Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Ashley Hartness entered into an oral agreement with Restoration Plus, which was owned by Rick Nuckles, for the restoration of his 1968 Pontiac Firebird. Dissatisfied with the restoration, Hartness filed suit against Nuckles, alleging breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, money had and received (unjust enrichment), conversion, fraud, deceit, and false representation. The circuit court entered judgment for Nuckles, finding that Hartness failed to comply with the notice requirement of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which requires a party bringing suit on a warranty to notify the breaching party before filing suit. The court also rejected the remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if breach of warranty claims exist for a contract that is exclusively for services, the UCC notice requirements apply, and the circuit court did not err in ruling that Hartness’s claims for breach of warranty failed for lack of notice; and (2) the circuit court did not err in ruling that Hartness could not recover for unjust enrichment or conversion. View "Hartness v. Nuckles" on Justia Law

Defendant Westlake Services LLC appealed a trial court order denying its motion to compel arbitration. Alfredo Ramos, and coplaintiffs (who are not parties to this appeal) sued Defendant Westlake Services LLC for causes of actions arising out of their purchase of used automobiles. Ramos alleged that negotiations for his purchase of a car were conducted primarily in Spanish. Defendant charged Ramos money for a “guaranteed auto protection” (GAP) contract to cover the vehicle he purchased. A copy of the GAP contract was not provided to him in Spanish. In exchange for the payment of a premium by the consumer and/or purchaser of the automobile, the ‘GAP’ insurance policy contract, which identifies the respective rights and liabilities of the parties to the contract, is purportedly intended to pay the difference between the actual cash value of the financed automobile and the then-current outstanding balance on the loan for the automobile should the financed automobile be destroyed or ‘totaled’ in an accident. Ramos asserted three causes of action based on Westlake’s failure to provide a translation of the GAP contract: (1) violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA); (2) violation of section 1632; and (3) violation of the unfair competition law (UCL). Westlake moved to compel arbitration of Ramos’s and his coplaintiffs’ claims, relying on the arbitration provisions contained in the underlying sales contracts they each had signed. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that Ramos reasonably relied on a Spanish translation of the English contract that Pena Motors (as Westlake’s agent) provided him that did not include the arbitration. The Court concluded that mutual assent to the arbitration agreement was lacking, void and that the trial court correctly denied Westlake’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Ramos v. Westlake Services" on Justia Law

Respondent had his vehicle serviced at Russel Collision and was billed for the repairs. Jeremy Martin, Russel Collision’s manager, later signed a “Notice of Sale of Motor Vehicle to Satisfy a Lien” for Respondent’s vehicle. The notice listed the “cost of process” at $1,000, which was the amount to which Russel Collision and Allstate Lien agreed they were entitled to keep Respondent’s car and sell it unless Respondent paid the costs related to the future sale of the car. Respondent’s vehicle was eventually sold at auction. Respondent filed suit against Russel Collision, Martin, and Allstate Lien, alleging that Md. Code Ann. Com. Law ("CL") 16-202(c), which provided Russel Collision a lien for Respondent’s vehicle, does not permit lien recovery costs of $1,000 as fees prior to the sale of the car. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondent. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that, under CL 16-202(c), a motor vehicle lien does not encompass “cost of process” fees and that such fees should not be included in the amount the customer must pay to redeem the vehicle. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a garagemen’s lien does not encompass lien enforcement costs or expenses or cost of process fees prior to sale should the owner attempt to redeem the vehicle before sale. View "Allstate Lien & Recovery Corp. v. Stansbury" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BOA and Wells Fargo alleging, among other claims, that BOA had violated Section 51.002(d) of the Texas Property Code and the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA), Tex. Fin. Code Ann. 392.301(a)(8), 392.303(a)(2), and 392.304(a)(8). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for BOA. The court concluded that, even if section 51.002(d) authorizes a private cause of action, plaintiff fails to state a claim because she did not allege that BOA attempted to send her a timely notice of sale or to initiate foreclosure. Further, the court concluded that, irrespective of any statutory notice requirements, BOA did not violate section 392.301(a)(8) of the TDCA by threatening to foreclose; plaintiff failed to allege a violation of section 392.303(a)(2); and plaintiff failed to establish any of the elements required by section 392.304(a)(8). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rucker v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

