Justia Consumer Law Opinion Summaries

Employees of Michaels Stores, Inc. request and record customers' zip codes in processing credit card transactions. Plaintiff, a customer of Michaels, filed an action on behalf of herself and a putative class of Michaels customers in the federal district court, alleging that Michaels unlawfully writes customers' personal identification information on credit card transaction forms in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, 105(a) (the statute). The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of state law and held (1) a zip code constitutes personal identification information for purposes of the statute; (2) a plaintiff may bring an action for violation of the statute absent identity fraud; and (3) the term "credit card transaction form" in the statute refers equally to electronic and paper transaction forms. View "Tyler v. Michael Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1996, Terri Cole and her husband financed the purchase of a home through a loan secured by a deed of trust on the home and the underlying property. In 2005, Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. became the servicer of the loan. Code defaulted on her loan in 2010. Vanderbilt foreclosed and purchased the home and real property at a trustee's sale. Thereafter, Cole refused to vacate the home. Vanderbilt filed an unlawful detainer action. Cole counterclaimed, alleging that Vanderbilt had violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA). Regarding the unlawful detainer claim, the circuit court found in favor of Vanderbilt. As to the remaining issues, the jury found Vanderbilt engaged in several violations of the WVCCPA. The circuit court subsequently awarded civil penalties to Cole totaling $32,125, and, some weeks later, granted Cole's motion for attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's civil penalties order and award of attorney fees, holding that the circuit court did not commit error with regard to either the civil penalties order or the attorney fees order. View "Vanderbilt Mortgage & Fin., Inc. v. Cole" on Justia Law

BIC, which has its principal place of business in New Jersey, distributed machines manufactured by BIL, BIC’s parent entity located in Japan. In 2001 BIC began distributing the Brother 3220C, a printer, fax machine, scanner and copier, accompanied by a Limited Warranty and User Manual drafted by BIL in Japan and translated by BIC. Huryk alleges that from 2002 to 2005, BIC and its executives in New Jersey, knew about but concealed information regarding defects in the 3220C that caused printer heads to fail and caused the machines to purge excess amounts of ink when not used frequently enough. The district court dismissed his putative class action claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. 56:8 on the ground that South Carolina law, not New Jersey law, applied. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that South Carolina was the place where Huryk acted in reliance upon BIC’s representations, the place where Huryk, a domiciliary of South Carolina, received the representations, and the place where a tangible thing which is the subject of the transaction between the parties was situated at the time. View "Maniscalco v. Brother Int'l Corp." on Justia Law

Gladys Garner and Randolph Scott defaulted on their respective automobile loan agreements. Both contracts were governed by the provisions of the Creditor Grantor Closed End Credit Act of the Commercial Law Article (CLEC). The contracts were later assigned to Ally Financial, Inc., Nuvell National Auto Finance, and Nuvell Financial Services (collectively, GMAC). GMAC repossessed both vehicles and informed the debtors that the vehicles would be sold at a "public auction." Both cars were later sold. The debtors filed separate complaints against GMAC alleging, in part, that GMAC violated the CLEC because the sales of their cars were in reality "private sales," requiring GMAC to provide a detailed post-sale disclosure to them under the CLEC, which GMAC had not done. The federal district court combined the cases and granted summary judgment for GMAC, concluding the sales were "public auctions" because they were both widely advertised and open to the public for competitive bidding. The federal appellate court then certified an issue for clarification to the Maryland Court of Appeals. The Court answered that the auctions were in reality "private sales" because attendance was limited to those who paid a refundable $1,000 cash deposit. View "Gardner v. Ally Fin., Inc." on Justia Law

