Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Experience Hendrix filed suit against Pitsicalis alleging that Pitsicalis was infringing trademarks in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051-1127, and that the trademark infringement also amounted to an unfair or deceptive trade practice proscribed by Washington's Consumer Protection Act (WCPA), Wash. Rev. Code 19.86.010-19.86.920. Determining that Pitsicalis had Article III standing, the court concluded, inter alia, that the WPRA was constitutional as applied to the narrow set of non-speculative circumstances at issue in this case; Pitsicalis was liable under the Lanham Act for using domain names that infringed Experience Hendrix's trademark "Hendrix"; and Paragraph 5 of the permanent injunction failed to state clearly the terms of the injunction and did not describe in reasonable detail the acts that were and were not restrained. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's determination that the Washington statute was unconstitutional and remanded Pitsicalis's declaratory judgment claims pertaining to the WPRA with instructions to enter judgment on those claims in favor of Experience Hendrix; affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment on Experience Hendrix's claim that Pitsicalis's use of domain names infringed Experience Hendrix's mark; vacated the permanent injunction and remanded so the district court could revise the language at issue; reversed the Rule 50(b)(3) decision to strike most of the jury's award of damages under both the Lanham Act and the WPRA; affirmed the district court's order granting a new trial on damages under both statutes; remanded for a new trial on such damages; vacated the district court's award of attorney's fees under the WCPA; and remanded the fee request for further proceedings. View "Experience Hendrix v. HendrixLicensing.com" on Justia Law

Scott alleged that Westlake repeatedly called her cell phone using an automated dialer in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, and sought, for herself and a putative class, statutory damages of $500 for each negligent violation and $1500 for each intentional violation, injunctive relief, and attorney fees. Before she moved for class certification, Westlake sent Scott’s attorney an offer to pay Scott $1500 (the statutory maximum) “for each and every dialer-generated telephone call made to plaintiff.” Westlake agreed to pay costs and to entry of an injunction. The message concluded by warning Scott that, in Westlake’s opinion, its offer rendered her case moot. The next day, Scott moved for class certification and declined the offer, stating that there was “a significant controversy” concerning how many dialer-generated calls Westlake had placed to her phone, so the offer was inadequate and did not render her case moot. The district court dismissed, finding that Westlake had offered Scott everything she sought, depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction, but retained jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the offer and directed the parties to conduct discovery to determine how many calls Scott received from Westlake. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the case is not moot. View "Scott v. Westlake Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1998, consumer class actions were filed against Trans Union alleging violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, by selling consumer information to target marketers and credit and insurance companies. The court approved a settlement. Trans Union agreed to give all class members “basic” credit monitoring services. Class members could also either claim cash from a $75 million fund or claim “enhanced” in-kind relief consisting of additional financial services. Trans Union was to provide $35 million worth of enhanced relief. The class was estimated at 190 million people. The Act authorizes damages of between $100 and $1000 per consumer for willful violations, so Trans Union faced theoretically possible liability of $190 billion. To persuade the court to approve the settlement, the parties agreed to an unusual provision that preserved substantive claims after settlement. Instead of releasing their claims, class members who did not get cash or enhanced in-kind relief retained the right to bring individual claims. Trans Union also partially waived the limitations period. The settlement authorized reimbursements from the fund to Trans Union itself “equal to any amounts paid to satisfy settlements or judgments arising from Post-Settlement Claims,” not including defense costs. There have been more PSCs than expected, depleting the fund. In a second appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the orders authorizing disbursement of the remainder of the fund. View "Wheelahan v. Trans Union LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs received letters from defendants that stated: Unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid. If you notify this office within 30 days from receiving this notice, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of the judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C 1692g(a) requires the debt collector to include “a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector” and a “statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.” Plaintiffs claimed noncompliance because the notice omits the phrase “that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed.” One letter referred to “your just debt;” the recipient alleged that the phrase suggests that the debt’s validity has been confirmed. Four trial courts dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that any written request for verification constitutes a dispute for purposes of the Act. The reference to “just debt” was mere puffery. View "Borucki v. Vision Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of cardholders who paid credit card penalty fees, challenged those fees on constitutional grounds. Plaintiffs argued that the fees are analogous to punitive damages imposed in the tort context and are subject to substantive due process limits described in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. The court concluded that the due process analysis developed in the context of jury-awarded punitive damages was not applicable to contractual penalty clauses. Further, there was no derivative liability under the Unfair Competition Law. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint where constitutional due process jurisprudence did not prevent enforcement of excessive penalty clauses in private contracts and the fees were permissible under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. 85-86, and the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA), 12 U.S.C. 1831d(a). View "In re: Late Fee & Over-Limit Fee Litigation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s nine-year-old daughter, N.K., was injured when N.K.'s sandals, popularly known as CROCS, were caught in an escalator, causing N.K. to sustain injuries. Plaintiff invoked diversity jurisdiction and brought suit against Crocs, Inc. (Defendant) in the United States District Court for, inter alia, failure to warn and breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to adduce significantly probative evidence that CROCS present a heightened risk of escalator entrapment sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find in her favor. View "Geshke v. Crocs, Inc." on Justia Law

After appellants failed to pay their medical debts, Urology and UAB West referred the accounts to Franklin Collection Service and added to appellants' accounts a charge for collection fees. The court held that Franklin violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p, when it collected from appellants a debt that included a 33-and-1/3% "collection fee" when appellants only agreed to pay the actual costs of collection. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Franklin on appellants claims under section 1692f of the FDCPA. The court affirmed the remaining federal and state law claims. View "Bradley, et al. v. Franklin Collection Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Gerald Eller argued that since the 1990's, defendant-appellee Trans Union, LLC included multiple erroneous entries on his credit report. In this third case against the company, plaintiff brought his claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Specifically, plaintiff argued that Trans Union willfully and negligently violated the FCRA with the entries on his report. Trans Union counterclaims, arguing that plaintiff had breached the terms of a 2006 settlement agreement. A jury returned a verdict in Trans Union's favor on all issues. Plaintiff appealed, arguing multiple errors at trial. Finding none, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Eller v. Trans Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners, filed an action against Defendant, a bank, alleging eleven counts of state law violations for Defendant’s decision to deny Plaintiffs’ application for a loan modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program and to foreclose on Plaintiffs’ home. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, holding that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act, rescission, negligence, and promissory estoppel. View "MacKenzie v. Flagstar Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit in state court alleging that Quicken Loans originated unlawful loans in West Virginia and that Defendant Appraisers, which included both the named appraisers and the unnamed class of appraisers, were complicit in the scheme. Quicken Loans removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The district court then granted plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court under the local controversy exception. Quicken Loans appealed. The court vacated and remanded for a determination by the district court as to whether the named defendant appraisers satisfied the "at least 1 defendant" requirement of the local controversy exception. View "Quicken Loans Inc. v. Alig" on Justia Law