Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Patron won 185 credits, or $1.85, while playing a penny slot machine at a Casino. However, at the same time, a message appeared on the screen stating, “Bonus Award - $41797550.16.” The Casino refused to pay the alleged bonus, claiming that the slot machine game malfunctioned, and therefore, the bonus award displayed on the screen was not valid. The Patron filed suit against the Casino, asserting breach of contract, estoppel, and consumer fraud. The district court granted summary judgment to the Casino on all three counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the rules of the game formed a contract between the Patron and the Casino, and the Patron was not entitled to the bonus under those rules; (2) the Patron failed to prove the necessary elements of either promissory or equitable estoppel; and (3) the Patron failed to present proof of an ascertainable loss sufficient to warrant recovery on her consumer fraud claim. View "McKee v. Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a dispute between a homeowners association that was a West Virginia Limited Expense Planned Community (“Association”), and homeowners who failed to pay their association assessments (“Homeowners”). The instant conflict revolved around the Association’s ability to place a lien on the real property of homeowners whose dues were delinquent. The Association filed separate complaints against the Homeowners, who responded by filing separate answers and counterclaims asserting violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act (WVCCPA). The circuit court consolidated the cases and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Association as to all of the Homeowners’ counterclaims, concluding (1) the Association had valid common law liens against the Homeowners’ real property; and (2) a homeowner associations’ attempts to collect assessments are not subject to the WVCCPA. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) an association is statutorily authorized to assert a consensual common law lien against real property; and (2) the unfair debt collection provisions of the WVCCPA do apply to a homeowner association’s attempts to collect delinquent assessments. View "Fleet v. Webber Springs Owners Ass’n" on Justia Law

When Samantha Reckis was seven years old, she developed toxic epidermal necrolysis, a life-threatening skin disorder, after receiving multiple doses of Children’s Motrin, an over-the-counter medication with ibuprofen as its active ingredient. Plaintiffs, Samantha and her parents, sued the manufacturer and marketer of Children’s Motrin and its parent company, alleging that Samantha developed TEN as a result of being exposed to ibuprofen in the Children’s Motrin and that the warning label on the medication’s bottle rendered the product defective because it failed to warn consumers about the serious risk of developing a life-threatening disease from it. A jury found in favor of Plaintiffs and awarded Samantha a total of $50 million in compensatory damages and each of Samantha’s parents $6.5 million for loss of consortium. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ claim of failure to warn was not preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; (2) a pharmacologist who offered the causation evidence essential to Plaintiffs’ case was qualified to testify as to specific medical causation, and the testimony was reliable and admissible; and (3) the damages awarded to each of the plaintiffs were not grossly excessive or unsupported by the record. View "Reckis v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

Environmental Law Foundation (ELF), sued Beech-Nut and other food manufacturers, distributors, and retailers, seeking enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, commonly referred to as Proposition 65 (Health & Saf. Code, 25249.5). ELF alleged certain of defendants’ products contain toxic amounts of lead sufficient to trigger the duty to provide warnings to consumers. The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants, concluding they had no duty to warn because they satisfactorily demonstrated that the average consumer’s reasonably anticipated rate of exposure to lead from their products falls below relevant regulatory thresholds. The court of appeal affirmed, analyzing regulations promulgated by the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment. View "Environmental Law Found. v. Beech-Nut Nutrition" on Justia Law

