Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Company Doe filed suit to enjoin the Commission from publishing in its online, publicly accessible database a "report of harm" that attributed the death of an infant to a product manufactured and sold by Company Doe. Consumer Groups filed a post-judgment motion to intervene for the purpose of appealing the district court's sealing order as well as its decision to allow Company Doe to proceed under a pseudonym. The court held that Consumer Groups' notice of appeal deprived the district court of jurisdiction to entertain Consumer Groups' motion to intervene, and, therefore, the court vacated the district court's order denying intervention; Consumer Groups were able to seek appellate review of the district court's orders because they met the requirements for nonparty appellate standing and have independent Article III standing to challenge the orders; and, on the merits, the district court's sealing order violated the public's right of access under the First Amendment and the district court abused its discretion in allowing Company Doe to litigate pseudonymously. Accordingly, the court vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.View "Company Doe v. Public Citizen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs refinanced their home in a mortgage loan transaction with Summit Mortgage. The mortgage was later assigned to Defendant, SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. Facing foreclosure, Plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Plaintiffs filed an adversary proceeding against SunTrust in the pending bankruptcy case, seeking rescission of the loan transaction and damages. SunTrust filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that because Plaintiffs filed their adversary complaint more than four years after the mortgage loan transaction, the defensive rescission-by-way-of-recoupment claim was barred by section 10(f) of the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act (“MCCCDA”). In response, Plaintiffs asserted that the four-year statute of limitations did apply to their action because section 10(i)(3) of the MCCCDA allows for recoupment claims at any time. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts certified a question of law to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which answered by holding that a borrower who grants a mortgage in a consumer credit transaction may not rescind the transaction under the MCCCDA defensively by way of common law recoupment after the expiration of the statute of limitations set forth in section 10(f) of the MCCCDA.View "May v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit pro se under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., against Equable, as successor in interest to Hilco. Plaintiff alleged that Hilco obtained his consumer credit report without a permissible purpose or plaintiff's consent, in violation of the section 1681(b). The magistrate court granted Equable's motion for summary judgment on the ground that certain discovery responses showed that plaintiff's suit was time barred under section 1681p(1) because he did not file suit within two years of receiving the May 2009 report. The court affirmed, concluding that, in light of Hyde v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank in Jefferson Parish, the limitations period began to run when plaintiff discovered that Hilco had obtained his credit report without his consent. View "Mack v. Equable Ascent Financial, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Chase, alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605(e); conversion; breach of contract; wrongful attempted foreclosure; and trespass. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase on all of plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claims where, although the court recognized that HUD regulations are enforceable terms of the contract, plaintiff failed to put forward any evidence of damages caused by the purported breach of these contract terms or seek any cognizable relief; plaintiff's trespass claim failed because plaintiff was admittedly in default and any visits by Chase's agents to the property at issue were permitted; plaintiff's wrongful attempted foreclosure claim failed where Chase believed it was entitled to foreclose on the property at the time and plaintiff attributed the problems with Chase only to its inability to fully keep track of her payments and communicate her payment status to her; and plaintiff's RESPA claim failed where Chase's response to plaintiff's requests was adequate and there were no damages as a matter of law from an inadequate response. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase on all claims. View "Bates v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, against a hospital-based radiology provider and its debt collection agent for making autodialed or prerecorded calls. The collection bureau, Gulf Coast, contended that the calls fell within a statutory exception for "prior express consent," as interpreted in a 2008 declaratory ruling from the FCC. The district court concluded that the FCC's interpretation was inconsistent with the language of the TCPA and, regardless of the 2008 FCC Ruling, did not apply on the facts of this case. The court concluded, however, that the district court lacked the power to consider the validity of the 2008 FCC Ruling and erred in concluding that the FCC's interpretation did not control the disposition of the case. In these circumstances, plaintiff's claim falls squarely within the FCC order. Consequently, the TCPA exception for prior express consent entitled Gulf Coast to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to plaintiff and remanded with instructions. View "Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court started from an agreement between Respondents, the University of South Carolina and the University Gamecock Club, and Appellant George M. Lee, III. In exchange for Appellant purchasing a $100,000 life insurance policy and naming the University the sole, irrevocable beneficiary of the policy, Appellant was given the "opportunity to purchase tickets" for his lifetime to University football and basketball games. Years later, the University instituted a program that required all Gamecock Club members, including Appellant, to pay a seat license fee as a prerequisite for purchasing season tickets. Believing that the University could not require him to pay additional consideration for the opportunity to purchase tickets without violating the agreement, Appellant brought a declaratory judgment action. The trial court entered judgment for the University and the Gamecock Club, finding that Appellant was not deprived of the opportunity to purchase season tickets when the University instituted the seat license fees. The Supreme Court reversed: the Agreement unambiguously prohibited the University from requiring Lee to pay the seat license fee as a prerequisite for the opportunity to purchase tickets pursuant to the Agreement. View "Lee v. University of South Carolina" on Justia Law

