Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a proposed class action in Florida state court against BLP, alleging that BLP sent unsolicited faxes in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), and its implementing regulations. BLP removed to federal court and BLP served each named plaintiff an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. BLP then moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the unaccepted Rule 68 offers rendered the case moot. The court concluded that a plaintiff's individual claim is not mooted by an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment, and a proffer that moots a named plaintiff's individual claim does not moot a class action in circumstances like those presented in this case, even if the proffer comes before the plaintiff has moved to certify the class. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the action. View "Jeffrey M. Stein D.D.S., et al. v. Buccaneers Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

JM Leasing purchased a brand‐new semi‐truck from PACCAR in 2007. Approximately four years and 3,000 miles later, JM concluded that the truck was a lemon and sought a refund from PACCAR under Wisconsin’s Lemon Law, Wis. Stat. 218.0171.1 PACCAR agreed to refund the purchase price, but a dispute arose over reimbursement of a $53.00 title fee and escalated into a debate over the “reasonable allowance for use” to which PACCAR was entitled . Ultimately JM won an interest‐bearing judgment of $369,196.06, plus $157,697.25 in attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting PACCAR’s claims that it complied with all relevant provisions of the Lemon Law and that the district court erred in calculating pecuniary loss. View "James Michael Leasing Co. v. Paccar, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Inc., alleging that Quicken committed common law fraud and violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act in connection with a loan agreement between Plaintiff and Quicken. The circuit court found in favor of Plaintiff on all but one of her claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that the circuit court improperly cancelled Plaintiff’s obligation to repay the loan principal, failed to support its punitive damages award with the correct analysis, and failed to offset the compensatory damages award against Plaintiff’s pretrial settlement with defendants who did not proceed to trial. After remand, the circuit court entered an opinion and order. The Supreme Court again reversed, holding that the circuit court (1) improperly created a lien on Plaintiff’s property; (2) erred in increasing the compensatory damages award to Plaintiff; (3) erred in awarding attorney fees and costs for both the first appellate proceeding and the post-appellate proceedings; (4) improperly increased the punitive damages award; and (5) erred in refusing to offset Plaintiff’s award of attorney fees and costs by a pretrial settlement between Plaintiff and the codefendants. Remanded. View "Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendants manufacture vitamins and nutritional supplements, including glucosamine pills, designed to help people with joint disorders, such as osteoarthritis. Several class action suits were filed under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2), claiming violations of states’ consumer protection laws by making false claims. Eight months later, class counsel negotiated a nationwide settlement that was approved with significant modifications. The settlement requires Rexall to pay $1.93 million in fees to class counsel, plus $179,676 in expenses, $1.5 million in notice and administration costs, $1.13 million to the Orthopedic Research and Education Foundation, $865,284 to the 30,245 class members who submitted claims, and $30,000 to the six named plaintiffs ($5,000 apiece) Class members, led by the Center for Class Action Fairness, objected. The Seventh Circuit reversed, characterizing the settlement as “a selfish deal between class counsel and the defendant.” While most consumers of glucosamine pills are elderly and bought the product in containers with labels that recite the misrepresentations, only one-fourth of one percent of them will receive even modest compensation; for a limited period the labels will be changed, in trivial respects. The court questioned: “for conferring these meager benefits class counsel should receive almost $2 million?” View "Pearson v. NBTY, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, Subodh Raysoni raised consumer fraud claims under the Fair Business Practices Act of 1975 against Payless Auto Deals, LLC, alleging that Payless gave false assurances that a used minivan never had been in a collision or otherwise damaged - assurances upon which he relied - when he purchased the minivan from Payless. Contending that the terms of their written contract rendered any such reliance unreasonable as a matter of law, Payless moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted that motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Payless relied on several provisions of the contract disclaiming warranties, but the Supreme Court held that its reliance was misplaced because these disclaimers were not absolute and unequivocal enough to warrant judgment on the pleadings: "We cannot say as a matter of law that the contractual disclaimers of warranties - which are, at least arguably, equivocal and limited - preclude any reasonable reliance in this case on a written Carfax report furnished by Payless. We do not mean to suggest that the provisions of the contract upon which Payless relies would not have been most reasonably understood by a customer just as Payless argues. On these pleadings, we cannot say as a matter of law that Raysoni will be unable to show that his reliance on representations that the minivan was undamaged and never had been in a wreck - particularly the written Carfax report - was reasonable." Judgment on the pleadings ought not have been awarded to Payless. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Raysoni v. Payless Auto Deals, LLC" on Justia Law

