Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Katelyn Hove was hospitalized in 2018 for pregnancy complications, and the Billings Clinic billed Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of Montana for her services. BCBS of Montana indicated that BCBS of Texas was her insurance provider. BCBS of Texas paid part of the bill, leaving a balance that Hove did not pay. The clinic assigned the unpaid debt to CB1, a debt-collection agency, which then sued the Hoves for breach of contract, breach of obligation, and unjust enrichment. The Hoves named BCBS of Montana as a third-party defendant. CB1 moved for summary judgment, supported by affidavits from the clinic. Hove responded with a written declaration disputing the charges, including an EOB from BCBS of Texas and an email from the Montana Commissioner of Securities and Insurance.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, granted summary judgment in favor of CB1, reasoning that Hove's declaration and attached EOB were unverified and inadmissible. The court entered a final monetary judgment against the Hoves. The Hoves filed a motion to amend the judgment, attaching a sworn affidavit with the same information as the declaration. The District Court denied the motion, stating that the declaration and its attachments were inadmissible hearsay and that the declaration did not meet the statutory criteria under § 1-6-105, MCA.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and found that a declaration under § 1-6-105, MCA, is equivalent to an affidavit. The court determined that Hove's declaration, which stated she never spent time in the ICU despite being billed for it, raised a genuine issue of material fact. The court reversed the District Court's summary judgment and remanded the case for trial on the merits. View "CB1 v. Hove" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jodi Bourgeois and Pamela Smith filed separate lawsuits against The TJX Companies, Inc., Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., and The Gap, Inc., alleging violations of the New Hampshire Driver Privacy Act (NH DPA). The plaintiffs claimed that the retailers required them to present their driver's licenses for non-receipted returns and subsequently disclosed their driver's license information to a third party, The Retail Equation (TRE), without their consent. The plaintiffs argued that this disclosure violated sections IX(a) and IX(b) of the NH DPA.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire dismissed the complaints in all three cases. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the NH DPA because a driver's license in the possession of the person to whom it pertains is not considered a "motor vehicle record" under the statute. The court also found that the information disclosed to TRE was not from a "department record" as defined by the NH DPA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court affirmed the district court's dismissals, agreeing that the plaintiffs' driver's licenses, in their own possession, are not "motor vehicle records" under the NH DPA. The court also held that the term "department record" refers to authentic copies of documents deposited and kept with the New Hampshire Department of Safety, and the information disclosed to TRE did not fall within this definition. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims under sections IX(a) and IX(b) of the NH DPA were not supported by the facts alleged. View "Bourgeois v. The TJX Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

A debt buyer, Velocity Investments, LLC, purchased consumer debt from Citibank, N.A., which had been charged off as a loss. Velocity sent a written communication to David Chai regarding the debt but failed to include the required notice of Chai’s right to request records, as mandated by the Fair Debt Buying Practices Act. Chai filed a lawsuit individually and on behalf of a putative class, seeking statutory damages under the Act, while disclaiming any concrete injury from the violation.The Santa Clara County Superior Court certified a class of individuals who received similar communications from Velocity. Velocity moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Chai lacked standing because he admitted to no concrete injury. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that the Act requires a consumer to have suffered actual damage to sue. Chai appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the Fair Debt Buying Practices Act does not condition a consumer’s claim for statutory damages on the existence of actual damages. The court found that the Act allows consumers to seek statutory damages for violations of their rights under the Act, regardless of whether they suffered actual damages. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment, allowing Chai to pursue his claim for statutory damages. View "Chai v. Velocity Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

