Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

AstraZeneca, which sells a heartburn drug called Nexium, and three generic drug companies (“generic defendants”) that sought to market generic forms of Nexium, entered into settlement agreements in which the generic defendants agreed not to challenge the validity of the Nexium patents and to delay the launch of their generic products. Certain union health and welfare funds that reimburse plan members for prescription drugs (the named plaintiffs) alleged that the settlement agreements constituted unlawful agreements between Nexium and the generic defendants not to compete. Plaintiffs sought class certification for a class of third-party payors, such as the named plaintiffs, and individual consumers. The district court certified a class. Relevant to this appeal, the class included individual consumers who would have continued to purchase branded Nexium for the same price after generic entry. The First Circuit affirmed the class certification, holding (1) class certification is permissible even if the class includes a de minimis number of uninjured parties; (2) the number of uninjured class members in this case was not significant enough to justify denial of certification; and (3) only injured class members will recover. View "In re Nexium Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

McHughes Law Firm filed a lawsuit on behalf of Precision Analytics, Inc., McHughes’ client, against Lillie McMullen asserting that McMullen was responsible for a consumer debt incurred on a credit card issued to her ex-husband. After that lawsuit was dismissed, McMullen filed a complaint against McHughes, alleging that McHughes violated the Arkansas Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and that McHughes invaded her privacy and engaged in malicious prosecution while attempting to collect on the consumer debt owned by Precision. The circuit court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that McMullen’s complaint failed to meet the pleading requirements of Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) and that McMullen failed to allege facts to establish various elements of her state-law claims. View "McMullen v. McHughes Law Firm" on Justia Law

Lewis filed a putative class action complaint for damages for violation of the Credit Card Act, Civ. Code, 1747, alleging that he purchased an alcoholic beverage, using a credit card for the purchase. The clerk requested personal identification information in the form of Lewis’s birth date. Lewis believed he was required to provide that information. The clerk entered Lewis’s birth date into the computerized cash register. Although the store was required by Business and Professions Code section 25660 to verify that a purchaser of alcohol is not under the age of 21, there is no legal requirement that the information be recorded. Most retailers selling alcoholic beverages do not record date of birth information. The store was not contractually obligated to provide personal identifying information in order to complete a credit card transaction. The trial court dismissed and the court of appeal affirmed, acknowledging that the Act prohibits requesting or requiring a purchaser to write any personal identifying information on the credit card transaction form “or otherwise,” and requesting or requiring a purchaser to provide personal identifying information which is recorded upon the credit card transaction form “or otherwise.” The prohibitions do not apply to purchases of alcoholic beverages. View "Lewis v. Jinon Corp." on Justia Law

Exactly three years after borrowing money to refinance their home mortgage, the Jesinoskis sent the lender a letter purporting to rescind the transaction. The lender replied, refusing to acknowledge the rescission’s validity. One year and one day later, the Jesinoskis filed suit, seeking a declaration of rescission and damages. The district court entered judgment on the pleadings, concluding that a borrower can exercise the Truth in Lending Act’s right to rescind, 15 U. S. C.1635(a), (f), only by filing a lawsuit within three years of the date the loan was consummated. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The unanimous Supreme Court reversed. A borrower exercising his right to rescind under the Act need only provide written notice to his lender within the 3-year period, not file suit within that period. Section 1635(a)’s language: a borrower “shall have the right to rescind . . . by notifying the creditor . . . of his intention to do so,” indicates that rescission is effected when the borrower notifies the creditor of his intention. The statute says nothing about how that right is exercised and does not state that rescission is necessarily a consequence of judicial action. View "Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

CMS collects consumer debts, subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6). CMS commences consumer state-court collection actions by filing standard-form complaints that allege, that “more than 90 days have elapsed since the presentation of this claim” to the consumer and seek prejudgment interest and attorney fees “as allowable by law.” When named plaintiffs contested CMS’s complaints, CMS served nearly identical discovery requests seeking disclosure of detailed employment and financial information. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against CMS and in-house CMS attorneys, claiming that CMS’s standard-form pleadings violate the FDCPA and the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act. In certifying four classes, the district court agreed that the predominant common question was whether the defendants sent each class member standard collection complaints and discovery requests, which violate the FDCPA and NCPA. The four classes consist of persons who received a county court collection complaint or discovery requests seeking to collect a debt “for personal, family, or household purposes,” or had such a collection action pending during the applicable limitations periods. The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the court failed to conduct the “rigorous analysis . . . of what the parties must prove” that FRCP 23 requires. View "Powers v. Credit Mgmt. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

