Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application to determine whether a plaintiff had a private right of action for damages against a health care provider under the Health Care and Consumer Billing and Disclosure Protection Act. Plaintiff Yana Anderson alleged that she was injured in an automobile accident caused by a third party. She received medical treatment at an Ochsner facility. Anderson was insured by UnitedHealthcare. Pursuant to her insurance contract, Anderson paid premiums to UnitedHealthcare in exchange for discounted health care rates. These reduced rates were available pursuant to a member provider agreement, wherein UnitedHealthcare contracted with Ochsner to secure discounted charges for its insureds. Anderson presented proof of insurance to Ochsner in order for her claims to be submitted to UnitedHealthcare for payment on the agreed upon reduced rate. However, Ochsner refused to file a claim with her insurer. Instead, Ochsner sent a letter to Anderson’s attorney, asserting a medical lien for the full amount of undiscounted charges on any tort recovery Anderson received for the underlying automobile accident. Anderson filed a putative class action against Ochsner, seeking, among other things, damages arising from Ochsner’s billing practices. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the legislature intended to allow a private right of action under the statute. Additionally, the Court found an express right of action was available under La. R.S. 22:1874(B) based on the assertion of a medical lien. View "Anderson v. Ochsner Health System" on Justia Law

The funds filed suit alleging that, among other things, the pharmacies engaged in fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive practices in connection with the sale of merchandise by failing to pass on the funds the entire difference between the acquisition cost of the generic prescription drug dispensed and its brand name equivalent as required by Minn. Stat. 151.121, subd. 4. The district court granted the pharmacies's Rule 12 motion to dismiss the complaint. The court held that section 151.21, subd. 4 does not create a private cause of action in favor of union-sponsored health and welfare benefit funds against pharmacies for failing to pass on the difference between the acquisition cost of brand name drugs and substituted generic prescription drugs; an omission-based consumer fraud claim is actionable under Minn. Stat. 325F.69, subd. 1 when special circumstances exist that trigger a legal or equitable duty to disclose the omitted facts; the amended complaint did not allege facts that would trigger a legal or equitable duty for the pharmacies to disclose prescription-drug acquisition costs; and, therefore, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Minn. Stat. 325F.69, subd. 1. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.View "Graphic Communications Local 1B, et al. v. CVS Caremark Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Nicholas Long and Julianne Ricci, purchased Dell computers in late 2000. In 2003, Plaintiffs filed this putative class action lawsuit alleging that Dell violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DPTA) and was negligent in charging Plaintiffs sales tax on nontaxable services purchased in conjunction with the computers. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Dell. The case remained pending for more than ten years. Here, the Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the negligence count and on the request for injunctive relief by Long; (2) vacated the grant of summary judgment on the DTPA count by Ricci; and (3) affirmed the superior court’s grant of Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the tax administrator’s affirmative defenses. Remanded.View "Long v. Dell, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with the unlawful sale or purchase of a motor vehicle by acting as a motor vehicle dealer, auction dealer, motor vehicle salesperson, or dealer’s agent without the required license. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial due to improper admission of expert testimony. After a second jury trial, Appellant was again convicted. On appeal, Appellant argued that the jury instructions misstated the definition of motor vehicle dealer. The Supreme Court agreed with Appellant and again reversed, holding (1) in order to qualify as a motor vehicle dealer, a person must be actively and regularly engaged in one of the statutory enumerated acts; and (2) the instructions given at Merchant’s second trial omitted this requirement from the elements of the offense. Remanded for a new trial.View "State v. Merchant" on Justia Law

