Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed this putative class action against Defendants - Nisource Corporate Services Company and AGL Resources, Inc. - alleging that Defendants engaged in deceptive business practices by disguising credit sales of hot water heaters as leases to avoid making the disclosures required under federal and Massachusetts’ consumer protection laws. Plaintiff alleged three disclosure violations: (1) a federal claim under the Truth in Lending Act; (2) a state law claim under the Massachusetts Retail Installment Sales and Services Act (RISSA) and (3) a state law claim under the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act (CCCDA). The district court found that Plaintiff did not qualify for protection in light of the state-law standards governing these transactions and dismissed her suit. The First Circuit affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) Plaintiff’s federal claim under TILA is barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) as to the pendent state law claims, which were timely, the Court affirmed dismissal for failure to state a claim. View "Philibotte v. Nisource Corp. Services Co." on Justia Law

Jim Hein hired John Sott and his companies (collectively, Sott) to construct a log home for him and then, later, an addition to the home. Hein eventually filed a complaint against Sott alleging negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The district court dismissed Hein’s claims related to the construction of the home as time-barred and then dismissed Hein’s remaining claims on the ground that Hein had not provided expert evidence that Sott’s work was either defective or caused Hein damage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that Hein’s negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims arising from water damage to his home were barred by the statute of repose; (2) did not err in determining that Hein’s CPA claims for damages arising two years before Hein filed his complaint were barred by the statute of limitations but erred in determining that Hein’s CPA claims based on alleged deceptive acts or practices in the performance of repairs occurring less than two years before Hein filed his complaint were barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) erred in determining that Hein was required to produce expert evidence for his CPA claim arising from Sott’s billing for work on the addition. View "Hein v. Sott" on Justia Law

Evankavitch executed a mortgage against her property and fell behind on her payments. The mortgagee’s rights were assigned to Green Tree. Green Tree and Evankavitch talked about the loan several times. Evankavitch initiated one discussion by calling Green Tree from her daughter’s (Cheryl) cell phone. Green Tree recorded Cheryl’s number and called Evankavitch at both Evankavitch’s and Cheryl’s numbers. Evankavitch instructed Green Tree to stop using her daughter’s number. Green Tree continued to call both numbers, left messages on Cheryl’s voicemail, and began calling Evankavitch’s neighbors. After learning of these communications, Evankavitch brought suit. Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, a debt collector is liable to a consumer for contacting third parties unless the communication falls under a statutory exception. One exception covers communication “for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer.” That exception prohibits more than one such contact “unless the debt collector reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is erroneous or incomplete and that such person now has correct or complete location information.” The Third Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Evankavitch, finding that the debt collector has the burden to prove that the challenged communications fit within the exception. View "Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant James McKenzie appealed a trial court’s order awarding him only $28,350 of the nearly $48,000 in attorney fees he sought in this case, following the parties’ settlement of McKenzie’s claim under the automobile “lemon law” provisions of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The trial court refused to award McKenzie any of the attorney fees incurred in the wake of Ford’s initial offer because it viewed the compromise offer ultimately accepted by McKenzie as essentially identical to the offer he had initially rejected – distinguished only by his “demand that [he] be allowed to file [a fee] motion.” The court concluded McKenzie unreasonably delayed settlement for the sole purpose of ginning up his fee award. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Court found the trial court’s comparative assessment of Ford’s two settlement offers was erroneous as a matter of law. "Even Ford concedes its initial settlement offer incorporated numerous extraneous provisions – including broad releases of both Ford and nonparties, an illegal confidentiality clause characterized as 'material' to the settlement, and what amounted to an opt-out provision in Ford’s favor – all of which were excised from the offer McKenzie later accepted. These differences are significant, and thus McKenzie’s rejection of the initial offer was reasonable, requiring his counsel to continue working on the case." The Court held further that the trial court’s erroneous comparison of Ford’s initial compromise offer with the offer McKenzie later accepted fatally undermined its conclusion that the entire amount of hours billed by McKenzie’s counsel in the wake of that initial offer was unjustified. The court’s additional finding, that McKenzie’s two attorneys also engaged in instances of duplicative billing after Ford’s initial offer, did not support a complete denial of fees for that period. Consequently, the case was remanded back to the trial court with directions to reconsider the fee award. View "McKenzie v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a wood manufacturer, alleging that wood he bought for a fence at his home was not properly pressure-treated and that it prematurely rotted. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims under the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ala. Code 8-19-5(5), (7), and for breach of express warranty. The court held that where a conflict exists between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which authorizes class actions including for consumer claims of this kind, and the ADTPA, which creates a private right of action but forbids private class actions, Rule 23 controls. The court also concluded that Alabama law allows a consumer to recover for breach of an express warranty, even in the absence of privity, in some circumstances. In this case, the court held that the complaint adequately alleges the required circumstances and thus states an express warranty claim on which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against MBCC, alleging claims arising from MBCC's failure to timely release a lien placed on her residence after she satisfied her underlying debt obligation. The district court granted summary judgment to MBCC and plaintiff appealed. The court rejected plaintiff's claims for breach of contract; slander of title; violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.; violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA), Va. Code 59.1-200; violation of Virginia Code 55-66.3; and declaratory judgment. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. The court noted the substandard nature of MBCC’s conduct in releasing the lien on plaintiff’s home. While the various statutory barriers cited negate plaintiff’s claims, had she acted diligently she may have had viable claims at least as to breach of contract and Va. Code 55-66.3(B). Finally, the court stated that MBCC would be well served to review its business practices to forestall such claims in future cases. View "Poindexter v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp." on Justia Law