LVNV buys uncollectable debts at a discount and pays Northland Group to collect them. LVNV purchased a debt of Buchanan’s and assigned it to Northland for collection. Northland sent Buchanan a letter, proposing to “settle” the balance of $4,768.43 for a payment of $1,668.96. The letter did not disclose that the Michigan six-year statute of limitations had run on the debt or that a partial payment on a time-barred debt restarts the statute-of-limitations clock under Michigan law. Buchanan alleged that the letter falsely implied that Northland held a legally enforceable obligation. Buchanan filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692–1692p.The district court rejected Buchanan’s discovery request and dismissed, concluding that Northland’s letter was not misleading as a matter of law. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the term “settlement” is one of “equivocal meaning” and that an unsophisticated debtor who cannot afford the settlement offer might nevertheless assume from the letter that some payment is better than no payment. View "Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Experian under the Fair Crediting Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681i(a), alleging that Experian negligently and willfully violated its duty under the Act to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of disputed information contained in his credit file. At issue was whether an allegation of a violation of section 1681i(a) requires the consumer reporting agency to have disclosed the consumer's credit report to a third party in order for a consumer to recover actual damages. The court concluded that, looking to the plain language of the Act, a consumer's credit report need not be published to a third party in order to entitle the consumer to actual damages under section 1681i(a). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's conclusion otherwise. View "Collins v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

When Appellant, a resident of the Pondview Condominiums, did not pay his condominium fees on time, the condominium trustees hired law firm Marcus, Errico, Emmer and Brooks, P.C. (“MEEB”) to collect Appellant’s debt. MEEB filed nine collection actions in Massachusetts state court against Appellant and prevailed in two of them. Displeased with MEEB’s collection activities, Appellant sued MEEB in federal district court, alleging violations of federal and state law. The magistrate judge concluded that MEEB committed numerous violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and that the FDCPA violations constituted “per se” violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Upon reconsideration, the magistrate judge reversed in part, finding MEEB not liable under Chapter 93A. The First Circuit reversed the magistrate judge’s determination that MEEB was not liable under Chapter 93A, holding that MEEB’s violations of the FDCPA constituted per se Chapter 93A violations by virtue of the unambiguous statutory language in the FDCPA and the Federal Trade Commission Act. View "McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks" on Justia Law

A jury found that PlastiPure and CertiChem violated the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), by making false statements of facts about Eastman's plastic resin product called Tritan. The district court entered an injunction against both companies and the companies appealed, challenging the jury verdict and the injunction. The court held that the Act prohibits false commercial speech even when that speech makes scientific claims. The court rejected the companies' contention that the district court should not have entered its injunction because the companies' statements about Tritan containing estrogenic activity (EA) from BPA are not actionable statements under the Act. The court concluded that application of the Act to the companies’ promotional statements will not stifle academic freedom or intrude on First Amendment values; the injunction only applies to statements made “in connection with any advertising, promotion, offering for sale, or sale of goods or services;" the companies may continue to pursue their research and publish their results; and the companies may not push their product by making the claims the jury found to be false and misleading. The court rejected the companies' argument that the jury's verdict must be reversed where a reasonable jury could have concluded that the companies' statements were false and misleading. The court rejected the companies' claims of error in the jury instructions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Eastman Chemical Co. v. PlastiPure, Inc." on Justia Law

The respondents, Shared Towers VA, LLC and NH Note Investment, LLC, appealed, and petitioner Joseph Turner, individually and as trustee of the Routes 3 and 25 Nominee Trust, cross-appealed, Superior Court orders after a bench trial on petitioner’s petition for a preliminary injunction enjoining a foreclosure sale and for damages and reasonable attorney’s fees. The parties’ dispute stemmed from a commercial construction loan agreement and promissory note secured by a mortgage, pursuant to which petitioner was loaned $450,000 at 13% interest per annum to build a home. Respondents argued the trial court erred when it: (1) determined that they would be unjustly enriched if the court required the petitioner to pay the amounts he owed under the note from November 2009 until April 2011; (2) applied the petitioner’s $450,000 lump sum payment to principal; (3) excluded evidence of the petitioner’s experience with similar loans; (4) ruled that, because the promissory note failed to contain a "clear statement in writing" of the charges owed, as required by RSA 399-B:2 (2006), respondents could not collect a $22,500 delinquency charge on the petitioner’s lump sum payment of principal; and (5) denied the respondents’ request for attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner argued that the trial court erroneously concluded that respondents’ actions did not violate the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded: contrary to the trial court’s decision, petitioner’s obligation to make the payments was not tolled. Because the loan agreement and note remained viable, it was error for the trial court to have afforded the petitioner a remedy under an unjust enrichment theory. The trial court made its decision with regard to the payment of $450,000 in connection with its conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to a remedy under an unjust enrichment theory. Because the Supreme Court could not determine how the trial court would have ruled upon this issue had it not considered relief under that equitable theory, and because, given the nature of the parties’ arguments, resolving this issue requires fact finding that must be done by the trial court in the first instance, it vacated that part of its order and remanded for further proceedings. In light of the trial court’s errors with regard to the attorney’s fees and costs claimed by respondents, the Supreme Court vacated the order denying them, and remanded for consideration of respondents’ request for fees and costs. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s rejection of petitioner’s CPA claim. View "Turner v. Shared Towers VA, LLC" on Justia Law