With the threat of foreclosure looming on his home, Plaintiff sued Bank for failing to consider him for a mortgage loan modification, which a California class action settlement agreement required Bank to do before attempting to foreclose on Plaintiff’s home. The complaint alleged breach of contract, violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, 35A and 35B, violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The First Circuit vacated in part and remanded Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, holding (1) Plaintiff’s statutory causes of action fell short of stating a cognizable claim; but (2) the district court improperly converted Bank’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s contract-based claims into a motion for summary judgment, warranting a remand of those claims. View "Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Check City filed a complaint for declaratory relief seeking clarification of Nev. Rev. Stat. 604A.425, which limits the amount of a deferred deposit loan to twenty-five-percent of a borrower’s expected gross monthly income. At issue was whether the twenty-five-percent cap includes only the principal borrowed or the principal amount plus any interest or fees charged. The district court granted Check City’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the cap only applied to the principal borrowed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 604A.425’s twenty-five-percent cap on deferred deposit loans includes both the principal amount loaned and any interest or fees charged; (2) section 604A.050 defines the phrase “deferred deposit loan” to include principal, interest, and fees; and (3) neither statute is ambiguous. View "State, Dep’t of Bus. & Indus. v. Check City P’ship, LLC" on Justia Law

Property Owners filed a lawsuit against a Mortgage Company, claiming that, by preparing deeds of trust and promissory notes for the Property Owners, the Mortgage Company (1) violated Mo. Rev. Stat. 484.010.2 and 484.020 by engaging in the "law business"; (2) committed an unlawful practice in violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act; and (3) was unjustly enriched because it charged for services it did not perform or did not perform lawfully. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Mortgage Company. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Property Owners did not dispute that the Mortgage Company did not charge a separate fee or vary its customary charges for preparation of legal documents, there were no disputed material facts, entitling the Mortgage Company to summary judgment as a matter of law. View "Binkley v. Am. Equity Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Brett Woods and Kathleen Valdes were state employees and representatives of a class of New Mexico state and local government employees who alleged they paid for insurance coverage through payroll deductions and premiums pursuant to a policy issued by Standard Insurance Company (Standard), but did not receive the coverage for which they paid and, in some cases, were denied coverage entirely. Plaintiffs filed suit in New Mexico state court against three defendants: Standard, an Oregon company that agreed to provide the subject insurance coverage; the Risk Management Division of the New Mexico General Services Department (the Division), the state agency that contracted with Standard and was responsible for administering benefits under the policy; and Standard employee Martha Quintana, who Plaintiffs allege was responsible for managing the Division’s account with Standard and for providing account management and customer service to the Division and state employees. Plaintiffs' ninety-one-paragraph complaint, stated causes of action against Standard and the Division for breach of contract and unjust enrichment; against Standard for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and Unfair Practices Act violations; and against Standard and Ms. Quintana for breach of the New Mexico Trade Practices and Fraud Act. The issue this appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether remand to the state court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) was required under either of two CAFA provisions: the state action provision, which excludes from federal jurisdiction cases in which the primary defendants are states; or the local controversy exception, which requires federal courts to decline jurisdiction where, among other things, there is a local defendant whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by plaintiffs and from whom plaintiffs seek significant relief. The Court concluded that neither provision provided a basis for remand, and therefore reversed the decision of the magistrate judge remanding the case to state court. But because the Tenth Circuit could not determine whether Defendants have established the amount in controversy required to confer federal jurisdiction, the case was remanded to the district court for the resolution of that issue. View "Woods v. Standard Insurance Co." on Justia Law

IntelliGender sold and advertised the IntelliGender Prediction Test as an accurate predictor of a fetus's gender using the mother's urine sample. The district court approved a Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), settlement between a nationwide certified class of purchasers of the Test and IntelliGender. The State subsequently filed an enforcement action against IntelliGender under the State's Unfair Competition and False Advertising Laws, largely based on the same claims as the class action. The court concluded that the district court correctly denied IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's enforcement action in its entirety where IntelliGender had not met its burden of showing that the CAFA class action settlement could bind the State in its sovereign capacity, where it asserted both public and private interests. The court agreed that a CAFA class action settlement, though approved by the district court, does not act as res judicata against the State in its sovereign capacity, even though many of the same claims are included in both actions. Because the State action is brought on behalf of the people, it implicates the public's interests as well as private interests, and therefore the remedial provisions sweep much more broadly. The court concluded, however, that the State is precluded from seeking the same relief sought in the CAFA class action where IntelliGender provided notice to the appropriate parties of the class action and the State chose not to participate. Therefore, the district court erred in denying IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's claims for restitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "State of California v. IntelliGender" on Justia Law