Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

CMS collects consumer debts, subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6). CMS commences consumer state-court collection actions by filing standard-form complaints that allege, that “more than 90 days have elapsed since the presentation of this claim” to the consumer and seek prejudgment interest and attorney fees “as allowable by law.” When named plaintiffs contested CMS’s complaints, CMS served nearly identical discovery requests seeking disclosure of detailed employment and financial information. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against CMS and in-house CMS attorneys, claiming that CMS’s standard-form pleadings violate the FDCPA and the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act. In certifying four classes, the district court agreed that the predominant common question was whether the defendants sent each class member standard collection complaints and discovery requests, which violate the FDCPA and NCPA. The four classes consist of persons who received a county court collection complaint or discovery requests seeking to collect a debt “for personal, family, or household purposes,” or had such a collection action pending during the applicable limitations periods. The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the court failed to conduct the “rigorous analysis . . . of what the parties must prove” that FRCP 23 requires. View "Powers v. Credit Mgmt. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

LVNV buys uncollectable debts at a discount and pays Northland Group to collect them. LVNV purchased a debt of Buchanan’s and assigned it to Northland for collection. Northland sent Buchanan a letter, proposing to “settle” the balance of $4,768.43 for a payment of $1,668.96. The letter did not disclose that the Michigan six-year statute of limitations had run on the debt or that a partial payment on a time-barred debt restarts the statute-of-limitations clock under Michigan law. Buchanan alleged that the letter falsely implied that Northland held a legally enforceable obligation. Buchanan filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692–1692p.The district court rejected Buchanan’s discovery request and dismissed, concluding that Northland’s letter was not misleading as a matter of law. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the term “settlement” is one of “equivocal meaning” and that an unsophisticated debtor who cannot afford the settlement offer might nevertheless assume from the letter that some payment is better than no payment. View "Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Experian under the Fair Crediting Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681i(a), alleging that Experian negligently and willfully violated its duty under the Act to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of disputed information contained in his credit file. At issue was whether an allegation of a violation of section 1681i(a) requires the consumer reporting agency to have disclosed the consumer's credit report to a third party in order for a consumer to recover actual damages. The court concluded that, looking to the plain language of the Act, a consumer's credit report need not be published to a third party in order to entitle the consumer to actual damages under section 1681i(a). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's conclusion otherwise. View "Collins v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

When Appellant, a resident of the Pondview Condominiums, did not pay his condominium fees on time, the condominium trustees hired law firm Marcus, Errico, Emmer and Brooks, P.C. (“MEEB”) to collect Appellant’s debt. MEEB filed nine collection actions in Massachusetts state court against Appellant and prevailed in two of them. Displeased with MEEB’s collection activities, Appellant sued MEEB in federal district court, alleging violations of federal and state law. The magistrate judge concluded that MEEB committed numerous violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and that the FDCPA violations constituted “per se” violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Upon reconsideration, the magistrate judge reversed in part, finding MEEB not liable under Chapter 93A. The First Circuit reversed the magistrate judge’s determination that MEEB was not liable under Chapter 93A, holding that MEEB’s violations of the FDCPA constituted per se Chapter 93A violations by virtue of the unambiguous statutory language in the FDCPA and the Federal Trade Commission Act. View "McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks" on Justia Law

A jury found that PlastiPure and CertiChem violated the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), by making false statements of facts about Eastman's plastic resin product called Tritan. The district court entered an injunction against both companies and the companies appealed, challenging the jury verdict and the injunction. The court held that the Act prohibits false commercial speech even when that speech makes scientific claims. The court rejected the companies' contention that the district court should not have entered its injunction because the companies' statements about Tritan containing estrogenic activity (EA) from BPA are not actionable statements under the Act. The court concluded that application of the Act to the companies’ promotional statements will not stifle academic freedom or intrude on First Amendment values; the injunction only applies to statements made “in connection with any advertising, promotion, offering for sale, or sale of goods or services;" the companies may continue to pursue their research and publish their results; and the companies may not push their product by making the claims the jury found to be false and misleading. The court rejected the companies' argument that the jury's verdict must be reversed where a reasonable jury could have concluded that the companies' statements were false and misleading. The court rejected the companies' claims of error in the jury instructions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Eastman Chemical Co. v. PlastiPure, Inc." on Justia Law

