Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Burzlaff bought a “Stallion” motorized tricycle from Thoroughbred Motorsports in 2009 for $35,000. When Burzlaff reported the first problems to Thoroughbred, the company instructed him to take his vehicle to a Ford dealer for warranty repairs. Burzlaff did so repeatedly. After the vehicle had been out of service for repairs for 71 days during the first year, Burzlaff demanded, under the Wisconsin Lemon Law, that Thoroughbred replace the vehicle or refund his purchase price. Thoroughbred refused. Further efforts to repair the vehicle at the Thoroughbred factory in Texas failed to correct the defects. Burzlaff sued Thoroughbred under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 2301, and the Wisconsin Lemon Law, Wis. Stat. 218.0171. The district court awarded double damages plus costs and attorney fees for a total judgment of $95,000 under the more generous provisions of the state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the jury instructions on the Lemon Law claim, the sufficiency of the evidence on that claim, and the submission of the Magnuson-Moss claim to the jury. View "Burzlaff v. Thoroughbred Motorsports Inc." on Justia Law

Med‐1 buys delinquent debts and purchased Suesz’s debt from Community Hospital. In 2012 it filed a collection suit in small claims court and received a judgment against Suesz for $1,280. Suesz lives one county over from Marion. Though he incurred the debt in Marion County, he did so in Lawrence Township, where Community is located, and not in Pike Township, the location of the small claims court. Suesz says that it is Med‐1’s practice to file claims in Pike Township regardless of the origins of the dispute and filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act venue provision requiring debt collectors to bring suit in the “judicial district” where the contract was signed or where the consumer resides, 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(2). The district court dismissed after finding Marion County Small Claims Courts were not judicial districts for the purposes of the FDCPA. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed, but, on rehearing en banc, reversed, holding that the correct interpretation of “judicial district or similar legal entity” in section 1692i is the smallest geographic area that is relevant for determining venue in the court system in which the case is filed. View "Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was assigned the serving rights to Plaintiff's mortgage on a piece of property. Plaintiff sued Defendant, claiming that Defendant attempted to collect more than was due on the loan. The parties settled. Plaintiff then filed this action against Defendant, alleging breach of the settlement agreement, defamation, and violations of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. An order of default was later entered against Defendant. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment, requesting that the default judgments be set aside because Plaintiff's claims were legally deficient. The trial court denied the motion. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a defaulting party who does not file a motion to vacate the order of default after a default judgment has been entered cannot file a Maryland Rule 2-534 motion to alter or amend a judgment to contest liability, and the defaulting party cannot appeal that judgment in order to contest liability.View "Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nefflen" on Justia Law

Via Christi Regional Medical Center, Inc. filed a hospital lien to collect on its bill for medical services provided to Ivan Reed after Reed's car collided with a Union Pacific Railroad train. The lien purported to encumber a portion of Reed's settlement with Union Pacific. Via Christi subsequently brought this action against Reed to enforce its lien. Reed counterclaimed, asserting that Via Christi, in an effort to enforce the lien, had engaged in deceptive and unconscionable practices in violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act. The district court judge entered judgment in favor of Via Christ on the lien and against Reed on his counterclaims. The court of appeals affirmed the enforceability of Via Christi's lien. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Via Christi's failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-407 rendered its lien ineffective and unenforceable against Reed; (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Via Christi knew or should have known that it misrepresented the amount it was owed for services rendered; and (3) the lower courts erred in ruling as a matter of law that a hospital's filing and pursuit of a lien could never be unconscionable. Remanded.View "Via Christi Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Reed" on Justia Law

