Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Robert and Tracy Barrett appealed the grant of two summary judgments in favor of Carlos Roman d/b/a Carlos Roman Roofing ("Roman") and Bobby Beach d/b/a Just Brick Masonry ("Beach") on all of the Barretts' claims against Roman and Beach. The issues before the Supreme Court in this appeal required resolution of the same issues that were in claims pending in the circuit court against a third party. A November 2012 judgment disposed of all of the Barretts' claims against Beach and Roman, but it did not dispose of the Barretts' claims against the third party. Thus, the Court's consideration of the circuit court's summary judgments in favor of Beach and Roman as final would mean that the intertwined claims against the subcontractors named as defendants in this action would have been litigated in piecemeal fashion. "The piecemeal adjudication of the claims against the subcontractors pose[d] an unreasonable risk of inconsistent results. Therefore, we must conclude that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the summary judgments in favor of Beach and Roman as final." Accordingly, the Court dismissed the Barretts' appeal.View "Barrett v. Roman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two Kansas residents who entered into an agreement with an out-of-state limited liability company (LLC) to assist them in managing their consumer debt and in dealing with their creditors. Plaintiffs brought an action against the LLC, its managing member, and other entities in federal court for alleged violations of the Kansas Credit Services Organization Act (KCSOA) and the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA). The U.S. district court certified two questions to the Kansas Supreme Court regarding the application of KCSOA and KCPA to attorneys and law firms. The Supreme Court answered by holding (1) If an attorney who is licensed to practice law in Kansas and who is acting within the course and scope of his or her practice is exempt from the provisions of the KCSOA, the attorney's law firm is also exempt; and (2) attorneys are not inherently exempt from the reach of the KCPA by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, but certain statutory remedies may be unconstitutional if they encroach on the traditional exclusive powers of the court, especially the powers relating to issuing and regulating the license to practice law.View "Hays v. Ruther" on Justia Law

Ford Motor Credit Company appealed a district court order dismissing its action to renew a prior judgment. Ford sued Jeremy Halvorson in Minnesota on a contract matter. A judgment was entered in Minnesota against Halvorson. Halvorson moved from Minnesota to North Dakota, and the Minnesota judgment was registered in North Dakota in 2011. Halvorson did not pay the judgment. In 2013, Ford commenced this action to renew the judgment by personal service of the summons and complaint upon Halvorson. Halvorson did not respond to the summons and complaint, and Ford moved for entry of a default judgment against Halvorson. The district court, on its own motion, denied the motion for default judgment and instead dismissed Ford's complaint with prejudice, concluding that Ford's action was an improper duplicate action on the original debt and that the proper method to renew a judgment was by affidavit under the procedure provided in N.D.C.C. 28-20-21. Ford moved for reconsideration of the order dismissing its action, and the court entered an order affirming dismissal of the action. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order dismissing Ford's action on the judgment. Because there was no reason apparent on the record to deny the default judgment, the Court remanded the case to the district court with directions to enter a default judgment in favor of Ford in its action to renew the prior judgment. View "Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Halvorson" on Justia Law

In 2006, Respondents obtained an adjustable rate mortgage loan from a mortgage company. Respondents executed a deed of trust on the real property being purchased and separately executed an arbitration rider. Respondents later defaulted on the loan, and Petitioner, which serviced the loan, assessed a number of fees. Respondents filed an action against Petitioner alleging violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. Petitioner filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the Dodd-Frank Act and that it was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's requested writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court's order, holding (1) the Dodd-Frank Act did not apply to the mortgage loan because the loan was executed prior to the Act's enactment; and (2) the arbitration agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable.View "State ex rel. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Circuit Court of Kanawha County" on Justia Law

Petitioners in this consolidated appeal were engaged in various aspects of the collection of consumer debts. After the Attorney General (AG) received complaints from consumers indicating that certain Petitioners had violated consumer protection laws, the AG issued an investigative subpoena, to which Petitioners objected. The AG filed a civil action against Petitioners seeking to compel Petitioners to comply with the subpoena. The circuit court ordered Petitioners to comply with the subpoena and temporarily enjoined Petitioners from collecting debts they had acquired before they were licensed. The Supreme Court primarily affirmed the circuit court's orders, holding (1) when the AG files a cause of action against an entity that is subject to an investigative subpoena, the AG's subpoena authority ends as to those matters that form the basis of the complaint's allegations, and the rules of discovery provide the method by which the AG may investigate the wrongdoing; (2) the investigative subpoena survives the AG's filing of a lawsuit when the subpoena pertains to matters that do not form the basis of the complaint; and (3) once the AG has instituted a civil action against an entity to enjoin unlawful conduct, the AG may seek temporary relief against the entity during the pendency of such proceedings. View "Cavalry SPV I, LLC v. Morrisey" on Justia Law

