Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

A class of Plaintiffs brought suit against Insured, a hotel proprietor, alleging that Insured violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The class and Insured subsequently reached a settlement. The class then filed a garnishment action against Insurer. Insurer sought a declaratory judgment that its policy with Insured did not provide coverage because the policy did not cover damages awarded related to the TCPA. The trial found (1) Insurer owed Insured a duty to defend in the class actions because the class's claims were covered under the policy; and (2) Insurer had a duty to indemnify Insured for the full settlement plus interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly determined that Insurer wrongly refused to defend Insured under its policy coverage; (2) Insurer was not entitled to a reassessment of the reasonableness of the settlement; and (3) policy limits did not bar Insurer's indemnification of the settlement.View "Columbia Cas. Co. v. HIAR Holding, LLC" on Justia Law

Karl McGhee, a financial advisor at LPL Financial, acted as financial planner for Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a complaint against McGhee and LPL, asserting claims for, inter alia, violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Defendants moved for an order compelling the parties to proceed to arbitration due to an arbitration agreement signed by Plaintiff. The motion judge denied the motion, concluding that none of Plaintiff's claims could be compelled to arbitration because claimants under chapter 93A, section 9 are not required to submit to arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) claims alleging an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of chapter 93A, section 9 must be referred to arbitration where the contract involves interstate commerce and the agreement is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); and (2) because Plaintiff and Defendants in this case entered into a valid contract whereby they agreed to settle all controversies related to Plaintiff's financial account by arbitration, and because the arbitration agreement was governed by the FAA, Defendants as a matter of law were entitled under the FAA to a stay of judicial proceedings and an order compelling arbitration. Remanded.View "McInnes v. LPL Fin., LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether insurance practices that violate the Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA) can support an Unfair Competition Law (UCL) action. In 1988, the Supreme Court held in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies that the Legislature did not intend to create a private cause of action under the UIPA for commission of various unfair practices listed in Cal. Ins. Code 790.03(h). In this case, Plaintiff sued Insurer for, among other causes of action, violation of California's unfair competition law (UCL) for engaging in false advertising. The trial court concluded that the UCL claim was an impermissible attempt to plead around Moradi-Shalal's bar against private actions for unfair insurance practices under section 790.03. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) private UIPA actions are absolutely barred, and litigants may not rely on the proscriptions of section 790.03 as the basis for a UCL claim; (2) however, when insurers engage in conduct that violates both the UIPA and obligations imposed by other statutes or the common law, a UCL action may lie; and (3) here, Plaintiff alleged causes of action that provided grounds for a UCL claim independent from the UIPA. View "Zhang v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Until 2001, the federal Truth in Savings Act (TISA), 12 U.S.C. 4310 et seq., allowed civil damages to be sought for failure to comply with its requirements. The provision authorizing lawsuits was later repealed, however. After Congress's repeal of section 4310, Plaintiffs filed a class action against Bank of America, alleging unlawful and unfair business practices based on violations of TISA disclosure requirements. The trial court sustained the Bank's demurrer, and the court of appeal affirmed, concluding that Congress's repeal of section 4310 reflected its intent to bar any private action to enforce TISA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that TISA posed no impediment to Plaintiffs' claim of unlawful business practice under California's unfair competition law, where by leaving TISA's savings clause in place, Congress explicitly approved the enforcement of state laws such as the unfair competition law.View "Rose v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff rented a garden tiller from Home Depot by signing a tool rental agreement. Plaintiff subsequently filed a class-action lawsuit against Home Depot, claiming that it violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) by automatically including a damage waiver fee in its agreement and not making clear in the agreement that the damage waiver fee was optional. Plaintiff also claimed the damage waiver was of no value. The trial court granted summary judgment for Home Depot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the damage waiver in the rental contract was clearly optional and provided a benefit of value to Plaintiff, Home Depot did not engage in any unfair practice prohibited by the MMPA. View "Chochorowski v. Home Depot U.S.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, food and beverage services employees of hotels, brought claims against their employers for violating Haw. Rev. Stat. 481B-14 by invoking Haw. Rev. Stat. 388-6, 388-10, and 388-11. