Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Until 2001, the federal Truth in Savings Act (TISA), 12 U.S.C. 4310 et seq., allowed civil damages to be sought for failure to comply with its requirements. The provision authorizing lawsuits was later repealed, however. After Congress's repeal of section 4310, Plaintiffs filed a class action against Bank of America, alleging unlawful and unfair business practices based on violations of TISA disclosure requirements. The trial court sustained the Bank's demurrer, and the court of appeal affirmed, concluding that Congress's repeal of section 4310 reflected its intent to bar any private action to enforce TISA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that TISA posed no impediment to Plaintiffs' claim of unlawful business practice under California's unfair competition law, where by leaving TISA's savings clause in place, Congress explicitly approved the enforcement of state laws such as the unfair competition law.View "Rose v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff rented a garden tiller from Home Depot by signing a tool rental agreement. Plaintiff subsequently filed a class-action lawsuit against Home Depot, claiming that it violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) by automatically including a damage waiver fee in its agreement and not making clear in the agreement that the damage waiver fee was optional. Plaintiff also claimed the damage waiver was of no value. The trial court granted summary judgment for Home Depot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the damage waiver in the rental contract was clearly optional and provided a benefit of value to Plaintiff, Home Depot did not engage in any unfair practice prohibited by the MMPA. View "Chochorowski v. Home Depot U.S.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, food and beverage services employees of hotels, brought claims against their employers for violating Haw. Rev. Stat. 481B-14 by invoking Haw. Rev. Stat. 388-6, 388-10, and 388-11. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that the hotel or restaurant violated section 481B-14 when it applied a service charge for the sale of food and beverage services but did not distribute the full service charge directly to Plaintiffs and failed to disclose this fact to consumers. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer a question of law and held (1) when a hotel or restaurant applying a service charge for the sale of food or beverage services allegedly violates section 481B-14 by not distributing 100 percent of the service charge directly to its employees as "tip income" and by failing to disclose this practice to the purchaser of the services, the employees may bring an action under sections 388-6, 388-10, and 388-11 to enforce their rights and to seek remedies.View "Villon v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Superior Court alleging that Restaurant.com's certificates violate the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA). Restaurant.com removed the matter to the federal district court, which granted its motion to dismiss. The judge concluded that certificates purchased by plaintiffs "provide an individual with a contingent right for discounted services at a selected restaurant[,]" but such a contingent right did not constitute the purchase of "property or service which is primarily for personal, family or household purposes." Therefore, plaintiffs were not "consumers" as defined by the TCCWNA and that the certificates were not "consumer contracts." Plaintiffs appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit certified two questions to the New Jersey Supreme Court. (reformulated): were Restaurant.com's certificates "property" under TCCWNA; if so, were they "primarily for personal, family or household purposes;" and were they a written contract, that gave or "displayed any written consumer warranty, notice, or sign." The New Jersey Court concluded that Plaintiffs were "consumers" and the certificates were "property . . . primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." Furthermore, the certificates purchased from Restaurant.com were "consumer contracts" and the standard terms provided on the certificates are "notices" subject to the TCCWNA.View "Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs refinanced their home through Lender. The monthly payment on the loan was $600 greater than Plaintiffs' total monthly income. After the mortgage was funded, it was sold and assigned to Bank. Servicer serviced the loan. After Plaintiffs defaulted on the loan, Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Plaintiffs subsequently brought this action asserting violations of the Consumer Protection Act, the Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, and the Borrower's Interest Act, and asserting that the loan was unenforceable because it was unconscionable. A superior court judge granted summary judgment to Defendants, Bank and Servicer, on all claims based on the ground that Defendants, as assignees, had no liability for the acts of Lender. The Supreme Court (1) reversed summary judgment in favor of Bank, holding that Bank was not shielded from liability as a matter of law by virtue of its status as an assignee and that Bank failed to establish the absence of material issues of disputed fact entitling it to judgment on any individual claim; and (2) affirmed summary judgment in favor of Servicer because Servicer was not shown to be an assignee and Plaintiffs offered no alternative basis on which Servicer might be held liable. Remanded.View "Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Leonards