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Plaintiff filed suit against CarMax, alleging breaches of express and implied warranties, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200 (UCL), and a violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). When plaintiff purchased her car at a CarMax dealership, she was not informed that there was an outstanding safety recall relating to the stop lamp switch in the vehicle. In regard to the alleged breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the Court of Appeal concluded that CarMax's express limitations on the remedies available applied to such a breach. The court explained that plaintiff obtained the remedy authorized under the contract and its limitations for a breach of warranty. However, plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to establish CarMax engaged in unfair or deceptive practices in violation of the CLRA, and plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to establish CarMax had a duty to disclose the safety recall. Finally, plaintiff stated a cause of action under the UCL where the violation of the CLRA served as the predicate violation of law necessary to establish the unlawful practice variety of unfair competition that was actionable under the UCL. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Gutierrez v. CarMax Auto Superstores California" on Justia Law

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In this class action lawsuit, the court of appeal correctly relied on Eggert v. Pacific States S. & L. Co., 20 Cal. 2d, 199 (Cal. 1942) in ruling that unnamed class members may not appeal a class judgment, settlement, or attorney fees award unless they intervene in the action. In the instant case, Class Representatives alleged that Restoration Hardware, Inc. (RHI) committed violations of the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act. The trial court found RHI liable for violations of the Act and awarded Representatives attorney fees. Appellant, an unnamed class member who never exercised her right to intervene during the class action by filing a complaint in intervention, filed a notice of appeal, challenging the award of attorney fees. The court of appeal dismissing Muller’s appeal for lack of standing, concluding that it was bound to follow Eggert. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, where Muller failed to intervene in the class action or file a motion to vacate the judgment and offered no persuasive reason why the court should create an exception to its long-standing rule, or overrule or distinguish Eggert, Muller was not entitled to relief. View "Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc." on Justia Law

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After RAC Acceptance East, LLC swore out a warrant for Mira Brown’s arrest for theft by conversion of furniture that she had rented from RAC, Brown filed a lawsuit against RAC alleging malicious prosecution and other torts. The trial court entered an order granting RAC’s motion to compel Brown to arbitrate her claims pursuant to the arbitration agreement incorporated into the parties’ rental agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed that order, concluding that whether RAC had waived its right to demand arbitration by its conduct in initiating the related criminal proceeding against Brown was a matter for the court to decide and that the trial court had correctly ruled that RAC did not waive arbitration. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari, and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment on the ground that the delegation provision in the parties’ arbitration agreement clearly gave the arbitrator, not the courts, the authority to determine that RAC did not waive by prior litigation conduct its right to seek arbitration, and the arbitrator’s decision on the waiver question could not be properly challenged as legally erroneous. View "Brown v. RAC Acceptance East, LLC" on Justia Law

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Malik Hasan ordered wine from Premier Cru Fine Wines (Premier Cru) and paid with credit cards issued by Chase Bank USA, N.A. (Chase) and American Express Centurion Bank (AmEx). Premier Cru declared bankruptcy while Hasan was still waiting for delivery of wine that he paid nearly $1 million for. Hasan claimed that under a provision of the Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA), Chase and AmEx had to refund his accounts the amount he paid for wine that Premier Cru failed to deliver. But because the Tenth Circuit rejected Hasan’s interpretation of that FCBA provision, it affirmed the district court’s orders dismissing his complaints against Chase and AmEx. View "Hasan v. Chase Bank USA" on Justia Law

