Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

The Attorney General brought an action against Corporation, which sold memberships in buying programs giving members the option to purchase various goods and services at discounted rates, alleging violations of the Buying Club Membership Law (BCL) and the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) and seeking civil penalties for consumer frauds committed against the elderly. The district court concluded (1) many of Corporation's marketing and sales practices violated the BCL and CFA; (2) Corporation did not commit consumer frauds against the elderly; and (3) application of the BCL to Corporation's solicitation practices did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The court awarded more than $25 million in consumer reimbursement, civil penalties, and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and modified, holding (1) Corporation's telemarketing and Internet practices violated the CFA; (2) Corporation's solicitations and its memberships offering one or more discount features were subject to the terms of the BCL; (3) application of the BCL to Corporation's solicitations did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause; (4) affirmed the reimbursement award for BCL violations as modified; and (5) reversed the ruling that the State was not entitled to civil penalties for consumer frauds committed by the elderly.View "State ex rel. Miller v. Vertrue, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a California resident, was sexually assaulted while vacationing in Mexico. The assault occurred while Petitioner received a complimentary massage in exchange for her attendance at a resort's timeshare presentation. Petitioner sued the resort, a corporation with its primary place of business in Florida, (the Florida Defendants) for negligent vacation packaging. The Florida Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, arguing that Mexico would be a more convenient forum. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding that the court misapplied the forum non conveniens analysis, particularly by failing to afford a strong presumption in favor of Plaintiff's initial choice of an otherwise proper forum.View "Cortez v. Palace Resorts, Inc." on Justia Law

The cases underlying these consolidated appeals involved the purchase of an automobile. Plaintiffs purchased vehicles and signed retail installment contracts with three separate dealers. The dealers assigned their rights in the contract and vehicles to Credit Acceptance Corporation, who financed the purchases. All of the contracts contained arbitration clauses. Plaintiffs later commenced civil actions against Credit Acceptance in circuit court, alleging, inter alia, violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection act (WVCCPA). Credit Acceptance filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss, which the circuit court denied, finding that the arbitration agreements were unconscionable based upon the unavailability of some of the arbitration forums named therein and because Plaintiffs in the agreements waived their respective rights to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed in both of the cases, holding that because one of the arbitration forums named in the arbitration agreements remained available to arbitrate the parties' disputes, and because an arbitration agreement is not unenforceable solely because a party to the contract waives her right to a jury trial, the causes must be remanded for entry of orders compelling arbitration.View "Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front" on Justia Law

Respondent refinanced the mortgage on his home with a loan he obtained from Petitioner. Because Respondent failed to make his monthly loan payments in accordance with the parties' agreement, Petitioner invoked its right to initiate a foreclosure sale of the house. After the foreclosure sale, the property was sold to Petitioner. Because Respondent refused to vacate the house, Petitioner filed an unlawful detainer action. In response, Respondent asserted various counterclaims against Petitioner alleging violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. The circuit court conditionally granted Petitioner's motion to dismiss Respondent's counterclaims and additionally certified two questions for the Supreme Court's consideration regarding whether Respondent timely asserted his counterclaims. The Supreme Court concluded that the counterclaims were not timely.View "Tribeca Lending Corp. v. McCormick" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced a putative class action against Defendant, alleging violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Dell successfully moved to compel arbitration according to an arbitration agreement signed by the parties. An arbitrator concluded that the parties waived class action relief by signing the agreement. In Feeney I, the Supreme Court invalidated the class waiver provision in the arbitration agreement. In this subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement was properly invalidated where (1) Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court after Feeney I, precluded the invalidation of class waiver provisions in arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, such as the one at issue here, and therefore, Concepcion undid the principal rationale for the Court's decision in Feeney I; (2) a court is not foreclosed from invalidating an arbitration agreement that includes a class action waiver where a plaintiff can demonstrate he effectively cannot pursue a claim against the defendant in individual arbitration according to the terms of his agreement, thus rendering his or her claim nonremediable; and (3) Plaintiffs demonstrated that they could not pursue their statutory claim under the individual claim arbitration process required by the arbitration agreement.View "Feeney v. Dell Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Anita Johnson purchased a vehicle from a dealership operated by JF Enterprises. Johnson signed numerous documents at a single sitting, including a retail installment contract and a one-page arbitration agreement. In 2010, Johnson sued the dealership, its president (Franklin), and the vehicle manufacturer (American Suzuki), claiming negligent misrepresentation. Franklin and JF Enterprises moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement. The trial court overruled the motion, finding that the installment contract did not refer to or incorporate the arbitration agreement and contained a merger clause stating that it contained the parties' entire agreement as to financing. The Supreme Court reversed after noting that contemporaneously signed documents will be construed together and harmonized if possible, holding that because the separate arbitration agreement was a dispute resolution agreement, not an additional financing document, it could be harmonized with the installment contract and was not voided by operation of the merger clause.View "Johnson v. JF Enters., LLC" on Justia Law