Charles and Yvette Whittier sued Ocwen Loan Servicing, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Merscorp, and Mortgage Electronic Registration System to prevent the foreclosure of their home mortgage loan. The parties reached a settlement and notified the district court, which issued an interim order of dismissal pending final documentation. The parties then filed a Joint Stipulation to Dismiss Action under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and a proposed Order of Dismissal With Prejudice, which stated that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. However, the court's dismissal order did not explicitly retain jurisdiction or incorporate the settlement terms.The Whittiers later filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement and sought attorneys' fees. The defendants argued that the court lacked ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. A magistrate judge recommended enjoining foreclosure proceedings, and the district judge adopted this recommendation, issuing an injunction in April 2020. Over two years later, PHH and Deutsche Bank moved to reopen the case and dissolve the injunction, claiming the Whittiers were in default. A different magistrate judge found that the court lacked ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement and recommended dissolving the injunction. The district judge agreed, dissolved the injunction, and dismissed the suit with prejudice in May 2024, explicitly declining jurisdiction over the settlement agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the district court lacked ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement because the dismissal order did not expressly retain jurisdiction or incorporate the settlement terms. The court affirmed the district court's decision to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the case with prejudice. View "Whittier v. Ocwen Loan Servicing" on Justia Law

Sterling Senechal submitted a claim to Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company for water damage caused by a broken water heater. Allstate issued three payments totaling $12,410.48. After a dispute over the loss amount, an appraisal determined the actual cash value to be $58,396.58, which Allstate paid minus the deductible and prior payments. Senechal then filed a lawsuit alleging breach of contract, violations of the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act (TPPCA), bad faith claims under Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code, and breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. Allstate removed the case to federal court and paid what it calculated as the maximum potential interest owed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate on all claims. Senechal conceded the breach of contract claim but opposed summary judgment on the other claims. The district court ruled that Allstate's payment of the appraisal award and interest defeated Senechal's claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment on Senechal's bad faith claims under Chapter 541 and common law, citing the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, which held that payment of an appraisal award and interest precludes recovery for bad faith claims unless there is an independent injury. However, the court vacated the summary judgment on Senechal's TPPCA claims, noting that payment of an appraisal award and interest does not automatically absolve an insurer of TPPCA liability. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Allstate's initial payment "roughly corresponds" with the appraisal award and whether Allstate is liable under the TPPCA. View "Senechal v. Allstate" on Justia Law

The City of Martinsville, Virginia, sued Express Scripts and OptumRx in state court, alleging public nuisance and harm related to the opioid epidemic. The defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, but the district court remanded it back to state court. In 2024, the defendants again removed the case to federal court under the federal-officer-removal statute. The district court granted Martinsville's motion to remand the case to state court.The defendants appealed the remand order before it was mailed to the state court and requested a stay of the remand order pending appeal, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski. The district court denied the stay, interpreting Coinbase narrowly to apply only to orders compelling arbitration. The defendants then sought a stay from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit granted the stay, holding that the district court was automatically stayed from mailing the remand order once the defendants filed their notice of appeal. The court applied the "Griggs principle," which divests the district court of control over aspects of the case involved in the appeal. The court found that the district court's interpretation of Coinbase was too narrow and that the automatic stay applied to the remand order. The court concluded that the district court lacked the authority to mail the remand order while the appeal was pending. View "City of Martinsville v. Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