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Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 1112 is facially constitutional, and, in the instant case, the trial court’s admission of a lab certificate in lieu of live witness testimony pursuant to that statute was not a violation of Defendant’s right of confrontation. Defendant appealed from a judgment, entered after a jury trial, convicting her of unlawful trafficking of a schedule W drug. At issue was whether the trial court’s admission of a lab certificate identifying a substance exchanged in a controlled purchase as methamphetamine. The court admitted the lab certificate in lieu of the testimony of the chemist pursuant to section 1112. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 1112 is facially constitutional; (2) Defendant’s failure to timely demand a live witness pursuant to section 1112 effected a voluntary, knowing, and intentional waiver of her Confrontation Clause rights; and (3) therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing into admission the chemist’s certificate in lieu of live testimony. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit’s review centered on how, or even whether, an important-but-subtle and often confusing doctrine limiting federal-court jurisdiction should apply to a unique Colorado procedure for “nonjudicial” foreclosure of mortgages. Plaintiff Mary Mayotte was the debtor on a note held by U.S. Bank, NA. Wells Fargo serviced the loan for U.S. Bank. One allegation was that Plaintiff contacted Wells Fargo to modify her loan, that Wells Fargo told her she needed to miss three payments to secure a modification, and that she eventually took this advice. Rather than granting her a modification, however, Wells Fargo placed her in default. She further alleged the defendants fabricated documents, that their actions rendered her title unmarketable, that they had no ownership interest in her promissory note or property, that they have been unjustly enriched by accepting payments not due them, that they damaged her credit standing, and that they violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The jurisdictional doctrine raised by this appeal was the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which forbade lower federal courts from reviewing state-court civil judgments. Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 120 requires creditors pursuing nonjudicial foreclosure to first obtain a ruling by a Colorado trial court that there is a reasonable probability that a default exists. The Tenth Circuit determined it did not need to decide whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred a federal court challenge to a Rule 120 proceeding or ruling: the federal-court suit here was not barred because none of the claims (at least none pursued on appeal) challenged the Rule 120 proceedings or sought to set aside the Rule 120 ruling. The Court left that issue for the district court on remand to consider what effect, if any, the Rule 120 ruling may have had on this case under state-law doctrines of claim and issue preclusion. View "Mayotte v. U.S. Bank National Association" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellant Dennis Obduskey appealed a district court’s order granting Defendants-Appellees Wells Fargo and McCarthy and Holthus, LLP’s motions to dismiss numerous claims, including whether either party was liable as a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). In 2014, Wells Fargo hired McCarthy and Holthus, LLP, a law firm, to pursue a non-judicial foreclosure on Obduskey’s home. Obduskey responded to a letter McCarthy sent him; rather than responding further, McCarthy initiated a foreclosure action. Obduskey then filed this action claiming (1) a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; (2) a violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act; (3) defamation; (4) extreme and outrageous conduct - emotional distress; and (5) commencement of an unlawful collections action. Wells Fargo and McCarthy filed motions to dismiss, which the district court granted on all claims. Regarding the FDCPA claim, the district court held that Wells Fargo was not liable because it began servicing the loan prior to default. It also held that McCarthy was not a “debt collector” because “foreclosure proceedings are not a collection of a debt,” but it noted that “not all courts have agreed” on whether foreclosure proceedings are covered under the FDCPA. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that the FDCPA does not apply to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings in Colorado, and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Obduskey’s claims. View "Obduskey v. Wells Fargo" on Justia Law

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Justin Vigos appealed a district court’s decision to reverse a magistrate court’s order granting his motion for summary judgment against MFG Financial, Inc. (MFG). MFG initiated this action to recover damages from a breach of contract. In 2007, Vigos purchased a vehicle from Karl Malone Toyota. The contract was assigned to Courtesy Auto Credit (Courtesy). After some time, Vigos defaulted on the contract and the vehicle was repossessed and sold at auction. Courtesy then allegedly assigned the contract to MFG who initiated this action in 2015. After discovery, the parties each filed a motion for summary judgment. The magistrate court granted Vigos’s motion for summary judgment, finding that MFG had not presented sufficient admissible evidence to show that it was a real party in interest. MFG appealed and the district court reversed the decision of the magistrate court. Vigos appealed, arguing that the district court applied the wrong standard when it failed to first determine if evidence was admissible before considering it for purposes of summary judgment. MFG cross appealed, arguing that the district court erred when it failed to award it attorney fees on appeal. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "MFG Financial Inc. v. Vigos" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, Wisconsin residents, incurred and defaulted on debts for medical services. Plaintiffs’ creditors assigned these debts to FSGB, a collection agency. FSGB sent plaintiffs letters stating: As of the date of this letter, you owe $[a stated amount]. Because of interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater. Hence, if you pay the amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary after we receive your check. Plaintiffs filed a class action, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692–1692p, claiming that FSGB’s letter is false because, under Wisconsin law, FSGB cannot lawfully or contractually impose “late charges and other charges” and that the letter causes unsophisticated consumers to incorrectly believe that they will avoid such charges if they immediately send payment. FSGB argued that the statement tracks the Seventh Circuit's "safe harbor language" from its 2000 “Miller” decision and that it is entitled to charge interest. The district court dismissed, acknowledging that some of the safe harbor language did not “strictly” apply but finding FSGB’s letter conveyed “the crucial fact” that plaintiffs’ debts were variable. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Debt collectors cannot immunize themselves from FDCPA liability by blindly copying and pasting the Miller safe harbor language without regard for whether that language is accurate under the circumstances. View "Boucher v. Finance System of Green Bay, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant’s request for substitution of counsel in this criminal proceeding. Appellant pleaded guilty to deliberate homicide. Thereafter, Appellant made a request for substitution of counsel. After a hearing, the district court deemed the representation matter resolved because the Office of the State Public Defender denied Appellant’s request for new counsel and Appellant had not appealed that decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court failed adequately to inquire into Defendant’s complaints regarding his counsel, which necessitated a remand. On remand, the district court issued an order again denying Appellant’s request for substitution of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it inquired into Appellant’s complaints of ineffective assistance of counsel and in denying his request for substitution of counsel. View "State v. Schowengerdt" on Justia Law