U.S. Bank National Association ("USB"), successor in interest to Bank of America, N.A., which was the successor by merger to LaSalle Bank, National Association, as trustee for Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-4 ("the Trust"), and Bank of America, N.A. ("BOA"), separately appealed a $3.9 million judgment entered against them on trespass and wantonness claims asserted by Chester and Emily Shepherd. USB also appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the Shepherds on its claims related to an alleged error in a mortgage executed by the Shepherds upon which the Trust had foreclosed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed. "'Every single one of these cases . . . rejects the availability of negligence and wantonness claims under Alabama law under comparable circumstances to those identified by the [plaintiffs]. Every one of these cases undercuts the legal viability of [the plaintiffs' negligence and wantonness claims], and rejects the very arguments articulated by the [plaintiffs] in opposing dismissal of those causes of action. ... the mortgage servicing obligations at issue here are a creature of contract, not of tort, and stem from the underlying mortgage and promissory note executed by the parties, rather than a duty of reasonable care generally owed to the public. To the extent that the [plaintiffs] seek to hold defendants liable on theories of negligent or wanton servicing of their mortgage, [those negligence and wantonness claims] fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted.'" View "U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Shepherd" on Justia Law

In 2011, Nationwide Credit Corporation, a debt-collection agency - telephoned Gregory Leeb about an unpaid medical bill. Leeb mailed and faxed a letter to Nationwide disputing the debt. A few days later, Nationwide sent Leeb a letter asking him to provide additional information and instructing him to detach the upper portion of the letter and “return with payment.” The bottom portion stated that the communication was “from a debt collector attempted to collect a debt.” Leeb sued, arguing that Nationwide violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) - which required Nationwide to “cease collection” until it verified the debt - by sending the letter. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Leeb. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Nationwide’s letter, objectively viewed, was an attempt to collect the debt; and (2) Nationwide’s violation was not excused under FDCPA’s “bona fide error” provision. View "Leeb v. Nationwide Credit Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, the law firm representing plaintiff's landlord in a suit for unpaid rent, alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e. Plaintiff claimed that the law firm had violated the act by swearing to an affidavit without personal knowledge of the facts. The court concluded that, absent an allegation that he actually did not owe rent, plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the defendant's practice misled the state court in any meaningful way. In this case, plaintiff's complaint only indicates that a trial was had in which the state court received evidence before rendering a judgment on the underlying rent issue. Because plaintiff has not alleged a plausible violation of the FDCPA and his class claims were properly dismissed, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Janson v. Katharyn B. Davis, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his claim under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692k, as untimely. The court concluded that the district court erred in finding that the FDCPA violation “occurred” when defendant sent the restraining notice. The court held instead that where a debt collector sends an allegedly unlawful restraining notice to a bank, the FDCPA violation does not “occur” for purposes of Section 1692k(d) until the bank freezes the debtor’s account. Because the record is unclear as to when the freeze actually took place, the court vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Benzemann v. Citibank" on Justia Law

This case concerned the nature of transactions that petitioners, national litigation finance companies, made with tort plaintiffs seeking funds to pay personal expenses while waiting for their lawsuits to settle or go to trial. Plaintiffs usually agreed to pay the companies a sum of money from the future litigation proceeds. By the terms of the agreements, any money the companies give tort plaintiffs were not to be used to prosecute the legal claims. The specific issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the companies’ forwarding of expense money to tort plaintiffs constituted a “loan.” Petitioners contended they were “asset purchases,” but the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code interprets these transactions as loans. The Supreme Court agreed with the UCCC: these transactions are loans. View "Oasis Legal Fin. Grp. v. Coffman" on Justia Law

The Internal Revenue Service filed a notice of federal tax lien against "Attorneys Title Insurance Agency of Wright Gary A Member" with the Pitkin County Recorder. The Recorder, however, listed the lien on its indexing website as against "Gary A. Wright" in his personal capacity. Wright paid the underlying lien. Credit reporting agencies (“CRAs”) Experian Information Services, Inc. (“Experian”) and Trans Union LLC (“Trans Union”) received information about the lien from their contractor, LexisNexis, and included it in their reports of Wright’s credit history. Wright learned about the lien appearing in his credit reports. He sent letters to the CRAs disputing the lien, asserting: (1) the IRS had withdrawn the lien because the taxes had subsequently been paid; and (2) the notice of the lien inaccurately stated the lien was assessed against him when it should have been assessed only against Attorneys Title Insurance Agency of Aspen (“ATA”). In response to these letters, the CRAs checked the information, but did not remove the lien entirely from Wright’s credit report because the IRS treated the lien as "released" rather than withdrawn. Wright sued under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and Colorado Consumer Credit Reporting Act (“CCCRA”), claiming the credit reports were inaccurate, the CRAs acted unreasonably in reporting the lien and responding to his letters, and the foregoing caused him to suffer damages. The district court granted summary judgment to the CRAs, concluding they used reasonable procedures to prepare Wright’s credit report and to reinvestigate in response to Wright’s letters. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Wright v. Experian Information Solutions" on Justia Law