Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that CitiMortgage's responses to requests for information about her mortgage violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601-2617; the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p; and N.Y. General Business Law (GBL) section 349. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that plaintiff failed to allege that CitiMortgage did not properly designate a qualified written address (QWR) or that any or her lawyer's letters were sent to the designated address. Because plaintiff's lawyer's letters are not QWRs, CitiMortgage's RESPA duties were not triggered, and therefore the district court properly dismissed the RESPA claims. The district court did not err in dismissing the FDCPA claims where the amended complaint failed to alleged that CitiMortgage qualified as a debt collector under the FDCPA. The district court did not err in dismissing the section 349 claim where CitiMortgage's QWR address notice was not inadequate. Finally, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court and denied her request for leave to amend.View "Roth v. CitiMortgage Inc." on Justia Law

Indiana pawnbrokers must obtain license from the state’s Department of Financial Institutions (DFI). Saalwaechter, owns Fares Pawn in Evansville, Indiana. He applied for a license in 2009, but DFI denied his application, citing concerns about previous operations on the property and about his store manager’s criminal history. The property has been used as a pawnshop for about 20 years, but different businesses with overlapping ownership. Saalwaechter received a license after he signed an agreement to comply with certain conditions, in particular not employing the manager. Saalwaechter sued DFI, alleging violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Saalwaechter did not contend that DFI treated him unfavorably on account of some identifiable characteristic, such as age, sex, or race, but that the state had singled him out for disparate treatment without a rational basis. The district court granted DFI summary judgment on the “class of one” claim, finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that DFI treated Saalwaechter differently from similarly situated applicants without a rational reason. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Fares Pawn, LLC v. IN Dep't of Fin. Insts." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit in an Illinois circuit court against Ernida, LLC alleging that Ernida had faxed unsolicited advertisements to Plaintiff and more than thirty-nine other recipients without first obtaining their permission. Ernida’s insurer, American Economy Insurance Company (American), took up Ernida’s defense in Illinois. While the Illinois action was ongoing, Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court against American, asserting diversity jurisdiction and seeking a declaration that American had a duty to defend Ernida in the Illinois action and had a responsibility to indemnify and pay any judgment in that action. The district court granted American’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff had not presented a justiciable controversy. On appeal, American claimed that Plaintiff’s claim did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction since Plaintiff had expressly waived any right to recover anything over $75,000 in its Illinois complaint. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order dismissing the case for lack of standing and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as the matter in controversy did not not exceed the sum or value of $75,000.View "CE Design, Ltd. v. Am. Economy Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellees are former Community College of Beaver County students who, according to their allegations, enrolled in and completed substantial work in CCBC's police training program. Their academic progress was cut short when, in 2002, CCBC’s alleged malfeasance caused state officials to decertify the program, thereby rendering their educational and financial investments largely worthless. Appellees filed actions in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, asserting claims of breach of contract, breach of warranty, and a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law 's (UTPCPL) provisions providing a private cause of action for "persons" injured by other "persons'" employment of unfair trade practices. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the UTPCPL defined a "person" subject to liability as including both private entities and political subdivision agencies. After careful review, the Supreme Court held that the UTPCPL defined a "person" as including private entities, but not political subdivision agencies. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order affirming the trial court's denial of partial summary judgment on this issue and remanded to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings. View "Meyer v. Community College of Beaver County" on Justia Law

AutoSource Motors, LLC petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court: (1) to vacate its order denying AutoSource's motion to dismiss the action filed against it by Stephanie Chamberlain for lack of personal jurisdiction; and (2) to enter an order granting AutoSource's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The controversy arose when Chamberlain purchased a vehicle from AutoSource via the Internet. Chamberlain's affidavit did not rebut the prima facie showing made by AutoSource in that her affidavit failed to establish that AutoSource was subject to suit in Alabama pursuant to either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction; consequently, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in denying AutoSource's motion to dismiss Chamberlain's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. AutoSource demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief it sought; the Supreme Court granted its petition and issued the writ. View "Chamberlain v. AutoSource Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking statutory damages under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1640(a)(2)(A), claiming that Buy Direct (dba Direct Buy) failed to provide the dates that payments would be due on an installment contract for membership in Direct Buy's wholesale membership club. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Direct Buy, concluding that Direct Buy failed to make the required disclosures to plaintiffs, who therefore were entitled to damages. View "Lea, et al. v. Buy Direct, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Greg Chandler’s Frame & Body LLC operated an automobile body shop and was one of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company’s Total Liberty Care Shops. The Attorney General (Respondent) filed a complaint alleging that Liberty Mutual and Chandler (together, Petitioners) violated the West Virginia Automotive Crash Parts Act by requiring the use of and using salvage/recycled OEM crash parts when negotiating and preparing estimates for repairs to vehicles and that Petitioners failed to disclose this practice to consumers. The circuit court granted Respondent’s motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined Liberty Mutual and Chandler from the practice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that the Crash Parts Act applies to salvage/recycled OEM crash parts.View "Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morrisey" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against West Virginia-American Water Company (Respondent) seeking damages and penalties for alleged violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA) regarding Respondent’s business policies and practices regarding leaks in Petitioner’s water line. The circuit court granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss, finding that Petitioner's claims arose from transactions encompassed by W. Va. Code 46A-1-105(a)(3) and thus were statutorily excluded from the WVCCPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 46A-1-105(a)(3) applied to exclude Petitioner's WVCCPA claims, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in dismissing Petitioner's complaint.View "Holt v. W. Va. Am. Water Co." on Justia Law

Appellant, a registered lender under the Mortgage Loan Act (MLA), and Appellee executed a customer agreement for a single-installment, $500 loan governed by the MLA. Appellee later defaulted on his loan. Appellant filed this action to recover on its loan to Appellee, seeking the unpaid principal balance on the loan along with interest and fees permitted by the MLA. A magistrate judge determined that Appellee’s loan was impermissible under the MLA and that the loan should be governed by the Short-Term Lender Act (STLA). The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the MLA does not authorize single-installment, interest-bearing loans and that the STLA prohibits MLA registrants from making single-installment loans of short duration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an “interest-bearing loan,” as defined by the MLA, may include a loan requiring repayment in a single installment; (2) Lenders registered under the MLA may make single-installment, interest-bearing loans, and the STLA does not limit the authority of lenders registered under the MLA to make any loans authorized by the MLA; and (3) Appellant’s loan to Appellee was an interest-bearing loan as defined under the MLA.View "Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a new vehicle from Dealer that was subject to Manufacturer’s limited warranty. Plaintiff later filed a complaint against Manufacturer and Dealer (together, Defendants), alleging that the vehicle was defective and that Defendants failed to repair or remedy the defects under the warranty. Dealer demanded that Manufacturer reimburse Dealer for the attorney’s fees it incurred in defending against Plaintiff’s claims and indemnification for and liability incurred. Plaintiffs claims against Defendants were disposed of through summary judgment and voluntary dismissal. The judge also found that Dealer was not entitled to indemnificationt. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff’s allegations alleged the fault or negligence of both Manufacturer and Dealer, Manufacturer did not have a duty to defend under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93B, 8(a).View "Ferreira v. Chrysler Group LLC" on Justia Law