Aaron’s stores sell and lease residential and office furniture, consumer electronics, and appliances. Byrd leased a laptop computer from Aspen, an Aaron’s franchisee. Although Byrd asserts that she made full payments, an Aspen agent came to repossess the laptop, claiming that the payments had not been made. The agent allegedly presented a screenshot of a poker website Byrd had visited as well as a picture of Byrd taken by the laptop’s camera. Aspen obtained the picture and screenshot through spyware named “PC Rental Agent” that can collect screenshots, keystrokes, and webcam images from the computer and its users. Between November 16, 2010 and December 20, 2010, the Byrds alleged that this spyware secretly accessed their laptop 347 times on 11 different days. According their putative class action, alleging violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2511, 895 customers had surveillance conducted through PC Rental Agent. Concluding that the proposed classes were not ascertainable, the district court denied class certification. The Third Circuit reversed. The court erred by: misstating the rule governing ascertainability; engrafting an “underinclusive” requirement; finding that an “overly broad” class was not ascertainable; and improperly applying precedent to the issue of whether “household members” could be ascertainable. View "Byrd v. Aaron's Inc" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Eighth Circuit held that the Petersons’ claim for rescission under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601, was time-barred by 15 U.S.C. 1635(f) because of their failure to file a lawsuit within three years of their transaction with Bank of America. In 2015, the Supreme Court held that another court had erred in holding that a borrower’s failure to file a suit for rescission within three years of the transaction’s consummation extinguishes the right to rescind and bars relief. Following remand by the Court, the Eighth Circuit vacated it earlier judgment and remanded. View "Bank of America v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Defendant owed $277 to a cash advance company, which assigned the debt to Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a complaint for the recovery of money in county court, but prior to the entry of judgment, Defendant voluntarily paid Plaintiff the amount sought. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for costs of the action. The county court overruled the motion for costs and dismissed the complaint, concluding that Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1708 precludes an award of costs when there have been voluntary payments made after the action was filed but before judgment was entered. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the county and district courts erred in interpreting the statute to provide for an exception where the defendant voluntarily paid the plaintiff’s claim before a judgment was entered; and (2) therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to its costs in this action. View "Credit Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

In this putative nationwide class action Plaintiffs claimed that they were deceived into purchasing Defendants’ “natural” cosmetics, which contained allegedly synthetic and artificial ingredients. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, California’s unfair competition and false advertising laws, and common law theories of fraud and quasi-contract. The district court dismissed the quasi-contract cause of action for failure to state a claim and dismissed the state law claims under the primary jurisdiction doctrine so that the parties could seek expert guidance from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not expressly preempt California’s state law causes of action that create consumer remedies for false or misleading cosmetics labels; (2) although the district court properly invoked the primary jurisdiction doctrine, it erred by dismissing the case rather than staying proceedings while the parties sought guidance from the FDA; and (3) the district court erred in dismissing the quasi-contract cause of action as duplicative of or superfluous to Plaintiffs’ other claims. View "Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2695.183 was promulgated in 2010 following complaints by homeowners who lost their residences in wildfires that they did not have enough insurance to cover the full cost of repairing or rebuilding their homes because, when they bought their insurance, the estimates of replacement value were too low. The Regulation prohibits a “licensee” from “communicat[ing] an estimate of replacement cost to an applicant or insured in connection with an application for renewal of a homeowners’ insurance policy that provides coverage on a replacement cost basis” that does not satisfy specific content and format provisions. Noncompliance “constitutes making a statement with respect to the business of insurance which is misleading and which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known to be misleading, pursuant to Insurance Code section 790.03.” Insurance Associations argued that the Insurance Commissioner lacked authority to define new unfair business practices; questioned whether the record established a high volume of complaints and whether the problem was caused by lack of knowledge; and complained that the expense of compliance would discourage carriers from providing insurance. They obtained a declaration that the Regulation was invalid. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the Commissioner lacked authority under the Unfair Insurance Practices Act. View "Ass'n of Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Kaymark defaulted on a mortgage held by Bank of America (BOA). On behalf of BOA, Udren Law Offices initiated foreclosure proceedings. The body of the Foreclosure Complaint listed not-yet-incurred fees as due and owing, which, Kaymark alleged, violated state and federal fair debt collection laws and breached the mortgage contract. The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of claims that the disputed fees constituted actionable misrepresentation under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, but affirmed dismissal of all other claims. By attempting to collect fees for legal services not yet performed in the mortgage foreclosure, Udren violated FDCPA section 1692e(2)(A), (5), and (10), which imposes strict liability on debt collectors who “use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt,” and section 1692f(1) by attempting to collect “an[] amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” The court analogized to similar claims in a debt collection demand letter. View "Kaymark v. Bank of America NA" on Justia Law