Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking statutory damages under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1640(a)(2)(A), claiming that Buy Direct (dba Direct Buy) failed to provide the dates that payments would be due on an installment contract for membership in Direct Buy's wholesale membership club. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Direct Buy, concluding that Direct Buy failed to make the required disclosures to plaintiffs, who therefore were entitled to damages. View "Lea, et al. v. Buy Direct, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Greg Chandler’s Frame & Body LLC operated an automobile body shop and was one of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company’s Total Liberty Care Shops. The Attorney General (Respondent) filed a complaint alleging that Liberty Mutual and Chandler (together, Petitioners) violated the West Virginia Automotive Crash Parts Act by requiring the use of and using salvage/recycled OEM crash parts when negotiating and preparing estimates for repairs to vehicles and that Petitioners failed to disclose this practice to consumers. The circuit court granted Respondent’s motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined Liberty Mutual and Chandler from the practice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that the Crash Parts Act applies to salvage/recycled OEM crash parts.View "Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morrisey" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against West Virginia-American Water Company (Respondent) seeking damages and penalties for alleged violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA) regarding Respondent’s business policies and practices regarding leaks in Petitioner’s water line. The circuit court granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss, finding that Petitioner's claims arose from transactions encompassed by W. Va. Code 46A-1-105(a)(3) and thus were statutorily excluded from the WVCCPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 46A-1-105(a)(3) applied to exclude Petitioner's WVCCPA claims, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in dismissing Petitioner's complaint.View "Holt v. W. Va. Am. Water Co." on Justia Law

Appellant, a registered lender under the Mortgage Loan Act (MLA), and Appellee executed a customer agreement for a single-installment, $500 loan governed by the MLA. Appellee later defaulted on his loan. Appellant filed this action to recover on its loan to Appellee, seeking the unpaid principal balance on the loan along with interest and fees permitted by the MLA. A magistrate judge determined that Appellee’s loan was impermissible under the MLA and that the loan should be governed by the Short-Term Lender Act (STLA). The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the MLA does not authorize single-installment, interest-bearing loans and that the STLA prohibits MLA registrants from making single-installment loans of short duration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an “interest-bearing loan,” as defined by the MLA, may include a loan requiring repayment in a single installment; (2) Lenders registered under the MLA may make single-installment, interest-bearing loans, and the STLA does not limit the authority of lenders registered under the MLA to make any loans authorized by the MLA; and (3) Appellant’s loan to Appellee was an interest-bearing loan as defined under the MLA.View "Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a new vehicle from Dealer that was subject to Manufacturer’s limited warranty. Plaintiff later filed a complaint against Manufacturer and Dealer (together, Defendants), alleging that the vehicle was defective and that Defendants failed to repair or remedy the defects under the warranty. Dealer demanded that Manufacturer reimburse Dealer for the attorney’s fees it incurred in defending against Plaintiff’s claims and indemnification for and liability incurred. Plaintiffs claims against Defendants were disposed of through summary judgment and voluntary dismissal. The judge also found that Dealer was not entitled to indemnificationt. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff’s allegations alleged the fault or negligence of both Manufacturer and Dealer, Manufacturer did not have a duty to defend under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93B, 8(a).View "Ferreira v. Chrysler Group LLC" on Justia Law

Trump Tower Chicago is a 92-story building with 486 residential condominium units, 339 hotel condominium units, retail space, a health club, ballrooms, meeting rooms, restaurants, a hair salon, and other facilities. When the owner of a hotel condominium unit is not occupying the unit, building management can rent it to a visitor; rental income is divided with the owner’s share credited against his annual maintenance fee. Plaintiff, an 80-year-old CPA and financial planner, agreed to buy two hotel condominium units in 2006 for $2.2 million. She bought them as an investment and already owned other investment condominium units, including a residential unit in Trump Tower Chicago. The agreement gave TrumpOrg “the right, in its sole and absolute discretion, to modify the Condominium Documents.” Plaintiff asked TrumpOrg to give her the right to terminate the agreement and get her deposit back if she disapproved of any such changes. TrumpOrg refused. Plaintiff signed the agreement, even though TrumpOrg had already made three changes. The next year, TrumpOrg made changes that greatly curtailed owners’ rights in the hotel facilities. Plaintiff refused to close. TrumpOrg did not seek to compel her to close, but did not return her down payment, $516,000 and canceled the purchase agreement. Plaintiff sought damages under the common law of contracts, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, the Condominium Property Act, and Illinois Securities Law. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Goldberg v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, L.L.C., " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of a putative class action alleging violations of California's Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, Cal. Civ. Code 1747.08. The Act prohibits retailers from collecting personal identification information in connection with credit card transactions. Plaintiffs alleged that Redbox violated the Act by imposing that customers using credit cards provide their ZIP codes to obtain discs from Redbox kiosks. The court concluded that Redbox's alleged conduct does not violate the Act where the statute exempts certain transactions, including those where "the credit card is being used as a deposit to secure payment in the event of default, loss, damage, or similar occurrence." Accordingly, the court dismissed the action.View "Sinibaldi v. Redbox" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff purchased a used yacht, the yacht’s starboard engine failed beyond repair. Plaintiff sued Defendant-manufacturer, alleging several causes of action, including breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The jury found Defendant liable only on the implied warranty claim. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Plaintiff was a subsequent purchaser of the used yacht and because Defendant disclaimed any implied warranty at the time of the first sale. The court of appeals reversed, holding that someone who knowingly buys used goods may still rely on an implied warranty from the manufacturer to the original buyer since the warranty passes with the goods. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant could not rely on its purported express disclaimer of implied warranties issued at the first sale because it did not properly raise that defense in the trial court; (2) an implied warranty of merchantability, unless properly disclaimed, passes to subsequent buyers; and (3) therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to recover on his implied-warranty claim.View "MAN Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her minor child, filed suit alleging that Wells Fargo violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991's (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), prohibition on autodialing cell phones without the express consent of the called party. Wells Fargo had called the cell phone number used by the child to collect a debt from a former customer who had listed the phone number on a Wells Fargo account application. Wells Fargo was unaware that the cell phone number was no longer assigned to the former customer and the former customer never revoked his consent or requested that Wells Fargo cease calling the number. The court concluded that "called party," for purposes of section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) means the subscriber to the cell phone service or user of the cell phone called. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in plaintiff's favor.View "Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

StreetEasy filed suit under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(d). This appeal arose out of the attempted resolution of a dispute between a real estate listing website and one of its co-founders over the propriety of actions taken by the co-founder when he separated from the company, and the validity of corporate actions that occurred before his departure. Because the order of dismissal failed to retain jurisdiction over enforcement of the parties' settlement agreement, or to incorporate the terms of that agreement, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's orders enforcing the settlement agreement and holding defendant in contempt for noncompliance. Because defendant was properly sanctioned for only one of the three factual contentions identified by the district court as the basis for its sanctions award, the court vacated that award and remanded the matter for reconsideration of the appropriate amount of monetary sanctions in light of this decision.View "StreetEasy, Inc. v. Chertok" on Justia Law