The Fleets applied to have their Bank of America (BofA) home loan modified in 2009 under the Making Homes Affordable Act. The result of multiple telephone calls and letters to various BofA-related personnel, the Fleets were either (a) assured the Fleets that everything was proceeding smoothly or (b) told BofA had no knowledge of any loan modification application. Finally, in November 2011, BofA informed the Fleets they had been approved for a trial period plan under a Fannie Mae modification program. All they had to do, was to make three monthly payments starting on December 1, 2011. If they made the payments, then they would move to the next step (verification of financial hardship); if they passed that test, their loan would be permanently modified. The Fleets made the first two payments, for December 2011 and January 2012, which BofA acknowledged receiving, and therefore foreclosure proceedings had been suspended. Toward the end of January 2012, their house was sold at a trustee’s sale. Two days after the sale, a representative of the buyer showed up at the house with a notice to quit. The Fleets informed him that the house had significant structural problems, and he said he was going to rescind the sale. The Fleets continued to try to communicate with BofA regarding the property. A BofA representative left voice mail messages to the effect that BofA wanted to discuss a solution to the dispute, but otherwise it appeared that productive conversation between the Fleets and BofA and between the Fleets and the buyer had ceased. In light of this silence (which they interpreted to mean the buyer was trying to rescind the sale), the Fleets spent $15,000 to repair a broken sewer main, which was leaking sewage onto the front lawn. They were evicted in August 2012. In June 2012, the Fleets sued BofA, the trustee under their deed of trust, BofA officers and some of the employees who had been involved in handling their loan modification, and the buyer of the property and its representative. BofA’s demurrer to the first amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend as to the remaining causes of action promissory estoppel, breach of contract, fraud, and accounting. All of the BofA defendants were dismissed. The Court of Appeal reversed: "Although the Fleets’ amended complaint spreads the fraud allegations over three causes of action and contains a great deal of extraneous information, it also alleges the requisite elements of promissory fraud. [. . .] This cause of action may or may not be provable; what it definitely is not is demurrable." The Court sustained the demurrer to the Fleets' action for promissory estoppel, and affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Fleet v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit consolidated class action appeals filed under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g), which provides that “no person that accepts credit cards or debit cards ... shall print [electronically] more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale.” Willful violation entitles a consumer who sustains no harm to statutory damages, but a consumer harmed by the violation can obtain actual damages by showing that the violation was the result of negligence. Consumers who bought products at RadioShack stores paid with credit or debit cards, and received electronically printed receipts that contained the card’s expiration date. The parties settled; each class member who responded positively was to receive a $10 coupon that could be used at any RadioShack store. The face value of all the coupons was $830,000. RadioShack was to pay class counsel $1 million. The Seventh Circuit reevaluated the value of the settlement to class members and the benefits of costs incurred and, noting Radio Shack’s fragile financial condition, stated ”A renegotiated settlement will simply shift some fraction of the exorbitant attorneys’ fee awarded class counsel in the existing settlement that we are disapproving to the class members. While Radio Shack’s violation was willful, given earlier litigation, Shoe Carnival had no previous violation to alert the company. Instead of omitting the entire expiration date from credit‐card receipts, Shoe Carnival omitted just the year The Seventh Circuit concluded that there was sufficient ambiguity in the statute to justify the district court’s determination that Shoe Carnival had not willfully violated FACTA. View "Aliano v. RadioShack Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and a putative class, alleging claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 42 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), that Campbell-Ewald instructed or allowed a third-party vendor to send unsolicited text messages on behalf of the Navy, with whom Campbell-Ewald had a marketing contract. The district court granted summary judgment to Campbell-Ewald under the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity. The court rejected Campbell-Ewald's claim that the personal and putative class claims were mooted by petitioner's refusal to accept the settlement offer; Campbell-Ewald's constitutional claims were unavailing where the company relied upon a flawed application of First Amendment principles; the TCPA imposes vicarious liability where an agency relationship, as defined by federal common law, is established between the defendant and a third-party caller; and the application of the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity is inapplicable in this case. Because Campbell-Ewald failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co." on Justia Law

After Jerramy Johnson, the owner of Front Row Motors, LLC, sold Scott Jones a used car, Jones filed an action against Front Row Motors, alleging, inter alia, a violation of the Indiana Deceptive Sales Act. Jones subsequently filed an amended complaint adding Johnson as a party defendant. The trial court awarded damages in favor of Jones and against Johnson and Front Row Motors jointly and severally. Defendants moved to set aside the default judgments for imperfect service of process. The trial court set aside the default judgment as against Johnson but denied the motion as to Front Row Motors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Front Row Motors’ motion to set aside the judgment, as Front Row Motors did not receive proper notice of the damages hearing, and therefore, the default judgment entered against it was void for want of jurisdiction.View "Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones" on Justia Law