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that the hotel or restaurant violated section 481B-14 when it applied a service charge for the sale of food and beverage services but did not distribute the full service charge directly to Plaintiffs and failed to disclose this fact to consumers. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer a question of law and held (1) when a hotel or restaurant applying a service charge for the sale of food or beverage services allegedly violates section 481B-14 by not distributing 100 percent of the service charge directly to its employees as "tip income" and by failing to disclose this practice to the purchaser of the services, the employees may bring an action under sections 388-6, 388-10, and 388-11 to enforce their rights and to seek remedies.View "Villon v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Superior Court alleging that Restaurant.com's certificates violate the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA). Restaurant.com removed the matter to the federal district court, which granted its motion to dismiss. The judge concluded that certificates purchased by plaintiffs "provide an individual with a contingent right for discounted services at a selected restaurant[,]" but such a contingent right did not constitute the purchase of "property or service which is primarily for personal, family or household purposes." Therefore, plaintiffs were not "consumers" as defined by the TCCWNA and that the certificates were not "consumer contracts." Plaintiffs appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit certified two questions to the New Jersey Supreme Court. (reformulated): were Restaurant.com's certificates "property" under TCCWNA; if so, were they "primarily for personal, family or household purposes;" and were they a written contract, that gave or "displayed any written consumer warranty, notice, or sign." The New Jersey Court concluded that Plaintiffs were "consumers" and the certificates were "property . . . primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." Furthermore, the certificates purchased from Restaurant.com were "consumer contracts" and the standard terms provided on the certificates are "notices" subject to the TCCWNA.View "Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs refinanced their home through Lender. The monthly payment on the loan was $600 greater than Plaintiffs' total monthly income. After the mortgage was funded, it was sold and assigned to Bank. Servicer serviced the loan. After Plaintiffs defaulted on the loan, Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Plaintiffs subsequently brought this action asserting violations of the Consumer Protection Act, the Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, and the Borrower's Interest Act, and asserting that the loan was unenforceable because it was unconscionable. A superior court judge granted summary judgment to Defendants, Bank and Servicer, on all claims based on the ground that Defendants, as assignees, had no liability for the acts of Lender. The Supreme Court (1) reversed summary judgment in favor of Bank, holding that Bank was not shielded from liability as a matter of law by virtue of its status as an assignee and that Bank failed to establish the absence of material issues of disputed fact entitling it to judgment on any individual claim; and (2) affirmed summary judgment in favor of Servicer because Servicer was not shown to be an assignee and Plaintiffs offered no alternative basis on which Servicer might be held liable. Remanded.View "Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Leonards entered into contracts with Centennial for the sale of a log home kit and construction of a custom log home. The Leonards later released Centennial from any claims for damages for defective construction or warranty arising out of the home's construction. Greg and Elvira Johnston held a thirty-six percent interest in the property at the time the release was signed. Eventually, all interest in the property was transferred to the Elvira Johnston Trust. A few years later, because of a number of construction defects affecting the structural integrity of the house, the Johnstons decided to demolish the house. The Johnstons sued Centennnial for negligent construction, breach of statutory and implied warranties, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Centennial, finding that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and were waived by the Leonards' release. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court's ruling that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and directed that the decision on remand apply only to the interest owned by the Johnstons at the time the release was executed; and (2) affirmed the district court's conclusion that the release was binding on the Leonards' sixty-four percent interest, later transferred to the Trust.View "Johnston v. Centennial Log Homes & Furnishings, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, FIA Card Services, filed a complaint against Defendant to recover damages for Defendant's unpaid credit card account. The district court subsequently entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff, as the moving party and party with the burden of proof at trial, failed to establish that there was no dispute of material fact as to each element of the cause of action where the record did not sufficiently establish either the existence of Defendant's credit card account or that Plaintiff was the owner of that account. Remanded.View "FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Saintonge" on Justia Law