The respondents, Shared Towers VA, LLC and NH Note Investment, LLC, appealed, and petitioner Joseph Turner, individually and as trustee of the Routes 3 and 25 Nominee Trust, cross-appealed, Superior Court orders after a bench trial on petitioner’s petition for a preliminary injunction enjoining a foreclosure sale and for damages and reasonable attorney’s fees. The parties’ dispute stemmed from a commercial construction loan agreement and promissory note secured by a mortgage, pursuant to which petitioner was loaned $450,000 at 13% interest per annum to build a home. Respondents argued the trial court erred when it: (1) determined that they would be unjustly enriched if the court required the petitioner to pay the amounts he owed under the note from November 2009 until April 2011; (2) applied the petitioner’s $450,000 lump sum payment to principal; (3) excluded evidence of the petitioner’s experience with similar loans; (4) ruled that, because the promissory note failed to contain a "clear statement in writing" of the charges owed, as required by RSA 399-B:2 (2006), respondents could not collect a $22,500 delinquency charge on the petitioner’s lump sum payment of principal; and (5) denied the respondents’ request for attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner argued that the trial court erroneously concluded that respondents’ actions did not violate the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded: contrary to the trial court’s decision, petitioner’s obligation to make the payments was not tolled. Because the loan agreement and note remained viable, it was error for the trial court to have afforded the petitioner a remedy under an unjust enrichment theory. The trial court made its decision with regard to the payment of $450,000 in connection with its conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to a remedy under an unjust enrichment theory. Because the Supreme Court could not determine how the trial court would have ruled upon this issue had it not considered relief under that equitable theory, and because, given the nature of the parties’ arguments, resolving this issue requires fact finding that must be done by the trial court in the first instance, it vacated that part of its order and remanded for further proceedings. In light of the trial court’s errors with regard to the attorney’s fees and costs claimed by respondents, the Supreme Court vacated the order denying them, and remanded for consideration of respondents’ request for fees and costs. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s rejection of petitioner’s CPA claim. View "Turner v. Shared Towers VA, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Sharon McGill sued defendant-appellant Citibank, N.A. for unfair competition and false advertising in offering a credit insurance plan she purchased to protect her Citibank credit card account. She brought claims under California’s unfair competition law (UCL), false advertising law (FAL), and Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), seeking monetary damages, restitution, and injunctive relief to prevent Citibank from engaging in its allegedly unlawful and deceptive business practices. Citibank petitioned to compel McGill to arbitrate her claims based on an arbitration provision in her account agreement. The trial court granted the petition on McGill’s claims for monetary damages and restitution, but denied the petition on the injunctive relief claims. Citibank appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to order all of McGill’s claims to arbitration. View "McGill v. Citibank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Palisades, alleging violations of two provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e and 1692f, and related statutes. Plaintiff, a credit card debtor, claimed that after Palisades purportedly purchased a judgment that had been entered against her in state court, it filed an Assignment of Judgment in the action that falsely represented its ownership of the judgment and misrepresented the amount she owed. The court concluded that the filing of an assignment of judgment in a debt collection act qualifies as debt collection activity that triggers the protections of the FDCPA; that the Assignment of Judgment that Palisades filed against plaintiff did not falsey claim Palisades' ownership of the judgment; and that the misrepresentations in the Assignment of Judgment as to the amount of the judgment and the amount of plaintiff's payments on the judgment were material. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment entered on plaintiff's FDCPA claim under section 1692e and remanded the claim. The court vacated the court's conditional ruling that the errors made in the Assignment of Judgment did not provide a basis for the "bona fide error defense" found in section 1692k(c). Finally, the court affirmed the judgment entered on plaintiff's section 1692f claim and her state-law claims. View "Powell v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC" on Justia Law

SEB distributes household products under several brand names, including electric steam irons sold under the Rowenta brand name. Euro-Pro distributes household appliances under the Shark brand name. The Shark packaging states: “MORE POWERFUL STEAM vs. Rowenta®†† at half the price.” The “††”refers to a fine-print footnote on the package’s bottom, stating that the claim is “††[b]ased on independent comparative steam burst testing to Rowenta DW5080 (grams/shot).” The packaging also asserts “#1 MOST POWERFUL STEAM*” with a fine-print reference on the bottom stating it “*[o]ffers more grams per minute (maximum steam setting while bursting before water spots appear) when compared to leading competition in the same price range, at time of printing.” SEB directed its internal laboratory to conduct tests, which showed that the Rowenta performed the same as the Shark. SEB commissioned an independent laboratory to conduct tests, which showed that the Rowenta outperformed the Shark. SEB claimed false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and unfair competition under Pennsylvania common law. The Third Circuit affirmed entry of an injunction, agreeing that the packaging’s definition of a claim term applies to the claim’s explicit message and that the court properly disregarded consumer survey evidence offering alternative meanings. View "Groupe SEB USA Inc v. Euro Pro Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Joyce Flannery sued defendant-respondent VW Credit, Inc. (VW), alleging VW failed to comply with provisions of California's Vehicle Leasing Act (VLA), California's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and California's Unfair Competition Law. VW filed a demurrer to the complaint, which the trial court sustained without leave to amend. On appeal, Flannery argued the court erred by applying the doctrine of substantial compliance to consumer protection laws. VW has moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The Court of Appeal denied the motion to dismiss and reversed the dismissal. Following the trial court's ruling on its demurrer, VW sought and received entry of an order dismissing the complaint again, and provided Flannery with notice of entry of the order. However, before the time in which to appeal from the dismissal expired, VW asked the trial court to vacate the dismissal and enter a new dismissal that included VW's costs. The trial court granted VW's request and entered an order vacating the first dismissal and ordering entry of a second dismissal, which included VW's costs. VW then served Flannery with notice of entry of the second dismissal. Thereafter, Flannery filed a notice of appeal from the second dismissal. VW argued that the notice of appeal was untimely because it was not filed within 60 days after service of notice of entry of the first dismissal; VW contends that, notwithstanding the literal meaning of the trial court's order vacating the first dismissal, the Court of Appeal should interpret the order as simply amending the first judgment to add VW's costs and thereby render Flannery's notice of appeal untimely. The Court interpreted the trial court's order literall: the first dismissal was vacated by the terms of the trial court's order, and a second dismissal was entered from which Flannery filed a timely notice of appeal. With respect to the merits, the Court reversed: "[a]lthough the doctrine of substantial compliance has been employed when doing so avoids injustice and is consistent with the purposes of a particular statute, those considerations are not present here, where VW failed to provide consumers with notice of their right to an appraisal upon early termination of their automobile leases in the language prescribed by Civil Code section 2987." The Court did not reach the question of whether VW's alleged violation of the VLA would support any relief under provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Act and the Unfair Competition Law. View "Flannery v. VW Credit" on Justia Law