltration, reasonably delayed plaintiffs’ hiring of professional contractors to open the wall and discover latent defects. The date when plaintiffs reasonably should have known that an injury occurred and that it was wrongfully caused was a question of fact. View "Henderson Square Condo. Ass'n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeffrey Smith appealed a circuit court granting judgment to defendant Milko Pesa d/b/a Auto Milko, on plaintiff’s small claim action seeking damages and other relief on the grounds that he validly revoked acceptance of the used motor vehicle the defendant sold him and that, by selling him the vehicle, the defendant violated RSA chapter 358-F. In February 2014, plaintiff purchased a 2004 Subaru from defendant “as is as seen.” Before purchasing it, he signed and/or initialed four documents, namely a receipt from defendant’s car dealership stating that plaintiff purchased the motor vehicle “as is as seen,” and containing statements in which defendant, as the seller of the motor vehicle, disclaimed “ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.” After purchasing the motor vehicle, the plaintiff had it inspected by a Subaru dealership, and the vehicle failed inspection. Thereafter, the parties agreed that the vehicle would be inspected by an independent mechanic. According to plaintiff, the independent mechanic corroborated the opinion of the Subaru dealership that the vehicle was beyond repair. According to defendant, the independent mechanic opined that the vehicle required only the replacement of a missing part. Plaintiff subsequently brought a small claim action against the defendant, seeking damages and rescission of the sale. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Smith v. Pesa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeffrey Roy appealed a circuit court order approving a recommendation of the Judicial Referee that judgment be entered in favor of defendant Quality Pro Auto, LLC on plaintiff’s small claim action. Plaintiff bought a used motor vehicle from defendant for $1,895. The bill of sale indicated that the vehicle was sold “As is As seen.” The sale also included a form from the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) titled “NOTICE OF SALE OF UNSAFE MOTOR VEHICLE.” In his small claims suit, plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the defendant had breached the implied warranty of merchantability when it sold the vehicle to him. Agreeing with the trial court that plaintiff waived this implied warranty, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Roy v. Quality Pro Auto, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former customers of West Bank, filed a multiple-count proposed consumer class action lawsuit against the Bank challenging one-time nonsufficient funds fees the Bank charged when Plaintiffs used their debit cards to create overdrafts in their checking account. Plaintiffs alleged usury claims and sequencing claims. The district court denied the Bank’s motions for summary judgment on the usury and sequencing claims but granted summary judgment on the Bank’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ usury claim arising under the Iowa Ongoing Criminal Conduct Act. In a companion case issued today, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in denying the Bank’s motions for summary judgment except as to the good-faith claim involving the sequencing of overdrafts. Likewise, the Court here found that the district court also erred in certifying the class action on all claims except for Plaintiffs' good-faith sequencing claim. View "Legg v. West Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former customers of West Bank, filed a multiple-count proposed consumer class action lawsuit against the Bank challenging one-time nonsufficient funds fees the Bank charged when Plaintiffs used their debit cards to create overdrafts in their checking account. Plaintiffs alleged usury claims and sequencing claims. the Bank filed three motions for summary judgment asking the district court to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ usury and sequencing claims. The district court denied the Bank’s motions for summary judgment on the usury and sequencing claims but granted summary judgment on the Bank’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ usury claim arising under the Iowa Ongoing Criminal Conduct Act. The Bank filed this interlocutory appeal on the district court’s denial of its motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in denying the Bank’s motions for summary judgment except as to Plaintiffs’ claim based on a potential breach of the express duty of good faith in the sequencing of postings of bank card transactions. Remanded. View "Legg v. West Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was diagnosed with drug-induced lupus, allegedly a side effect from using Solodyn, a treatment for acne. Plaintiff sued Medicis Pharmaceutical Corporation, which manufactures and distributes Solodyn, alleging that Medicis knowingly represented and omitted material facts in connection with the sale or advertisement of Solodyn in violation of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Plaintiff also alleged that Medicis failed to adequately warn her of the consequences of the long-term use of Solodyn. The superior court granted Medicis’s motion to dismiss. At issue on appeal was the learned intermediary doctrine (LID), under which a manufacturer satisfies its duty to warn end users by giving appropriate warnings to the class of persons who may prescribe or administer the product. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, holding (1) the LID does not prevent Plaintiff from suing Medicis; (2) Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to survive Medicis’s motion to dismiss with regard to her products liability claim; and (3) the CFA applies to prescription pharmaceuticals, and therefore, Plaintiff alleged an actionable claim under the CFA. View "Watts v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wells Fargo, alleging that his mortgage agreement, providing him with a loan far in excess of his home’s actual value, was an “unconscionable contract” under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, W. Va. Code 46A–1–101 et seq. The court agreed with the district court that the amount of a mortgage loan, by itself, cannot show substantive unconscionability under West Virginia law, and that plaintiff has not otherwise made that showing. The court concluded, however, that the Act allows for claims of “unconscionable inducement” even when the substantive terms of a contract are not themselves unfair. Accordingly, the court remanded so that the district court may consider this issue in the first instance. View "McFarland v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Appellant, a payday loan company, provided loans to the named plaintiffs. The named plaintiffs and other borrowers did not repay their loans, prompting Appellant to file several thousand individual collection actions. Appellant secured thousands of default judgments against the named plaintiffs. It was later discovered that the process server hired by Appellant falsified affidavits of service. The named plaintiffs sued Appellant, alleging that Appellant improperly obtained its default judgments against them and other similarly situated borrowers without their knowledge. Appellant moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provisions in its loan agreements. The district court denied Appellant’s motions, holding that Appellant waived its right to arbitrate by bringing collection actions in justice court and obtaining default judgments based on falsified affidavits of service. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Appellant waived its right to an arbitral forum where the named plaintiffs’ claims all concerned the validity of the default judgments Appellant obtained against them in justice court. View "Principal Investments v. Harrison" on Justia Law

The Ticket Law, N.J. Stat. 56:8-35.1, part of New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act, says: It shall be an unlawful practice for a person, who has access to tickets to an event prior to the tickets’ release for sale to the general public, to withhold those tickets from sale to the general public in an amount exceeding 5% of all available seating for the event. The Consumer Fraud Act permits private plaintiffs to sue any person who violates the Act and causes them to suffer ascertainable damages. Plaintiffs wanted to attend Super Bowl XLVIII, which was held in New Jersey in 2014. One plaintiff bought two tickets on the resale market, allegedly for much more than face price. They assert that the NFL’s method of selling tickets to Super Bowl XLVIII violated the Ticket Law and resulted in unjust enrichment. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. Neither plaintiff has constitutional standing to bring this case. Otherwise, anyone who purchased a Super Bowl ticket on the resale market would have standing to sue in federal court based on nothing more than conjectural assertions of causation and injury. Article III requires more. The court declined to interpret the Ticket Law’s meaning. View "Finkelman v. Nat'l Football League" on Justia Law

In 2013, Plaintiff purchased a new car from Defendant. In 2014, Plaintiff filed the underlying petition for damages, alleging that Defendant violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act by failing to pass title for her new vehicle. Thereafter, Defendant asked the trial court to enforce the arbitration agreement between the parties. The trial court overruled the motion to compel arbitration on the ground that the contract between the parties was void under Mo. Rev. Stat. 301.210. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding that even though the sale between Plaintiff and Defendant may be void under section 301.210, that question is for the arbitrator to determine, not the trial court. Remanded with instructions for the trial court to grant Defendant’s motion and compel arbitration. View "Ellis v. JF Enters., LLC" on Justia Law