HRRG is in the business of acquiring or collecting debts under the FDCPAs definition of a “debt collector,” 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6), and sent Caprio a double-sided “Collection Letter.” Caprio filed a putative class action, alleging two claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, claiming that the letter’s instructions would confuse “the least sophisticated consumer” about how to dispute the alleged debt. The district court granted Caprio judgment on the pleadings. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding that the collection letter was deceptive because it can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate. View "Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant requested her medical records from a medical clinic. Pursuant to its contract with Appellant's medical care provider, Healthport, Inc., a private company that fulfills such requests for medical records, obtained and sold Appellant the copies of her requested medical records. Healthport collected sales tax on charges for services rendered in retrieving and copying the medical records. Appellant subsequently filed a class-action complaint against Healthport for violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), unjust enrichment, and a declaratory judgment that Healthport illegally collected the sales tax. Healthport impleaded the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DF&A) by filing a counterclaim and a third-party complaint seeking declaratory judgment on whether the State's tax statutes require the collection of sales tax on labor and copy charges associated with the production of medical records. The circuit court granted Healthport's and DF&A's motions for summary judgment, finding that sales tax applied to the sale of copies of medical records and that this conclusion rendered Appellant's additional claims moot. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal without prejudice for lack of a proper Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certificate, as the circuit court's Rule 54(b) certificate failed to comply with Rule 54(b). View "Holbrook v. Healthport, Inc." on Justia Law

Johnny Washington and his son were traveling in their 1994 Ford Explorer when their vehicle was struck by a driver (Karah Williams) who had run a stop sign. The Explorer rolled over twice, fatally injuring Johnny. Paulette Washington, individually and as administratrix of Johnny's estate, filed a complaint against Ford Motor Company for negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, and breach of warranties. The jury returned a verdict finding that Ford and Williams, in equal measure, had been the proximate cause of Johnny's death. The jury awarded $4,652,125 in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive damages. Ford appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the judgment was not final because it did not set forth a specific dollar amount owed by Ford. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Massachusetts residents, bought a three-dwelling in Massachusetts, financing the entire purchase price with two mortgage loans from Plaza Home Mortgage (Plaza). After the collapse of the housing market, Plaintiffs sued Plaza, alleging state common law and statutory violations in making the loans. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' claim based on Plaza's alleged violation of the Massachusetts covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) Plaintiffs' claim based on a violation of the Massachusetts consumer protection was correctly dismissed as time-barred. View "Latson v. Plaza Home Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mark Case appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to defendant St. Mary's Bank and denied his cross-motion for summary judgment on his claims that the bank engaged in trespass and violated state law and the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The matter arose from the bank's foreclosure on property Plaintiff leased from his landlord, Jean Marcelin. Months before the foreclosure sale, pipes burst in an apartment above plaintiff's, causing a flood. The City of Manchester turned off water and electricity to the building. Plaintiff spoke about the problem to Marcelin, who denied that he still owned the property. Plaintiff then spoke about the problem to a Bank representative; the representative asked plaintiff to allow her, a plumber, and an electrician into the building. The plaintiff complied with this request. The City placed a legal notice on the property’s front door, stating that it was unsafe and prohibiting occupancy. Plaintiff had not resided at the property since the flood, though most of his possessions remained at the property. When the Bank allowed him access to the apartment to remove his possessions, plaintiff observed that his apartment door was "wide open" and subsequently alleged that many of his possessions were missing. Finding no error with the superior court order, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision. View "Case v. St. Mary's Bank " on Justia Law

Marx alleged that GRC violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by harassing and falsely threatening her in order to collect on a debt. The district court ruled against Marx and awarded GRC costs under FRCP 54(d)(1), which gives courts discretion to award costs to prevailing defendants unless "a federal statute ... provides otherwise." Marx unsuccessfully argued that the court’s discretion under Rule 54(d)(1) was displaced by the FDCPA provision, 15 U.S.C. 1692k(a)(3), which provides that “[o]n a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.” The Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. Section 1692k(a)(3) is not contrary to, and does not displace district court discretion to award costs under, Rule 54(d)(1); its allowance of costs does not create a negative implication that costs are unavailable in any other circumstances. The context of the statute indicates that Congress was simply confirming a background presumption that courts may award to defendants attorney’s fees and costs when the plaintiff brings an action in bad faith. Because Marx did not bring this suit in bad faith, the specific provision is not applicable. View "Marx v. General Revenue Corp." on Justia Law