In January 2006, two former payday lenders, defendants B&B Investment Group, Inc., and American Cash Loans, LLC, began to market and originate high-cost signature of $50 to $300, primarily to less-educated and financially unsophisticated individuals. The loans were for twelve months, payable biweekly, and carried annual percentage rates ranging from 1,147.14 to 1,500%. The Attorney General’s Office sued Defendants, alleging that the loan products were procedurally and substantively unconscionable under the common law and that they violated the Unfair Practices Act (UPA). The district court found that Defendants’ marketing and loan origination procedures were unconscionable and enjoined certain of its practices in the future, but declined to find the high-cost loans substantively unconscionable, concluding that it is the Legislature’s responsibility to determine limits on interest rates. Both parties appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s finding of procedural unconscionability. However, the Court reversed the district court’s refusal to find that the loans were substantively unconscionable because under the UPA, courts have the responsibility to determine whether a contract results in a gross disparity between the value received by a person and the price paid. The Supreme Court concluded that the interest rates in this case were substantively unconscionable and violated the UPA. View "New Mexico ex rel. King v. B&B Investment Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action suit against a law firm for violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. The district court granted the firm's motion to dismiss, reasoning that the letter to plaintiff was not an initial communication as defined by the Act, and that the alleged error in the letter was not misleading. The court affirmed, holding that the letter, which was an initial communication, would not mislead the sophisticated consumer. View "Caceres v. McCalla Raymer, LLC" on Justia Law

McLaughlin had a mortgage. As a result of an error, the mortgage company believed that he was in default and referred the matter to a law firm, PHS, which sent McLaughlin a letter about the debt that he claims violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 by referring to attorneys’ fees and costs that McLauglin claims had not yet been incurred. The district court dismissed certain claims because McLaughlin did not ask PHS to validate the debt before he filed suit. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that he was not required to request validation. The court affirmed imposition of sanctions against PHS for its failure to produce certain documents during discovery. View "McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., alleging that defendants made false representations to him in connection with their efforts to collect a purported debt. Plaintiff claimed that defendants violated the FDCPA by misidentifying his original creditor in a series of collection letters sent to him, as well as in a complaint filed against him in state court. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff had Article III standing where plaintiff alleged that he suffered the violation of his right not to be the target of misleading debt collection miscommunications. The court also concluded that plaintiff had statutory standing under the FDCPA. The court concluded that Nelson & Kennard violated the FDCPA by including misleading references to American Investment Bank in both its letter to plaintiff and in the state court complaint it filed against him. These conclusions were sufficient to warrant both reversal of the judgment granted to Nelson & Kennard and entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "Tourgeman v. Collins Financial Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's denial of their motion to remand and its dismissal on the merits of their claims against Wells Fargo and Kozeny. The court concluded that, because plaintiffs did not allege that Kozeny owed a tort duty enumerated in the deed of trust, no reasonable basis in fact and law supported plaintiffs' negligence claim against Kozeny; because there was no reasonable basis in fact and law for either of plaintiffs' negligence and breach of fiduciary claims, it follows that Kozeny was fraudulently joined and that the district court properly denied plaintiffs' motion to remand; the court modified the district court's dismissal of the claims against Kozeny to be without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and because Kozeny - the only nondiverse defendant - was dismissed, the district court properly retained federal diversity jurisdiction over plaintiffs' remaining claims against Wells Fargo. Because plaintiffs failed to state a claim of wrongful foreclosure, fraudulent misrepresentation, violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.020.1, negligence, or negligent misrepresentation, the district court properly granted Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss. View "Wivell, et al v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al." on Justia Law

In 2003, a default judgment was entered in the Court of Common Pleas against appellant Sharon Knott, in favor of appellee LVNV Funding, LLC. The Creditor did not attempt to execute on the judgment for more than nine years, until the Creditor moved to refresh the judgment in 2012. Throughout the proceedings, Knott argued that 10 Del. C. sec. 5072 acted acts as a statute of limitations that requires the holder of a judgment to seek to execute on the judgment within the first five years after the judgment is entered. The Superior Court rejected that argument, relying on a decision of a Commissioner finding that the five year limit in 5072 did not operate as a statute of limitations, but was merely a time period after which a judgment creditor had to affirmatively ask the Superior Court to refresh the judgment in its discretion, rather than the judgment creditor being entitled to execute on the judgment as of right. At oral argument on appeal, the parties acknowledged for the first time that perhaps the relevant statute was actually 10 Del. C. sec. 5073. But Knott argued that the result was the same under either statute, because both statutes imposed a five year period of limitations on the collection of judgments. Disagreeing with Knott's argument, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Knott v. LVNV Funding, LLC" on Justia Law