Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Abraham and Betty Jean Morrow filed a request for a modification of their home loan, serviced by Bank of America, through the federal Home Affordable Modification Program. Bank of America denied the modification and scheduled a trustee’s sale of the property. The Morrows subsequently filed a complaint against Bank of America based on the bank’s alleged breach of an oral contract for modification of their loan. The district court granted summary judgment to Bank of America, concluding (1) the Morrows’ claims for breach of contract, fraud, and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) were barred by the Statute of Frauds; and (2) the Morrows could not succeed on their claims of negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because Bank of America owed no duty to the Morrows. The Supreme Court reversed as to the negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violations of MCPA claims, holding that Bank of America owed a duty to the Morrows, genuine issues of material fact existed as to some claims, and the Statute of Frauds did not preclude the remainder of the Morrows’ claims. View "Morrow v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

Seven years after Plyler installed a Whirlpool microwave oven and eight hours after using that oven, a houseguest woke him because of a fire in the microwave. Firefighters extinguished the fire. Plyler claims that he injured his elbow and knee while he ran into and out of his house and that he experienced post-traumatic stress disorder. At trial on negligent recall and strict liability claims, a fire department investigator could not identify a specific cause of the fire. Plyler blamed the fire on a product defect that had led Whirlpool to recall microwaves in 2001. Whirlpool’s Director of Global Product Safety testified that the ovens posed a fire hazard only if they contained splattered food. uncleaned for an extended time, and were running at the time of the fire. After Whirlpool discovered that 1.8 million microwaves contained the defect, it issued a recall through the Consumer Product Safety Commission, mailed notices to owners who had submitted a product registration card, and released news announcements. Although the average recall leads to repair or replacement of 10 to 15 percent of affected units, Whirlpool repaired 75 percent of the recalled microwave. Plyler stated that he kept his microwave clean; that he never received notice; that he paid for it with a credit card; and that Whirlpool should have been able to contact him. The jury found in favor of Whirlpool. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to rulings that limited Plyler’s testimony to his observations and that allowed questions about the relationship between the fire and his divorce.View "Plyler v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a purported class action against Charter in Missouri state court, alleging that Charter violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.10 et seq., and breached its contract with the class members. Plaintiffs alleged that Charter had provided the class members with Internet modems that were incapable of operating at the speed that Charter had promised. Charter removed to federal court. The court concluded that Charter met its burden of showing that the amount in controversy exceeded the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005's (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), $5 million jurisdictional threshold. The court also concluded that, under Missouri law, plaintiffs failed to allege facts to support pecuniary loss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint.View "Grawitch, et al. v. Charter Communication" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-consumers brought an action against Defendant-retailer under two consumer protection statutes, alleging that Defendant improperly charged them sales tax reimbursement on sales of hot coffee sold “to go,” when, according to Plaintiffs, the tax code rendered such sales exempt from sales tax. Plaintiffs sought a refund of the asserted unlawful charges, damages, and an injunction forbidding collection of sales tax reimbursement for such sales. The trial court sustained Defendant’s demurrer, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Revenue and Taxation Code provides the exclusive means by which Plaintiffs’ dispute over the taxability of a retail sale may be resolved, and Plaintiffs’ current lawsuit was inconsistent with tax code procedures; and (2) the consumer statutes under which Plaintiffs brought their action could not be employed to avoid the limitations and procedures set out in the tax code.View "Loeffler v. Target Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against MERS in state court asserting claims related to MERS's facilitation of the provision of "Esign" mortgages to consumer-borrowers. MERS appealed the district court's grant of a motion to remand to New York state court on the ground that MERS's notice of removal was untimely. The court reversed and held that, in Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) cases, the 30-day removal periods of 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) are not triggered until the plaintiff serves the defendant with an initial pleading or other paper that explicitly specifies the amount of monetary damages sought or sets forth facts from which an amount in controversy in excess of $5,000,000 can be ascertained. The court also held that where a plaintiff's papers failed to trigger the removal clocks of sections 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3), a defendant may remove a case when, upon its own independent investigation, it determines that the case is removable. Therefore, the 30-day removal periods of sections 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) are not the exclusive authorizations for removal in CAFA cases. In this instance, plaintiffs never served MERS with a complaint or subsequent document explicitly stating the amount in controversy or providing MERS with sufficient information to conclude the threshold amount in controversy was satisfied. Therefore, the removal clocks of section 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) did not commence. After MERS determined upon its independent investigation that section 1332(d) conveyed CAFA federal jurisdiction because the amount in controversy, number of plaintiffs, and minimal diversity requirements were satisfied, it properly removed the case by alleging facts adequate to establish the amount in controversy in its notice of removal. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded.View "Cutrone v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Company Doe filed suit to enjoin the Commission from publishing in its online, publicly accessible database a "report of harm" that attributed the death of an infant to a product manufactured and sold by Company Doe. Consumer Groups filed a post-judgment motion to intervene for the purpose of appealing the district court's sealing order as well as its decision to allow Company Doe to proceed under a pseudonym. The court held that Consumer Groups' notice of appeal deprived the district court of jurisdiction to entertain Consumer Groups' motion to intervene, and, therefore, the court vacated the district court's order denying intervention; Consumer Groups were able to seek appellate review of the district court's orders because they met the requirements for nonparty appellate standing and have independent Article III standing to challenge the orders; and, on the merits, the district court's sealing order violated the public's right of access under the First Amendment and the district court abused its discretion in allowing Company Doe to litigate pseudonymously. Accordingly, the court vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.View "Company Doe v. Public Citizen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs refinanced their home in a mortgage loan transaction with Summit Mortgage. The mortgage was later assigned to Defendant, SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. Facing foreclosure, Plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Plaintiffs filed an adversary proceeding against SunTrust in the pending bankruptcy case, seeking rescission of the loan transaction and damages. SunTrust filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that because Plaintiffs filed their adversary complaint more than four years after the mortgage loan transaction, the defensive rescission-by-way-of-recoupment claim was barred by section 10(f) of the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act (“MCCCDA”). In response, Plaintiffs asserted that the four-year statute of limitations did apply to their action because section 10(i)(3) of the MCCCDA allows for recoupment claims at any time. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts certified a question of law to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which answered by holding that a borrower who grants a mortgage in a consumer credit transaction may not rescind the transaction under the MCCCDA defensively by way of common law recoupment after the expiration of the statute of limitations set forth in section 10(f) of the MCCCDA.View "May v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit pro se under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., against Equable, as successor in interest to Hilco. Plaintiff alleged that Hilco obtained his consumer credit report without a permissible purpose or plaintiff's consent, in violation of the section 1681(b). The magistrate court granted Equable's motion for summary judgment on the ground that certain discovery responses showed that plaintiff's suit was time barred under section 1681p(1) because he did not file suit within two years of receiving the May 2009 report. The court affirmed, concluding that, in light of Hyde v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank in Jefferson Parish, the limitations period began to run when plaintiff discovered that Hilco had obtained his credit report without his consent. View "Mack v. Equable Ascent Financial, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Chase, alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605(e); conversion; breach of contract; wrongful attempted foreclosure; and trespass. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase on all of plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claims where, although the court recognized that HUD regulations are enforceable terms of the contract, plaintiff failed to put forward any evidence of damages caused by the purported breach of these contract terms or seek any cognizable relief; plaintiff's trespass claim failed because plaintiff was admittedly in default and any visits by Chase's agents to the property at issue were permitted; plaintiff's wrongful attempted foreclosure claim failed where Chase believed it was entitled to foreclose on the property at the time and plaintiff attributed the problems with Chase only to its inability to fully keep track of her payments and communicate her payment status to her; and plaintiff's RESPA claim failed where Chase's response to plaintiff's requests was adequate and there were no damages as a matter of law from an inadequate response. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase on all claims. View "Bates v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, against a hospital-based radiology provider and its debt collection agent for making autodialed or prerecorded calls. The collection bureau, Gulf Coast, contended that the calls fell within a statutory exception for "prior express consent," as interpreted in a 2008 declaratory ruling from the FCC. The district court concluded that the FCC's interpretation was inconsistent with the language of the TCPA and, regardless of the 2008 FCC Ruling, did not apply on the facts of this case. The court concluded, however, that the district court lacked the power to consider the validity of the 2008 FCC Ruling and erred in concluding that the FCC's interpretation did not control the disposition of the case. In these circumstances, plaintiff's claim falls squarely within the FCC order. Consequently, the TCPA exception for prior express consent entitled Gulf Coast to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to plaintiff and remanded with instructions. View "Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau" on Justia Law