Timmy and Stephanie Blackmon sued Eddie Powell (d/b/a Powell Plumbing Company) for negligence, wantonness, breach of implied warranties and breach of contract following a water-line rupture that caused extensive flooding and water damage. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Powell, and the Blackmons appealed. Finding the evidence in the trial court record supported the motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Blackmon v. Powell" on Justia Law

In 2001, Plaintiff, a special education student at a public elementary school in the town of Duxbury, fell and sustained injuries while unsupervised at school. Plaintiff presented a claim to the town based on her injuries. The Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, an association that settles unpaid claims covered by an insurance policy issued by an insurer that later becomes insolvent, made no offer to settle Plaintiff's claim despite its obligation to defend the town. Plaintiff subsequently commenced a consumer action against the insolvency fund. The superior court allowed the insolvency fund's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court decided that the insolvency fund was subject to consumer actions and remanded the case. The parties subsequently settled Plaintiff's negligence claim. A superior court judge ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees, a decision the insolvency fund appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where, as here, a plaintiff prevails in a consumer action against the insolvency fund under the consumer protection act, the insolvency fund is liable for reasonable attorney's fees.View "Wheatley v. Mass. Insurers Insolvency Fund" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified three questions regarding the operation of the State's law governing non-judicial foreclosure to the Georgia Supreme Court. After careful analysis, the Georgia Court concluded that current law did not require a party seeking to exercise a power of sale in a deed to secure debt to hold, in addition to the deed, the promissory note evidencing the underlying debt. The Court also concluded that the plain language of the State statute governing notice to the debtor (OCGA 44-14-162.2), required only that the notice identify "the individual or entity [with] full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage with the debtor." This construction of OCGA 44-14-162.2 rendered moot the third and final certified question. View "You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from appellee Bank of America, N.A.'s attempts to enforce the terms of the promissory note and deed to secure debt executed in its favor by appellant Johnta M. Austin ("Borrower"). The Bank sued to collect the debt it claimed the Borrower owed as a result of default, including attorney fees, and the trial court awarded the Bank summary judgment. The issue came on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court because the constitutionality of the statute at issue was called into question. The Court has long held that "all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature and that before an [a]ct of the legislature can be declared unconstitutional, the conflict between it and the fundamental law must be clear and palpable and [the] Court must be clearly satisfied of its unconstitutionality." The Court found that the statute in this case bore a rational relation to the purpose for which the statute was intended, namely to provide debtors with the opportunity to avoid the contractual obligation to pay the creditor’s attorney fees by allowing the debtor a last chance to pay the balance of the debt and avoid litigation. Further, the Court concluded that the application of OCGA 13-1-11 to arrive at the amount of the award of attorney fees in this case was neither punitive nor violative of Borrowers’ due process rights, nor was the award contrary to the intent of the statute. View "Austin v. Bank of America N.A." on Justia Law