The parties’ dispute involved various “credit repair” services provided to plaintiff consumers, for which some of the disclosure requirements of the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA, or the Act), 15 U.S.C. 1679 et seq., were not met. At issue was the district court's denial of a motion to vacate certain aspects of an arbitration award. The court held that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law by determining that plaintiffs failed to prove actual damages under the Act; the court rejected plaintiffs’ various arguments regarding their request for additional attorneys’ fees and costs; and the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of his contractually delegated authority under section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jones v. Dancel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Eckler and Engel filed separate actions against Neutrogena, alleging that their sunscreen products were misleadingly labeled and marketed in violation of California consumer protection statutes. Plaintiffs alleged that Neutrogena misleadingly labeled its products with the descriptions “sunblock,” “waterproof,” and “sweatproof” (Labeling Terms), terms that the FDA prohibited; Engel contends that Neutrogena is liable for marketing products that bore the Labeling Terms before the December 17, 2012 compliance date; the Eckler matter raises an additional product labeling issue with respect to sunscreen with a sun protection factor (SPF) value greater than 50; and, although Eckler does not contend that the SPF values on Neutrogena’s products were inaccurate, she believes that consumers will be misled about their benefits and seeks an order that Neutrogena modify its labels and alter its advertising. The superior court sustained Neutrogena’s demurrer to Eckler’s complaint without leave to amend, and granted its motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Engel’s complaint. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 379r, and implementing FDA regulations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Eckler v. Neutrogena Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, debt-collection attorneys for non-party Publix, under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim. At issue was whether representations made by an attorney in court filings during the course of debt-collection litigation are actionable under the FDCPA. The court found that the plain language of the FDCPA, other persuasive decisions interpreting that language, and the purpose underlying the Act mandate a finding that the FDCPA applies to attorneys, like defendants, who regularly engage in debt collection activity, even when that activity includes litigation and even when the attorneys’ conduct is directed at someone other than the consumer. The court further concluded that absent a statutory exception, documents filed in court in the course of judicial proceedings to collect on a debt, like defendants' sworn reply, are subject to the FDCPA. However, because the court agreed with the district court’s finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim under the FDCPA, the court affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. View "Miljkovic v. Shafritz and Dinkin, P.A." on Justia Law

Petitioners purchased and financed an automobile from Respondent. Petitioners averred that Respondent failed properly to disclose the vehicle’s history. At issue in this case was the extent to which multiple documents executed on the same day during the course of the purchase and financing could be read together as constituting the entire agreement between the parties. The issue arose in the context of whether Petitioners’ claims against Respondent were subject to a mandatory arbitration provision in the Buyer’s Order, which set forth the purchase price. A Retail Installment Sales Contract (RISC), which contained the financing terms of the purchase, did not include an agreement to arbitrate. The circuit court granted Respondent’s motion to compel arbitration, thus disagreeing with Petitioners that the language of the Buyer’s Order was superseded by the RISC. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, for the purposes of the instant case, the Buyer’s Order may be construed together with the RISC as evincing the entire agreement between the parties. View "Ford v. Antwerpen Motorcars Ltd." on Justia Law