Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

During Plaintiff’s marriage dissolution proceedings, Nancy Smith served as guardian ad litem for Plaintiff’s children. After Plaintiff stopped paying bills to Smith, Smith assigned the unpaid bills to Collection Professionals, Inc. (CPI). CPI filed a complaint to collect the debt. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action alleging, among other claims, that Collection Professionals, Inc. (CPI) violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by attempting to collect a false debt. CPI counterclaimed for the amount owed for Smith’s services. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of CPI and Smith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly awarded summary judgment to CPI on Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim because the FDCPA did not apply under the circumstances of this case; (2) correctly awarded summary judgment to Smith; and (3) correctly awarded CPI $7,408 in damages plus interest. View "Amour v. Collection Prof’ls, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against ISPC, alleging that ISPC violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1635, 1637, by failing to disclose examples of minimum payments and the maximum repayment period, as well as failing to properly delay performance to allow plaintiffs to rescind the contract. The court concluded that ISPC did not take the requisite interest in plaintiffs’ primary residence to trigger the TILA protections on which plaintiffs rely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Lankhorst v. Indep. Savings Plan Co." on Justia Law

Morgan Drexen was described as a "legal software and legal software development company" owned and operated by nonlawyers but provided paraprofessional and administrative support to attorneys. The company provided debt-management services nationwide in conjunction with contracting attorneys, known as "engagement counsel." Morgan Drexen referred to engagement counsel as its "clients" and paid them a minimal fee that passed through the engagement counsel's (or engagement law firm's) trust accounts. Parties Donald Moore and Lawrence Williamson, Jr. served as engagement counsel. Moore was a Colorado-licensed attorney, and Williamson was a Kansas attorney who represented Colorado clients by association with Moore. In 2011, Morgan Drexen applied in Colorado to be registered as a debt-management service provider under the Debt Management Services Act (DMSA). The DMSA Administrator denied the application and issued a cease-and-desist order instructing Morgan Drexen to stop providing its services to Colorado residents and collecting fees. Morgan Drexen, Moore and Williamson filed a complaint seeking a declaration that :(1) they did not provide debt-management services under the original DMSA; and (2) the amended DMSA was unconstitutional. In its review of Morgan Drexen's appeal, the Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in concluding that Morgan Drexen's services fell within the scope of the legal services exemption in the original DMSA. Further, the amended DMSA was constitutional. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Coffman v. Williamson" on Justia Law

Defendants challenged a district court order requiring that they add two statements to their cigarette packages and advertisements: an announcement that a federal court has ruled that they “deliberately deceived the American public” about the dangers of cigarettes; and a declaration that they “intentionally designed cigarettes” to maximize addiction. The court concluded that given its earlier decisions in this case, the manufacturers’ objection to disclosing that they intentionally designed cigarettes to ensure addiction is both waived and foreclosed by the law of the case. Those decisions make equally clear that the district court, in ordering defendants to announce that they deliberately deceived the public, exceeded its authority under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, to craft remedies that “prevent and restrain” future violations. 18 U.S.C. 1964(a). The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that defendants violated the Fair Debt Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e, 1692f, by charging and attempting to collect interest at a rate higher than permitted under the law of her home state and that defendants violated New York's usury law, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349; N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law 5-501; N.Y. Penal Law 190.40. The district court entered judgment in favor of defendants. The court reversed the district court's holding that the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 85, preempts plaintiff's claims because neither defendant is a national bank nor a subsidiary or agent of a national bank, or is otherwise acting on behalf of a national bank, and because application of the state law on which plaintiff's claim relies would not significantly interfere with any national bank’s ability to exercise its powers under the NBA. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded to the court to address in the first instance whether the Delaware choice-of-law precludes plaintiff's claims. Finally, the court also vacated the district court's denial of class certification. View "Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claims that she entered into a credit card purchase from defendants, which did not involve mail order, shipping or cash advances, but that she “was asked for personal identification information, in the form of her email address, by defendants’ employee attending to the transaction.” Plaintiff provided the requested personal identification information, which was entered into the electronic sales register at the checkout counter adjacent to both defendants’ employee and plaintiff.” The amended complaint alleged violation of the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, Civil Code 1747.08, which provides that: [N]o person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation that accepts credit cards for the transaction of business shall . . . request, or require as a condition to accepting the credit card as payment in full or in part for goods or services, the cardholder to provide personal identification information, which the person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation accepting the credit card writes, causes to be written, or otherwise records upon the credit card transaction form or otherwise.” The trial court declined to certify a class in plaintiff’s suit. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that does not prohibit the collection of personal identification information once a credit card transaction has been concluded. View "Harrold v. Levi Strauss & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against DHS, alleging twenty-one causes of action stemming from the Government's collection, maintenance, and use of information about him. The court affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss each claim except those brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that DHS is in possession of his full and specific credit card number, along with information regarding the type and issuer of the card. That plaintiff possesses a major credit card of a specific type and number bears on his mode of living for purposes of the definition of "consumer report" within the meaning of the Act. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's ruling that the Act's claims failed on the first prong of the definition of "consumer report" and remanded for further proceedings. View "Abdelfattah v. DHS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action suit against J.C. Christensen, alleging that J.C. Christensen violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, by offering to settle his debt for less than the full amount without warning him that his total savings might be reduced by an increase in his tax liability. The district court dismissed the suit. The court held that a debt collector need not warn of possible tax consequences when making a settlement offer for less than the full amount owed to comply with the FDCPA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Altman v. J.C. Christensen & Assoc." on Justia Law

After refinancing a home mortgage in 2007, Beukes, mailed a notice of rescission in 2010, which was rejected. Beukes stopped making payments. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), as nominee for the lender, published notices of a mortgage foreclosure sale. MERS ultimately purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Beukes sued, seeking rescission and damages under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635(a), claiming that the amount disclosed as the finance charge on the loan understated the amount they were actually charged by $944.31. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit held an appeal pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, (2015), then affirmed the dismissal. Because Beukes mailed notice within three years, the right of rescission had not expired, but the finance charge disclosed in 2007 did not vary from the actual finance charge by more than one-half of one percent of the total amount financed, so it must be treated as accurate. Therefore, the right to rescind expired three business days after delivery of the disclosures. Beukes did not timely attempt to exercise any expanded right to rescind arising from section 1635(i)(2) that might have been available after the initiation of foreclosure proceedings. View "Beukes v. GMAC Mortg., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a debt collector, alleging that by sending a collection letter that sought ten percent interest on a debt, defendant violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692(f)(1) and thereby violated California's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the Rosenthal Act), Cal. Civ. Code 1788-1788.33. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that defendant's debt collection letter did not violate the FDCPA or the Rosenthal Act where the district court's grant of summary judgment was based on an incorrect reading of California Civil Code section 3287. The court concluded that section 3287(a) can entitle a creditor to prejudgment interest on a debt that is certain or capable of being made certain even without a prior judgment. View "Diaz v. Kubler Corp." on Justia Law