Richard Martinez, a licensed plumber, contracted with Gayle Jelley to construct a pool in her backyard for $26,900. Jelley made several payments totaling $9,000, but Martinez abandoned the project after partially completing the excavation and rebar installation. It was later discovered that Martinez's contractor's license had expired before the project began. The Department of Consumer Affairs, Contractors State Licensing Board (CSLB) confirmed that Martinez had never held a valid contractor's license and had previously received three administrative citations for unlicensed contracting.The People charged Martinez with grand theft, acting as a contractor without a license, requiring an excessive downpayment, and unlawfully receiving payments exceeding the work performed. Martinez was arraigned on December 9, 2021, and later filed a motion to dismiss based on a violation of his speedy trial rights, citing a four-and-a-half-year delay in prosecution. He argued that the delay resulted in the loss of key witnesses and evidence, causing actual prejudice to his defense.The Superior Court of Riverside County granted Martinez's motion to dismiss, citing the prosecution's lack of effort to arrest Martinez after the complaint was filed. The People appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard by not requiring Martinez to demonstrate actual prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Martinez failed to affirmatively demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the delay, as required under state constitutional law. The court also noted that the trial court did not conduct the necessary analysis of the four factors required to determine a federal speedy trial violation for the misdemeanor charges. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision in part and remanded the case with directions to conduct the proper analysis for the federal speedy trial claim on the misdemeanor charges and to deny the motion to dismiss on the felony charge. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The case involves Eastern Maine Medical Center and eight other Maine hospitals (the Hospitals) who filed a 509-page complaint against various businesses and individuals (the Opioid Sellers) involved in the marketing and distribution of prescription opioids. The Hospitals alleged that the Opioid Sellers created illegitimate demand for opioids and unlawfully increased supply, leading to an opioid epidemic that caused the Hospitals to incur high costs for treating patients with opioid misuse, addiction, and dependency, with only partial reimbursement from insurance.The Business and Consumer Docket (Duddy, J.) dismissed the Hospitals' complaint. The court found that the complaint did not comply with the requirement for a "short and plain statement" of the claim but chose to dismiss it based on the legal insufficiency of the claims. The court concluded that the Hospitals could not recover under any of their legal theories, including negligence, public nuisance, unjust enrichment, fraud and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and civil conspiracy. The court also denied the Hospitals' request for leave to amend their complaint.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's dismissal. The court held that the Hospitals' claims were legally insufficient. Specifically, the court found that the Hospitals did not have a direct negligence claim, as they did not suffer harm directly caused by the Opioid Sellers. The fraud and misrepresentation claims failed due to lack of reliance by the Hospitals on the Opioid Sellers' misrepresentations. The unjust enrichment claim was dismissed because the Hospitals did not confer a benefit on the Opioid Sellers. The public nuisance claim failed as the Hospitals did not suffer a special injury different in kind from the public. Lastly, the civil conspiracy claim was dismissed as it required an underlying tort, which was not present. The court concluded that the deficiencies in the complaint could not be remedied by amendment. View "Eastern Maine Medical Center v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

Sheryl Glover and Cathy Booze, plaintiffs, argued that Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by charging optional fees for expedited mortgage payments online or by phone. Ocwen offered borrowers the option to make expedited payments for an additional fee, while mailed payments incurred no fee. Glover and Booze paid these fees multiple times, but their mortgage agreements did not mention such fees.The Southern District of Florida held that Ocwen was acting as a debt collector when it charged the fees, that the fees were incidental to the principal obligation, and that they were not permitted by law nor authorized by the debt agreements. The district court awarded actual damages to Glover and Booze. Ocwen appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Ocwen, as a debt collector, violated the FDCPA by charging an amount not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. The court emphasized that the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from collecting any amount unless it is expressly authorized by the debt agreement or permitted by law. The court found that the convenience fees were not permitted by law, as neither the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) nor the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA) substantively authorized such fees. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Glover and Booze. View "Glover v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

A California consumer entered into an agreement with an RV manufacturer that stipulated all legal disputes would be resolved in Indiana under Indiana law. The consumer later filed a lawsuit in California under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, alleging the RV manufacturer failed to repair or replace a defective motorhome. The manufacturer moved to stay or dismiss the action based on forum non conveniens, arguing that the case should be heard in Indiana. To address concerns about the consumer's rights under the Song-Beverly Act, the manufacturer offered to stipulate that California law would apply to the warranty claims in Indiana.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the manufacturer's motion, stating that the forum selection clause was not unconscionable and that the consumer's rights could be preserved by staying the California action while the Indiana case was pending. The court concluded that if the Indiana court declined to apply the Song-Beverly Act, the consumer could move to lift the stay in California.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and found that the lower court erred in its application of the legal standard. The appellate court held that the stipulation to apply California law in Indiana did not cure the unconscionability of the forum selection clause. The court emphasized that the agreement, as written, was void and against public policy because it attempted to waive unwaivable rights under the Song-Beverly Act. The appellate court concluded that severing the unconscionable terms would condone an illegal practice and that the lower court's solution violated California public policy.The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case, ordering the trial court to deny the motion to dismiss or stay. The appellate court's decision underscores the importance of protecting California consumers' unwaivable statutory rights and ensuring that forum selection clauses do not undermine those rights. View "Hardy v. Forest River, Inc." on Justia Law