Benjamin and Keri Fidelak filed a petition for damages in Caddo Parish district court (a court of proper venue) against Foreign & Classic Auto Centre, Inc., a small, independent repair shop in Shreveport, which specialized in the repair of high end foreign automobiles. The Fidelaks claimed that Foreign & Classic sold them a defective engine for their 2004 Land Rover. In response, Foreign & Classic raised numerous defenses and asserted a third party demand against British Parts International (BPI) for reimbursement and indemnification because BPI sold the engine to Foreign & Classic. BPI is headquartered in Houston, Texas, and conducts business nationwide. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on the enforceability of a forum selection clause. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and held that the forum selection clause at issue here was not enforceable because a third party defendant may not object to venue where the principal action has been instituted in the proper venue. View "Fidelak v. Holmes European Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a consumer telephone service complaint against Verizon New England. The Department of Telecommunications and Cable eventually dismissed Plaintiff's claim as moot because, during the course of the proceedings, Plaintiff's customer relationship with Verizon had been terminated. On appeal, a single justice dismissed Plaintiff's complaint because it failed to comply with the timely filing requirements of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 5. Plaintiff appealed to the full court. The Department subsequently afforded Plaintiff a renewed opportunity to pursue a timely appeal under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 5, and Plaintiff chose to do so. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the ruling of the single justice that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 5 governs appeals from final orders issued by the Department; and (2) declared the remainder of the matter moot because Plaintiff filed a new petition for judicial review within the time period required by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 5. Remanded. View "Olmstead v. Dep't of Telecommunications & Cable" on Justia Law

The parties in this case entered into an agreement with two writings drafted by U-Haul of West Virginia. The first writing was a rental contract signed by the three plaintiffs. The second writing was a rental contract addendum that was not signed. The addendum contained a provision requiring that any disputes between the parties be arbitrated and was not made available to U-Haul customers prior to their execution of the rental contract. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against U-Haul for breach of contract and false advertising, among other claims. U-Haul sought to compel Plaintiffs to resolve their claims in arbitration, arguing that the addendum was incorporated by reference into the signed rental contracts, and thus, U-Haul was allowed to enforce the arbitration provision. The circuit court denied U-Haul's motion to compel arbitration. U-Haul then filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking a writ of prohibition to set aside the circuit court order that refused to compel Plaintiffs to participate in arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that the addendum was not incorporated by reference into the signed rental contracts.View "State ex rel. U-Haul Co. of W. Va. v. Zakaib" on Justia Law

These two consolidated appeals concerned two appellants who separately sued the Housing Authority for Baltimore County (HABC) for negligence and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (CPA) for injuries arising out of Appellants' alleged exposure to lead paint in properties that HABC owned and operated. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of HABC, finding that Appellants in both cases did not substantially comply with the notice requirement of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly concluded that Appellants did not substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Appellants did not show good cause for their failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement; and (3) the LGTCA notice requirement, as applied to a minor plaintiff in a lead paint action against HABC, does not violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. View "Ellis v. Housing Auth of Baltimore County" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against multiple defendants alleging negligence and violations of Maryland's Consumer Protection Act (CPA) for injuries resulting from his exposure to lead-based paint when he lived at two properties in Baltimore City while he was an infant. At the close of discovery, Defendants filed several dispositive and evidentiary motions, which the trial court granted. The court of special appeals affirmed. At issue before the Court of Appeals was the exclusion of a lead test report, the exclusion of testimony by Petitioner's medical expert, and the grant of summary judgment as to Petitioner's CPA cause of action. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the court of special appeals erred in holding that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding the lead test report and the testimony by Petitioner's medical expert; and (2) the court of special appeals did not err in affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment as to Petitioner's cause of action under the CPA. Remanded.View "Butler v. S&S P'ship" on Justia Law

A commercial tenant remained in possession of premises for six years after it lost its lease when the property was sold through foreclosure. The tenant ultimately conceded that the foreclosure terminated the lease and the tenant became a tenant at sufferance. The property owner sued the tenant for breach of the terminated lease, trespass and other torts, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). The trial court granted summary judgment for the tenant on all claims. The court of appeals reversed and remanded in part. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a tenant at sufferance cannot be liable for breach of the previously-terminated lease agreement; (2) a tenant at sufferance is a trespasser and can be liable in tort, including, in this case, tortious interference with prospective business relations; (3) the tenant here was not liable under the DTPA because the property owner was not a consumer; and (4) the owner in this case could not recover under the attorney's fees under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Remanded.View "Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp." on Justia Law