entered into contracts with Centennial for the sale of a log home kit and construction of a custom log home. The Leonards later released Centennial from any claims for damages for defective construction or warranty arising out of the home's construction. Greg and Elvira Johnston held a thirty-six percent interest in the property at the time the release was signed. Eventually, all interest in the property was transferred to the Elvira Johnston Trust. A few years later, because of a number of construction defects affecting the structural integrity of the house, the Johnstons decided to demolish the house. The Johnstons sued Centennnial for negligent construction, breach of statutory and implied warranties, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Centennial, finding that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and were waived by the Leonards' release. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court's ruling that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and directed that the decision on remand apply only to the interest owned by the Johnstons at the time the release was executed; and (2) affirmed the district court's conclusion that the release was binding on the Leonards' sixty-four percent interest, later transferred to the Trust.View "Johnston v. Centennial Log Homes & Furnishings, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, FIA Card Services, filed a complaint against Defendant to recover damages for Defendant's unpaid credit card account. The district court subsequently entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff, as the moving party and party with the burden of proof at trial, failed to establish that there was no dispute of material fact as to each element of the cause of action where the record did not sufficiently establish either the existence of Defendant's credit card account or that Plaintiff was the owner of that account. Remanded.View "FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Saintonge" on Justia Law

The Attorney General brought an action against Corporation, which sold memberships in buying programs giving members the option to purchase various goods and services at discounted rates, alleging violations of the Buying Club Membership Law (BCL) and the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) and seeking civil penalties for consumer frauds committed against the elderly. The district court concluded (1) many of Corporation's marketing and sales practices violated the BCL and CFA; (2) Corporation did not commit consumer frauds against the elderly; and (3) application of the BCL to Corporation's solicitation practices did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The court awarded more than $25 million in consumer reimbursement, civil penalties, and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and modified, holding (1) Corporation's telemarketing and Internet practices violated the CFA; (2) Corporation's solicitations and its memberships offering one or more discount features were subject to the terms of the BCL; (3) application of the BCL to Corporation's solicitations did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause; (4) affirmed the reimbursement award for BCL violations as modified; and (5) reversed the ruling that the State was not entitled to civil penalties for consumer frauds committed by the elderly.View "State ex rel. Miller v. Vertrue, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a California resident, was sexually assaulted while vacationing in Mexico. The assault occurred while Petitioner received a complimentary massage in exchange for her attendance at a resort's timeshare presentation. Petitioner sued the resort, a corporation with its primary place of business in Florida, (the Florida Defendants) for negligent vacation packaging. The Florida Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, arguing that Mexico would be a more convenient forum. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding that the court misapplied the forum non conveniens analysis, particularly by failing to afford a strong presumption in favor of Plaintiff's initial choice of an otherwise proper forum.View "Cortez v. Palace Resorts, Inc." on Justia Law

The cases underlying these consolidated appeals involved the purchase of an automobile. Plaintiffs purchased vehicles and signed retail installment contracts with three separate dealers. The dealers assigned their rights in the contract and vehicles to Credit Acceptance Corporation, who financed the purchases. All of the contracts contained arbitration clauses. Plaintiffs later commenced civil actions against Credit Acceptance in circuit court, alleging, inter alia, violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection act (WVCCPA). Credit Acceptance filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss, which the circuit court denied, finding that the arbitration agreements were unconscionable based upon the unavailability of some of the arbitration forums named therein and because Plaintiffs in the agreements waived their respective rights to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed in both of the cases, holding that because one of the arbitration forums named in the arbitration agreements remained available to arbitrate the parties' disputes, and because an arbitration agreement is not unenforceable solely because a party to the contract waives her right to a jury trial, the causes must be remanded for entry of orders compelling arbitration.View "Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front" on Justia Law