In 2005, James Wiese attended an auction held by Alabama Powersport Auction, LLC (APA) and purchased a "Yerf Dog Go-Cart," for his two minor sons. The go-cart was on consignment to APA from FF Acquisition; however, Wiese was not aware that FF Acquisition had manufactured the go-cart. Soon after purchasing the go-cart, Wiese discovered that the engine would not operate for more than a few minutes at a time. After several failed attempts to repair the go-cart, Wiese stored the go-cart in his garage for almost two years. In 2007, Wiese repaired the go-cart. Matthew Wiese was riding the go-cart and had an accident in which he hit his head on the ground causing a brain injury that resulted in his death in 2010. The elder Wiese brought contract claims against APA stemming from his purchase of the go-cart and for his son's death. APA appealed the circuit court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that based on the common-law principles of agency, an auctioneer selling consigned goods on behalf of an undisclosed principal may be held liable as a merchant-seller for a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under 7-2-314, Ala. Code 1975. As a result,the Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment denying APA's summary-judgment motion as to Wiese's breach-of-the-implied-warranty-of-merchantability claim.View "Alabama Powersport Auction, LLC v. Wiese" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Janet Knutsen appealed a superior court decision to deny her motion for summary judgment and and for granting defendant Vermont Association of Realtors, Inc.'s (VAR) motion for summary judgment on her consumer fraud claim arising out of her purchase of a home in Moretown. Plaintiff argued that VAR's form purchase and sale agreement, which was used in her real estate purchase (to which VAR was not a party) violated the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) in that two provisions of the form were unfair and deceptive, and that she was therefore entitled to damages under section 2461(b) of the CFA. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly held that 'VAR's sole connection to this case was its drafting of the template clauses that [plaintiff] and her buyer's broker used for the purchase of the house, and that could not support a consumer fraud claim.View "Knutsen v. Dion" on Justia Law

After purchasing a car from Defendant, a car dealership, Plaintiff discovered that the car had extensive problems. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging that advertising the car as a "Sporty Car at a Great Value Price" violated the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act and that the salesperson's representation to her that the car would "just need a tune-up" was fraudulent. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court correctly found that Defendant's advertisement was classic puffery, which was fatal to Plaintiff's deception claims; but (2) Plaintiff established an issue of material fact as to her fraud claim based on the salesperson's statements. Remanded.View "Kesling v. Hubler Nissan, Inc." on Justia Law

Donald Austin filed suit against Stokes-Craven, an automobile dealership, after he experienced problems with his used vehicle and discovered the vehicle had sustained extensive damage prior to the sale. The resolution of this case involved an interpretation of a narrow portion of the Supreme Court’s opinion in “Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding Corp.,” (691 S.E.2d 135 (2010)). Specifically, the consolidated appeals were the result of a dispute over the Court's holding concerning Austin's entitlement to trial fees under the South Carolina Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act and whether the Supreme Court's denial of Austin's motion for appellate costs under Rule 222 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules had preclusive effect on his right to pursue appellate and post-appellate fees under the Dealer's Act. After careful review of the appellate record in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's award of trial fees to Austin and remanded this case to the circuit court to conduct a hearing to determine what amount of appellate and post-appellate fees should be awarded to Austin. View "Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Peter and Nicole Dernier appealed the dismissal of their action for: (1) a declaratory judgment that defendant U.S. Bank National Association could not enforce the mortgage and promissory note for the debt associated with plaintiffs' purchase of their house based on irregularities and fraud in the transfer of both instruments; (2) a declaration that U.S. Bank has violated Vermont's Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) by asserting its right to enforce the mortgage and note; and (3) attorney's fees and costs under the CFA. They also appealed the trial court's failure to enter a default judgment against defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS). Plaintiffs fell behind on their mortgage, and brought suit against two parties: Mortgage Network, Inc. (MNI), which is in the chain of title for both the note and the mortgage, and MERS, which is in the chain of title for the mortgage as a "nominee" for MNI. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the mortgage was void, asserting that: (1) MERS, as a nominee, never had any beneficial interest in the mortgage; (2) MNI had assigned its interest in both instruments to others without notifying plaintiffs; and (3) no party with the right to foreclose the mortgage had recorded its interest. MNI responded that plaintiffs had named MNI as a party in error, because MNI did "not own the right to the mortgage in question." MERS did not respond. Around this time, plaintiffs received a letter in which U.S. Bank represented that it possessed the original promissory note and mortgage and that it had the right to institute foreclosure proceedings on the property. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to amend and dismissed plaintiffs' case for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs appealed. After careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in dismissing Counts 1 and 2 of plaintiffs' amended complaint for lack of standing, to the extent that these counts alleged irregularities in the transfer of the note and mortgage unconnected to the pooling and servicing agreement. The Court affirmed as to dismissal of Counts 3 and 4 of plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint. The case was remanded for further proceedings.View "Dernier v. Mortgage Network, Inc." on Justia Law