Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

State Farm filed a complaint for negligence against Appellant, alleging that Appellant was at fault in an automobile accident with State Farm's insured. Appellant counterclaimed, alleging that State Farm was unjustly enriched as a result of having engaged in the deceptive and unlawful business practice of causing collection-style letters to be mailed in an attempt to collect unadjudicated, potential subrogation claims as debts. Appellant's counterclaim identified two putative classes. State Farm filed a motion to strike the class allegations. Rather than granting the motion to strike class allegations, the circuit court denied class certification "for the reasons stated in State Farm's motion." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court acted without due consideration of the Court's foregoing case law on typicality, commonality, and predominance and therefore abused its discretion in prematurely denying class certification at the early pleading stage of this case. Remanded. View "Kersten v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Glen Llewellyn filed this action asserting a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim, a Fair Credit Reporting Act claim, and a state law outrageous conduct claim against Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC and Nomura Credit and Capital, Inc. (collectively, the Ocwen Defendants) based on their alleged credit reporting inaccuracies, and asserting an FDCPA and an outrageous conduct claim against Castle Meinhold & Stawiarski, LLC in connection with foreclosure actions CMS took against Plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment for the Defendants on each of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff appealed, arguing summary judgment was inappropriate on his FCRA and FDCPA claims. Upon review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit reversed the portion of the district court's order granting summary judgment to the Ocwen Defendants on Plaintiff's FCRA claim based on his alleged emotional damages and remanded the case for further proceedings. The district court's order was otherwise affirmed. View "Llewellyn v. Allstate Home Loans" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Tenant Tracker alleging that it failed to adopt reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy of its credit reporting, in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. Plaintiff claimed that Tenant Tracker violated the FCRA by including entries in her credit report that did not accurately reflect her own background. The court held that plaintiff did not present competent evidence that she suffered actual damages under the FCRA where the only alleged harm she suffered was emotional injury. The corroboration of a brief episode of frustration and unhappiness did not constitute a genuine injury and actual damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of her suit. View "Taylor v. Tenant Tracker, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Thomas and Vera Gladden appealed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Respondent Palmetto Home Inspection Services, alleging the limit of liability provision in a home inspection contract was unenforceable as violative of public policy and as unconscionable under the facts of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that contractual limitation of a home inspector's liability did not violate South Carolina public policy as expressed by the General Assembly and, as a matter of law, was not so oppressive that no reasonable person would make it and no fair and honest person would accept it. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to the inspector. View "Gladden v. Palmetto Home Inspections" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated this putative class action against Priceline, seeking compensatory, punitive, and equitable relief for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and contract, as well as a violation of Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110b. Plaintiffs' claims arose from Priceline's alleged failure to disclose to users of its "Name Your Own Price" booking service that a successful bid for a hotel room would generally exceed the amount Priceline itself compensated the hotel vendor, with Priceline retaining the difference as profit. Because plaintiffs failed as a matter of law to allege an agency relationship between Priceline and consumers who use its "Name Your Own Price" service to reserve hotel accommodations, they could not plausibly claim that Priceline breached an agent's fiduciary duty in failing to apprise consumers that it might have procured the accommodations at costs lower than their bids, retaining the difference as profits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Johnson v. Priceline.com, Inc." on Justia Law

These appeals, heard in tandem, challenged two separate judgments entered in the district court in favor of TD Bank and Capital One, respectively, dismissing plaintiffs' claims that the banks violated Article 52 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), as amended by the Exempt Income Protection Act (EIPA), 2008 N.Y. Laws Ch. 575. Plaintiffs, as judgment debtors, alleged that the banks failed to provide them with certain required notices and forms, restrained their accounts, and assessed them fees, all in violation of the EIPA. Because these appeals presented unresolved questions of law, the court reserved decision and certified the issues to the New York State Court of Appeals. View "Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Universal successfully defended a lawsuit brought by a group of cotton farmers in Arkansas state court for damages arising from off-target aerial application of the herbicide known as 2,4-D Amine. Universal then sued several aerial herbicide applicators (collectively, Crop Dusters) who were not parties to the cotton farmers' litigation, seeking to recover its attorney's fees incurred during the cotton farmers' litigation. Because the Crop Dusters owed no duty to Universal, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Universal's negligence claim. The court affirmed the dismissal of Universal's Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ark. Code Ann. 4-88-107(a), claim where the alleged conduct failed to fit within the scope of the unconscionable trade practices prohibited by the ADTPA. Because the Arkansas Supreme Court most recently has rejected any cause of action against a third party for attorney's fees incurred in earlier litigation against another party, and in this case there was no duty running from the third party to the plaintiff that would support such a cause of action in any event, the court affirmed the dismissal of Universal's claims based on the third-party-litigation exception to the American Rule and Restatement (Second) of Torts section 914(2). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Universal's complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Universal Cooperatives, Inc., et al v. AAC Flying Service, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of the alleged exposure of Plaintiff to lead paint at the homes in which she spent her childhood. Petitioner, by her mother, sued the owners of two of the homes, for negligence and unfair trade practices under the Consumer Protection Act. Only the claims against the second owner proceeded to trial. The circuit court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendant after excluding proposed expert opinion testimony of a pediatrician to establish Defendant's building as the source of Plaintiff's lead exposure and elevated blood lead levels. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the proposed expert testimony; but (2) summary judgment in this case was not appropriate, as disputes of material fact existed to foreclose a grant of summary judgment. View "Ross v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore City" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and received medical treatment at Benefis Health System, Inc. Plaintiff had healthcare coverage as a TRICARE beneficiary and also had medical payments coverage through his insurance carrier, Kemper. Plaintiff's medical treatment costs totaled $2,073. Benefis accepted $662 from TRICARE as payment in full satisfaction of the bill pursuant to a preferred provider agreement (PPA) between Blue Cross Blue Shield and Benefis. Benefis subsequently received $1,866 from Kemper, upon which Benefis reimbursed TRICARE's payment in full. Plaintiff filed an individual and class action complaint, claiming that he was entitled to the additional $1,204 that Benefis received from Kemper over and above the TRICARE reimbursement rate. Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asking the district court to find Benefis breached its contract with TRICARE and that Benefis was liable for Plaintiff's damages. The district court converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding (1) Plaintiff was not entitled to pocket the difference between the TRICARE reimbursement rate and the amount Benefis accepted from Kemper; and (2) Plaintiff failed to establish any damages that resulted from the alleged breach. View "Conway v. Benefis Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff submitted an online application for a payday loan with Geneva-Roth Ventures, which charged Plaintiff an interest rate of 780 percent APR. The loan agreement contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiff entered into the contract over the Internet and did not separately sign or initial the arbitration clause. Plaintiff brought a putative class action against Geneva-Roth for charging an interest rate higher than the thirty-six percent APR permitted by the Montana Consumer Loan act for payday loans. Geneva-Roth filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the loan agreement. The district court denied the motion, determining that the arbitration clause was unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration clause qualified as a contract of adhesion and fell outside Plaintiff's reasonable expectations. Therefore, the arbitration clause was unconscionable. View "Kelker v. Geneva-Roth Ventures, Inc." on Justia Law